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Summary: 
This thesis provides a critique on the law of self-defence in England and Wales. It 
demonstrates the general justifiability of the defence, while challenging recent 
legislative amendments that expand its scope for householders. Location has 
developed as a key variable in cases of self-defence, with greater rights of protection 
ascribed to householders defending against intruders than is permitted in other 
situations. The reasons behind this increased protection are criticised, and it is argued 
that it is more appropriate to apply the same standard of self-defence regardless of the 
location of the attack. The research also explores the complex relationship existing 
between the criminal law defence of self-defence and crimes involving offensive 
weapons in the law of England and Wales. It demonstrates that the law has developed 
in a contradictory and confusing manner. While self-defence may provide a defence 
to the infliction of injury to an aggressor, it is unlikely to justify the initial criminal act 
of carrying an offensive weapon or bladed article in a public place. The reasons for 
carrying weapons are examined, and it is submitted that in addition to legal attempts 
to deter and punish possession, proactive initiatives targeted at the community level 
are required. This is a matter of balancing competing harms, namely, harms to the 
individual against a risk of harm to society. It is argued that the law has developed 
appropriate methods for addressing the harms involved in self-defence through 
application of the reasonable force test. The thesis also highlights the role of the 
media in shaping public perception of the defence and offences discussed. It also 
demonstrates the relevance of emotions, primarily fear, and argues for an increased 
consideration of the power of fear to influence an individual’s defensive force, and 
decision to carry a weapon for protection where appropriate. 
 
 
 
 4 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has helped me along my 
journey in writing this thesis. The path has been much like Welsh country roads, long, 
full of twists and turns, and with several potholes to navigate. There are many people 
without whom it simply would not have been possible for me to persevere. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Glenys Williams and Dr Anèl Marais for 
their support, feedback, advice, honesty, and generosity with their time. Special 
thanks is owed to Dr Glenys Williams for asking me in my final year of 
undergraduate study whether I had ever considered studying for a PhD. I had not, and 
had she not opened the door to me, I might never have undertaken this research. I was 
recently told that a PhD supervisor is known as ‘Doktormutter’ in German, meaning 
‘doctor mother’ - a better term could not be found for the tremendous guidance she 
has shown me. Diolch yn fawr. 
 
I am also very grateful to my funders, the Coleg Cymraeg Cenedlaethol for making it 
possible for me to pursue this research. The Coleg and its passionate staff have 
offered far more than financial support; they have provided valuable training 
opportunities, forums for discussion and exchanging ideas, and created a vibrant 
Welsh medium research community across Wales. I am proud to be a part of the 
Coleg’s vision and programme to enhance the provision of Welsh medium higher 
education, and feel privileged to have received one of their postgraduate scholarships 
and lecturing posts.  
 
I would also like to thank all my colleagues at the Department of Law and 
Criminology, Aberystwyth University, for their lively discussions on my research 
during staff research seminars, and their general collegiality and approachability. I 
would also like to thank my closest friends who have been very understanding of my 
work related antisocial behaviour. 
 
A lifetime worth of thanks goes to my family. They have supported my aspirations, 
believed in me, and pushed me to strive for higher goals throughout my life. I would 
not have been able to reach where I am today without my parents, sister, 
grandparents, auntie, my beautiful nieces, and not to forget Alffi the dog. Words alone 
are not enough to express my gratitude for all that they have done for me, and for all 
their encouragement and assistance while writing this thesis. Diolch o waelod calon. 
 
And last, but certainly not least, my boyfriend and best friend, Udara. Thank you for 
your patience – I know I have not been an easy person to live with! Thank you for 
your constant support, and for driving me onwards when the path was uncertain, and 
for pointing me back in the right direction when I was losing my way. Thank you for 
being there and for sharing this journey with me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Title           1 
Declarations          2 
Summary          3 
Acknowledgements         4 
Table of Contents         5 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION       9 
 
1. Introduction         9 
1.1 The aims of the research and the original contribution    11 
1.2 The essence and scope of the research      14 
1.3 Methodology          17 
1.4 Preliminary explanations        22 
1.4.1 Death as the ultimate harm and lesser harms    22 
1.4.2 Justification and Excuse      25 
1.5 The structure of the thesis and outline of chapters    29 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: SELF-DEFENCE – THE ‘GENERAL’ POSITION    32 
 
2. Introduction           32 
2.1 The law of self-defence        33 
2.1.1 The criteria to be met in cases of self-defence    38 
2.1.1(a) Necessity – Imminence     39 
2.1.1(b) Necessity – Retreat      47 
2.1.1(b)(i) Mistake      52 
2.1.1(b)(ii) Lawful Purpose     54 
2.1.1(c) Proportionality - Reasonable Force    56 
2.2 Theories that Justify Self-defence      60 
2.2.1 Rights and forfeiture theory      62 
2.2.2 Natural Law        71 
2.2.3 Consequentialism       78 
2.2.4 Forced Choice        82 
2.2.5 Double Effect        85 
2.2.6 Autonomy        87 
2.2.7 Which theory?        90 
2.3 Reasonable person test and individual characteristics      91 
2.4 The distinction between culpable and innocent aggressors   97 
2.5 Conclusion                   100 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND BLADED ARTICLES 102  
 
3. Introduction         102 
3.1 The research context        103 
 3.1.1 The situation according to the statistics    107 
 6 
 3.1.2 The problematic case of identifying weapons offences  112 
3.2 The Law - prohibited weapons       116 
 3.2.1 The Prevention of Crime Act 1953     119 
3.2.2 The Criminal Justice Act 1988               121 
 3.2.3 Emphasising the objectives of the legislation    123 
 3.2.4 Harm and offensive weapons      126 
3.3 The Nature of the weapon       130 
3.4 Statutory defences – ‘reasonable excuse’ and ‘good reason’   134 
 3.4.1 Imminence and the importance of the circumstances   136 
3.4.2 The relevance of self-defence to the statutory defences           144 
3.5 Offensive weapons, bladed articles and self-defence    147 
3.5.1 Self-generated self-defence               153 
3.6 Legal and non-legal proposals                156 
3.6.1 The legal proposal                156 
 3.6.2 The non-legal proposal       158 
3.7 Initiatives directed at preventing and restricting the carrying    158 
   of offensive weapons 
3.8 Conclusion         164 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: SELF-DEFENCE – THE ‘HOUSEHOLDER’ POSITION      169 
 
4. Introduction         169 
4.1 The current position of the law       170 
 4.1.1 The application and scope of the new test for     171 
      self-defence in the home 
 4.1.2 Tracing the road to law reform     179 
4.2 The debate on the Crime and Courts Bill     180 
4.2.1 Arguments supporting the change to the     187 
    ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test 
  4.2.1(a) The intruder has caused the need for self-defence  187 
4.2.1(b) Providing increased protection to the public by   188 
       increasing the ‘comfort zone’ before legal intervention 
  4.2.1(c) The uncertainty of ‘reasonable force’   190 
4.2.1(d) Weak standards of self-defence result in             191 
      increased crime rates 
4.2.1(e) Previous prosecutions of householders            193 
4.2.2 Arguments opposing the change to the ‘grossly    195 
     disproportionate force’ test 
4.2.2(a) Possible incompatibility with the European            195  
       Convention of Human Rights 
4.2.2(b) The lack of justification for the amendment            197 
4.2.2(c) Creating confusion not clarity             200 
4.2.2(d) Creating a risk of vigilantism and the irony of            202 
       increasing the dangers faced by householders 
4.2.2(e) Leaving the door ajar for revenge             203 
4.2.2(f) Politics, public perception and the lack of            204  
      understanding of the law 
4.3 Location and its relation to weapons      207 
 4.3.1 Interpreting public place in weapons offences    209 
 7 
 4.3.2 The private place approach      211 
 4.3.3 The infamous case of Anthony Martin     213 
 4.3.4 Householders, intruders, and weapons - restricting revenge  215 
 4.3.5 Cases where no prosecutions occurred    216 
4.4 Conclusion                  217 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: LOCATION        220 
 
5. Introduction         220 
5.1 Theories about the home        221 
  5.1.1 Dimensions of place and space     221 
  5.1.1(a) What is the meaning of ‘space’ and ‘place’?  222 
  5.1.2 Attachment, meanings and identity     226 
  5.1.3 Castle doctrine        229 
  5.1.4 Autonomy and privacy       233 
 5.1.5 The ‘fear factor’ in home invasions     236 
 5.1.6 The defence of property      239 
 5.1.7 Burglary        243 
5.2 Understanding the law in context      247 
  5.2.1 Fear of crime        247 
 5.2.2 Environmental Criminology      251  
  5.2.2(a) Opportunism       254 
  5.2.3 Young people and public places     255 
  5.2.4 Moral luck        258 
  5.2.4(a) Luck in one’s person and luck in one’s circumstances 259 
  5.2.4(b) The causes and effects of action    263 
5.3 Conclusion         265 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: EMOTIONS AND THE MEDIA     267 
 
6. Introduction         267 
6.1 Emotions          267 
 6.1.1 Overview of the role of emotions in criminal law   268 
 6.1.2 Mechanistic and evaluative conceptions of emotions   269 
 6.1.3 Responses that result from emotions     272 
 6.1.4 Fear and self-defence       275 
 6.1.5 Emotions and offensive weapons     280 
 6.1.6 Emotional excuses: duress and loss of control   283 
 6.1.7 Guilt and inchoate offences      287 
 6.1.8 Closing remarks on emotion      294 
6.2 The media          296 
 6.2.1 Fascination with crime       299 
 6.2.2 Techniques used by the media      301 
 6.2.3 The impact of media reporting      305 
 6.2.4 Media representations of knife crime     311 
 6.2.5 Self-defence and the media      316 
6.3 Conclusion         319 
 
 8 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION       321 
 
7. Final conclusion         321 
7.1 The scope of self-defence as a defence to weapons offences   321 
7.2 Location as a distinct variable in the law     323 
7.3 Closing Observations                 326 
 
 
Bibliography                   328 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘uplifted knife’ derives from the US case of Brown, where it was stated that 
‘Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife’.1 This 
phrase reflects the intertwining of a criminal law defence, self-defence, with the 
criminal offence of weapon possession or use. It is an apt illustration of the focus of 
this research enquiry, and the title ‘The uplifted knife: exploring the boundaries of 
self-defence’ conveys the principal aims of this thesis. The central themes under 
consideration are the extent to which self-defence provides a defence to weapons 
offences, and the reasons why location is treated as a distinct variable according to the 
law. 
 
The thesis analyses the scope of self-defence, with a particular focus upon the 
possession and use of weapons. However, the thesis goes further than this in assessing 
how far the defence extends, considering the impact of location, the concept of harm, 
media representations, and the relevance of emotion. It is an ambitious project that 
spans several disciplines. While its home discipline is naturally law, it ventures into 
the terrains of criminology, sociology, policy, and at times science. This decision was 
based on the belief that any study of law must engage with the broader context within 
which it operates, rather than in a vacuum.
2
 This is especially true in relation to the 
subject matter. Self-defence is a subject of social relevance, as is the phenomenon of 
carrying weapons. To conduct this study without approaching the field of criminology 
would have been to set out into darkness. Touching upon these various disciplines has 
allowed a fuller insight into the complex relationship between self-defence and 
weapons, and the reasons why people carry items with them in case of attack. 
 
It is necessary to provide a definition of the term ‘weapon’ as it is applied in this 
study. While the title refers to the ‘uplifted knife’, much of the discussions that follow 
will also have relevance to other types of weapons. In broad terms, a weapon may be 
                                                        
1
 Brown v United States 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
2
 This pertains to the socio-legal research tradition, although elements of the research enquiry also 
require application of the doctrinal approach. The methodology employed in this thesis will be 
explained at section 1.3 of the present chapter. 
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defined as any article which may be used offensively, in a threatening manner, or to 
cause harm to others. This is probably the widest interpretation that may be ascribed 
to the term, as it is not limited to articles that have been specifically created in order 
cause harm or facilitate an assault, such as firearms. This definition essentially covers 
most objects, as it could extend to furniture; decorative items (such as flower vases); 
kitchen, gardening or DIY appliances; as well as to certain types of animals (for 
example, dangerous dogs). The dictionary definition describes a weapon as being ‘an 
object or instrument used in fighting … anything that serves to outwit or get the better 
of an opponent’.3 This illustrates that one of the core features of a weapon is the 
additional power or strength that it gives to its user and this is reflected to an extent 
within the legal approach to weapons.  
 
The law of England and Wales categories different weapons based on their nature, 
purpose and the risk of danger that they pose, providing detailed definitions of what 
falls within each category. For example, there are distinct offences of selling, 
manufacturing, possessing and using prohibited weapons to uphold the aim of 
safeguarding the public. Examples of the different categories of weapons include 
firearms, offensive weapons and articles with blades or sharp points.
4
 While the 
breadth of the term ‘weapon’ is acknowledged, this thesis concentrates on a narrower 
category of weapons than the literal meaning of the term. This decision was taken for 
the purpose of assessing the legal approach and effectiveness of the law, and to 
facilitate the exploration of the connection with the defence of self-defence. It was 
therefore necessary to limit the consideration to two main legal classes of weapons, 
namely, offensive weapons and articles with blades or sharp points.
5
 These categories 
of offences are distinct yet closely related, and a comparison of their interpretation 
and scope provides the foundation for this enquiry. Furthermore, in relation to the 
examination of the reasons behind weapons possession in public places and in order 
to gain insight into the social context, the consideration is focused upon the 
possession of knives as a specific example. 
 
                                                        
3
 J.Butterfield et al. (eds), Collins English Dictionary: Complete and Unabridged, (6th ed, 
HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 2003), at 1818. 
4
 For a discussion of these classifications and different types of weapons, see section 3.2. 
5
 As will be seen in Chapter 3, these offences are set out in section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 
1953, and section 139 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 1988 respectively. 
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The reason for selecting knives and sharp instruments as a focal point is due to the 
higher incidence of crime involving such weapons in England and Wales than other 
types of weapons, and their easily accessible nature.
6
 This does not by any means 
suggest that other weapons are not used offensively or defensively. The law in 
relation to offensive weapons and articles with blades or sharp points is examined in 
Chapter 3, as this is how the law has developed to define these objects. As mentioned, 
knives are the principal type of weapon considered with regard to examining the 
reasons behind possession and are discussed as a form of case study. However, many 
cases that have reached the courts where self-defence has been raised as a defence 
involve the use of various types of weapons, and are not limited to knives. The 
weapons used in these cases are discussed as and when they arise, which means that 
the relationship between the defence and weapons offences has a wider reach beyond 
the focus on knives.  
 
As is discussed in Chapter 3,
7
 the nature of a weapon and the gravity of harm that it is 
capable of inflicting, could influence whether or not the force used was reasonable in 
the circumstances, and consequently impact whether or not self-defence will provide 
a defence to the use of the article. While the dangerous nature of a weapon is certainly 
a factor for consideration, the use of a particularly dangerous item will not 
automatically bar a plea of self-defence, but may pose a higher obstacle in the form of 
proving ‘reasonable force’.  This shows the importance of context for self-defence, as 
it is not merely the nature of the weapon that is instructive, but also the manner and 
circumstances in which it is used. 
 
1.1 The aims of the research and the original contribution 
 
The core of this study is the exploration of the reasons why self-defence is a 
permissible action, and the examination of various problematic circumstances. It is a 
common misconception that self-protection provides a good reason for possessing 
weapons, and this can present problems for individuals acting out of fear. There exists 
a need for increased public awareness and understanding of the law in this regard, and 
the thesis builds upon the existing material within the field to achieve this goal.  
                                                        
6
 For further discussion of this, see section 3.1.2. 
7
 See section 3.3 for a consideration on the relevance of the nature of the weapon. 
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The research assesses the present position of the law, and critically explores its depth 
and breadth. The thesis appreciates various modes of social change and the power of 
public opinion, for example the influence of media representations in shaping public 
perception of crimes involving weapons, as well as the defence of self-defence. The 
original contribution of the thesis is made by way of a three-part claim. First, the 
exploration of the relationship between self-defence and weapons offences; second, 
the enquiry into the location based distinctions drawn within the law of self-defence; 
and third, the variety of different aspects and perspectives that have been combined in 
order to address the central themes of the thesis.  
 
With regard to the first claim, many studies have discussed self-defence with regard 
to its potential and its limitations as a defence for the use of lethal force.
8
 There has 
been much discussion in relation to its justificatory theories and hypothetical 
scenarios.
9
 This thesis revisits these previous discussions in the literature within the 
context of the research, as they are necessary considerations for any study on self-
defence to acknowledge. However, proving or disproving the relevance of these 
theories is not the primary aim of this research. Rather, the thesis focuses on a 
different enquiry, and one that has been underexplored. The literature on the 
relationship between self-defence and weapons offences is sparse
10
 but the subject 
raises important questions about the connection between the defence and this specific 
category of offences.  
 
As already mentioned, the dynamic between self-defence and weapons offences is 
one of the central themes of this study and it is also one of the main claims of 
originality. The thesis considers this relationship in detail, highlighting the 
complications that exist in this area of law, and considering the need for greater 
clarity on the defences that should apply and the permissibility of assessing fear 
                                                        
8
 For example, F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006); and 
S.Uniacke Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1994). 
9
 For example, see J.J.Thomson ‘Self-Defense’ (1991) 20(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 283. 
10
 However, see Lanham’s article for a direct exploration of this relationship: D.Lanham ‘Offensive 
Weapons and Self-defence’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 85. 
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within the construction of a defence.
11
 The thesis highlights in particular the apparent 
disconnect between weapons offences and self-defence. This can be stated as an 
uncertain area within the law, with conflicting interpretations arising from the case 
law on the suitability of the defence for such offences. The thesis therefore offers an 
original contribution in its combination of the exploration of self-defence and 
offensive weapons alongside each other. 
 
The second claim relates to the amendments made by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 
in respect of the creation of a ‘householder’ form of self-defence. The law will be 
clarified in Chapter 2, (which assesses the general position), and Chapter 4 (which 
explains the householder provision). The thesis is critical of the disparity between 
locations in self-defence, namely the different approaches applied depending on 
whether a person is in a public place or in a private dwelling. As the law has recently 
been changed to permit greater protection for householders, the research traces and 
questions this change, analysing the implications in connection with the proposed 
reasons for reform.  
 
As this distinction is a relatively new feature of the law, this change is an emerging 
field of academic discussion,
12
 especially with regard to the element of location. This 
is the other central theme of this research and is a significant part of the original 
contribution made by the study. The thesis looks beyond the discipline of law in order 
to understand deeper sociological and criminological aspects of location, to question 
the very fabric of the home and what in particular separates perceptions of public and 
private places. This research adds an interesting dimension to the legal debate as it 
considers individual and social constructs of home, and the emotional attachments 
that are formed towards one’s home and their power to influence behaviour, and 
connects these considerations to the law of self-defence and weapons offences.
13
          
                                                        
11
 See Chapter 3 for discussion. The law in relation to offensive weapons and bladed articles is 
explained at section 3.2, while the specific statutory defences of reasonable excuse and good reason are 
set out at section 3.4. 
12
 L.Bleasdale-Hill ‘“Our Home is Our Haven and Refuge – a Place Where we Have Every Right to 
Feel Safe”: Justifying the Use of up to “Grossly Disproportionate Force” in a Place of Residence’ 
(2015) Criminal Law Review 407; S.Miller ‘Grossly Disproportionate’: Home Owners’ Legal License 
to Kill’ (2013) 77(4) The Journal of Criminal Law 299; and C.Elliott ‘Interpreting the Contours of 
Self-defence within the Boundaries of the Rule of Law, the Common Law and Human Rights’ (2015) 
The Journal of Criminal Law 330. 
13
 See Chapter 5. 
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The third and final claim of originality is made in relation to the diversity of the 
research. The thesis contributes to the existing literature by extending the study into 
other fields, and draws connections that have not been analysed alongside each other 
in previous studies. This is evident in the attention paid to the importance of location, 
the relevance of emotions, and the role of the media within the political framework 
for legislative change in this field. Despite the perhaps intrinsic connection of fear to 
self-defence, the emotion is not an essential feature of the defence. Similarly, as fear 
is an important motivator for weapons possession,
14
 it was considered necessary to 
study emotions in more detail to improve the approach and inform the perspective of 
this research. The same is true with regard to the relevance of the media, as media 
representations can be said to influence the public perception regarding the scope of 
self-defence and the gravity of weapons offences. Again this is a novel enquiry, as the 
relevance of broader social engagement with the defence, offences, and the role of the 
media, has not been explored in this way. This medley of topics makes this thesis 
original, and sets it apart from the existing literature in the field. 
 
1.2 The essence and scope of the research  
 
Many elements arise when considering the scope of self-defence, and this thesis 
approaches a number of challenges associated with the defence. The public 
perception, or the layman’s view of what qualifies as self-defensive action, may vary 
from those actions that are considered to constitute self-defence in the eyes of the law. 
It is a challenging subject as it inherently involves the balancing of the defender’s 
right to defend himself 
15
 against the aggressor’s own rights. Most people have a basic 
understanding of the defence and some knowledge of its principles, and even without 
being fully aware of the legal standards and requirements of the test, it is a relatively 
well-known defence.  
 
The criminal law of self-defence recognises that in certain circumstances it is 
acceptable to cause harm or even to kill another person in order to protect oneself 
                                                        
14
 This will become evident during the discussion on the subject in Chapter 3.  
15
 For the duration of this research, any reference to the masculine personal pronoun ‘him’ is intended 
also to include ‘her’, unless featuring in relation to the facts of a particular case that is examined. 
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against their aggression. This statement suggests that it is a simple, straightforward 
matter. However, the lines formulating the boundaries of the defence are not always 
clearly defined. There are many situations that present a challenge for the defence, or 
rather, for those attempting to rely on the defence. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to discuss all the various problematic contexts that have arisen. It should be noted at 
the outset that issues relating to victims of domestic abuse will not be explored in this 
study, although it is acknowledged that the topic raises important questions and a host 
of complex issues. The literature critiquing the treatment of such individuals and the 
obstacles that the tests of self-defence present to them is extensive, and has been a 
topic of debate for many years.
16
  As this research is primarily focused upon the 
central themes of self-defence as a defence to weapons offences and the different 
approaches to location, this particular issue falls outside the scope of the present 
study. 
 
Accordingly, the complex relationship between the right to self-defence and the legal 
prohibition in England and Wales on carrying offensive weapons is one of the 
principal challenges explored in this thesis. This topic merits detailed attention, as 
although there is extensive literature addressing various aspects of self-defence, few 
have explored the connection with offensive weapons - though it is often referred to 
in passing. Most people would accept that there is a general right to self-defence in 
the law of England and Wales, but this right becomes questionable when weapons are 
                                                        
16
 Examples of the academic debates on this topic include: F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence op cit fn 8 
at 89-93; S.S.M.Edwards ‘Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self-defence – the Law 
Commission’s Options for Reform’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 181, at 181; D.Ormerod Smith and 
Hogan’s Criminal Law, (13th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), at 390-391; 
S.S.M.Edwards ‘Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control’ (2010) 74 The 
Journal of Criminal Law 223, at 241; O.Bakircioglu ‘The Contours of the Right to Self-defence: Is the 
Requirement of Imminence Merely a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?’ (2008) 72 The Journal 
of Criminal Law 131, at 131 and 164; J.Dressler ‘Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping 
Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters’ in 
S.Shute & A.P.Simester Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002), at 261; C.L.Carpenter ‘Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
defense’, (2003) 86(4) Marquette Law Review 653, at 657; M.A.Franks ‘Real Men Advance, Real 
Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women's Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege’ 
(2013-2014) 68 University of Miami Law Review 1099; J.Herring ‘The Meaning of Domestic Violence: 
Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3’ (2011) 33(3) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law 297; A.D.Brosius ‘An Iowa Law in Need of Imminent Change: Redefining the Temporal 
Proximity of Force to Account for Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Who Kill in Non-
Confrontational Self-Defense’ (2014-2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 775; S.S.M.Edwards ‘Loss of Self-
Control: When His Anger is Worth More than Her Fear’ in A.Reed & M.Bohlander (eds) Loss of 
Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic Comparative and International Perspectives, 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Surrey, 2011). 
 16 
involved, and the matter may be described as a grey area of law. Usually, as self-
defence is a morally permissible act, it is not considered wrong to act defensively and 
perhaps injuring another for the purpose of self-preservation. However, when an 
individual possesses an offensive weapon in case of attack, the line between right and 
wrong is less clear. 
 
Thus, the research explores the difference between the accepted exception to the rules 
of morality and criminal law, that of self-defence, and the more contentious act of 
armouring oneself with a weapon in order to use it in self-defence if the situation 
arises.
17
 Situations of self-defence are contrary to the normal perception of violence as 
immoral and unacceptable. It is perfectly normal and embedded in human nature, 
reason and reaction, to attempt to protect oneself against harm. However, the 
possession and use of offensive weapons for defensive purposes adds an interesting 
dimension to this research, as this aspect creates further uncertainties regarding what 
should be considered permissible acts of self-defence.  
 
The law relating to offensive weapons has changed over the years and England and 
Wales employ a strict approach to such offences.
18
 The carrying of weapons is a 
subject that divides opinion, and there is significant disparity between different 
jurisdictions worldwide. There is no general standard that may be expected, neither is 
there a universally agreed approach to the issue of weapons possession.
19
 On the 
contrary, there is a universally acknowledged principle that self-defence may provide 
protection from criminal liability even when the aggressor’s life has been taken.20 A 
basic explanation of the defence is offered by Paterson, who states that ‘the life of a 
person is always held inviolable unless the person, either now or prospectively, is 
posing a deadly or gravely injurious threat to others. Actions that seek to repel or 
stop such threats may be classified as actions of self-defence’.21 Various theories have 
                                                        
17
 This involves a degree of preparation, which is problematic as it suggests that the defender had time 
for foresight and the potential to avoid the threat. This is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
18
 A.Ashworth & J.Horder Principles of Criminal Law, (7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013), at 333. 
19
 For example, as will become evident, the approach in the USA is significantly different to that in 
operation in England and Wales. See A.Ashworth ‘Editorial: Firearms and Justice’ (2013) 6 Criminal 
Law Review 447, at 447. 
20
 F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence op cit fn 8 at 1. 
21
 C.Paterson Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia; A Natural Law Ethics Approach, (Ashgate Publishing, 
Hampshire, 2008), at 84. 
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been advanced as justifications for this state of affairs and their merits and 
applicability will be explored in Chapter 2.
22
  
 
As will become evident, in terms of the theoretical framework of the research, 
different theories have been explored as and when appropriate rather than relying on 
one single conceptual framework throughout the thesis. As Westerman notes ‘the 
legal system performs this double function of both subject-matter and theoretical 
framework’. 23  It is therefore necessary to set out the methodology used in this 
research to address the aims of the thesis. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
Due to the broad remit of the research, the methodology has been varied and does not 
fit neatly into a single category of legal research. Rather, it can be said to draw upon 
different methods of conducting legal research, with aspects of the research requiring 
a doctrinal approach while the thesis substantially adopts a socio-legal perspective. 
 
Legal research is often categorised as being doctrinal or non-doctrinal. The doctrinal 
approach tends to involve the analysis of statutes and judicial decisions, and is 
primarily library based. While the non-doctrinal approach focuses on law reform, 
identifying problems with the law, legal theory, or policy,
24
 to gain deeper 
understanding of legal concepts within the broader context in which they operate. 
 
The doctrinal approach is often referred to as ‘black-letter law’ 25  and primarily 
involves the collection of primary sources of law as well as secondary sources. This 
method is adopted in this research as a starting point. The primary sources considered 
are the relevant statutes and case law relating to self-defence and weapons offences. 
These materials enable an interpretation of the current legal position to be reached. As 
Hutchinson states: ‘Doctrinal legal research lies at the heart of any lawyer’s task 
                                                        
22
 See section 2.2. 
23
 P.Westerman ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the 
Debate on Law’ in M.Van Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Method for 
What Kind of Discipline?, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011), at 87. 
24
 I.Dobinson & F.Johns ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in M.McConville & W.H.Chui (eds) Research 
Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007), at 19. 
25
 M.McConville & W.H.Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2007), at 1. 
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because it is the research process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content 
of law’.26 This is a necessary step in the investigation as the law must be clearly 
located and defined before an appreciation of its appropriateness can begin. 
Additionally, the secondary sources consulted provide scope to deepen the 
understanding and analysis of the topic. The secondary sources drawn upon in this 
research are especially broad, ranging from journal articles, governmental 
publications, textbooks and monographs, to information on institutional websites and 
the news media.
27
 
 
The exploration of these sources in particular places this research within the broad 
spectrum of socio-legal research.
28
 This term encompasses many varied types of 
research methods and approaches. Employed within this research it facilitates an 
exploration of ‘law in context’29  and a discussion of the reasons behind the law 
reform proposals, questioning the necessity of reform in contrast to the need to clarify 
existing provisions, highlighting grey areas of law and critique based on the wider 
social implications and drivers of legal regulation. The research therefore 
demonstrates the connection and interdependency of doctrinal research and socio-
legal research on each other, as each method informs and improves the knowledge 
that would be gained and viewpoints projected solely by the other.
30
     
 
The methodology has included a diverse range of different sources, from traditional 
primary legal sources to academic literature across a wide range of disciplines, and 
also to non-academic materials such as newspaper articles, televised programmes, and 
websites. This was especially relevant to the understanding of the media portrayal of 
cases involving self-defence and the reporting of incidents of knife crime.
31
 
Engagement with varied resources was necessary due to the nature of the research and 
to gain a fuller picture and a deeper understanding of the context of the research. 
                                                        
26
 T.Hutchinson ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in D.Watkins & M.Burton (eds) Research 
Methods in Law, (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013), at 9. 
27
 C.Chatterjee Methods of Research in Law, (Old Bailey Press Ltd, Kent, 1997), at 23. 
28
 I.Dobinson & F.Johns ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in M.McConville & W.H.Chui (eds) Research 
Methods for Law, op cit fn 24 at 20; F.Cownie & A.Bradney ‘Socio-legal Studies: A Challenge to the 
Doctrinal Approach’ in D.Watkins & M.Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, (Routledge Abingdon, 
2013), at 35 and 47. 
29
 M.McConville & W.H.Chui (eds) Research Methods for Law, op cit fn 25, at 1. 
30
 F.Cownie & A.Bradney ‘Socio-legal Studies: A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach’, op cit fn 28 at 
47. 
31
 As can be seen in Chapters 3 and 6. 
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It may therefore be said that a qualitative approach to the analysis of documents is 
applied in this thesis. According to Walliman, qualitative research is based upon 
information that is expressed in words,
32
 as opposed to the opposite approach in 
quantitative research which has a greater numerical emphasis.
33
 Qualitative research 
tends to examine aspects of social life such as ‘the background, interests and broader 
social perceptions’34 of a specific topic. It lends itself well to research within the field 
of law and this project in particular, as it permits a research question to be formed at 
the beginning, but facilitates its evolution during the process of collection and 
analysis of data. This flexibility enables fluidity and freedom to adapt views during 
the research process as knowledge and awareness increases.
35
  
 
Qualitative methods involve the collection of texts and documents and their analysis 
and interpretation, thus the focus is upon written sources of information.
36
 This 
method is appropriate to legal research and this study as it provides an unobtrusive 
way of seeking the answers to the research questions. This method is unobtrusive as it 
entails the collection of data that is already publicly available (such as case reports; 
statutes; Parliamentary debates; and published articles), omitting the need to involve 
members of the public, or representatives of institutions personally (as there may be if 
interviews or focus groups were used as part of the data collection process). This 
research benefits from the accessibility of the type of data required for collection, 
which is a consideration for research design.
37
 Some of these resources were already 
available before the research project commenced, and through the process of 
collection, selection and interpretation, the documents become data.
38
 
 
                                                        
32
 N.Walliman Social Research Methods, (Sage Publications, London, 2006), at 124. 
33
 I.Dobinson & F.Johns ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in M.McConville & W.H.Chui (eds) Research 
Methods for Law, op cit fn 24 at 17. 
34
 A.Holliday Doing and Writing Qualitative Research, (2nd edn, Sage Publications, London, 2007), at 
5. 
35
 L.Richards Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, (2nd edn, Sage Publications, London, 
2010, at 11. 
36
 N.Walliman Social Research Methods, op cit fn 32 at 131. 
37
 C.Chatterjee Methods of Research in Law, op cit fn 27 at 17; J.Hage ‘The Method of a Truly 
Normative Legal Science’ in M.Van Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of 
Method for What Kind of Discipline?, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) at 22; and M.Burton ‘Doing 
Empirical Research: Exploring the Decision-making of Magistrates and Juries’ in D.Watkins & 
M.Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law, (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013), at 55. 
38
 L.Richards Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, op cit fn 35 at 46/47. 
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The terms that best describe this research method are textual analysis or documentary 
methods, which represent a critical approach to the analysis of documents. These 
methods involve the detailed examination of documents,
39
 and Jupp states that with 
textual analysis ‘the emphasis is less on the amount and frequency of occurrences and 
more on interpreting the meaning the document might have.’40 This refers to the view 
that these methods are to be regarded as qualitative content analysis.
41
 Rather than 
considering the frequency that a particular topic arises within the text as with 
quantitative content analysis, the focus is instead on the ideas and meanings within 
the document, and the ‘characteristics of the content’.42 This approach is well-suited 
to legal study generally, and to the aims of this research project, which is intrinsically 
concerned with the interpretation of different texts.
43
  
 
This method is easily adaptable to the analysis of legal statutes and cases as it 
provides a method for detecting how the legislator’s intentions are applied and 
interpreted in practice by the courts and within the criminal justice system. Chatterjee 
highlights that this is a method which also facilitates the analysis of materials such as 
newspapers and Parliamentary debates, which assists in reaching an understanding of 
the motivations of law reform and the messages targeted towards informing public 
perception.
44
 According to Bloor and Wood, ‘researchers who use this approach may 
use discourse analysis to examine the role of official documents and how they 
regulate society.’ 45  Discourse analysis is described as ‘a qualitative method of 
‘reading’ texts, conversations and documents which explores the connections between 
language, communication, knowledge, power and social practices,’46  focusing on 
their meaning and structure. Therefore, both textual analysis/documentary methods 
and discourse analysis are useful methods for understanding the effect and 
effectiveness of legislation relating to offensive weapons and self-defence in this 
study. This is especially pertinent when referring to court judgements in individually 
                                                        
39
 V.Jupp The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, (Sage Publications, London, 2006), at 79. 
40
 ibid, at 80. 
41
 A.Bryman Social Research Methods, (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), at 529. 
42
 V.Jupp The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, op cit fn 39 at 41.  
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 M.Van Hoecke ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Van Hoecke, M. 
(ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?, (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2011), at 4. 
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 C.Chatterjee Methods of Research in Law, op cit fn 27 at 42. 
45
 M.Bloor & F.Wood Keywords in Qualitative Methods - A Vocabulary of Research Concepts, (Sage 
Publications, London, 2006), at 58-59. 
46
 V.Jupp The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods, op cit fn 39 at 74. 
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relevant cases, as the judges will only permit the defence of self-defence, especially 
when offensive weapons are involved, in so far as it does not encroach on the 
intention of Parliament in drafting the relevant statutes, which thus requires careful 
interpretation. 
 
The advantage of employing this method is that the existing literature in the field is 
placed at the forefront of the research enquiry and provides context knowledge.
47
 
When research is reliant on documentary methods, care must be taken with regard to 
the quality of the data being analysed. This caution applies in particular to 
publications in the press and online news media, as there is a risk that the information 
provided may be taken out of context in order to deliver the maximum response from 
the readers. Nevertheless such media are valuable sources as they provide an insight 
into the public’s perception of the law in the area, and can play a crucial role in 
demands for law reform.
48
 Another informative source is the secondary analysis of 
official statistics to detect whether the laws are effective in practice from examining 
the statistical data on crime rates.
49
 Official statistics and media representation, 
primarily in the press and online news media, can provide significant insight into the 
social phenomena, as they consider the general awareness and public perception of 
the law in conjunction with the evidence available to see whether there is a consensus 
about the extent of the situation.
50
 
 
It is clear that this research has benefitted from a combination of methodologies, most 
notably the approaches of doctrinal legal research and socio-legal research. It has 
considered a wide breadth of sources in order to engage with the aims of the research 
and the various disciplines that have informed the perspective of this study. As the 
methodology has now been outlined, it is imperative that important elements which 
influence the scope of this research are clarified.   
                                                        
47
 This approach may be considered to adopt the principles of theoretical sampling, where one starts 
with a document or text that seems interesting and relevant to the research, and proceeds to build 
literature from there. U.Flick An Introduction to Qualitative Research, (3rd edn, Sage Publications, 
London, 2006), at 267. 
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 J.Knowles Effective Legal Research, (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012), at 95. 
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50
 The comparison of findings generated by different research methods and resources on the same topic 
is an example of triangulation, which Bryman describes as providing ‘greater validity’ through the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research. A.Bryman Social Research Methods, op cit fn 41 
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Many factors can influence the justification of self-defence, and it is necessary to 
explain the interpretation for the purposes of this research of two such factors at the 
outset of the thesis. The first relates to the degree of harm that may be caused in self-
defence, whether it is lethal or non-lethal; and the second relates to the distinction 
between justification and excuse.
51
  
 
1.4 Preliminary explanations 
 
1.4.1 Death as the ultimate harm and lesser harms 
 
In the interest of clarity, it should be explained at the outset that this research will not 
be limited only to a discussion of cases resulting in killing in self-defence; it will also 
encompass lesser harms than death which occur as a consequence of using defensive 
force. Much of the existing literature has focused on acts of killing in self-defence and 
has attempted to provide justifications for this outcome, such as Leverick and 
Uniacke’s monographs,52 and articles by Kasachkoff53 and Quong.54 Killing in self-
defence is arguably the most controversial element in the debate on the defence and is 
the most serious outcome possible from self-defensive actions.
55
 Accordingly, this has 
fuelled most of the academic debate on the subject. This is the most morally troubling 
and criminally grave result of the defence, and is also the moral wrong and crime that 
attracts the greatest need for proof of justifying circumstances and individual 
accountability.
56
 Young classifies self-defence as an example of a morally justifiable 
                                                        
51
 For an explanation of this distinction, see section 1.4.2. 
52
 F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence, op cit fn 8; S.Uniacke Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence 
Justification of Homicide op cit fn 8. 
53
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Law and Philosophy 509. 
54
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 As evident in Wallerstein’s article, where he notes that the final point along the harm scale, where 
fatal injuries occur, is where the most conflict arises for the underlying theories and justifications. 
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killing.
57
 However, not all cases involving defensive action will result in a fatal 
injury. Therefore, while his view is not contested in this study, it is considered 
preferable to regard the defence as being a morally sound action in the prevention of 
any personal harm, and not only lethal harm.  
 
Feinberg’s research is instructive on what is considered to be the definition of ‘harm’, 
which according to him entails the setting back of an interest. When an interest is 
interfered with, it harms its holder, causing a deterioration of his situation, a 
worsening of his position.
58
 There are many types of interests that fall subject to the 
harm principle, including the interests of bodily integrity and autonomy, property 
interests and privacy.
59
 All of these will be discussed to varying degrees in this thesis, 
as interests meriting self-defensive action when they are threatened. The extent to 
which the defence is available relies on the nature of the interest protected, with 
personal interests given greater credence than rights of ownership. Within the context 
of self-defence, usually the defender will be reacting to a threat to his life or the life of 
another, or at least will be fearful for his life. To lose one’s life or suffer a physical 
injury would certainly constitute the setting back of one’s interests and a harm.60 
 
Most references to fatal self-defence also apply to non-fatal outcomes, so the standard 
required by the law is generally the same. However, it may be applied more narrowly 
depending on the gravity of the offence. For example, a person claiming self-defence 
to an offence of causing actual bodily harm may be able to plead that his action was 
reasonable with slightly more ease than one who is accused of murder, as the 
threshold to be reached may be higher in the latter. Thus, it is in the interest of 
minimizing any possible omissions and restrictions in terms of the offences that self-
defence applies to, that this study includes a consideration of lesser harms that result 
from non-fatal self-defence.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Although he focused upon killing as the result of defensive force, he expressly stated that his research 
was also intended to apply to less grave defensive force. S.Wallerstein ‘Justifying the Right to Self-
Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 999, at 1001. 
57
 R.Young ‘What is so Wrong with Killing People?’ (1979) 54 Philosophy 515, at 515. 
58
 J.Feinberg Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press 
Oxford, 1987), at 53. 
59
 ibid at 61. 
60
 Uniacke adds that it is not only the harm caused that is relevant, but also the wrong suffered. The 
wrong would only be produced if the harm is caused in an unjust manner. S.Uniacke ‘Proportionality 
and Self-defense’ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 253, at 260.  
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This is most important in relation to the consideration of offences involving the 
possession and use of offensive weapons. Such actions do not always produce fatal 
results, as they often involve minor injuries or mere threats. Therefore, the nature of 
this research requires a broader application and understanding of self-defence. 
Sangero argues that limiting a justification of self-defence to instances which result in 
death is problematic,  
 
‘the restriction of the discussion of private defence to homicide offenses 
alone, so prevalent in the literature, is both mistaken and misleading – 
mistaken because private defence applies also to other offenses, such as 
simple assault, and misleading because concentrating solely on situations 
of ‘a life for a life’ distorts the picture’.61  
 
Leverick in particular has been scrutinised for her ‘narrow’ examination of the 
defence, for only considering cases of killing in self-defence.
62
 Due to her claim that 
the rights theory is the principal justificatory theory of self-defence, and the 
significant reliance therein on the right to life, it is difficult to transfer her approach 
across to lesser harms than death.
63
 Critics have stated that ‘A theory of self-defense 
should have explanatory power beyond killing to prevent being killed … It is widely 
implausible that one would need a different theory for not killing in self-defense than 
one needs for killing in self-defense’.64 This view is convincing, and has influenced 
the decision taken in this research not to place limitations on the application of the 
defence. Thus, lesser harms than death, which occur as a result of self-defence will 
also be considered. 
 
The second factor, mentioned earlier is that the way in which the defensive harm that 
ensues is generally perceived depends on whether the defence is considered to 
provide a justification or an excuse. It is necessary to define the distinction from the 
outset, as it will surface regularly throughout the thesis. 
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 B.Sangero ‘A New Defense for Self-Defence’ (2006) 9(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 475, at 483-
484. 
62
 F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence, op cit fn 8. 
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1.4.2 Justification and Excuse 
 
Before embarking on this study, it is necessary to highlight an important distinction 
between criminal defences, namely, the classification of defences as either 
justificatory or excusatory.
65
 This distinction is often drawn within criminal law 
theory, and its implications for the moral standing of an act must be understood, 
although it is not substantially incorporated into the law.
66
  
 
According to the mainstream distinction of justification and excuse, self-defence falls 
into the category of justification defences. Leverick offers the following explanation 
of the distinction:  
 
‘the accused who claims a justification asserts that what she did was, all 
things considered, an acceptable thing to do, even though it satisfied the 
definition of an offence. The accused claiming an excuse asserts that, 
although what she did was unacceptable, there is a reason why she should 
not be blamed for it’.67  
 
Accordingly, it may be said that a justification determines that the defendant’s 
conduct under the circumstances is not criminally wrongful, while an excuse states 
that although the conduct is criminally wrongful, the defendant is not criminally 
blameworthy for the actions taken.
68
  
 
Greenawalt states that ‘the central distinction between justification and excuse is 
between warranted and unwarranted action for which the actor is not to blame’,69 the 
justification defence being warranted and the excuse being unwarranted in this 
respect. This has led to what Funk considers to be the orthodox opinion that 
justifications focus on the act, the individual’s conduct, while excuses centre on the 
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discussions in this section. 
66
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 26 
actor.
70
 He indicates that while justifications create ‘exceptions to the prohibitory 
norms’, these norms are unaffected by excuses, which instead ‘exempt certain people 
from punishment’.71 
 
It may therefore be deduced that a justificatory defence is preferable in terms of moral 
judgement
72
 and stigma as ‘it is an act without moral flaw’.73 Acts of self-defence are 
not merely excused; they are justified and morally acceptable.
74
 While excuses can be 
described, as ‘individual or subjective’, justifications on the other hand are ‘general or 
objective’,75 arguably meaning that they are less dependent on the people involved 
and more focused on the circumstances,
76
 which are more universally applicable. A 
successful plea of self-defence allows defendants to admit their wrongdoing, but at 
the same time claim it was justifiable in the circumstances, thereby offering a defence 
for the actions taken, holding it not wrongful and a lawful conduct in the particular 
context.
77
  
 
It is worth noting that this is, to an extent, a paradoxical conclusion, because if an 
action is justified and ‘right’ it should not need a defence. Despite the fact that the 
injury to an aggressor can be explained and that it is not wrongful within the 
circumstances, an injury has nevertheless been caused. Without the explanation by 
way of the defence, the conduct would be unlawful. Consequently, the conditions that 
must be present for self-defence to be permissible must be applied strictly, to ensure 
that innocent people are not injured unnecessarily. The nature of a justification 
inevitably concludes that the aggressor’s life has become of less value to society than 
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the defender’s life, and care must be taken when reaching such perplexing decisions.78 
Leverick claims that the justification and excuse distinction provides moral clarity 
within the criminal law, as it is essential for the law to express why punishment is 
necessary and the reasons why one might be absolved from punishment.
79
 This is 
certainly true with regard to the ability to explain why actions are acceptable and not 
wrongful in specific circumstances.  
 
Although Colvin believes that criminal law would be better placed without the 
distinction,
80
 and Greenawalt claims that the ‘criminal law should not attempt to 
distinguish between justification and excuse in a fully systematic way’,81 it is morally 
and legally significant in terms of its impact on the defendant’s liability for the 
offence committed. Colvin argues that a better distinction would be possible if the 
criminal law separated the different types of defences as ‘defences of contextual 
permission and defences of mental impairment’.82 The first would cover those acts 
that are acceptable, while the latter would address situations where the individual 
concerned is not a proper subject of the criminal law. This is a potentially viable 
suggestion as it would provide clarity on the separation of defences according to their 
nature. Moreover, further academic opinion cast doubt on the distinctions’ 
importance. For example, Fletcher states that while the distinction was significant to 
Blackstone, it no longer has the same significance, and ‘only those common law 
theorists who read and respect the philosophical literature have high regard for the 
distinction’.83 While this may be true, the general consensus supports the distinction 
which is widely used and accepted by academics,
84
 although seldom used in practice 
by judges.
85
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For example, in Re A (Children)
86
 the necessity defence was used to grant permission 
to surgeons to separate conjoined twins, knowing that while the operation would save 
the stronger twin, Jodie, it would kill her weaker sister, Mary. The case provides an 
example where the distinction of justification and excuse was implicit in Brooke LJ’s 
judgement. This was so despite his statement that ‘English criminal law does not 
make any clear-cut distinction between a justification and an excuse’.87 Kugler notes 
that despite evidence of an awareness of the distinction in the judgement, and an 
apparent application of necessity as a justification, there were occasions where the 
language pertained to excuse.
88
 Williams’s analysis illuminates this as she discusses 
the necessity test that was laid down in the case, and explains that the decision to 
include a proportionality requirement indicates reliance upon utilitarian reasoning.
89
 
As such, she notes that the utilitarian concept of choosing the lesser of two evils is 
regarded as a justification.
90
 Thus, upon this understanding, the judgement can be 
interpreted as employing a justification and not an excuse. Therefore, although judges 
may not specifically identify, highlight or adhere to the distinction, it nevertheless 
provides the theoretical foundations for the approach taken in judgements. It is 
accordingly an important construct and engages a valuable role within criminal law 
theory. 
 
As the scope and aims of this study have now been defined and preliminary 
distinctions have been explained, it is necessary to outline the structural content of the 
thesis. The five substantive chapters focus on individual aspects relating to self-
defence, yet are intertwined together to reflect the different challenges of the law in 
this area.  
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1.5 The structure of the thesis and outline of chapters 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the defence of self-defence. It will explain the general operation of 
the law as well as the criteria that must be fulfilled in order to successfully plead the 
defence. The word ‘general’ is included here as there are two separate tests of self-
defence in operation in England and Wales. This chapter discusses the position as it 
relates to the majority of situations, while Chapter 4 explores the position in relation 
to householders. This chapter has a strong theoretical dimension, and assesses the 
varying theories that have been developed to justify self-defence. It will also evaluate 
the objective standard of the reasonable person, which is applied to those seeking to 
rely on the defence. The relevance of the defender’s and the aggressor’s 
characteristics will be introduced, with a consideration of whether the aggressor is 
culpable or innocent. The individual’s characteristics may be relevant to the overall 
assessment of self-defensive action, as it may explain why certain individuals are 
more likely than others to resort to weapons. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the law concerning offensive weapons and bladed articles, 
setting out the research context first before considering the legal aspects. It considers 
the importance ascribed to the nature of the weapon or article concerned, and the 
statutory defences that are available against a charge of possession. Offensive 
weapons present a particular challenge to the defence in respect of the admissibility of 
actions taken prior to a situation of self-defence, as a matter of pre-emption or 
preparation. It explores whether or not self-defence is a potential defence. Notably, 
whether a weapon is used or merely possessed has a significant bearing on the 
applicability of self-defence. Similarly, by pre-emptively carrying a weapon, the 
defender is partly responsible for the circumstances that ensue. Therefore, the impact 
of the individual’s own contribution, as an instance of self-generated self-defence is 
considered.
91
 This chapter also explores both legal and non-legal proposals to address 
the issues of weapons carrying. It discusses the initiatives that have been established 
with a view to reducing the prevalence of such crimes, and to change the belief that 
the possession of weapons is required as a matter of self-defence.  
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Chapter 4 identifies the two separate tests that exist based on location, as the law 
differs in the specific context of homeowners, compared to that of general self-
defence. The chapter explores this difference, focusing upon the recent change in the 
law in the context of householder cases. It analyses the debate that ensued before the 
passing of the Crime and Courts Bill 2013, as well as the arguments supporting and 
opposing the amendments to the law with regard to householders. In this respect, it is 
closely connected with Chapter 5, which explores the issue of location. It will also 
clarify the relevance and role of location in the law relating to offensive weapons, as 
the relationship between self-defence and these offences is a key feature of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 5 evaluates the impact of location upon the defence of self-defence. It 
explores the reasons why the law was amended in the context of householders. The 
issue of retreat before using force in self-defence is considered, and a number of 
theories such as the castle doctrine are examined to question the special status of the 
home. The chapter also explores the relevance of criminological insights to further 
appreciate the different legal positions based on location within a broader context. 
These provide a context for example, to fear of crime patterns in respect of private 
and public places, the opportunity for crime, and the use of public places by young 
people. 
 
Chapter 6 surveys two distinct areas that may influence the law regarding self-defence 
and offensive weapons. The first topic discussed is the role of emotions as triggering 
factors behind the carrying of weapons or recourse to self-defensive action, and 
whether these should be permissible considerations by law. While the primary 
emotion discussed is fear, other emotions may also be involved, particularly in 
relation to the use and possession of weapons. The second topic considered is the 
media, as this has played a vital role in the sensationalising of weapons offences,
92
 as 
well as being a driving force behind the changes to the law of self-defence. This 
aspect is approached by highlighting the public’s fascination with crime, and the 
techniques used by the media to attract attention and create an impact before 
discussing media effects in respect of knife crime and self-defence.  
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and makes original contributions to the existing 
literature in the field, by offering a new perspective on several dimensions of self-
defence. The examination of the relationship between self-defence, offensive 
weapons, location, and the relevance of emotions and the media represents a broad 
exploration of the boundaries of self-defence, highlighting areas into which the 
defence should and should not extend.  
 
The following quote aptly summarises the challenges ahead of this research project: 
 
‘The justification of self-defence is an ancient, yet unsettled, area of 
criminal law. The defense reflects a tension in our society; we seek to 
punish those who are morally blameworthy, acquit those who act out of 
self-preservation, and at the same time to enforce standards of behaviour 
that prevent the development of a lawless society’.93 
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Chapter 2: Self-defence – The ‘General’ Position 
 
2. Introduction 
 
The criminal law defence of self-defence permits the use of force against an aggressor 
in certain qualifying circumstances, even if the force proves lethal. It allows 
individuals to act within their best interests to secure their own safety, by repelling 
threats or attacks with defensive force. This means that individuals who successfully 
plead self-defence will not receive punishment for the crime, which ‘but for’ the 
defence, they will have committed. While self-defence is theoretically a potential 
defence to all crimes in the law of England and Wales,
94
 not all circumstances will 
justify the defensive action that has been exerted. It is here that the legal definition of 
the defence is most pivotal, as it is often either unfamiliar to, or misunderstood by lay 
people. 
 
Thus, the natural starting point and first matter to be addressed in this chapter is the 
law itself. It is necessary to gain an understanding of the wording and interpretation of 
the law, and to explore the parameters of the defence before analysing problematic 
situations. While this chapter focuses upon the general position of the law, Chapter 4 
expands upon this by examining the legal position relating to householders, as there 
are now two different strands of self-defence in operation within the law of England 
and Wales.  
 
Secondly, the chapter evaluates the various theories advanced in an attempt to explain 
the justification behind self-defence.
95
 Despite the prima facie perception that self-
defence is a rightful and permissible action,
96
 albeit within certain constraints, the 
underlying foundations that justify the defence are difficult to state conclusively,
97
 
therefore many different theories have been developed.  
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Thirdly, self-defence is largely measured according to an objective test, (although the 
test also involves a degree of subjective analysis), namely, a test focusing on the 
reasonable person. This notion will be questioned in its appropriateness for 
determining reasonableness within the defence. Accordingly, deliberation is given to 
the appropriateness of the defender’s individual physical characteristics as permissible 
considerations, which would require an increased degree of subjectivity within the 
defence.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the relevance of the aggressor’s characteristics. 
This involves an appreciation of whether the aggressor is culpable or innocent, as this 
significantly influences whether self-defence is permissible or impermissible in the 
circumstances.  
 
2.1 The law of self-defence 
 
Self-defence is one of the most well established defences available in cases of crimes 
of violence. It has been available for centuries
98
 and is widely accepted as a complete 
defence in common law jurisdictions.
99
 In theory, it is a potential defence to any 
crime, although in practice, some crimes will certainly fall short of its requirements, 
and will not meet the criteria that have been developed.
100
 Despite the fact that self-
defence is often considered not only a defence, but also a right,
101
 there are many 
elements of the defence that are unclear and far from obvious in their application.  
 
Self-defence is a common law defence, which means that the law is to be found in the 
precedent of case law. Although the law is aptly covered and effectively dealt with by 
the courts, there are some statutes that overlap, or act as a reinforcement of, or 
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alternative to the common law. First, the common law position will be addressed, 
followed by an assessment of the statutory framework.  
 
The common law position in relation to self-defence is explained in simple terms in 
the case of R v Martin,
102
 namely that there is a general entitlement for a defendant to 
use reasonable force in self-protection against unlawful threats and attacks. The 
question of whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances is to be 
considered by the jury, according to the circumstances as the defendant honestly 
believed them to be at the time of the attack.
103
 However, the defence is not unlimited 
in its scope, as the force will only be reasonable providing it is necessary. This means 
for example, that if there are alternative options available to the defender other than to 
use force in self-defence, such as safely retreating, then it will not be reasonable to 
take forceful action.
104
  
 
It was claimed by their Lordships in the case of R v Palmer
105
 that the law in this area 
is simple and easily understood, ‘it is a straightforward conception ... Only common 
sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man 
who is attacked may defend himself’.106 Despite this assertion, the topic nevertheless 
merits detailed attention, as some aspects of the defence can be complex and 
inconsistencies in the application of the law sometimes occur. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental principles underpinning the defence are indeed widely comprehensible to 
lawyers, juries, and (under proper direction) laypeople alike. 
 
As the common law position has been outlined, the discussion must turn to examine 
the statutory position regarding self-defence. The Criminal Law Act 1967 addresses 
the prevention of crime, and this Act applies also to cases of self-defence. Section 3 of 
the Act reads: ‘A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in 
the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or 
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suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large’.107 Most cases of self-defence 
will fall under this category, as the action will be taken in the prevention of crime.  
 
It is therefore an important element of self-defence that the defensive action is taken 
as a response to a criminal or unlawful threat, and is directed towards the aggressor, 
who creates the need for defensive force.
108
 Uniacke highlights the necessity that the 
defensive action is reacting to the unlawful threats by stating, ‘The permissibility of 
homicide in self-defence is grounded in the fact that the act is one of resisting, 
repelling, or warding off an unjust immediate threat’.109 The same principle applies to 
non-fatal acts of self-defence. The unlawful force requirement may be posed as a 
reason for the fundamental difference in approach to the defence of self-defence and 
those of duress and necessity, where the victim is not posing an unjust threat to the 
accused.
110
 However, there are some cases where the aggressor will not be acting 
unlawfully, for example, a child under the age of ten who is not criminally liable,
111
 
or a person who lacks mental capacity.
112
 Technically, therefore, in such situations, 
only the common law defence will be available,
113
 as it cannot be said that the force 
was used in the prevention of crime. 
 
More recently, legislation has shown support for the common law defence, in the 
form of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and the Legal Aid, 
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Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
114
 The 2008 Act will be explored 
first, and following this, the contribution of the 2012 Act will be examined.  
 
Section 76 of the 2008 Act sets out a provision on what amounts to ‘reasonable force 
for purposes of self-defence’. It states in subsection (1) that the scope of the provision 
is to clarify the term ‘reasonable force’ in relation to the defences listed in subsection 
(2), which are the common law defence of self-defence, and the statutory defence of 
prevention of crime in section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. The provisions of 
section 76 are lengthy, as it progresses to discuss in detail the various considerations 
that may be taken into account when assessing reasonable force. These are explained 
in subsection (3), specifically stating that the degree of force used is to be assessed in 
light of the circumstances as the defender considered them to be at the time. This 
appears to be a mere restatement of the decisions in the cases of Williams
115
 and 
Beckford.
116
 However, subsection (3) also states that subsections (4) to (8) are 
relevant to the consideration of reasonable force, (appearing here as originally 
enacted);
117
  
 
(4) If D claims to have held a particular belief as regards the existence of 
any circumstances  
(a) the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to 
the question whether D genuinely held it; but  
(b) if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it, D is entitled to 
rely on it for the purposes of subsection (3), whether or not  
(i) it was mistaken, or  
(ii) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one 
to have made.  
(5) But subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief 
attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced.
118
 
(6) The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been 
reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was 
disproportionate in those circumstances.  
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(7) In deciding the question mentioned in subsection (3) the following 
considerations are to be taken into account (so far as relevant in the 
circumstances of the case)  
(a) that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able 
to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; 
and  
(b) that evidence of a person's having only done what the person 
honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate 
purpose constitutes strong evidence that only reasonable action 
was taken by that person for that purpose.  
(8) Subsection (7) is not to be read as preventing other matters from being 
taken into account where they are relevant to deciding the question 
mentioned in subsection (3).
119
  
 
It is clear from the legislation that the principles set out in the common law are 
accepted. Again, subsection (7) appears to be another restatement of the common law. 
The case of Palmer
120
 provided the authority for the consideration that individuals 
acting in the heat of the moment may not be able to weigh the exact amount of force 
that is necessary for self-defence, when determining its availability.  
 
Essentially, the provision does no more than reinforce the common law position
121
 
that the reasonableness of the degree of force used in self-defence will be considered 
in light of the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
122
 For this reason, 
providing the defendant’s defensive action constitutes no more than he honestly and 
instinctively considered to be necessary in the circumstances; that his belief was 
reasonably held; and represents the only possible choice that was available to him, he 
will not be prosecuted for the offence he has committed, and which but for the 
defence, he would be criminally liable for.
123
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The 2012 Act is a continuation of the attempt to clarify the legal position regarding 
self-defence, although it adds little to the existing extensive provisions.
124
 Section 148 
provides a revision to the 2008 Act, although the amendments made are minimal as 
they merely target accidental omissions from the former Act. Its purpose was to 
secure the inclusion in subsection (2) of the defence of property within the defence, 
and the explanation in subsection (3) (with the insertion of subsection (6A)) that the 
ability to retreat is only a consideration and not a determining factor of the defence,
125
 
as already stated in the case of McInnes.
126
 The provision does not contribute new 
law, but represents another reinforcement of the common law without changing the 
test for self-defence.
 
 
 
These attempts at clarification have come under fire from critics. Allen criticised the 
2008 Act as “one of the worst examples of gesture politics resulting in pointless 
legislation ... it simply legislates for what case law had already established”.127 This 
view is a fair deduction, and as the 2012 Act merely amends the 2008 Act, again 
inserting the principles laid out by the common law into statutory form, it falls subject 
to the same criticism.
128
 However, a more positive interpretation of the provisions is 
to regard them as a codification of the common law - a development that has been 
advanced as desirable for many years.
129
 
 
2.1.1 The criteria to be met in cases of self-defence 
 
The key determinant of lawful self-defence is the use of reasonable force. The test of 
reasonable force is split into two main components that must be satisfied for a plea of 
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self-defence to be successful. The two components are: (i) the existence of the 
necessity to act, and (ii) the proportionality of the act. These conditions are both 
moral and legal prerequisites to permissible acts of self-defence. Stemming from 
these two requirements, several other indicators of the availability of the defence have 
been developed. Necessity requires the attack that is resisted with defensive force to 
be imminent. It also requires that there should be no other reasonable option or 
solution open to the defender, other than to resort to force for self-protection. This 
lack of an alternative action is sometimes referred to as the ‘duty to retreat’, although 
in fact there is no actual duty; it is rather a factor to be considered.
130
 Under the 
requirement of necessity, the legal response to mistakes is discussed as such cases are 
problematic in that the defender is mistaken in relation to the need for defensive 
action. Similarly, it is important that the defender be aware of the circumstances 
justifying his use of force, as a lawful purpose is a key component of the defence.  
 
On the other hand, the proportionality requirement demands that only a reasonable 
amount of force be used, i.e. that the defensive force should be proportional to the 
aggressive force it resists.
131
 Excessive force should be deterred and could potentially 
deny the availability of the defence. Each element merits individual attention and will 
be discussed in the following order: necessity (imminence, duty to retreat) and 
proportionality (reasonable force).  
 
2.1.1(a) Necessity – Imminence 
 
First, the requirement of imminence refers to the immediacy
132
 of the harm that would 
be suffered and its proximity to the defensive action exerted. The attack, which it is 
necessary to avoid by the use of force, must be about to happen, posing an immediate 
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necessity but non-imminent threats could be cases involving victims of domestic abuse, or cases where 
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threat to the defendant. A threat that may materialise in the distant future is 
insufficient. The purpose of this rule is to ensure that self-defensive action is only 
taken when it is absolutely necessary. Thus, if there is a reasonable alternative to the 
use of force, self-defence will not be available. If there is no present danger, then the 
defence will most likely be denied.  
 
Leverick notes that the law of England and Wales has moved away from the notion 
that imminence is a definite requirement of self-defence
133
 to the current position that 
it is merely a factor to be considered with regard to the necessity of force.
134
 Herring’s 
view is compatible with this approach as he states that ‘It is not absolutely necessary 
to show that the attack is imminent or immediate’.135 Indeed, this appears to be in line 
with the clarification offered with regard to reasonable force in the legislative 
provision. Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 does not 
expressly identify imminence as a requirement or a relevant consideration.
136
 While 
subsections (7)(a) and (b) refer to ‘necessary action’, imminence is not specifically 
identified within the provision. However, it should be noted that subsection (8) 
declares that other considerations may be taken into account, and thus, the absence of 
an express provision in the statute should not be read as excluding the need for 
imminence. It is argued here that while imminence seems to be mostly indicative of 
reasonable force, it should also be regarded as a requirement of self-defence. 
Appropriately, it would appear that imminence remains to be a factor that is 
considered by the courts. 
 
For example, in the case of Hitchens,
137
 the Court of Appeal clearly regarded 
imminence to be a relevant consideration, a question they referred to as one of 
‘remoteness’. It was stated that in cases of self-defence, there is   
‘greater scope for operation where it is certain or nearly certain that a 
crime will be committed immediately if action is not taken. Conversely, 
the lower the degree of likelihood of a crime being committed and the 
                                                        
133
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greater the time between awareness of the risk and the time when the 
crime might be committed, so the scope for any defence to have any 
realistic prospect of success will be correspondingly reduced.’138 
 
This demonstrates the need to assess imminence as evidence of reasonableness. The 
question of probability or remoteness is also telling, as there will almost always be 
uncertainty regarding the future. Thus, the probability of attack is highly relevant to 
imminence, as if an attack has not been initiated and does not constitute an active 
threat upon the defender, it is much more challenging to assess that the force used was 
necessary. This is a matter of relative knowledge and proof; the more that is known 
about the extent of the threat or attack, the more evidence there is of a need for 
defensive force, and the type of force it was reasonable and proportionate to use. The 
less that is known, due to the lack of urgency in the threat faced, the more doubtful 
the need for force becomes, and the possibility that another course of action was open 
to the defender is increased.
139
 Imminence is not only concerned with the immediacy 
of an attack, but also the degree to which it was truly impending and how likely it was 
to materialise. It is therefore an important aspect of proving the reasonableness of 
force, and Bakircioglu describes imminence ‘as a litmus test to detect possible abuses 
of the self-defence doctrine’.140 
 
There are many circumstances for which the imminence aspect presents an obstacle, 
for example cases involving ‘battered women’141 and also the possession of some 
form of weapon. Indeed, many cases have arisen where the courts have demanded 
imminence within the context of weapons offences, as a key method of restricting 
unmeritorious pleas of self-defence.
142
 The flaw of a liberal approach to the carrying 
of weapons for self-defence is the reality that many people would simply be unable to 
use the weapon to overpower an aggressor. While firearms are always more effective 
as they facilitate a defence yet maintain a safe distance between the aggressor and the 
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victim, they are also liable to be disproportionate. In terms of pre-emptive action, the 
greater distance raises a problem in terms of probability, as if the threat does not 
materialise, the grave action of firing the weapon cannot be reconsidered or 
withdrawn. Whereas with a weapon like a knife, used for close combat, the 
probability of danger and the nature of the threat will be much clearer, and confirmed 
by the proximity between the aggressor and victim by the time it is necessary to use. 
Contrarily, with such weapons, although the imminence requirement can be proved 
more satisfactorily, they do not necessarily provide sufficient protection for a 
vulnerable individual, such as a frail elderly person, who may lack the strength to use 
it in self-defence. 
 
Imminence is clearly a strong indicator of the necessity of the defensive action, 
especially when pre-emptive actions are involved, and is therefore a required 
component of self-defence. The more immediate the threat or attack, the more 
reasonable it will be to take defensive action to resist it. It is much easier to assess 
whether an action is taken in self-defence when an attack is taking place or is about to 
commence, than when an individual has perceived a risk, and acts in preparation to 
enable a response to the threat. Naturally this is due to the tangibility of an occurring 
attack, while a threat of a future attack is intangible. This makes it difficult to prove 
the probability of the attack, and to assess its nature and gravity. Imminence provides 
a safeguard against acts that occur too early in the developing stages of an attack for 
them to truly be regarded as self-defence, before the scale of attack can be 
appreciated. A danger with pre-emptive action, where preparation does ensue too 
early, is that the defender might act before the aggressor has formed his intention to 
kill, thus before the likelihood and nature of the threat is confirmed.
143
  
 
It is suggested that the flexible treatment of imminence is due to the fact that 
sometimes a defence may be reasonable despite the absence of an impending attack. 
One common example that is offered to demonstrate this is a case of kidnap, where 
the harm to the victim may not be immediate, as there may be a few days, or even 
weeks perhaps, before they will be in imminent danger, but yet they should be 
permitted to act defensively to secure their escape and safety as and when it is 
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possible for them to achieve a successful defence.
144
 Indeed, Sangero argues that such 
situations satisfy the legal requirements of self-defence as the situation can be 
interpreted as imminent from the point at which a threat has been recognised,
145
 in 
this example, from the point that the victim is kidnapped onwards. While this is a 
relatively liberal interpretation of imminent, it is compelling as it is relative to the 
exceptional circumstances. It is also in line with the right to life and the general aims 
of requiring imminence, which is to prevent the killing of innocent people who are not 
posing a threat or inflicting an attack on the defender.
146
  
 
Alexander notes the need to consider the probability of attack, but suggests that rather 
than focusing upon this factor, it would be more appropriate to question the 
defender’s actions according to whether it is compatible with the reactions of a 
‘person of reasonable firmness’ in the circumstances.147  However, this suggestion 
would not clarify or solve the issue. Essentially, it does not reduce the relevance of 
the probability of attack to an assessment of a pre-emptive strike. It would not alter 
the position, as defending against an attack that is unlikely to materialise, would not 
be considered in line with the actions of a ‘person of reasonable firmness’ in the 
circumstances. Probability remains a relevant consideration, as without it, conducting 
an analysis of the reasonableness of preparatory actions would be unattainable.  
 
However, despite the appearance thus far that pre-emptive actions cannot be taken, 
the contrary is true, and there is potential to rely on self-defence in specified 
situations. Indeed, as Ferzan states, the need for defence could arise much earlier in 
the chain of events than when the aggressive act itself has begun.
148
 It is recognised 
that a defender does not have to wait for the attacker to strike the first blow and can 
take measures to avoid the danger in anticipation of a forthcoming attack.
149
 
According to Rodin, there is no requirement that physical harm must be suffered by 
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the defender before any harm he causes to the aggressor in his own defence will be 
permissible. The reason for this is that inflicting a defensive harm to prevent a rights 
violation is sufficient.
150
 As aggressors in cases of self-defence are interfering with 
the defender’s rights,151 this is satisfied, even without the presence of physical harm 
as the very risk created by the aggressor constitutes a form of harm to the defender. 
 
Nevertheless, even when a pre-emptive action may be permissible, the element of 
imminence must remain to a certain extent. The limitation placed on pre-emptive 
action is that the ‘attack must be, or believed to be, imminent’.152 The reason for this 
is to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of the aggressor, the importance 
of which will become evident during the discussion on the rights theory.
153
 The 
imminence requirement therefore limits actions that extend beyond the reasonable 
scope of the defence, acting as a barrier to self-made law, which is an increased risk 
when preparatory actions are taken due to the uncertain nature of the aggressive acts it 
seeks to repel.
154
  
 
Comparisons can be drawn between preparatory actions of self-defence and the law 
regarding criminal attempts, due to the non-commission or non-commencement of the 
threat or attack.
155
 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 states that an 
attempt is ‘an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the 
offence’.156 Culver notes that the test searches for ‘conduct which is not so near the 
beginning of commission of a criminal offence that detection would involve 
unbearable intrusion on individual autonomy, yet prior to the ‘last act’ required for 
that offence’.157 The expectation is that something more than merely preparatory has 
been committed before an attempt will be found, namely, identifiable steps have been 
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taken towards the completion of the crime.
158
 Attempts are usually punished less 
severely than the completed offence as a result of the degree of harm which has, or 
rather has not, been caused. The attempt to commit a crime is itself a crime, not 
because of the injury it inflicts on an individual or society, but because of its potential 
danger to the public.
159
 The language of a crime of attempt and a pre-emptive act of 
self-defence are similar, although their outcomes may be very different. While an act 
more than merely preparatory in the context of an attempt will be sufficient to commit 
the offence, the action of preparation in a case of self-defence does not bar the 
defence, and it may be held permissible, depending on the circumstances.  
 
The possession of offensive weapons for self-defensive needs is punished 
comparatively similarly to attempts. Although carrying a weapon alone does not of 
itself inflict an injury, it increases the danger to the public generally. The act of mere 
possession is therefore a punishable offence, just as intending and initiating action 
towards committing a certain crime but failing to complete it is a crime. ‘That those 
should not be allowed to go free who attempt to commit some crime but fail, is a 
feeling deep rooted and universal’, 160  but perhaps the difference between the 
criminality of an attempt, and a preparatory self-defensive action, is essentially 
centred upon the intention of the perpetrator. While in the former there is a guilty 
intention, which satisfies the mens rea of the crime attempted, the same is not true of 
the latter, as an intention to act in self-defence is not an unlawful intention. As the 
defender’s self-defensive intention is formed as a direct response to the aggressor’s 
behaviour, the reaction is acceptable within the difficult circumstances that face the 
defender.
161
 The aggressor’s behaviour places the defender in a difficult position, and 
the defender’s self-defensive intention is acceptable as it is formed in response to the 
predicament he faces due to the aggressor’s behaviour. The defender’s intention 
involves the belief that the use of force will prevent the threat posed by the 
aggressor.
162
 By offending, the aggressor chooses to be placed in a position where 
force may lawfully be used against him when necessity so requires.
163
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While imminence does not currently form a separate requirement of self-defence, and 
is merely a factor for consideration, it should be an influential component, and feature 
within the legislative provisions that clarify the meaning of reasonable force. The 
reason for this argument is the fact that imminence and probability of harm are such 
strong indicators of reasonableness, that where they are absent, serious questions may 
be raised with regard to whether the force was at all necessary.
164
 However, in the 
same respect as that the possibility of retreat is merely an indication of self-defence; it 
is perhaps wise to avoid an overly strict interpretation of this requirement.  
 
This could be achieved by requiring a consideration of imminence and probability as 
an indicator of necessary force, but apply a context sensitive approach in each 
individual case. This would be consistent with the objective and subjective elements 
of self-defence. For example, failure to prove imminent danger should perhaps not bar 
the application of self-defence completely. Rather, if there is a reasonable belief that a 
significant probability of danger is present, and the defender acted at the only 
available opportunity to repel this danger, then such action should be open to 
consideration by a jury as being capable of satisfying necessary force, and 
consequently, reasonable force. This could be monitored by requiring a high standard 
to be reached, namely the ‘inevitability of harm’, which Leverick suggests to be a 
more appropriate measure of necessity.
165
 This would operate as a safeguard against 
fears of widening the net too far, but also acknowledge cases where imminence may 
be satisfied as a matter of the probability of harm. This would not extend the scope of 
reasonable force too broadly, as probable danger is as much evidence of lawful self-
defence as is imminent danger. It is argued here that all aspects of imminence should 
be retained and should feature more prominently within the legal position on 
reasonable force.      
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2.1.1(b) Necessity – Retreat 
 
The second consideration deriving from the requirement of necessity is the possibility 
of safely retreating. Opinion and expectation concerning this condition as an aspect of 
self-defence have changed over the years. It has developed from the belief that there 
was an absolute ‘duty to retreat’ to the law today, where no ‘duty’ as such exists. The 
retreat tradition was based on the English common-law system, especially in the 
writings of William Blackstone.
166
 The concept behind the rule of retreat reflected the 
doubts of the courts regarding pleas of self-defence, and concerns that the defence 
could mistakenly be perceived as the right to kill, instead of the right to defend.
167
 It 
was due to this fear that the retreat rule was developed, which required that 
individuals attempt to avoid the situation if possible before resorting to force.  
 
Leverick has examined different variations of retreat rules in a comparative study, and 
found that there are at least four possible legal approaches.
168
 First, there is the 
absolute retreat rule, where if it is possible to retreat, this must be the course of action 
chosen by the defender. Second, there is a strong retreat rule, requiring an attempt to 
retreat if possible prior to resorting to force. Third, there is a weak retreat rule, which 
Leverick states is the position of the law in England and Wales.
169
 This variation does 
not regard retreat as a conclusive criterion for lawful self-defence, but rather a 
consideration to be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of the force 
used. Finally, there is the no retreat rule, where retreat does not come into the 
deliberation process of determining lawful instances of self-defence at all.
170
 
 
Currently there is no rule of law stating that a person must retreat before acting in 
self-defence in England and Wales. The court in R v Julien
171
 held that in order to rely 
on a claim of self-defence, it would be sufficient for a defendant to prove that he had 
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shown an unwillingness to fight. This approach has been relaxed further as, according 
to the decision in R v McInnes,
172
 the possibility of a retreat is not a conclusive factor, 
but is merely an element to be considered when deciding on the availability of self-
defence.
173
 The case of R v Field
174
 reflects this rule, stating that individuals are not 
even under the duty to avoid a specific place or area in which the danger of attack is 
more likely or expected to occur; a person may nevertheless go there despite such 
knowledge.
175
 Arguably this is an expression of the value and privilege accorded to 
individual autonomy and liberty within the law. This interpretation was confirmed by 
the court in the case of R v Bird,
176
 where it was stated that evidence of an attempt to 
withdraw from a fight was merely a factor to be considered as indicative of self-
defensive force. Therefore, it appears settled that only a weak form of duty to retreat 
exists in the law of England and Wales today.
177
 
 
The main concern is proving that the reaction is deemed reasonable in the 
circumstances.
178
 In other words, if it is possible for the victim to retreat safely,
179
 the 
decision to use force instead might not be reasonable, but that does not mean that one 
is always under a duty to run away. This is especially true in relation to attacks that 
occur in the home, where the householder is in a difficult position and has few options 
available. Kadish discusses the duty to retreat in criminal law and says that as a 
‘condition of using deadly force [it] has traditionally been a minority rule, and even 
today many jurisdictions reject it. Indeed, when it is required, there is never a duty to 
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abandon one’s home or (in many jurisdictions) similar places, like one’s place of 
business’.180  
 
When assessing the possibility of retreating, the cases of R v Gladstone Williams
181
 
and R v Beckford
182
 held that the issue is to be looked at subjectively, from the 
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, whether reasonable or not. 
Although one need no longer ‘flee to the wall’183 before self-defence may be claimed, 
common morality
184
 asserts that it is always preferable to avoid the use of force where 
it is possible,
185
 because although ‘it is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat ... it is ten 
times more distasteful to kill’. 186  The reason for this can be summed up under 
utilitarian reasoning,
187
 that the survival of both parties by the retreat of one, as 
opposed to causing some injury or harm to the aggressor by the decision of the 
defender to stand his ground and fight, is the lesser harm in this scenario.  
 
Kroeze has summarised utilitarianism as ‘a theory of judging legal rules and 
institutions based not on deontological morality but on the question of whether it 
maximised happiness and minimized unhappiness’. 188  According to Bentham, all 
actions are subject to the analysis of the utility principle with regard to the 
augmentation or diminution of happiness.
189
 Inflicting harm is a graver consequence 
than the potential feeling of cowardice or shame that ensues from retreating, and the 
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guilt accompanying such conduct is also a heavier burden to carry.
190
 Morality 
requests that no harm be caused where it is not absolutely necessary as a last resort act 
of self-protection. Therefore, where an alternative to using defensive force is 
available, for example by contacting the police and retreating, this should be pursued 
before resorting to violence,
191
 so that no moral or criminal wrong is committed.
192
 It 
appears that this is a cultural and perhaps an era judgement as well, and reflects the 
attitudes of modern society following the development of widely accessible national 
and regional law enforcement.
193
 
 
It is worth noting briefly the comparison that may be drawn between the legal 
approach in England and Wales and that of some individual states within the USA. 
Approaches have changed during the past decade in some American States regarding 
the retreat rule.
194
 Despite the need for a reasonable retreat to be taken where such an 
option is available, “stand your ground” privileges have developed (mainly in the 
context of homeowners who are threatened within their own home),
195
 allowing the 
abandonment of the retreat rule. Florida is said to have started the trend in 2005 as the 
first state to abandon the rule of retreat.
196
 Leverick notes:  
 
‘at least fifteen US states have abandoned the retreat rule, even where 
lethal self-defensive force is involved … permitting any person who is not 
engaged in unlawful activity and who is attacked in any place where she 
has a right to be to use deadly force against an attacker without having to 
take a safe opportunity to escape’.197  
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Bobo has also written about this trend, and has looked in particular at Alabama, which 
employs the same approach as Florida. He explains that the change in the law there 
creates a presumption that whenever citizens believe someone has intruded into their 
dwelling, they will have a justification for using force against them in self-defence. It 
also encompasses situations occurring outside of the home, so that the presumption 
applies to any location where the defender has a right to be. This presumption may of 
course be rebutted, but the burden of disproving it will be upon the prosecution.
198
 
Alabama’s courts had protected the duty to retreat, inherited from the English 
common-law system for many years. However, it has been removed from the law as it 
was considered to be incompatible with the culture, era, and beliefs of the majority of 
American people,
199
 or the ‘American mind’,200 that viewed retreating as cowardly.201 
 
While England and Wales retain a weak rule of retreat, it does not directly 
discriminate on the ground of location, as retreat is merely a consideration to be taken 
into account. It depends upon what is reasonable in the circumstances. However, it is 
possible that the new test for householders
202
 may mean that future cases will apply a 
weaker consideration of retreat in the home than in areas outside the dwelling. This 
could potentially lead to the development of indirect discrimination between locations 
on the ground of retreat. Arguably, the recent changes in England and Wales have 
moved closer to the notion of a presumption of lawful self-defence, by permitting 
anything up to ‘grossly disproportionate force’.203 This empowers the defender far 
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more by prioritising his interests over those of the aggressor’s, and a similar approach 
is taken in relation to mistake. 
 
2.1.1(b)(i) Mistake 
 
Occasionally, defenders mistake the circumstances and the need for force in self-
defence. Mistaken belief is an interesting factor in relation to the defence in the law of 
England and Wales.
204
 Where a person is mistaken in believing that there is a need to 
use defensive force, the mistaken belief should be honestly held, but need not be 
reasonable in order to secure an acquittal on the grounds of self-defence.
205
 The origin 
of this rule was the R v Gladstone Williams case,
206
 where it was decided that self-
defence could be pleaded in relation to an honest, but unreasonable belief held by the 
defendant that he was being attacked. The reason for this approach is that the defender 
is acting with the lawful purpose of self-protection.
207
 Although mistaken as to the 
need for force, when a person acts to defend himself, he is not acting unlawfully,
208
 
but rather is responding within the justifying circumstances of self-defence.
209
  
 
This approach towards mistaken belief was confirmed in the case of R v Beckford
210
 
and later in R v Owino,
211
 where it was submitted that a defendant was to be judged 
according to his honest belief, even if it was mistaken, and that it is the role of the 
jury to determine whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances as the 
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defendant believed them to be.
212
 This ruling was followed in R v Shaw,
213
 which 
declared that ‘it was not the actual existence of a threat but the appellant’s belief as to 
the existence of a threat which mattered’.214 Therefore, it may be considered that the 
application of self-defence is relatively broad in this context.  
 
There are debates about the compatibility of this rule and Article 2 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
215
 For example, Leverick argues that there is 
room to believe that the law of England and Wales is incompatible with the 
Convention right to life.
216
 Wicks agrees, and states that  
 
‘the lack of any requirement of objective justification for a mistaken belief 
is a serious shortcoming in English law’s protection of the right to life 
and should be rectified as soon as possible in a manner that continues to 
protect the individual who forms an erroneous perception of the situation 
due to fear and panic but also ensures that the victim of such a mistaken 
perception is not legitimately killed in the absence of any good reason’.217 
 
Although no ruling of incompatibility has been provided to date, it does appear that 
the present position of the law falls short of the convention requirement that the force 
should be ‘absolutely necessary’.218 The present position makes it too easy for people 
to claim mistaken self-defence, and a higher standard should be employed.
219
  
 
The law of rape provides a strong illustration of the difference between a standard of 
genuine or honest belief, and that of a reasonable belief when assessing mistake. In 
the case of DPP v Morgan
220
 Mr Morgan had invited three men home to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife. He had stated that although she would consent, she would 
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appear to resist as part of her own sexual enjoyment. The three men used force against 
her and each had sexual intercourse with her. During the trial the judge had indicated 
that if the defendants were mistaken about her consent, the mistaken belief must be 
both honest and reasonable. On appeal against conviction, it was held that the judge 
had misdirected in relation to mistaken belief, as the mistaken belief need not have 
been reasonable.
221
 Their convictions remained in place despite the misdirection as 
their beliefs were not considered to be genuine. The law has since been strengthened 
to require the belief in consent to be reasonable by section 1(1)(c) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003.
222
 Nevertheless, the law of rape provides a clear example of the 
differences in the standards of honest as opposed to reasonable beliefs, and puts into 
context the greater ease of the honest belief approach. 
 
It is submitted that when an individual acts in self-defence albeit in mistaken 
circumstances, it would be more appropriate to say that he is claiming an excuse form 
of the defence, rather than a justificatory form of the defence.
223
 The reason for this is 
that it cannot be considered that the action is acceptable, and therefore it falls short of 
a justification. Rather, as a wrongful action has occurred, it falls subject to 
consideration as an excuse. There is a reason why the defender should not be blamed, 
namely, the belief in the need to act defensively, although this belief was mistaken. 
This situation is more aligned with the excuse defence than a justification. This ties 
into the proportionality of the action and will be discussed shortly.
224
 
 
2.1.1(b)(ii) Lawful Purpose 
 
Another condition connected to mistaken belief is that the defender must be acting 
with a lawful purpose. The defender must prove that he was merely acting to protect 
himself, with the object of self-defence.
225
 There is a requirement that the defendant 
should be aware of the circumstances justifying the defence, known as the Dadson 
                                                        
221
 ibid, at 187. 
222
 Section 1(2) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides further direction on reasonable belief: 
‘Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including 
any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents’. The current legal position is clearly more 
appropriately formulated than previously in this context. 
223
 F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence, op cit fn 8 at 37. 
224
 See section 2.1.1.(c).  
225
 J.Slater, op cit fn 78 at 151. 
 55 
principle. The rule originated in the case of R v Dadson,
226
 where a constable who 
was guarding property on a piece of land, had shot a fleeing thief. At the time, the 
constable was unaware of the fact that the thief had prior convictions for the same 
offence, which effectively sanctioned his shooting. Unfortunately, as he did not know 
of the justifying circumstances, the constable could not rely on the defence.
227
  
 
The principle that individuals should knowingly have a lawful purpose is applicable 
to self-defence and acts as a deterrent for malicious actions of revenge that are 
masked as self-defence. This reflects the justificatory nature of the defence by 
ensuring the greatest protection against possible misuse.
228
 It is designed to restrict 
situations where, for example, A deliberately shoots B without knowing that B 
intended to kill him. Here, A effectively acts in self-defence saving his own life by 
terminating B’s capacity to carry out his plan. Although justifying circumstances are 
present, this is not a pure case of self-defence. A is unaware of the fact that he is in 
danger and that he is acting in self-defence. Consequently, his intention is unlawful as 
‘a bad motive or purpose bars an actor’s force from being justified’, 229  which 
establishes the mens rea for the offence committed.  
 
There is debate that the Dadson principle should no longer apply, that it is only 
applicable in cases involving public officials and not private individuals, and that it 
should not be regarded as an authority excluding self-defence to unknowingly 
justified actors in general.
230
 However, Funk concludes that it ‘represents a very 
principled, precedented, coherent, and logically compelling manner of ensuring that 
unknowingly justified actors cannot benefit from their fortuitous situation’231 and it 
serves its purpose effectively. It would be unfair to depart from this standard, because 
regardless of the justifying circumstances, the actor’s intention remains impermissible 
and should not enable a defence in this instance. This brings the discussion onto the 
next requirement of self-defence, that of proportionality. 
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2.1.1(c) Proportionality - Reasonable Force 
 
The other vital component of lawful actions in self-defence is proportionality. Its 
purpose is to protect the rights and interests of the aggressor, by securing that only 
reasonably necessary force is used against him. This requires that the defensive force 
used should be proportionate to the aggressive force it resists. Proportionality 
considers whether the amount of force that was used by the defender was either 
reasonable or excessive in the circumstances. This is a matter of evaluating and 
comparing the values involved,
232
 through a combination of subjective and objective 
considerations. The subjective element assesses the individual context of the case to 
examine whether the actions were reasonable in the circumstances. The objective 
element deliberates what the ‘reasonable man’ would have thought was necessary in 
the circumstances. This does not mean that the defender must pause for time to 
measure the severity of the attack being experienced, in order to respond with exact 
proportionality. The law acknowledges that in the heat of the moment, when faced by 
an immediate and unexpected attack, it is not viable to decipher the gravity of the 
circumstances accurately.  
 
As noted earlier,
233
 it was pivotally held in the case of R v Palmer
234
 that:  
 
‘if there had been an attack so that defence is reasonably necessary it will 
be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety 
the exact measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that 
in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what 
he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be the 
most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been 
taken’.235  
 
Therefore, consideration will be given to the fact that people do not always make the 
right decision in the face of fear,
236
 and that it should be taken into account that the 
defendant may misjudge the amount of force necessary for successful self-defence.
237
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The case also stressed that the use of excessive force in self-defence does not reduce a 
charge of murder to manslaughter, (as is the case with partial defences).
238
 Self-
defence is an all-or-nothing defence, so that either it is satisfied and the defendant will 
be acquitted, or it is disproved and the individual faces a full charge for the offence 
committed. Despite criticism
239
 of the reformed partial defence of loss of control 
(previously known as ‘provocation’)240 the defence could potentially be applicable 
where excessive force has been used. As proportionality is a key requirement of self-
defence, an individual who has used excessive force will not be protected under that 
defence. Contrarily, the loss of control defence may provide leniency to such 
individuals, as the ‘loss of control’241 element may explain the excessive amount of 
force used.
242
 Where the defensive force used is grossly disproportionate to the attack 
faced by the defender, the person will not be able to rely on self-defence to avoid 
criminal liability for the offence committed. The aggressor must be protected from the 
use of force that is more than that necessary for the defender’s self-protection,243 but 
the alternative defence of loss of control may provide a form of excuse for the action 
taken.  
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While killing in self-defence is potentially proportionate, depending upon the level of 
harm averted and caused, a divergent position exists within the defence of necessity. 
According to necessity, it is doubtful whether it can ever be proportionate to kill. It 
was stated in the case of R v Latimer
244
 that  
 
‘It is difficult … to imagine a circumstance in which the proportionality 
requirement could be met for a homicide. We leave open … the question 
of whether the proportionality requirement could be met in a homicide 
situation. In England, the defence of necessity is probably not available 
for homicide’.245  
 
However, two distinctive points must be noted here: first, the necessity defence is 
widely regarded as no defence to murder;
246
 and secondly, the harm caused in this 
particular case was clearly disproportionate to what it sought to avert, as the 
defendant had killed his disabled daughter to avoid her suffering an operation which 
was not life threatening.
247
 Thus, this wider debate does not specifically apply to 
instances of self-defence, although it does highlight the importance of proportionality 
within the defence.  
 
In contrast to the consideration of imminence, the requirement for force to be 
proportionate generally has a firmer position within the current law. This is evident in 
the provision of section 76(6) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, 
which states that ‘The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been 
reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was disproportionate in 
those circumstances’. This identifies the need for force to be proportionate through 
offering a negative instruction, specifying that disproportionate force falls beyond the 
scope of reasonable force. This demonstrates the fundamental connection between 
reasonableness and proportionality, which are reflective of each other. Such is the 
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closeness of these terms that the courts have often interpreted proportionate force and 
reasonable force as being one and the same.
248
 Indeed, this was the express approach 
taken by the Court of Appeal in the case of Keane and McGrath,
249
 where the terms 
were used interchangeably, and the phrase ‘reasonable or proportionate’ appeared 
regularly throughout the judgement.  
 
The case of Palmer emphasises the integral nature of proportionality to reasonable 
force in the statement that ‘If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be 
common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of 
proportion to the necessities of the situation’.250 This shows that proportionality is a 
logical requirement of self-defence, not only as evidence of reasonable force but also 
of necessary force. Proportionality is generally treated as a requirement of lawful self-
defence,
251
 and rightly so, as it indicates that the defender acted appropriately 
considering the competing harms at play,
252
 and according to the circumstances. It 
provides a measure of reasonableness and necessity, and vice versa. Thus, it can be 
said that despite the separate assessments that they introduce, all the main components 
of self-defence are interrelated and interwoven. The overarching question is whether 
the force used was reasonable, and proportionality and necessity contribute towards 
finding the answer in each individual case. While proportionality is a requirement of 
reasonable force, it is important to note that it does not demand an unrealistically high 
standard by expecting actions to reach exact proportionality, as that in itself would go 
against the nature of self-defence as a natural, impulsive reaction to a threat or attack.  
 
Sangero argues that proportionality and necessity should not be combined within an 
overall assessment of reasonable force, but should rather constitute separate 
requirements. He bases this approach on the importance of each factor and the need to 
                                                        
248
 As highlighted by Elliott in her article C.Elliott ‘Interpreting the Contours of Self-defence within the 
Boundaries of the Rule of Law, the Common Law and Human Rights’, op cit fn 12 at 331. 
249
 R v Keane; R v McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514. For a discussion on the challenges of 
interpretation facing the courts since the householder provision introduced the potential for 
disproportionate force to be considered as reasonable force, see Elliott’s article, ibid. 
250
 R v Palmer op cit fn 105, at 831. 
251
 Apart from within the context of householder cases where disproportionate force may be permitted. 
See Chapter 4 for further discussion. Sangero strongly emphasises that proportionality is a crucial 
consideration. See B.Sangero Self-Defence in Criminal Law, op cit fn 73 at 141. 
252
 S.Uniacke ‘Proportionality and Self-defense’ op cit fn 60 at 261. 
 60 
avoid any weakening of the standards that they safeguard.
253
 However, due to the 
similarities between each component and the way in which they complement and 
confirm each other, placing reasonable force as the overarching principle with 
proportionality and necessity forming required elements of reasonableness is logical, 
and brings clarity to the law. It enables a relatively straightforward direction to be 
given to the jury, that they must determine, based on the facts, whether reasonable 
force has been used, and in order to determine this, that they should consider whether 
the force was both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.
254
         
 
The issue of proportionality and excessive force will be developed further in the 
present Chapter when discussing the possession of offensive weapons, and the role 
that the relative power of the parties may play in self-defence.
255
 Proportionality will 
also be a core theme in Chapter 4, as the new position relating to householders has 
eroded the condition from the law in this context.
256
 While the general position of 
self-defence attaches significance to proportionality, the householder position allows 
disproportionate force to be used. When viewed solely in this respect, even without 
delving deeper into why this approach is problematic, it appears illogical.
257
 
Permitting anything up to gross disproportionality is dangerous and challenging to 
justify. Although self-defence has many justificatory theories, it is difficult to extend 
these to the new householder test, especially considering the fact that self-defence is a 
justificatory defence.  
 
2.2 Theories that Justify Self-defence 
 
It is necessary to consider some of the different theories that seek to justify self-
defensive actions, in order to fully understand the defence. It is not the main objective 
of this research to explore in depth the various theories that have been advanced to 
justify self-defence, but rather to set out briefly the most prominent of these theories, 
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and the ones that are considered to be most relevant to the present study. In this 
respect, this section will explore the following theories: (i) rights and forfeiture; (ii) 
natural law; (iii) consequentialism; (iv) forced choice; (v) double effect; and (vi) 
individual autonomy. These theories provide explanations as to why it is permissible 
to act in self-defence, even when the action results in the aggressor’s death.258 
 
Self-defence is regarded as not only legally permissible but also morally acceptable. 
Despite the fact that ‘most people believe that the deliberate and intentional killing of 
another person is generally morally wrong, many also believe that killing another 
person is sometimes morally justified and sometimes even called for’.259 Self-defence 
is one of these situations; it provides an exception to the general prohibition against 
killing. Circumstances giving rise to self-defence are special cases where although a 
usually punishable offence has been committed, criminal liability is set aside, as the 
conduct is not wrongful in this particular context. McMahan says  
 
‘that there are occasions on which it is permissible intentionally to kill 
another person in self-defense is an axiom in contemporary ethical theory 
... while we are confident that killing in self-defense is sometimes 
permissible, there is uncertainty about why this is an exception to the 
general prosecution of intentional killing’.260 
  
Many people feel strongly, not only that they should be permitted to use force to 
protect themselves, but that they also possess a ‘right’ to do so.261 Whether or not 
such a ‘right’ exists will be questioned in this section. 262  Nevertheless, Leverick 
asserts that when it comes to justifying self-defence, there is a tendency to take the 
defence for granted, without attempting to explain why it constitutes a justified action 
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that exempts criminal liability.
263
 Although, prima facie, it may seem obvious why the 
defence is permitted because of its exceptional quality as an instinctive human 
reaction of self-preservation, upon closer examination, the justification is not easy to 
locate.
264
 Despite the statement that ‘self-defence is the clearest of all laws; and for 
this reason - the lawyers didn’t make it’,265 it is a considerably harder task than it 
seems to justify self-defence.  
 
The defence is problematic because of the right to defend one’s life. This defensive 
right is derivative from the right to life, as evident in the self-defence exception in 
Article 2(2) of the ECHR.
266
 All individuals, including those who pose a threat to the 
lives of others, possess the right to life. This is what complicates the matter, as usually 
every individual bears the same rights under the law, but for self-defence to be 
available, there inevitably must be an imbalance between the rights of the parties 
involved. For the defence to be accepted, the defender’s rights must have been 
prioritised over the aggressor’s. Thus, the first justificatory theory under examination 
is the rights and forfeiture theory, which provides an explanation for the competing 
rights of the defender and aggressor. 
 
2.2.1 Rights and forfeiture theory 
 
According to Leverick
267
 and Ashworth,
268
 the most appropriate and convincing 
theory that explains why self-defence is justifiable is the rights theory. This theory 
focuses on an individual’s human rights, particularly the right to life. This right is 
arguably the most important
269
 and fundamental of all the recognised human rights. It 
may be claimed that the reason for this is that the right to life is a prerequisite to the 
possession of all other rights.
270
 In other words, without the protection of one’s life, it 
is impossible to possess any other right, thus making the denial of the right to life an 
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irreparable injury. It is on this basis that a person is permitted to act in self-defence 
when faced with an unjust threat to one’s life, and the right to life has gained 
protection in international conventions.
271
  
 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights contains a provision that: 
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law’.272 There are exceptions to the 
general rule prohibiting the depravation of life, and these are contained in Article 
2(2):  
 
‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of 
this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful 
violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection’.273  
 
This clearly includes lawful self-defence. 
 
The rights theory operates as a justification to self-defence because in using lethal 
defensive force against an aggressor, the defendant is merely protecting his own right 
to life. Although this is at the expense of the aggressor’s right to life, it is asserted by 
several authors such as Thomson,
274
 Uniacke
275
 and Leverick
276
 that during the period 
of the attack, the aggressor temporarily forfeits his right to life, and thus his right not 
to be killed, by posing an unjust immediate threat to the life of another. It is important 
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to note that an aggressor only forfeits his right to life during the time he is posing a 
threat to the life of another; the moment he ceases to be a threat, the right to life is 
regained. Therefore, an individual who withdraws from his attack may not lawfully be 
killed, as this would not constitute self-defence; the defensive force would be 
excessive in such a circumstance, as it would no longer be necessary. It is important 
to stress this principle, as the language of forfeiture can be controversial due to its 
negative connotations of being a form of punishment.
277
  
 
Dressler claims that ‘forfeiture runs counter to the proposition that ‘all human lives 
must be regarded as having an equal claim to preservation simply because life itself 
is an irreducible value’.278 The meaning of forfeit in this context does not refer to any 
imposition of a penalty; rather the meaning here is simply ‘to lose’.279 It may be that 
‘suspend’ would be a more appropriate word to use in this context than ‘forfeit’, as it 
implies a temporary ceasing of something, and that it will be regained when certain 
conditions are met. Nevertheless, the literature mainly employs the word ‘forfeiture’, 
therefore the same will be applied here for consistency. Interestingly, despite 
Fletcher’s disapproval and rejection of the idea of forfeiture back in 1979,280  the 
theory is still developing and is widely used by many to this day. As no convincing 
and adequate alternative has been found, it seems likely that forfeiture will continue 
to be a compelling justification in the future.  
 
However, due to the negative connotations of forfeiture, there is a need for theoretical 
justification. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is the fact that the aggressor is 
posing an immediate threat to the defender’s life. Thomson has clarified that the 
reason it is permissible to use lethal defensive force in this context, is not the fact that 
without defensive action the defender will be killed by the aggressor, but rather that 
without defensive action, the aggressor will violate the defender’s right not to be 
killed.
281
 Uniacke believes that the right to life is a conditional right and is dependent 
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upon a person’s conduct.282 This supports the view that the permissibility of self-
defence originates from the right not to be killed.
283
 This conditional approach to 
rights is appropriate and means that the interest protected is potentially held by all 
people, providing they satisfy the necessary conditions.
284
 For example, in relation to 
the right to life, it is possessed by all persons providing they do not pose an unlawful 
threat to the life of another.
285
  
 
The possibility of forfeiting a right, inevitably invokes the discussion of the nature of 
the right that is possessed. This leads to a problem that is presented by the rights 
theory. Human rights are often referred to as unconditional or absolute rights.
286
 
Accordingly, they cannot be lost, or forfeited, providing the individual retains the 
status required in order to possess them.
287
 This view of rights as absolute is 
incompatible with the approach taken by the rights theory in order to justify self-
defence. The understanding of rights as absolute contrasts to the claim that the 
aggressor temporarily forfeits his right to life by virtue of the threat he presents to the 
defender. Therefore, it is argued here that an interpretation of the right to life as being 
absolute is misplaced and untenable.  
 
Indeed, Wallerstein states that the idea of the right to life as an absolute, 
unconditional right must be abandoned, otherwise it is impossible to explain why and 
how it can be forfeited.
288
 Similarly, Sangero claims that absolute rights are non-
existent,
289
 as does Bagaric who states that ‘All rights can be violated in some 
circumstances’.290 This is a logical approach in respect of the right to life because it 
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explains why it is possible for rights to be withdrawn or suspended based on 
circumstances, whereas the unconditional argument reaches an impasse in this 
situation, as it cannot allow for any denial of the norm. Considering also that the law 
is fluid by nature, and is required to apply to a wide range of highly varied situations, 
the conditional approach furthermore appears more appropriate.  
 
Indeed, even the Conventions that have been prepared to protect the right to life 
contain exceptions to the general prohibition of its depravation. For example, Article 
2(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights,
291
 expressly states that there are 
situations when one’s life may be lawfully taken without contravening the Convention 
right, of which self-defence is an example. Based on this, it is difficult to appreciate 
how the idea of an absolute right can be defended, as even the right to life, although 
widely regarded as the most fundamental of human rights, can potentially be lawfully 
denied in certain situations. An example of the non-absolute nature of the right is 
demonstrated in the field of medical law, as although a rare occurrence, one 
individual’s right to life can be outweighed by another individual’s right.292 However, 
the prohibition of torture included in Article 3 of the ECHR may be considered an 
absolute right, as there are no derogations listed within the definition of the right. It is 
expressly stated that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’ 293  without exception, thus such action can never be 
lawful.
294
 
 
It is better to approach the matter as a balancing of competing rights, than to rely on 
the status of particular individual rights. It is therefore a logical conclusion, in order to 
explain the permissibility of self-defence under the rights theory that the aggressor’s 
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right to life must be considered to be conditional on his actions. By posing a threat to 
the defender, he breaks the condition upon which it is held, thus forfeiting his right.
295
  
 
This argument may also be appreciated from the opposite perspective namely that of 
the right not to be killed, which is implied in the right to life.
296
 From this viewpoint, 
the right not to be killed derives from the right to life,
297
which consequently generates 
the right to act in self-defence when threatened. The following extract by Wallerstein 
summarises the nature of the dynamic between these interconnected rights: 
 
 ‘The notion of a right in rem is that it is the same kind of obligation, 
directed to indefinite and unidentified numbers of people. The right not to 
be killed is similar to all other basic rights, which are in rem, such as 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The construction of the right 
not to be killed and the derivative right to self-defense is a familiar one: a 
right in rem not to be killed which, if infringed by a specific individual, 
gives rise to a right in personam to self-defense’.298 
 
Therefore, it may be said that the right to self-defence is a derivative right, which 
originates from the fundamental right to life and the right not to be killed. This allows 
an initially general right to become a personal right against a specific individual.
299
 
Essentially, this means that individuals have a right not to suffer attacks on their lives, 
and when faced with such a situation, they can exert force against their aggressor 
without interfering with his rights.
300
 The aggressor has both violated the defender’s 
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right, and neglected his own duty not to kill. While every individual holds the right to 
life and right not to be killed equally, upon becoming an unjust threat to another 
person, the defender’s rights outweigh the aggressor’s. The defender is morally 
innocent, and his right has narrowed from a general right to a specific right to act at 
that point in time against the threat to his right to life, and natural right not to be 
killed. 
 
Thus, it appears from the discussions so far, that the right to life is the only right of 
relevance to the rights and forfeiture theory. Indeed, there is a problem with the rights 
theory regarding whether or not the justification applies when self-defence has not 
resulted in the death of the aggressor. Does the right to life protect against lesser 
harms than the loss of life, namely any non-fatal injuries or injuries to one’s 
autonomy?
301
 Herring claims that it does not as ‘Article 2 is not relevant in cases of 
non-deadly force’.302  Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the rights 
theory is obsolete in this particular context, as other human rights could permit self-
defence in situations where non-fatal force has been used.
303
 Articles 3,
304
 5,
305
 and 
8
306
 of the ECHR may be relevant, as they safeguard against interferences to one’s 
autonomy, physical and moral integrity.
307
 Therefore, although self-defence is often 
considered to be a corollary of the right to life, as the right not to be killed, it may also 
derive from other rights in situations where death has not occurred. 
 
The possession of a right usually requires one to be able to take steps to protect that 
right, but as Ryan highlights, ‘there are limits to the actions one may take’.308 A 
person acting in self-defence must act in accordance with the ordinary standards 
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required, and may only do what is considered reasonable.
309
 It is important to 
remember what Beale notes of the protection of legal rights, that ‘the law does not 
ordinarily secure the enjoyment of rights, it grants redress for a violation of rights’.310 
Therefore, care must be taken when considering the rights theory to ensure that it is 
not misinterpreted as a provision allowing individuals to take the law into their own 
hands. Indeed, this is why the conditions of necessity and proportionality are 
requirements of reasonable force, in order for self-defensive actions to be lawful. 
 
It is notable that the rights approach to the justification of self-defence compliments 
the requirements of reasonable force.  
 
‘Rights function to protect persons from being used simply as a mean to 
the ends of others. But if the possession of rights can be conditional on the 
observance of relevant moral requirements, and in particular on 
respecting the rights of others, then it is natural to think that rights can be 
forfeited in precisely this way: by transgressing a relevant moral 
requirement, a person can become liable to be harmed as a means to 
preventing or remedying that very transgression. Necessity and 
proportionality therefore follow as necessary components of liability’.311  
 
The law has developed these tests in line with the morally right action to take. 
Inflicting harm in order to avoid suffering harm is an acceptable intention, and the 
intention with which one acts is very important in this context.
312
  
 
It may be argued that the rights and forfeiture theory is incompatible with the 
important ethical principle of the sanctity of life. This principle reflects that all lives 
are accorded equal value, while any case of self-defence justified by the forfeiture of 
the aggressor’s rights involves a prioritisation of one life over another. However, as 
the forfeiture of the right to life is merely temporary, and is regained as soon as the 
aggressor ceases to pose an unlawful threat to the defender’s life, the theory 
acknowledges the severity of the circumstances for both parties. Thus, by permitting 
only temporary suspension of rights, it does not disrespect the sanctity principle. It is 
difficult to reconcile this argument with Kadish’s statement that ‘the life of the good 
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man and the bad stand equal, because how a man has led his life may not affect his 
claim to continued life’. 313  This suggests that the aggressor’s behaviour is an 
insufficient reason to justify taking his life. However, the rights and forfeiture account 
is not based on blameworthiness, rather it pivots on the defender’s right not to be 
killed. As the rights being balanced are equal,
314
 it is necessary to find a 
distinguishing feature. The difference between the parties is undeniable - the defender 
is not responsible for the circumstances while the aggressor is responsible. The 
potential unfairness of the rights justification towards the aggressor is mitigated by 
the fact that his rights are merely suspended during the period in which he poses an 
unjust threat to the life of another. This means that although the aggressor has 
committed a wrong, his interests are also protected.  
 
While the rights theory is arguably the most compelling theory individually, this 
approach is problematic in that it involves the temporary forfeiture by the aggressor of 
his human rights. Despite not being the perfect solution, the rights theory has many 
benefits and explains difficult situations successfully.
315
 The theory’s strength derives 
from being based not on the aggressor’s wrongdoing, but rather on the defender’s 
right to life, to preserve one’s life against the threat against oneself.316 Despite its 
relative controversy, as will become evident, when this theory is viewed in 
accordance with the other theories, it is tenable as it does not seem to be contrary to 
conventional morality.
317
 Indeed, several other theories bear similarities and 
connections to the rights forfeiture account, such as natural law theory.  
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2.2.2 Natural Law 
 
The theory of natural law is closely connected to that of rights theory, as the right to 
life in particular may be said to derive from nature. This prioritisation of life means 
that self-defence is a defence that is recognised in conceptions of natural law which 
highlight the preservation of life. There are many different strands of natural law, and 
‘Natural law theory’ is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics, theories of 
politics, theories of civil law, and theories of religious morality’.318  This section 
draws upon natural law as a theory of law,
319
 and briefly summarises some of the 
most notable strands within the legal tradition.
320
 
 
According to D’Entrèves, the best general description of natural law is that it provides 
a title to the ‘point of intersection between law and morals’.321 Broadly, the theory 
indicates that law both depends upon, and partly derives from moral norms, which are 
not only universally acceptable and applicable, but are also located in nature.
322
 
Freeman explains that the claim to the existence of universal ethical principles is 
based upon the fact that all people, in all societies, are capable of having knowledge 
of these values and living according to them, as they are discoverable by reasoning 
about human good.
323
  
 
The ancient Greeks probably provide the earliest delineation of natural law theory, as 
its philosophy ‘has deep roots in the classical Greek conception of the universe as 
normatively ordered’.324 This is evident in both Plato and Aristotle’s search for a truth 
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existing and residing in nature.
325
 The concept of self-preservation in particular can be 
traced back to the ancient Greeks and the belief that certain relationships involved the 
existence of natural rights and duties, and that ‘the right of self-defense was equally 
located in nature’.326 The philosophy that is advanced here is that things follow pre-
determined paths according to their nature, which determines their place in the world 
and their natural ends.
327
 The theory evidently has a long tradition and according to 
Freeman ‘Until the Stoics “nature” had meant “the order of things”; with them it 
came to be identified with man’s reason. When man lived according to “reason” he 
was living “naturally”. To the Stoics precepts of reason had universal force’.328 This 
notion of natural law advances the idea that there are universal moral standards that 
all people are capable of discovering.  
 
The next influential stage in the history of natural law is the role of the Roman Stoic 
philosophers, such as Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Their logic was that law 
is a method of distinguishing between right and wrong, or what is regarded as just or 
unjust actions, and is a product of nature which is aimed at protecting the good in 
society while penalising the evil.
329
 
 
Howevever, the classical and perhaps most well-known view of natural law theory is 
that developed by Saint Thomas Aquinas, based on Christianity, specifically Roman 
Catholicism. Aquinas stated that ‘The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that 
God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally’.330 Despite the 
perception that all humans know the difference between right and wrong, a legal 
structure of rules is required in order to counter the presence of evil that exists within 
men.
331
 Due to the fact that people do not always act righteously, in accordance with 
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morality and the law, defences such as self-defence are crucial to provide fairness and 
justice within society. 
 
It is problematic to rely on a religious base alone for the theory,
332
 and Hugo De 
Groot (Grotius)
333
 has been ascribed with the responsibility of secularising natural law 
theory.
334
 Following his philosophy it is no longer necessary to conform to a 
particular religion to be an advocate of natural law.
335
 In Moore’s opinion ‘it is good 
to be without God as we seek to vindicate any belief in the objectivity of morals, for 
we don’t need him in this task’,336 which supports the fact that natural law can exist 
independently of its religious connotations. As natural law is self-evident, there is no 
need to base its tenets on the existence of God.
337
 
 
This view of law as being tied to morality distinguishes the tradtion of natural law 
from other theoretical traditions. Notably, natural law is often compared to positivism. 
Positivism considers ethics and morals to be separate and distinct from the law, and 
hence unnecessary to the foundation of law. There is an emphasis upon law as a 
science, and the importance of obedience and command are notable characteristics of 
its philosophy which is reflected in the phrase ‘law is law’.338 Kroeze interestingly 
notes that ‘It is not often that a theory of law can be said to suffer from ‘bad press’, 
but that is the case with positivism’. 339  Its ‘bad press’ may be attested to its 
persistence that once a law is made, its validity is not affected even if it is considered 
to be immoral.
340
 The problem is that positivism is considered accountable for rigid 
interpretations of the law in court rooms by the judiciary, and the theory has been 
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blamed for ‘the ‘mechanical and wooden’ interpretation of statutes by the courts’.341 
Therefore, for the purposes of this research, positivism is too rigid in its application of 
the law to be used to question the law and its effectiveness,
342
 or to observe to what 
degree it should be extended, and to explore whether offences of possessing offensive 
weapons should be covered by the defence of self-defence. On the other hand, natural 
law theory is adaptable and flexible, and is designed in a way that facilitates moral 
questioning and reasoning within the context of legal study. Indeed, aspects of natural 
law theory remain pertinent and useful in a modern, secular society.
343
 For example, 
Hsiao adopts the theory to support his proposition that the natural right to life gives 
rise to a natural right to bear arms.
344
  
 
An important principle of the modern tenets of natural law is the emphasis placed 
upon the preservation of life.
345
 The principle that good is to be done, and life is to be 
preserved at all times is the strand of natural law that is considered useful to the 
present research. As will be seen shortly with reference to Finnis, it forms part of the 
modern formulation of the theory.
346
 Self-preservation is a principle prioritising 
personal security, and Blackstone prioritised this as a natural right, stating that it 
encompasses an individual’s ‘legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, 
his body, his health, and his reputation’.347 The destruction of life and evil is to be 
avoided, and everything that achieves these goals is encompassed within the theory.
348
 
This natural law account considers the autonomy of the individual to be vital. In the 
words of Hobbes ‘jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as 
he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own 
life’.349 Therefore, the right to self-defence is highly valued: ‘the sum of the right to 
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nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves’.350 This theory gives self-
defence a privileged status as a significant right that is not only recognised in law, but 
also exists in nature, and is therefore morally grounded. It is notable that natural law 
accepts that there are exceptions to general moral norms, for example killing, as 
although killing is clearly a serious wrong, it may be just if it results from an act of 
self-preservation or self-defence. As Golding notes, ‘Although natural law prohibits 
immoral actions that cause harm to other human beings, it is not ‘necessarily 
contrary to natural law to kill in self-defense’.351 
 
This is so despite the status of life as a necessary good in order to lead the ‘good life’. 
This concept is attributed to Finnis, and life is the first good to be listed in his view of 
the ‘basic forms of human flourishing’. 352  Similarly, Paterson refers to life as a 
primary good, in the context of his work on assisted suicide and euthanasia.
353
 He 
explains that primary goods are those entities that are ‘the very purposes or goals in 
life that ultimately inform and shape the content of all worthwhile human action’.354 
The value of life is not only evident in its status as a primary good, but also in the fact 
that it is necessary in order to enjoy any of the other primary and secondary goods.
355
  
 
In light of this theory demonstrating the value of life, causing death in self-defence 
appears contestable. However, in the context of self-defence, the action of avoiding 
death (harm to the defender) by causing injury or death to another (harm to the 
aggressor) is permissible. Within the context of the injury or damage suffered by the 
aggressor, the lawful circumstances mitigate the general principles relating to harm.
356
 
Generally, harm involves the commission of wrongful acts, but cases of self-defence 
fall outside the norm as the action is justified, even if it causes the death of the 
aggressor. This is not to say that no harm has occurred as a matter of fact, but rather, 
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that the harm has eventuated in special circumstances in which it is considered 
justified.  
 
The concept of self-preservation is especially pertinent to this research, as it provides 
a direct connection between natural law theory and self-defence. Uniacke has 
explored this relationship between self-defence and natural law, and claims that the 
former derives from the latter.
357
 She refers to the moral permission of self-defence 
and the different justifications for allowing the defence. The varying degrees of these 
justifications range from the belief that legitimacy originates merely from the just 
intention of self-preservation; to the belief that self-defence is a moral and legal 
‘right’; to the more extreme contention that there is a ‘duty’ to preserve life.358 These 
suggestions create a wide scale of what is considered acceptable, from merely being 
allowed to protect oneself, to having a ‘right’ of self-preservation, to being under a 
duty to act defensively. Such reasoning about a duty to act in self-defence is 
antiquated, and alludes to a period when individuals were expected to keep arms in 
order to assist the state with peacekeeping.
359
 This duty is unlikely to be accepted in 
modern times due to the institutionalisation of law enforcement bodies, and the 
strengthened role of the state to protect its citizens.
360
 However, the claims that it is a 
moral right, that individual’s may prefer their own lives over their aggressor’s, and 
that others are permitted to assist the defender to protect himself, are relevant and 
justify the defence of self-defence.  
 
Indeed, self-preservation also creates a strong link between natural law and the right 
to life. This is evident in Ashworth’s assertion that the right to life, to physical 
security, ‘may be described as “natural” and “absolute” in the sense that reason 
demands its recognition if men are to live together in society, and in the sense that the 
instinct towards self-preservation is so strong and basic to human nature that “no 
law can oblige a man to abandon” it’.361 Therefore, in order to protect the right to 
life, the right to use defensive force must also be permitted, and a defence of self-
defence must be available.  
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It is apt to refer to Locke’s philosophy on the state of war, that a human life is to be 
preserved as far as is possible as the fundamental law of nature demands ‘when all 
cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred; and one may 
destroy a man who makes war upon him’.362 He compares the aggressor to a ‘beast of 
prey;’ an analogy indicating predatory, dangerous, cruel, and ruthlessness in the 
aggressor’s treatment of his fellow man.363 Thus, on a basic evaluation, by his nature 
and actions, the aggressor devalues his own life by posing an unjust threat to the life 
of another, and as a result loses some of the rights otherwise awarded to him. There is 
a similarity here to the rights and forfeiture account, providing additional support and 
justification for the theory. Due to the offensive actions of aggressors, they lack status 
as moral beings as they have transgressed expected behavioural norms, thus placing 
them in a position of moral weakness in comparison with their victim. In attacking 
their prey, ‘beasts of prey’ willingly place themselves in a position of risk and danger. 
They act according to their nature for survival, as does their prey, which will fight 
back where possible. The risk is knowingly undertaken, and the beast may suffer an 
injury or fatal blow. When transferring this analysis to the context of aggressors and 
defenders in cases of self-defence, the main point to draw from the reference to beasts 
is that the preservation of human life is paramount and that by exerting violence upon 
another human being, the aggressor’s transgression means that violence may lawfully 
be used against him.
364
 The wrongfulness of the aggressor’s action attracts such 
significant moral disapproval that it outweighs his general right of self-preservation. 
The defender’s right to preserve one’s life becomes paramount. Therefore, the natural 
law account of self-defence applied here asserts that the defence is morally 
permissible as it is founded in nature itself.
365
 Accordingly, any harm caused to the 
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aggressor is his own doing because his actions place him outside the general 
protection of both law and morality.
366
 
 
Natural law does not necessarily constitute a separate theory of justification, as it 
bears similarities to the other theories discussed. Rather, it can be seen as providing 
more of a framework and credibility for the study, as opposed to a distinct 
justificatory theory in its own right. The significant preference ascribed to self-
preservation, provides a foundation and basis for the claims of the other theories 
discussed here, including the following theory of consequentialism.  
 
2.2.3 Consequentialism 
 
The former discussion leads onto the next theory, namely consequentialism, as it sets 
out the contention that the aggressor’s actions create his fate. The consequentialist 
approach weighs the consequences of the offensive and defensive actions against each 
other. It involves an assessment of which consequence produces the ‘greatest 
happiness’. An example of the theory is utilitarianism which seeks to maximize 
happiness to the greatest number of people.
367
 Alternatively, and pertinent to the 
consideration of self-defence, it does not necessarily need to involve a significant 
amount of people before happiness can be maximised.
368
 Often self-defence involves 
an aggressor and a defender, therefore the analysis is of the consequences of the loss 
of one life or another, as opposed to one life or several lives. Despite the absence of 
unequal consequences to be balanced, permitting the defender’s use of force is the 
greatest good in this situation, for the individual defender, and for the social legal 
order.  
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In assessing self-defence, the consequentialist conclusion is that it is preferable for the 
aggressor’s life to be lost, than that of the innocent victim, who merely responds to 
the attack by using force in defensive action.
369
 On an analysis based on the 
consequences alone,
370
 this is the clear outcome to be supported. Kadish states that 
‘when the choice is between the life of the victim and the life of his assailant, the 
answer is unambiguous in every legal system: the victim may kill to save his own 
life’.371 This is a strong view concerning the fact that the interests of the defender to 
protect himself and preserve his own life outweigh the aggressor’s life. This view is 
underpinned and justified by the notion of a right to resist aggression,
372
 which 
represents the greatest good in the circumstances. 
 
Similarly, Fletcher states that ‘an aggressor killed in self-defence … is not a relevant 
invasion of protected legal interest’,373  as the action is justified according to the 
circumstances. One may say that the aggressor has placed himself in a position of 
moral weakness compared to the defender, and because of this aggressive, immoral 
behaviour, the aggressor’s own life is accorded lesser value. What is meant by the 
term ‘moral weakness’ is that the aggressor is subject to an increased level of moral 
scrutiny. His actions have attracted great disapproval as a result of their wrongfulness, 
and thus render him less worthy of moral protection than one who has not acted 
offensively. This reasoning supports the tenets of consequentialism because it 
indicates that the preferred consequence is that harm be caused to the aggressor and 
not the defender. By agreeing with this view, we are effectively saying that when 
looking at self-defence, the exercise undertaken is the comparison of the interests of 
the individuals involved. Accordingly, the right to kill in self-defence is founded upon 
the fact that a choice between lives must be made, that of the aggressor and the 
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victim, and that the latter is to be preferred by virtue of his innocence in the 
circumstances.
374
  
 
Assessing the circumstances in this manner is an example of weighing a choice of 
evils. The ‘lesser of two evils’ account is more commonly used when dealing with the 
defence of necessity,
375
 but it is still worth mentioning in this context of consequential 
thought as a possible justification for self-defence.
376
 Essentially, what this theory 
advances is that where there are two inevitable evils about to occur, (in this context an 
unlawful attack on an innocent person or the use of defensive force), the lesser evil is 
to be preferred. Therefore, the defensive action is permissible as the lesser harm. 
Within the context of self-defence, this argument holds that the defender’s life should 
be protected, as he is an innocent person who is subjected to an unjust attack. The 
defender’s life is protected by permitting the lesser harm/evil, that is, the infliction of 
defensive force on the aggressor in order to prevent the attack on the defender from 
succeeding. Both outcomes are a form of evil, either an innocent individual will be 
attacked, or the aggressor will be injured or killed in order to repel the offensive use 
of force. The greater harm is the former, that of the defender suffering an injury or 
being killed. The lesser harm is an infliction of injury or the killing of the aggressor 
through the use of defensive force. This argument entitles the victim to claim that the 
offence he committed ‘was necessary to prevent greater harm from occurring’.377  
 
Leverick states that consequentialist theories are commendable in that they prioritise 
the outcome that causes the smallest harm in a certain scenario, the focus therefore 
being on the most just result in the situation.
378
 Despite this positive feature of the 
theory, it is problematic that ‘to judge an action purely on the basis of its 
consequences is to neglect issues of individual rights and justice’, 379  potentially 
resulting in a grave injustice to an individual, purely as one person’s suffering is 
considered a lesser harm than the suffering of another. This assessment of 
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consequences is similar to the prioritization of self-preservation in natural law theory. 
However, it differs as it places the focus upon the weighing of consequences as good 
or bad outcomes, as opposed to justifying the defender’s preference of his own life 
over that of his aggressor’s.  
 
Arguably, this approach bears a similarity to the principle in the law of tort, that 
‘where a loss has been incurred, between two innocents the causer pays’. 380 
Considered in relation to self-defence, where usually only one party is innocent while 
the other is acting unlawfully, this principle would support the justification of the 
defender’s action. Thus, the guilt and blameworthiness of the aggressor would render 
any defensive force exerted against him acceptable, as he is responsible for the need 
to resort to such action in the first place.
381
 The defender is thus favoured over the 
aggressor, because of the latter’s moral fault,382 as the reasons for acting defensively 
are perfectly moral. A balancing of good and bad outcomes is therefore similarly 
achieved.  
 
This analysis considers the consequences in light of the fact that the aggressor has 
forced a choice of lives situation, his own and that of the defender, and evaluates 
which consequence should be preferred. It is attractive in that it gives preference to 
the least morally harmful outcome.
383
 However, the danger with the argument of 
consequentialism, is that it focuses too much on the blameworthiness of the 
aggressor.
384
 This could create the misleading impression of self-defence as a form of 
punishment.
385
 It is possible that self-defence may be viewed as permitting a defender 
to determine the measurement and allocation of the aggressor’s punishment, and 
therefore as a form of arbitrary, extrajudicial punishment. This is clearly not the 
reason for allowing self-defence as a defence; rather it is a legal mechanism for 
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securing justice to individuals when faced with difficult circumstances and a threat to 
personal security. While consequentialism is insufficient by itself as a justification, if 
applied in conjunction with the other theories, it seems reasonable as it regards the 
preservation of the innocent defender’s life as the greatest good, and the consequential 
loss of the aggressor’s life as the least bad outcome. Its approach is similar to the 
following theory of forced choice, where because of the aggressor’s actions, his rights 
to defend himself are impaired based on the threat he poses to the defender.  
 
2.2.4 Forced Choice 
 
Wasserman believes that it is the very fact that the aggressor forces a choice between 
lives at the time defensive force is used against him, that renders self-defence both 
morally and legally acceptable.
386
 The aggressor is in control of the situation; while 
he has forced a choice with respect to the defender, he himself could withdraw the 
attack introducing a new choice where neither would be harmed.
387
 The defender 
merely acts within his best interests, and it is this disparity between the actions of the 
parties that supports the view that it is the aggressor’s life that should be sacrificed. 
Responsibility is linked to choice as the criminal law emphasises the need for 
individuals to be acting according to their free will before criminal liability arises. In 
the present example, the defender lacks this ability to choose.
388
 
 
Wallerstein also uses this theory to explain why self-defence is justified, claiming that 
this is the most appropriate approach in order to fully unravel the defence. He 
mentions that it is because of the involuntariness of the defender’s action, having been 
placed in a position where one has no choice but to either endure or subject force, that 
the action is permitted.
389
 Individuals are permitted to prefer their own lives to that of 
others, especially aggressors who are posing a threat to their safety. Therefore, it 
renders it morally and legally permissible for a person to kill one’s aggressor in self-
defence, if that is the only way of saving one’s own life.  
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It seems both logical and reasonable for a person to value one’s own life more than 
the life of an aggressor who threatens to deny one’s life, and therefore to choose to 
save oneself as opposed to suffering the aggression. Such reasoning appeals to the 
personal partiality approach,
390
 entitling a defender to prefer to preserve one’s own 
life over that of one’s aggressor. This approach accords great emphasis on the 
aggressor’s action, and due to his unlawful act, it is only natural that ‘his suffering 
harm makes the outcome more just than it would be if the Victim were to be harmed 
instead’.391 This is connected to the lesser harmful result theory, or consequentialism, 
as it advocates that allowing force against the aggressor is the lesser harm, as he bears 
sole responsibility for the position the defender faces.
392
  
 
Rodin discusses liability as a factor justifying the infliction of harms in self-
defence.
393
 This approach consists of assessing the relative status of the persons 
involved. It explains that in defence cases, while the aggressor is responsible for an 
unjust attack on a victim, and the forced choice that ensues, the defender (by virtue of 
being the victim) is not reciprocally responsible for using force to repel the attack. ‘It 
is this asymmetry in their respective agency that explains why the villain [the 
aggressor] is liable to be killed by the defender and not the other way around (even 
though both may constitute a threat to the life of the other)’.394 It is therefore the 
aggressor’s status as an unlawful threat, or risk of harm to the defender, which entitles 
the defender to avoid suffering the harm to one’s own person by inflicting the harm 
on the aggressor instead. It is a situation where harm is highly likely to occur, either 
by the defender’s lack of a defensive response against the aggressor, or by one’s 
decision to react to the threat or attack by defending oneself. However, as explained 
by the rights and forfeiture theory, it is acceptable, as the person who suffers harm has 
forfeited his right not to be harmed under the circumstances.
395
 Essentially, the 
general assertion is that by becoming an unjust threat to the life of the innocent 
defender, the aggressor forfeits his own right to life. The aggressor is thus not harmed 
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in the same way as the defender would be if the attack was not stopped, as he has 
temporarily forfeited his rights for the duration of his attack.
396
 
 
However, it must be noted that based on the harm principle, self-defence can be a 
risky activity for the defender. As it involves a heat of the moment reaction and the 
individual has limited options available, one may place oneself in a position of facing 
criminal liability if one’s actions are not deemed reasonable in the circumstances.397 
Regarding the defender’s culpability when acting in self-defence, having good 
intentions and reasons for taking the risk of causing harm will reduce one’s 
culpability considerably. In the context of self-defence, the intention usually required 
is for force to be used for the purpose of defence, although this may also entail an 
intention to harm the aggressor in order to achieve this.
398
 In assessing the harm that 
is brought about in self-defence, it is necessary to appreciate and understand ‘the 
reasons that motivate the action - in particular, whether the reasons are considered 
invalid or valid. In many contexts, people do not judge a harmful action as an 
instance of wrongdoing because they view the reasons motivating the action as valid 
and therefore deem causation of harm justifiable’. 399  Defensive reasons are an 
example of these accepted reasons for causing harm, and the law does not demand a 
superior standard of people faced with a threat, and will take into consideration that 
they are responding in the heat of the moment. Therefore, the defender’s instinctive 
reaction and assessment of the risk of causing harm to his aggressor can be explained 
by the forced choice he faced in the circumstances. The culpable act is appreciated in 
light of the risk as the defender viewed it at the time, and not according to the real 
nature of the risk involved.
400
 Because the nature of the situation demands a spur of 
the moment reaction to a threat or an attack, despite responding in a normally harmful 
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manner, society is tolerant of the conduct in the circumstances, as it involves a threat 
to life and physical security,
401
 and a lack of alternative choices for the defender. 
 
2.2.5 Double Effect 
 
The weighing of consequences and forced choices leads to a consideration of the 
doctrine of double effect, which will only be mentioned here briefly. The theory states 
that an action generating a good outcome may be morally justified despite also 
bringing about a bad consequence providing it was not intended, but merely 
foreseeable.
402
 The doctrine is commonly utilised in medical ethics, especially when 
considering palliative care and decisions regarding end of life treatment.
403
 There are 
many different approaches to the philosophical construct,
404
 and a number of varying 
yet fundamentally similar requirements have been developed.
405
 There are several 
conditions that must be satisfied:  
 
‘(1) the act by itself must be morally good or at least indifferent. (2) … 
[it] must intend to cause a good effect. (3) A bad effect may have been 
foreseen but not intended … (4) The good effect follows from the action, 
not from the bad effect … (5) There is a sufficiently grave reason for 
achieving the good effect, compensating for hazarding the evil effect’.406  
 
Self-defence cases are capable of satisfying these criteria, and indeed, double effect 
was first developed within the context of self-defence.
407
 Therefore, these conditions 
merit individual consideration within the context of the defence. 
 
First, as has already been seen in this chapter, acting to preserve one’s life is 
acceptable and regarded as morally justified. As self-defence is essentially the 
infliction of defensive force to avoid an unlawful threat, this means that the act itself 
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can be regarded as morally good.
408
 The very nature of self-defence is the resistance 
of unjust aggression which is a lawful objective, thus, satisfying the first requirement 
of double effect. 
 
Second, the intention is merely to repel the unlawful threat that the defender is 
exposed to, and thus is taken in pursuit of a good effect. The avoidance of the 
suffering of harm by the innocent defender is a good outcome of the defensive act. As 
self-defence requires the defender to use only reasonable force, this ensures that the 
intention of the actor is merely to resist the harm he would otherwise suffer from the 
threat posed by the aggressor.
409
 
 
Third, while defenders will often focus on the need for defence itself and not the end 
consequence for the aggressor, it is likely that some harm will have been foreseen. In 
the difficult circumstances of self-defence which require instinctive reactions, a 
defender will foresee that his defensive action may result in harm to his aggressor. 
Nevertheless, in order to satisfy the requirements of self-defence, he is merely doing 
what was necessary at the time.
410
 Therefore, the important point here is that while he 
foresees the potential harm, he does not intend it. There is a clear moral 
differentiation between intention and foresight within the doctrine of double effect.
411
 
The approach regards the foreseen negative consequences of actions as permissible, 
while classifying an intended negative outcome as unacceptable. However, this 
distinction can be considered to represent a very narrow difference.
412
 
 
Fourth, the defensive force is directed towards the threat, therefore the risk to the 
defender’s safety is repelled as a direct result of his defensive action, not by the harm 
sustained by the aggressor.
413
 Finally, if the defensive force used was necessary for 
the preservation of the defender’s life, then the risk he faced clearly provides a 
sufficiently serious reason for acting as he did. This involes an assessment of 
proportionality,
414
 to ensure that the harm caused to the aggressor accords to the harm 
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avoided by the defender. Thus, this satisfies the standards required by the doctrine of 
double effect.  
 
Providing the conduct is reasonable in the circumstances, the defender does not 
commit a criminal offence, as he does not intend to cause harm to his aggressor, but 
merely intends to protect himself, which is a lawful and moral intention. The doctrine 
of double effect justifies itself by separating the defender’s intention from the 
foreseeable effect of the action.
415
 Thus, as in all just cases of self-defence the 
defender’s intention will be to repel the threat, and as long as one does not also intend 
the harm, but merely permits it as a ‘side effect’,416 one’s action will be permissible 
even if the consequences were foreseeable.
417
  
 
2.2.6 Autonomy 
 
Another possible justification for self-defence places emphasis on the autonomy of 
individuals. This is the approach preferred by Sangero who asserts that it is the 
existence of an injury to one’s autonomy that is the crucial justifying element of self-
defence.
418
 Within this context, autonomy is broadly specified as control over one’s 
own person, the claim to one’s self-determination, and right not to be interfered with, 
thus to be free from threats and attacks. This principle is different to the previous 
theories under discussion as it focuses not on the individual’s reasons for preferring 
their own life, or the weighing of consequences, but rather solely on the intrusion with 
one’s liberty to determine one’s own life experiences. 
 
Sangero claims that there is a need to strike a balance between the following factors: 
the expected physical injury to the defender if protective action is not taken; personal 
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autonomy; the offender’s culpability; and the social-legal order.419  This approach 
ascribes great value to the rights of individuals and their self-determination through 
the importance attached to autonomy, while the respect ascribed to the social-legal 
order ensures appropriate and adequate protection within wider society.
420
 Thus, an 
appropriate balance is struck between one’s right of self-determination and the 
concurrent rights of other individuals as well. 
 
The ability to self-govern and to protect oneself and one’s own personal sphere of 
control is highly valued within society, making the autonomy principle justifying self-
defence plausible and persuasive. In order to prioritize individual self-determination 
the law must develop a means to ensure the protection of individual sovereignty, 
because without this security there can be no enjoyment of self-determination.
421
 It is 
the very fact that some injury or harm is caused to a person, by the presence of a 
threat to his life or a physical attack upon him, which infringes his own autonomy that 
triggers the right to self-defence. Schopp argues that this intrusion on the victim’s 
autonomy forces him to either defend himself against it or tolerate it, and because of 
this overstepping by the aggressor, he loses his protected rights of sovereignty and 
freedom from interference.
422
  
 
Such reasoning is compelling as it allows a wide scope for self-defence, and bears 
similarity to the principle of forfeiture in the rights theory. It does not, for example, 
impose a restriction that the harm suffered or inflicted must result in death in order for 
the defence to be relevant, while at the same time an act of self-defence justified by 
individual autonomy also protects the social-legal order.
423
 It does this by permitting 
the defender to take defensive action to prevent the commission of a crime, which in 
turn deters aggressors from offending.
424
 This satisfies moral standards, as an 
individual’s sphere of sovereignty represents an entity that should not be interfered 
with by others, and which is thus to be protected as a moral and legal right. However, 
it is problematic that the principle of autonomy conflicts with the requirement of 
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proportionality.
425
 This is evident in the contrast between the limitation that the 
proportionality requirement places upon actors, and the unlimited nature of autonomy. 
While proportionality requires actions to correspond proportionately to the offensive 
force they repel, autonomy claims that an individual should not have to suffer 
interferences, and may repel any aggression with the force that they determine is 
appropriate. The proportionality requirement is necessary for the fair and lawful 
application of self-defence, and if the autonomy principle is incompatible with 
proportionality it cannot provide an adequate and appropriate justification by itself.
426
 
Nevertheless, autonomy is an important factor in the permissibility of defensive 
action.
427
 
 
The threat posed need not always be to one’s life, it may be any threat of physical 
violence, for example, the loss of limbs or rape. The crucial factor is that an injury to 
one’s autonomy is involved - ‘self-defense extends to parts of yourself that are 
integral to you; your life is important, but it does not compromise all that is important 
or importantly defended’.428 Nevertheless, the killing or injuring of another in order to 
protect oneself from suffering harm, can still be regarded as a serious moral wrong,
429
 
therefore it is important that the defensive action is justified. As the autonomy 
principle does not restrict defensive force to threats to one’s life, it guards against an 
interference with one’s person, which although arguably are less severe harms than 
death, can still constitute serious intrusions to self-determination. In this regard, it 
bears similarity to the importance attached to the right of self-preservation under 
natural law as previously considered. 
 
The autonomy argument, while convincing, has the potential for abuse and the over 
exertion of self-determination by individuals. As it does not impose limitations on the 
degree of harm that must be threatened, other than that it harms one’s autonomy, its 
application is broader than the other theories, which is problematic. Nevertheless, its 
broad scope is also its advantage. The autonomy argument can provide a justification 
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of self-defence in circumstances when the threat faced by the defender is less grave 
than a threat to life. While many theories prioritise killing in self-defence and defence 
against threats to life,
430
 autonomy can justify the use of force against non-fatal 
threats and the infliction of non-fatal force. However, it can also provide a 
justification of self-defence in situations where a defensive action results in the death 
of the aggressor. Thus, it can be applied within a variety of different contexts, to 
different levels of threats and use of force. The autonomy principle makes a vital 
contribution considering the wide-reaching application of self-defence.  
 
2.2.7 Which theory? 
 
The moral justification of self-defence can be achieved through a combination of the 
theories above, rather than by a single theory as no individual theory succeeds in 
providing an adequate justification on its own. As McMahan says, ‘rather than there 
being a single, unitary justification for killing in self-defense, there may be several 
distinct justifications, so that self-defense may be justified in one way in one case and 
another way in another’. 431  This provides the most logical and comprehensive 
justification for the defence, and provides flexibility to adapt to particular 
circumstances. Such a view encompasses approaches that focus on the aggressor and 
his liability, as well as approaches centred upon the defender, and the permissibility of 
using defensive harm against the threat or attack.
432
  
 
It is better to suggest that a mixture of (i) the temporary forfeiture of one’s rights by 
virtue of posing an unlawful threat to the defender; (ii) the natural law emphasis on 
self-preservation; (iii) the weighting of the consequences in favour of the defender; 
(iv) the moral guilt of the aggressor in forcing the choice of lives; (v) the separation of 
intention and foresight as a matter of double effect; and, (iv) the importance of the 
defender’s autonomy constitutes the reasons why self-defence is justified as a 
defence. Any weaknesses inherent in the separate theories may be overcome by 
combining the good qualities in order to produce one coherent body of thought, which 
justifies the defence without risking a disregard of the aggressor’s rights. There are 
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clearly several reasons why the defence is considered justified, and these should be 
appreciated respectively for their individual merits. Therefore, the conclusion drawn 
is that no single theory fully justifies self-defence on its own, but a mixture of 
different theories provides a reasoned justification. 
 
It is not only the theoretical reasons why actions of self-defence are justified that have 
been widely discussed. The criminal law concept and test of reasonableness, 
embodied in the form of the reasonable man, or the reasonable person,
433
 also need 
examination in order to gain a better understanding of its merits and effectiveness. It 
is necessary to consider this matter as it forms a fundamental aspect of an assessment 
of self-defence, namely the objective criterion. As previously mentioned, the test for 
reasonable force in self-defence involves the subjective consideration of the 
circumstances as the defender perceived them, and the objective consideration of 
whether the force was necessary in those circumstances from the perspective of the 
‘reasonable man’.434  
 
2.3 Reasonable person test and individual characteristics 
 
‘Reasonableness in criminal law is an objective standard ... not an empirical or 
statistical measure of how average members of the public think, feel, or behave. 
Average is not the same as right or appropriate’.435 The difficulty and challenges 
raised by such a standard, is how the appropriate level of reasonableness should be 
stated.
436
 With self-defence, although the action would generally be wrongful, 
because it is carried out for the purpose of self-defence, this is considered to be a 
reasonable reaction. The meaning of reasonable here is that the particular action falls 
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within ‘allowable limits’, 437  and has not gone beyond what is acceptable in the 
circumstances. The action is justified on the ground that any reasonable person could 
and would have committed it in the circumstances. Debate has circulated around 
whether this standard is appropriate.
438
  
 
As noted earlier, one crucial reason for utilising the reasonable person test is the fact 
that self-defence permits a defence even when the defender is mistaken as to one’s 
need to use defensive force.
439
 Lee states that ‘if we eliminated the reasonableness 
requirement, a self-defender would have to be correct in his belief that the victim 
posed an imminent threat of bodily harm’.440 The reasoning here is that even when a 
defender mistakes the need for force, the reasonable person test is still engaged to 
assess whether the reaction was permissible in the circumstances as mistaken. 
However, without the existence of the standard, the action might not be justified 
under such circumstances, as it would be difficult to justify the consideration of 
mistake without infringing the aggressor’s rights. This would impose a much higher 
bar to the defence than is applied through the reasonableness standard.  
 
Another reason why it is important to retain the reasonable person test is the danger 
that ‘a person ... who was actually, but unreasonably, afraid of another person 
because of that person’s race or ethnicity, could claim self-defence and be 
acquitted’.441 Removing the objective element from the defence would risk allowing 
self-defence in situations where people over-react due to unfounded pre-existing 
beliefs or opinions about certain individuals or groups of people. The test ensures that 
only reasonable force is permitted by the law, and protects against the use of 
unnecessary force due to prejudice alone, or due to other irrelevant reasons. It would 
be dangerous to remove the test of the reasonable person, as it would distort the 
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requirement that an action should be necessary and proportional, and that it should not 
be based on unlawful reasons.
442
  
 
Fletcher states that the ‘advantage of the single term “reasonable” is that it packs 
into the initial norm criteria that are the same as or similar to those invoked in 
assessing “abuse of rights” at a secondary level of argument … the privilege of self-
defense is no longer absolute. It is limited at the outset by the concept of 
reasonableness’. 443  This is successful in guiding the determination of defensive 
actions accordingly between lawful and unlawful self-defence, and provides a net to 
filter through only appropriate actions. However, Simons argues that a better standard 
would be to question whether the individual had acted with a ‘reasonable degree of 
self-control’.444 This standard is more relevant to and associated primarily with the 
partial defence of loss of control, and is therefore unhelpful in cases of self-defence, 
as it could increase confusion by blurring the lines between different defences. 
 
Another area of debate has circulated around the question of whether on occasion, the 
specific characteristics of the individual concerned should be considered when 
deciding whether the act is one of self-defence.
445
 Westen suggests that the standard 
would be better formulated if it considered the individual in light of all his 
characteristics, and then questioned whether he showed respect for the interests of 
others in the circumstances.
446
 Accordingly, the defendant’s character is of 
importance to the reasonableness of one’s actions. This idea is similar to a term used 
by Alpert and Smith, ‘subjective objectivity’. 447  That is, that there is a dual 
consideration, merging subjective elements into the general objective nature of self-
defence, and that ‘subjective objectivity is the essence of the “reasonable person”’.448  
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It is interesting to question whether some of the individual’s characteristics should be 
taken into consideration when assessing the availability of self-defence.
449
 This would 
mean considering subjective facts, while the test for self-defence is mainly 
objective.
450
 Klansky claims that ‘it is important that the jury consider the individual 
characteristics of the defendant, for there is no “reasonable man” who can know 
whether the defendant’s conduct was justified’,451 and mentions that it is a fictional 
concept. Indeed, it may be argued that it is unfair to refuse to appreciate the balance 
of power between the defender and the aggressor. Weak, vulnerable people might not 
be able to adequately defend themselves without using a weapon, and in order to 
effectively do so, carry a weapon. On the other hand, what would be the position of 
people who have advanced defensive/aggressive skills, such as some form of martial 
arts training, who have the potential to present greater danger than an average person, 
even without possessing any weapons - would it be more reasonable to allow the use 
of a weapon to counter a threat by such attackers? Certainly, those with a high level of 
self-defence skills are not restricted from using their skills defensively against 
aggressors, providing the force used is reasonable in the circumstances.
452
  
 
If the principle that each case of self-defence is considered according to the 
circumstances of the case is applied in the context of self-defence as a defence to 
weapons offences, it may be desirable and useful to allow such considerations to bear 
some weight in the assessment process. Pichhadze argues for increased flexibility in 
the application of the proportionality requirement as ‘a physical attack by a more 
powerful aggressor can potentially be as deadly as a weapon’,453 and it should be 
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possible to conclude that the ‘reasonable man’, or ‘ordinary person’, would also have 
used a weapon in response to an attack by a physically stronger attacker.
454
 
 
Similarly, it is claimed that on occasion, necessity should be ‘ascertained according 
to the physical capacity of the attacker and the defender’455  to acknowledge the 
impact the differing strengths and characteristics of the parties may have on the 
outcome of their confrontation. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v 
Martin
456
 proclaiming that evidence of the defendant’s physical characteristics may 
be admissible, nevertheless holding on the other hand that psychiatric conditions 
could not be taken into account.
457
  
 
One suggestion is that while the defendant must be judged according to the standard 
of the reasonable person, the test would allow consideration of the reasonable person 
within the same specific circumstances as the defendant faced at the time.
458
 Thus, 
what this suggests is that the standard of the general reasonable man could be 
narrowed, in order to better fit the specific circumstances of each case. In a way, this 
already is the position of the law, as the circumstances are considered according to the 
defendant’s belief at the time of the attack, and considers the reasonableness of the 
actions within this context.  
 
It is suggested in Smith & Hogan
459
 that section 76(8) of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 could strengthen the argument for allowing individual 
characteristics to be considered. The provision states that the considerations that are 
listed to be considered in section 76(7) are not exhaustive, and others may be relevant 
when assessing the reasonableness of the force according to section 76(3).
460
 The 
imbalance in the size and strength of the parties, being only one type of potentially 
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contributory characteristic,
461
 could be responsible for the defender’s belief that one’s 
use of defensive force was reasonable in the circumstances and therefore should be 
permissible in court.
462
 This is evident in the statement that ‘the object of a weapon 
was to assist weakness to cope with strength’,463 as a method of overcoming the odds 
against individuals. An example where an imbalance of size and strength may 
encourage the use of a weapon is when victims of domestic abuse, typically a female 
victim and male partner, act to defend themselves.
464
 While the objective test of the 
‘reasonable person’ represents the norm in society of acceptable behaviour towards 
other people, in some cases there is a need to look at the specific individuals to assess 
the reasonableness of their conduct on subjective grounds.  
 
If the law were to allow subjective considerations in cases where it would make a 
significant difference to the outcome of the trial, and would be necessary for the 
maximum enforcement of justice, the defence of self-defence could be utilised in the 
fairest and widest possible manner. This could be practised by only allowing the 
consideration of characteristics in appropriate cases, where not doing so would be 
absurd because it represents an obvious factor in the individual’s decision-making 
process.
465
 This would prevent the misuse of the defence and dispel fears that this 
occasional consideration of subjective characteristics would make the defence easier 
to plead.
466
 There is a need for clarification concerning to what extent an individual’s 
physical characteristics may be relevant. While self-defence involves a mixture of 
subjective and objective tests, appreciating the situation from the defendant’s honest 
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perspective and expecting one’s actions to be reasonable according to those 
circumstances, it does not encompass the subjective reality of the individual’s 
characteristics. An authority is required, as although R v Martin
467
 above has excluded 
the relevance of psychological characteristics, it has opened the door to considerations 
of physical characteristics, the scope of which is uncertain.
468
 This matter is 
particularly relevant in cases involving offensive weapons, because as discussed 
above, a physically weaker individual may be unable to defend himself without the 
assistance of a weapon.  
 
This dilemma of individual characteristics reflects the difficulty of applying a general 
legal standard as each individual is different. Similarly, the individual characteristics 
of the aggressor or individual posing the threat to the defender must be considered. 
 
2.4 The distinction between culpable and innocent aggressors 
 
Situations of self-defence involving different types of aggressors present 
complications. The philosophy behind the defence often raises context-specific 
challenges for the justification of the defence, raising questions that probe its validity. 
The matters referred to in this respect are situations of self-defence involving different 
types of aggressors.
469
 There are distinctions based on culpable or innocent 
aggressors, and on whether the defensive action is exerted against a passive threat, or 
a mere bystander.
470
 It is necessary to clarify briefly which type of aggressor and 
threat the present research is addressing. The distinction has an impact upon the 
justifiability of using defensive force, and it must be explained in order to understand 
the capacity in which this research considers circumstances to be justified. 
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Culpable aggressors are those who are criminally liable for their actions as they are 
considered to be legally responsible agents. Thomson’s hypothetical case 
demonstrates the permissibility of killing a culpable or villainous aggressor. Her 
fantastical scenario involves standing in a meadow when a sudden threat presents in 
the form of a truck being driven intentionally towards you, and the only way to 
prevent it is to kill the driver.
471
 This is a morally justified instance of killing in self-
defence. Generally, the innocent individual, that is the defender, is morally favoured 
over the culpable individual - that is the aggressor, in such situations.
472
  
 
Innocent aggressors, or non-culpable aggressors as they are sometimes called, are 
those who are not regarded as legally responsible for their actions, and therefore 
cannot be held criminally liable.
473
 Innocent aggressors are therefore individuals who 
are either mentally incapacitated, or below the age of criminal responsibility, but who 
nevertheless impose a risk to life.
474
 Thomson’s example of an innocent aggressor 
involves the same threat from a truck in a meadow, but this time the driver is not 
responsible for his actions.
475
 Again, self-defence is available here and morality 
permits killing in self-preservation,
476
 but it may be claimed that such action is merely 
excused this time and not justified.
477
  
 
There is another category that is often discussed when theorising self-defence, and 
that is the position regarding passive or innocent threats. A passive threat is one that 
puts the defender’s life at risk, but the threat merely arises due to circumstances and 
not by way of attack. Thomson’s example here involves a different scenario. The 
threat is faced by a sunbather when a fat man is pushed off the cliff directly above.
478
 
By not acting, the defender faces certain death. By acting to deflect the path using the 
sun awning, he can save himself, but will kill the innocent man falling towards him 
through no fault of his own. Similarly, Leverick offers the example of ‘the 
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mountaineer roped to her companion who falls and threatens to pull the companion 
off the mountain’.479 Although unfortunate for the fat man and the mountaineer’s 
fallen companion, self-defence can controversially again provide a defence here.
480
 
While philosophical arguments often design fantastical cases for illustration,
481
 the 
fallen mountaineer is realistic and has resulted in cases.
482
 Morality permits the 
defender to prefer the preservation of his own life and not to suffer the injustice of 
death himself. However, it may again be claimed that this is based on the excuse form 
of the defence, and not the justification.  
 
The final situation that can be distinguished from culpable and innocent aggressors, 
and from passive threats, is that of an innocent bystander. An innocent bystander is 
different to the other threats in that he does not pose a direct threat to the life of the 
defender. He is merely present at the time of emergency, and presents an obstacle to 
the defender’s safety, or lies in the path that leads to the defender’s survival.483 
Essentially, any self-protective action taken against a bystander would be morally 
questionable.
484
 Self-defence would be impermissible as these cases involve placing 
the bystander in the path of the danger, to suffer the harm instead of the defender.  
 
While it is clearly acceptable for the defender to exert force in self-protection against 
the culpable aggressor, and perhaps more controversially, also against the innocent 
aggressor and the passive threat, it is never permissible to exert that force against the 
innocent bystander, who is not causally related to the creation of the threat.
485
 
Individuals within this latter category are merely possible shields to the threat faced, 
and self-defence law does not support or favour the defender’s option to utilise such 
individuals as a means to an end.
486
 This is the only fair approach to the situation as 
the presence of an unlawful threat is a condition of the justifiability of self-defence. 
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An innocent bystander is not culpable nor is he attacking the defender, therefore the 
defender’s interests of self-preservation does not take priority in this situation.487 
 
Although it is necessary to be aware of these varying types of aggressors, for the 
purposes of the present research, it will be assumed that the aggressor discussed is a 
culpable aggressor. Unless stated otherwise this will be the approach throughout the 
thesis. It is particularly important to be aware of the fact that it is mainly culpable 
aggressors that are discussed, in relation to the possession of offensive weapons, as 
this could affect the application of the law to the offence and possible defence of self-
defence.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The nature of the defence of self-defence as a complete justification for crimes of 
violence, up to and including murder, requires a number of conditions and limitations 
to be enacted in order to safeguard the rights of the aggressor as well as that of the 
defender. Although it is morally acceptable to defend oneself against unlawful threats 
and this is protected as a conditional right,
488
 there must be a limit upon the force that 
is permissible in order to safeguard rights. The law must balance the individual’s right 
to self-defence against the undesirable risk of authorising people to take matters into 
their own hands and rendering aggressors as enemies to the public who are denied all 
rights. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, this is achieved through the standard 
of reasonable force, with its requirements for necessity and proportionality. Although 
these conditions can pose challenges of interpretation, they act as a gateway for 
permissible acts of self-defence, and as a barrier to actions that fall beyond the 
boundaries of the defence.  
 
Balancing these competing interests is complicated and depends upon what is held 
reasonable in the particular circumstances. It is difficult to gauge with certainty from 
the law exactly what actions individuals may justly take in self-defence. It is 
necessary in order to allow the wider applicability of the defence to keep its 
parameters vague so that the law may adapt to include any lawful instances of self-
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defence without arbitrarily denying any justified examples of the defence.
489
 The 
legislator must either strive to set out all the relevant rules and all the exceptions to 
them in the fullest possible detail, so as not to exclude any lawful use of the defence, 
or provide only the outline of the principles that should be considered, and leave the 
work of providing the details to the courts and the common law.
490
  
 
As highlighted in this chapter, it is difficult to find a general consensus regarding the 
justifiability of self-defence. Several theories have been developed to explain why it is 
a permissible action. The theories of rights and forfeiture, natural law, 
consequentialism, forced choice, double effect, and individual autonomy were 
discussed as providing the most convincing explanation when combined together. 
Similarly, the benefits of the reasonable person test were explored alongside the 
relevance of the individual’s physical characteristics, as this may play a significant 
role in decisions to carry and use weapons in self-defence.
491
  
 
Indeed, one area where the law appears particularly grey is in relation to the 
connection between self-defence and offensive weapons. This is a complicated topic 
as self-defence may justify some actions involving the use of weapons, such as the 
use of a weapon to inflict injury upon an aggressor, but not others, such as preparatory 
possession. The problem of weapons use further challenges the philosophical 
foundations of the defence and its boundaries. The next chapter discusses the law in 
relation to offensive weapons and bladed articles and the possibility of self-defence as 
a defence to offences of their use and possession. 
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Chapter 3: Offensive Weapons and Bladed Articles 
 
3. Introduction 
 
As the legal requirements of self-defence have been explained in the previous chapter, 
this chapter examines a specific instance that challenges the scope of the defence, 
namely, the relationship between self-defence and offences involving the possession 
and use of offensive weapons. The connection between the defence and these offences 
is problematic. It is difficult to state with certainty whether or not the defence will be 
available within the context of offensive weapons. These challenges will be the topic 
for consideration in this chapter, which explains the situation regarding offensive 
weapons and articles with blades or sharp points.
492
  
 
The fear that inclines individuals to carry weapons is perhaps supported by the public 
belief that there is an entitlement to do ‘whatever it takes’ to safeguard personal 
security. Indeed, the criminal law defence of self-defence is applicable to a wide 
range of criminal offences. In theory, it is a potential defence to the strict liability 
offences of possessing an offensive weapon or a bladed article, but in practice it does 
not extend to these offences.
493
 As will become evident, considering that self-defence 
is a complete and justificatory defence, it is unlikely to be regarded as a suitable 
defence for crimes of possession. Offences involving offensive weapons, namely, 
possession or use of the article to threaten or cause injury, are of particular interest to 
this study, and the defence will primarily be explored in this context.
494
 The 
underlying connection between offensive weapons legislation and self-defence is 
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relatively clear, as most people claim they carry weapons in order to protect 
themselves.
495
  
 
In order to address this topic, the chapter will first outline the context and background 
to the carrying of offensive weapons in the UK. Secondly, the law will be examined 
to clarify the present position in relation to weapons, and determine its effectiveness. 
The objective of the relevant legislation will be emphasised, and the type of harm 
involved in weapons possession offences will be discussed. Thirdly, it will be 
necessary to consider the importance attached to the nature of the weapon involved, 
and the impact this has on legal application. The nature of the weapon is a pivotal 
consideration and factor in the applicability of the defence, and in relation to knives, it 
is unlikely that a reasonable excuse for carrying a knife will be found. The law in this 
area, in contrast to that of self-defence, is located in statutes and expressly states that 
there are exceptions to the offences. Therefore, the fourth aspect to be discussed will 
be the statutory defences which may be available to weapons offences. Once this has 
been discussed, the chapter will delve deeper into the relationship between self-
defence and weapons offences, which is the fifth matter under consideration. Whilst 
individuals are generally permitted to use a weapon of opportunity
496
 to secure self-
defence, it is far more contentious when an individual deliberately forearms oneself in 
case of a future attack. Sixthly, the chapter proceeds to explore legal and non-legal 
solutions or proposals to address the issues of weapons possession. Finally, 
consideration will be given to various initiatives and programmes that have been 
developed in an attempt to reduce the carrying and use of offensive weapons.  
 
3.1 The research context 
 
For several years, crimes involving offensive weapons have been widely reported by 
the news media. The topic has repeatedly hit the headlines, suggesting an alarming 
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number of incidents, and therefore creating the perception that it is a growing problem 
in the UK.
497
 Clough opened her paper at the SLS conference in September 2013 by 
stating that for many, knife crime has become ‘old news’.498  Although it is now 
somewhat less prominently reported in the national press than in 2006-2008, it 
remains a continuing and resurfacing problem.
499
 The issue remains an important 
policy consideration, and is evidently on the government’s agenda, as a policy 
briefing was held in January 2015 in London on gang and knife crime.
500
  
 
Indeed, new legislation provides evidence that the issue remains an important matter 
and that there is a clear policy objective to respond more forcefully against carriers. 
Despite reasoned and stern opposition, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 was 
passed including a provision introducing a mandatory custodial sentence for 
individuals aged sixteen or over, who commit a second offence of possessing an 
offensive weapon or bladed article in public or on school premises.
501
 This move is 
problematic as there is no evidence to support that tougher legislation will address the 
issues of weapon carrying. It was compellingly opposed at both the House of 
Commons and House of Lords, however the majority voted to retain the provision as 
part of the Bill. The main objections against the new provision were that it removes 
sentencing discretion from the courts, and could have a significantly detrimental 
                                                        
497
 R.Wood ‘UK: the Reality Behind the ‘Knife Crime’ Debate’ (2010) 52(2) Race & Class 97, at 97-
98; The Government Reply to the Seventh Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 2008-09 
HC 112, Knife Crime, (2009), at 1. 
498
 J.Clough "Sharpening the Knife: A Critique of the Criminalisation of Bladed Articles", (SLS 
Conference, Edinburgh, September 2013). 
499
 While this upward trend in knife related injuries may not be reflected nationwide, incidents appear 
to be on the rise in London. D.Hill ‘How Should the Police Respond to London's Knife Crime Injury 
Rise?’, (The Guardian, 16 June 2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/davehillblog/2015/jun/16/how-should-the-police-respond-to-londons-knife-injury-rise> (accessed 
on 18/06/15); D.Hill ‘London Knife Crime: Less 'Tough' Talk and More Thinking Might Help’, (The 
Guardian, 26 June 2015), <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/davehillblog/2015/jun/26/london-
knife-less-tough-talk-and-more-thinking-might-help> (accessed on 27/06/15).  
500
 GovKnow, ‘Gang and Knife Crime: Prevention and a Pathway Out’, (London, January 29 2015), 
<http://govknow.com/briefing-detail.html?id=1389> (accessed on 20/12/14). 
501
 Section 28 of the 2015 Act amends section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, by tightening the 
response in relation to repeat offenders. 
 105 
effect on young offenders who will be exposed to incarceration
502
 and perhaps be 
further criminalised by the experience.
503
 Section 28, subsection 2B states that:  
 
‘the court must 504  impose an appropriate custodial sentence (with or 
without a fine) unless the court is of the opinion that there are particular 
circumstances which — 
(a) relate to the offence, to the previous offence or to the offender, and 
(b) would make it unjust to do so in all the circumstances.
505
 
 
Allowing more consideration of self-defence within the context of weapons 
possession would evidently sit uneasily alongside the existing and emerging 
legislation that seeks to tackle the issue. Self-defence can only be permitted providing 
it does not operate against the deterrent objective of the legislator. Therefore, it 
appears that self-defence should be clearly stated not to provide a defence for such 
offences, unless there is evidence to prove that the use of the weapon when faced with 
an imminent threat was reasonable. 
 
Further evidence that knife crime remains a problem is provided by cases such as the 
widely reported brutal murder of a soldier in Woolwich.
506
 The attack involved the 
use of meat cleavers. This example may be classed as an act of terrorism due to the 
motives of the offenders, and distinguished from the more common fear or gang 
related attacks. However, the level of aggression coupled with the use of horrific 
weapons epitomises the gravity of weapons possession and use: the fear that it causes; 
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the tragic consequences which can follow; and the reasons why such crimes attract 
high levels of media and public interest, as well as requiring legal control.  
 
Other relatively recent news stories have involved stabbings in public places during 
busy periods when many people are in close proximity. These include the stabbing 
and murder of a schoolteacher by a pupil in her classroom in front of other pupils;
507
 
the stabbing and murder of a schoolgirl on a bus on her way to school in 
Birmingham;
508
 and also the stabbing of three men in a nightclub in Birmingham.
509
 
The fact that such incidents occur in public places at peak times, as opposed to the 
more typical areas that are feared, for example, dark deserted car parks,
510
 adds to the 
fear and horror of the event. From the perspective of the news media, it certainly 
appears that the presence of weapons on the streets is a very present and real threat to 
public safety, with many similar cases occurring on a regular basis.
511
 The wide scale 
reporting of offences involving offensive weapons can paint a bleak picture of 
society.
512
 This is often described as an instance of social breakdown, or an instance 
of moral panic,
513
 which sensationalist news reporting of offensive weapons offences 
can accentuate. A moral panic is the occurrence of an ‘exaggerated reaction, from the 
media, the police or wider public, to the activities of particular social groups’,514 
which highlights the topic as a matter of concern to the public, in need of attention 
and action by the police and the Government. 
 
However, as will become evident, the statistical data currently available does not 
confirm this picture of social breakdown, and it is difficult to assess whether or not 
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the incidents of such crimes are in fact on the rise.
515
 This difficulty is partly due to 
the lack of reliable statistics, which do not provide a complete picture of the incidents 
of crimes involving offensive weapons, and changes in recording practices that make 
comparisons between different years challenging. The data collected on crime and 
offences involving weapons in particular, is widely accessible and available. 
Following the recommendations of the National Statistician’s Review of crime 
statistics in June 2011, which was accepted by the Home Secretary, it is now easier to 
gain access to the data, as from April 2012 it is both collated and published by the 
Office for National Statistics.
516
 There are three main data sets of interest and 
assistance to the present study, that of Police Recorded Crime, the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales, and Hospital Episode Statistics. Each set is useful to an extent, 
but each has its own limitations. 
 
3.1.1 The situation according to the statistics 
 
First, the data available from Police Recorded Crime (PRC) is an annual publication, 
which is gathered based on the reporting of crime to the police. It is a valuable source, 
as every crime that is reported to the police will be documented. However, this means 
that reliance on PRC statistics alone is problematic because it relies on crimes being 
reported before they can be recorded. Due to the fact that many crimes occur without 
ever coming to the attention of the police, the overall picture gained from the data 
collected could potentially be incorrect, with possible underreporting of some crimes 
occurring. Research by Tarling and Morris has shown that the seriousness of the 
crime has a direct impact on the likelihood that it will be reported; the more serious 
the crime, the more likely it will be recorded.
517
 Their research also explained other 
reasons why crimes may not be reported to the police, and one concerning reason was 
the belief that ‘the police would not be interested or could not solve the case’.518 
Therefore, there are potentially many crimes that occur without being reported to the 
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police for these reasons, and one study claims that ‘more than 50% of assaults 
presenting to hospital are not reported to the police’,519  implying that the actual 
number of offences which occur could be far greater than that reported in the PRC.  
 
For the year ending in December 2012, the PRC record for offences involving a knife 
or a sharp instrument represents a 16% decrease on the previous year, at a total of 
27,415 offences.
520
 By the end of June 2014, the overall recorded figure was 
26,007.
521
 This decline is attributed to the decrease in the numbers of robberies and 
cases of actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm involving a knife or sharp 
instrument. It does not provide a guide in relation to possession offences, which may 
not have witnessed a reduction in the same way.
522
  
 
Another complication arises from the methods of counting and recording crimes, as 
these have changed considerably over the years, meaning that comparing data from 
previous years is possible only in relation to crimes of robbery, murder and 
homicide.
523
 The previous methods did not account for different types of weapons, 
making it difficult, for example, to trace the use of knives in such crimes over the 
years to the present day. This leaves a gap regarding crimes of possession and 
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assaults, which cannot easily be appreciated in terms of their actual occurrence, be 
that on the rise or in decline.  
 
In January 2014, the UK Statistics Authority decided that PRC would no longer be 
designated as national statistics, as it does not attain the necessary standards.
524
 
Changes are being made to bring all police forces in line with each other, to minimise 
over-recording and under-recording based on reaching individual targets,
525
 to 
produce a new code of ethics, and start annually auditing each police force area.
526
  
 
The second set of useful annual data is the Crime Survey for England and Wales 
(CSEW), which was previously called the British Crime Survey, and has been 
running since 1982. It is distinct from the PRC as it is a victimisation survey of 
38,000 members of the public living in households in England and Wales.
527
 It 
surveys around 35,000 adults over 16 years of age, and 3,000 children between the 
ages of 10 and 15. It questions their experience of crime over the last twelve months. 
It may provide a more complete picture of overall incidents of crime, as it is possible 
that some individuals who did not report the crime to the police feel more comfortable 
disclosing information to this survey. However, there are a few notable omissions 
from the survey, in relation to homicide data and historical data relating to children 
between 10 and 15 years of age.
528
 Until 2009, the survey completely excluded young 
people under the age of 16. This was problematic considering that young people are 
often the social group most affected by crimes involving offensive weapons, and are 
the most heavily victimised section in relation to such crimes.
529
 There are fears that 
                                                        
524
 Public Administration Select Committee, Caught Red-handed: Why we can’t Count on Police 
Recorded Crime Statistics, (HC 2013-14, 1-54), at 3, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubadm/760/760.pdf> (accessed on 
01/11/14). 
525
 HMIC, Crime-recording: Making the Victim Count, (2014), 
<http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/crime-recording-making-the-victim-
count.pdf> (accessed on 25/07/15), at 29-31, 49 and 51. 
526
 Public Administration Select Committee, Caught Red-handed: Why we can’t Count on Police 
Recorded Crime Statistics,  op cit  fn 524 at 41-47. 
527
 The sample size has decreased from 46,000 in previous years, to 38,000 in 2012-2013. This is for 
reasons of ensuring proportionate representation across smaller police force areas and larger police 
force areas. Office for National Statistics, The 2012-2013 Crime Survey for England and Wales: 
Volume 1: Technical Report, (TNS BMRB, 2012), at 6-7.  
528
 R.Chaplin J.Flatley & K.Smith (eds) Crime in England and Wales 2010/11, (Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, 2011), at 56. 
529
 C.Eades et al. ‘Knife Crime’ A Review of Evidence and Policy, op cit fn 495 at 24. More specifically 
than young people in general, it is young males who are most at risk of victimisation. 
 110 
children younger than 16 also carry weapons for protection,
530
 and it is possible that 
‘an adolescent’s first experience with weapons may be as early as 12 years of age’.531 
It is vital to note that ‘stabbing injury assaults among children less than 15 years of 
age resulted in 70 hospital admissions in 2004/5’,532 thus although perhaps surprising, 
this age category is indeed at risk of victimisation of weapons offences.  
 
As a response to these concerns, children between 10 and 15 years of age are now 
also interviewed for the survey. The sample is much smaller, as eligible children are 
selected from the households already participating in the main survey, and the aim is 
to interview around 3,000 children between 10 and 15 years of age. The primary 
objective of including this age group in the survey is to provide estimates of the levels 
of crime experienced by children and their risk of victimisation.
533
 In the data 
gathered for the twelve month period of 2009/10, it was estimated that 1% of children 
aged 13 to 15 had carried a knife for their own protection in the previous year, with 
13% of those aged 13 to 15 years old reporting that they knew someone who had 
carried a knife for this reason.
534
 Therefore, the overall picture gained from the survey 
should become more representative following this inclusion.
535
  
 
In 2011/2012 the survey reported overall that 7% of offences involved the use of a 
knife, which is consistent with the PRC report of 6%.
536
 According to the CSEW, 
knives or sharp instruments were reportedly used in 35% of homicides and 48% of 
attempted murders.
537
 This demonstrates that although the overall percentage is fairly 
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low, within the individual categories, these weapons are regularly involved in serious 
crime, as they are easily accessible and utilised as facilitators of crime. The figures for 
2013/2014 demonstrate that the overall number of crimes committed by the use of a 
knife or sharp instrument has remained consistent with the previous 12 months. This 
is so despite an increase in the reporting of rape and sexual offence cases, as there has 
been a reduction in cases of robbery using these weapons.
538
 However, the figures for 
the year ending in June 2015 show an increase of 4% on the previous year for the 
overall amount of offences recorded using a knife or sharp instrument,
539
 showing the 
remaining prevalence of these weapons in criminal acitvity. 
 
The third data set which provides useful reports of these crimes, is the information 
gathered by NHS hospital admissions, and recorded by the Hospital Episode 
Statistics.
540
 The information is gathered on a provisional monthly basis, and collated 
for publication as an annual report. In the year ending September 2012, the number of 
admissions as a result of an assault with a sharp instrument (defined as any object 
capable of piercing the skin) was 4,121 - a decrease of 12% on the previous year.
541
 
This therefore reinforces the data gathered by the PRC and CSEW, which together 
provide a fuller picture of the current situation.
542
 The figures for 2014 confirm this 
downward trend, with a 5% decrease on the previous year, at 3,654 admissions.
543
 
The data also shows that young males, between the ages of 18-25, are the social group 
most affected by weapons offences, and are the social group most likely to require 
admission to hospital as a result of an assault with a knife or sharp object.
544
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3.1.2 The problematic case of identifying weapons offences 
 
The difficult challenge of estimating the scale of these types of criminal activity is 
compounded by the fact that it is problematic to detect when a person is committing 
an offence of possession in the first place. The full scope of the legislation prohibiting 
the possession of offensive weapons will be explored in section 3.2, however, a 
possession offence arises where “any person who without lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public 
place any offensive weapon”.545 Indeed, most examples of weapons offences, and 
‘knife crime’ in particular, involve offences of possession, or the carrying of the 
article merely for use to threaten somebody, and most commonly do not cause 
physical harm to an identifiable victim.
546
 Therefore, whether these crimes are ever 
discovered depends on the circumstances that unfold. If the knife carried is hidden, 
not used, not exposed or used to threaten somebody, and if the individual in question 
gives the police no reason to conduct a search, many unknown knives could be in 
circulation in the public domain, representing concealed danger. Although undeniably 
less serious than the use of a weapon to inflict injury on another person, such 
behaviour has potentially lethal consequences, and can cause significant fear within 
and danger to society. It is notable that in England and Wales in 2008/2009 the most 
common causes of homicide were knives and various other sharp instruments.
547
 This 
reflects the gravity of the situation, as the more accessible an article is, the more likely 
it is that it will be used in crime.  
 
For the purposes of this research, the weapons that will primarily be discussed are 
knives. The reason for this prioritisation is that knives are the most commonly carried 
weapons in the UK context, as they are the most easily accessible weapons 
available.
548
 Reports by the news media, and political debates favour the term ‘knife 
crime’, which is very broad in its scope. This is an umbrella term, encompassing 
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many different types of sanctioned behaviour. These vary in degrees of seriousness. 
At the lower end of the spectrum are cases of merely possessing knives, without intent 
to threaten or injure a person whilst carrying the article. At the higher end of the 
spectrum are cases where knives are used to facilitate crimes.  
 
Criminologists argue that the sensational and emotionally charged use of the term 
‘knife crime’ by the media carries a risk of normalising such crimes, and desensitises 
the issue. This in turn paints an exaggerated picture that civilisation within society is 
in disarray.
549
 The same view is submitted here, that the greater the detail and more 
regular attention paid to these crimes, the greater the belief by consumers of the news 
that there is a high occurrence of such crimes and that they should be concerned about 
their safety. The majority of the population and consumers of the news media are far 
removed in reality from such crimes. Few will have personal experience of these 
offences, and media representations are therefore powerful in forming public 
perception about these crimes.
550
 The outcome of these representations can have a 
negative impact upon communities.
551
 Not only does it contribute to the levels of fear 
experienced, but also young people are often stereotyped as devious.
552
 This is a 
simplified generalisation. It neglects to expose the truth that only a minority of young 
people in specific localities are in fact perpetrating these crimes. A Home Office 
Study has confirmed that the media portrayal of young people creates a sense of 
unfairness and injustice on their part. This incites their belief that they are being 
targeted, blamed without cause, and that the societal presumption is that all young 
people are intent on generating trouble and committing crimes.
553
 Stephen has 
pursued this hypothesis, and emphasises the importance of appropriately 
characterising ‘youth’.554 
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As well as this negative image of young people, the public perception produced from 
media representations is accompanied by a sense of urgency for change. There is both 
an increased awareness of the dangers posed by weapons possession, and a belief that 
the law requires reform to allow the criminal justice system to respond more 
forcefully with harsher sentences.
555
 The hope underlying such suggestions is that 
tougher repercussions will accomplish a change of behaviour, and deter the carrying 
of weapons. However, such a broad reaction ignores the fact that knife carrying is not 
a typical problem across the whole jurisdiction.  
 
On the contrary, it is a problem associated most commonly with socially deprived 
areas within cities, where there is a high density of young people in the population.
556
 
Common risk factors emerge in such locations triggering patterns of gang behaviour, 
accompanied by knife crime. Among the obvious risk factors are the shortages of 
opportunities for personal development, in the form of education and employment, as 
well as a general lack of access to recreational facilities for young people.
557
 These 
individuals become trapped, unable able to escape from poverty, and easily drawn 
into anti-social behaviour and criminal activities.
558
 Notably, Tadros has explored the 
suggestion that when criminalizing conduct, consideration should be given to the 
arguably lower responsibility of the poor for their wrongdoing, due to the economic 
injustices they suffer. This is a controversial matter and there is currently no 
framework for allowing such considerations, and ‘blame shifting’ within the criminal 
law.
559
 Bagaric has discussed the relevance of disadvantaged backgrounds to the 
allocation of punishment, arguing that poverty impairs the capacity for choice within 
individuals and should be taken into consideration with regard to less serious 
offences, but is an inappropriate consideration in serious crimes such as sexual 
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assaults.
560
 Although it is potentially dangerous to draw generalisations of this nature, 
it could be suggested that poorer social environments and living conditions attract a 
higher likelihood of weapons possession.  
 
Studies have found that other risk factors contributing to an individual’s decision to 
carry a weapon include: prior maltreatment,
561
 victimisation, being a witness to 
crime,
562
 or being a member of a gang. It is important to remember that the children 
and young people involved in such crimes are vulnerable members of society. The 
line between perpetrator and victim is very narrow, as reflected by the saying 
‘yesterday’s victim is tomorrow’s perpetrator’.563 Being a part of a gang influences 
youths by emphasising the need to acquire and maintain a reputation, with peer 
pressure forcing certain behaviour in order to retain membership and gain respect.
564
 
Gangs offer protection to their members
565
 and it can be dangerous to leave, as it is 
not only rivals that pose threats, but also former comrades.
566
 Not only is it dangerous 
to leave a gang, but also to venture outside of the gang’s territory. Shaw notes that 
part of a gang’s identity relies on the geographical territory in which they operate.567 
There is a strong feeling of possession, ownership and the need to protect their 
territory from outsiders. This is often termed ‘postcode’ or ‘turf wars’. Accordingly, 
this generates fear within communities and a belief that individuals require weapons 
in order to protect themselves.
568
 The result is an increase in the overall likelihood of 
violence in such areas. Fights that may have been merely started by verbal abuse and 
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resolved by fists
569
 instead can produce fatalities because these natural tools have 
been replaced with violent weapons.
570
 This is accompanied by the attitude that 
weapons enable self-protection, and that it is preferable to be arrested than dead.
571
 It 
has been stated that ‘violent offenses committed with a weapon are the most 
dangerous offenses, often leading to serious injury, disability or death’,572  which 
means that the fact that more young people are deciding to carry weapons is 
significantly increasing the risks of violent crime. There appears to be a feeling within 
such communities that they must take matters into their own hands,
573
 that they 
cannot merely wait and rely on the police for protection.
574
 It is simply not possible 
for law enforcement officers to protect every single individual from every threat they 
face, and there are therefore occasions when it is necessary for measures to be taken 
for self-protection.
575
 
 
This provides the sociological context for this chapter. Due to the general lack of 
awareness and knowledge of the law regarding offensive weapons and bladed articles, 
the chapter will now examine what falls within these classifications.  
 
3.2 The Law - prohibited weapons 
 
Public opinion about the carrying of arms has changed considerably over the years, 
from a time when it was considered the norm to carry items such as swords, and many 
other types of intrinsically offensive weapons, to the modern age where a strict 
approach to governance is employed.
576
 Social attitudes have changed. The norm in 
the Middle Ages, and the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was that members of 
the public had a duty to act to prevent a crime, to keep weapons for this purpose, and 
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assist the state with peace-keeping.
577
 On the contrary, a civilised society with 
institutional support from law enforcement officers
578
 arguably should not require the 
possession of weapons on the streets for the securement of collective order, or to keep 
the peace. In fact, the presence of weapons in public is considered to achieve the 
opposite effect, namely that of public disorder. Murdie compares the situation before 
and after the enactment of legislation: ‘modern English hooligans were meagerly 
armed compared with their forebears who had routinely carried swords, axes ... and 
all manner of hunting and farming implements in the cause of personal offence and 
defence’.579 This indeed may be true, although a number of frightening weapons such 
as machetes are occasionally carried on the streets even in current times.
580
 The 
context and circumstances have changed, and such behaviour is no longer considered 
acceptable due to the serious, extensive social harm it could potentially cause.
581
  
 
Alongside the social changes, and perhaps partly responsible for the change of 
attitude is the increase in legal regulation. A new landscape of criminal offences has 
emerged over the eras in relation to weapons. As Husak notes ‘most of the people 
sentenced to jail today are incarcerated for conduct that was not even criminal a 
century ago’.582 There are many prohibitions in this area within the laws of England 
and Wales.
583
 The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (to be considered shortly) ‘was 
created under the presumption that banning weapons from all civilians, regardless of 
their intention, from public places would reduce violent crime … The Act was passed 
in response to the large rise in violent crime in the United Kingdom’.584 The Act was 
the first clear step towards prohibiting the carrying of personal weapons. Earlier 
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legislation governing the use of weapons was already in existence, although not 
directed at the carrying of weapons on the person specifically, such as the Explosive 
Substances Act 1883.  
 
The Act of 1953 triggered vigorous debate in Parliament. Many contested the 
provision against the carrying of weapons, claiming it to be an encroachment of the 
right to self-defence, and that its only result would be to make it a crime for people to 
be placed in a position to protect themselves.
585
 Although the discussions attempted to 
clarify the position, explaining that it would be permissible to carry an article for a 
defensive purpose if necessary, this was not evident from the wording of the Act 
itself. Many cases questioning the interpretation and intention of Parliament have 
since arisen.
586
  
 
The same kinds of arguments raised remain true today, for example, that people 
should be able to prepare to protect themselves without facing punishment. However, 
Murdie claims that despite the obvious fact that the legislation has resulted in many 
convictions, it has also clearly prevented far more incidents of serious violence 
facilitated by weapons from being committed in the first place.
587
 This suggests that 
the legislation serves its purpose as a deterrent to the carrying of offensive weapons, 
and articles with blades or sharp points. It is submitted that it was necessary to 
implement the legislation as a positive step towards controlling potentially lethal 
situations. Nevertheless, it may be that submitting that the Act represents a deterrent 
to the carrying of offensive weapons would be unsubstantiated and premature, 
considering the fact that many individuals who decide to arm themselves with 
weapons do so regardless of the law. These actions cannot be so easily deterred.  
 
There is certainly a strong attempt at deterrence within the legislation. Prohibiting the 
carrying of knives and other weapons is a matter of public interest and importance. 
Therefore, the law is spread across a number of varying statutes, targeting different 
weapons and circumstances. The statutes governing the possession, sale and use of 
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offensive weapons, include the Explosive Substances Act 1883 (mentioned earlier); 
the Firearms Act 1968; the Offensive Weapons Act 1996; and the Knives Act 1997.
588
 
However, the most important Acts in relation to this research and what is termed 
‘offensive weapons’ in particular, are the aforementioned Prevention of Crime Act 
1953, and the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
589
 Both provisions are phrased slightly 
differently to sanction different actions and will be introduced separately. As will be 
seen shortly, especially in relation to their potential defences, their application will be 
similar. 
 
3.2.1 The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 
 
As noted earlier, section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that “any 
person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie 
on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an 
offence”. 590  The section has several conditions: (i) lack of lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse; (ii) possession in a public place; and (iii) of an offensive weapon. 
The term ‘lawful authority’ generally refers to those with statutory authority to 
possess such articles, for example the police carrying truncheons in the course of their 
duties to maintain public order and protection. The term ‘reasonable excuse’ provides 
a potential defence to the offence committed under the section, and will be explored 
in more detail shorty.
591
 The term ‘public place’ is easily comprehendible, meaning 
any area that the public can generally access, either freely or by paying a fee.
592
 
Additionally, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the term ‘offensive weapon’. 
The term is defined in the statute in section 1(4) as “any article made or adapted for 
use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for 
such use by him or by some other person”.593 
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589
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The offence and its definition have produced several cases requiring statutory 
interpretation. On several occasions, the courts have had to consider the intention of 
Parliament in enacting this legislation. It is evident from this provision,
594
 that despite 
the intrinsically innocent nature of an article, it has the potential to be defined as an 
‘offensive weapon’ according to the intentions of the carrier. The case of Harrison v 
Thornton
595
 employed a rigid interpretation of the provision, holding that even 
picking up a stone in order to inflict an injury was regarded as an offence under the 
1953 Act. However, this interpretation ignores the wording of the statute of ‘having it 
with him’,596 and the decision in that case may have construed the legislation too 
narrowly. It is thus doubtful that this is an accurate application of the law.
597
  
 
The 1953 Act classifies three different types of weapons in its definition of offensive 
weapon in section 1(4): those that are made to cause injury, those adapted to cause 
injury, and those intended to cause injury. In the case of R v Simpson
598
 the Court of 
Appeal analysed the wording of the definition, describing the first classification as 
being offensive per se. This indicates that the inherent nature of the object is that of a 
weapon, for example, ‘a bayonet, a stiletto, or a hand-gun’. 599  The second 
classification was again explained by way of examples, namely that of ‘the broken 
bottle deliberately broken in order that the jagged end may be inserted into the 
victim’s face’,600 or ‘a potato with a razor blade inserted into it’,601 transforming an 
innocent object into a potential weapon. The third category can be considered a 
weapon or not depending on the intentions of the carrier at the time, for example a 
hammer in the case of Yaman.
602
 If there is a pre-meditation that the article could be 
used offensively then it could fall within the remit of the provision. However, in order 
for the offence to be committed, the offensive intention must be formed before the 
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weapon is used.
603
 If no such intention has been formed, an innocent article should 
not be considered an offensive weapon.
604
  
 
3.2.2 The Criminal Justice Act 1988 
  
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 differs from the previous Act as it is targeted towards 
articles with blades or sharp points. It is therefore a separate provision to prohibit such 
items. The offence is set out in section 139: 
 
‘(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) below, any person who has an article 
to which this section applies with him in a public place shall be guilty of an 
offence.  
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, this section applies to any article which 
has a blade or is sharply pointed except a folding pocketknife.  
(3) This section applies to a folding pocketknife if the cutting edge of its 
blade exceeds 3 inches.  
(4) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this 
section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the 
article with him in a public place.  
(5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a 
defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove 
that he had the article with him — (a) for use at work; (b) for religious 
reasons; or (c) as part of any national costume’.  
 
This is a detailed provision that identifies specific and clear exceptions to the general 
prohibition against carrying articles with blades or sharp points in the section. Such 
exceptions refer to the type of article, for example, exempting folding pocketknives, 
depending on the length of the blade.
605
 A defence is listed, namely that of ‘good 
reason’. Examples that could constitute a ‘good reason’ are suggested, such as for use 
at work. The Act of 1988 is clearly relevant to the present study, as crimes involving 
knives, and knife possession offences, are far more common in the UK than crimes 
involving other weapons. Many other types of weapons are carried and used, but 
‘although other weapons – such as baseball bats, screwdrivers, and chains – are also 
carried, by far the most common weapons are knives’.606  Compared to the items 
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listed, knives stand out as being easier to conceal and to offer better injury inflicting 
prospects.  
 
Additionally, the easy access to knives makes them the most commonly carried and 
used weapons in the UK. According to a report by the World Health Organization, 
this is a common position across Europe: ‘Knives and other sharp implements are 
commonly available in most countries, are the most commonly used weapon in most 
countries and are involved in about 40% of homicides among young people in the 
region’.607 The choice of knives as weapons may be compared to the wider use of 
firearms in the US for example.
608
 This is due to the UK’s strict licensing laws, which 
means that guns are less accessible to the general public,
609
 and makes crimes 
involving these weapons less prominent than they would be in the US. Public opinion 
and the approach to legal control are obviously different;
610
 the law is far more liberal 
in the US concerning the carrying of weapons, (specifically guns where it is 
recognised as a Constitutional right),
611
 than in the UK.  
 
Indeed, it is often said that the UK has one of the strictest approaches to weapons 
regulation, receiving strong criticism from gun liberalists.
612
 The restrictive legal 
approach is criticised for the lack of autonomy it extends to its subjects, and for 
placing victims in a weak position to defend themselves. An individual merely 
attempting to take precautionary defensive measures may face criminal liability. 
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Ashworth highlights the harsh nature of the law of England and Wales in relation to 
gun control. He explains that the main offences indicate strict liability, operating 
without the usual requirements of mens rea, presumption of innocence, and 
proportionate sentencing expected by criminal law.
613
 The nature of the offence 
means that it is committed as soon as the requirements of the Act are met, with no 
need for a criminal intention, and an instant appearance of guilt.
614
 It matters not 
whether the individual is aware that he is committing an offence.
615
  
 
While many ordinary people are unaware of such legislation, for example taking large 
kitchen knives with them on picnics, it appears likely that those who carry such 
articles for defensive purposes, such as gang members, have greater awareness of the 
illegality of their actions. Applying strict liability to such offences can be described as 
a zero tolerance approach, and a method of deterring the undesirable behaviour of 
carrying weapons. On one hand, it would be unfortunate in the former case for an 
innocent family or group of friends to be punished while having a picnic, as although 
possessing a dangerous article, their intention for its use is solely in relation to 
assisting with their food preparation. On the other hand, the legislation is necessary to 
prevent the latter kind of case, where knives are carried perhaps only with the 
intention to frighten or deter trouble, but with the knowing potential for use against a 
person if needs must.  
 
3.2.3 Emphasising the objectives of the legislation 
 
The purpose and aim of the 1953 Act have been emphasised by the courts on several 
occasions.
616
 It has been stressed that ‘the Act of 1953 never intended to sanction the 
permanent carriage of an offensive weapon merely because of some enduring 
supposed or actual threat or danger to the carrier’.617 This evidently proves that the 
provision attracts a rigid interpretation.  
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In considering the reasonableness of possession during a trial, the court must consider 
three factors: first, the intention of the carrier at the time; second, the circumstances 
surrounding the offence; and third, the nature of the weapon concerned.
618
 The 
consideration of these factors creates an obstacle for people who arm themselves 
regularly to undertake criminal activities.
619
 It was stated in the case of Taikato that 
‘the legislator did not intend that criminals, hoodlums or members of street gangs 
should be free to carry prohibited weapons because they had a well-founded fear of 
attack from other criminals hoodlums or street gangs’.620 It is necessary to restrict the 
defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ in this way, because the purpose of the provision is to 
keep weapons off the streets, and to deter a culture of carrying weapons. Interpreting 
the provision more liberally would be problematic and would undermine its authority. 
Smith has demonstrated that the legislation would be defeated if ‘everyone who 
reasonably feared that he might be attacked at some time was allowed to carry an 
offensive weapon. However good the motives of the carriers, the more weapons that 
are carried on the streets, the greater is the chance that they will be used’.621 This is a 
reasonable deduction and represents the role of the criminal law in shaping and 
deterring certain behaviours.  
    
The issue of the carrying of offensive weapons was addressed in the case of R v Felix 
Densu,
622
 where the defendant was charged with possessing an offensive weapon 
contrary to section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. The article in question 
was a metal telescopic extendable baton, which he claimed he had found, and did not 
know was a weapon. Appreciating the seriousness of the offence, the court held that 
lack of knowledge did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the purposes of 
satisfying the defence according to the Act.
623
 Thus, a balance must be struck between 
the competing interests of public safety, and an individual’s right to defend oneself. If 
too lenient an approach is taken it risks defeating the object of legislating to prohibit 
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the possession of offensive weapons, while on the other hand, if the approach applied 
is too harsh, it might deny people the availability of the defence, despite the fact that 
they acted reasonably in the circumstances.  
 
The difficulty is that these offences have the potential to cause public fear and injury, 
but are essentially just that, a potential danger not yet materialised. Naturally, this 
makes the preventative task of control challenging to achieve and target effectively. 
This involves consideration of the level of harm that must be caused before a conduct 
will be criminalised.
624
 The issues posed by the harms of weapons possession is 
illustrated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in four combined appeals:  
 
“every weapon carried about the streets, even if concealed from sight, 
even if not likely to be or intended to be used, and even if not used 
represents a threat to public safety and public order ... when considering 
the seriousness of the offence courts should bear in mind the harm which 
the weapon might foreseeably have caused”.625  
 
It appears here that what might happen, as a potential future harm is the key 
component of such offences. With these offences, the primary objective is to secure 
the safety of the public. Guidelines published by the Crown Prosecution Service 
explain that where the first part of the two-stage prosecution test is reached (the 
evidential hurdle), the second part (the public interest component) will normally 
require a prosecution. Additionally, the sentence would need to be carefully 
considered to ensure that it reflects the seriousness of the offence.
626
 It is clear that the 
appropriate legal approach is to target possession offences through the criminal justice 
process, even if no physical harm is caused. This attempts to deter more serious 
crimes, such as actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm, from being committed. 
By approaching these offences in this way, the legal system is acknowledging the 
gravity of possession offences.
627
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3.2.4 Harm and offensive weapons 
 
Offences involving the possession of offensive weapons clearly create an increased 
risk to others. Such crimes often do not inflict harm to a specific person, but rather, 
represent a threat to everyone in the vicinity. The activity is prohibited and rendered 
criminal because of the potential danger that it creates, as opposed to the actual harm 
that it inflicts. This is an example of the balancing of harm to the individual and harm 
to society. Public interests, and public harms are wide in scope, not specifically 
identifiable other than by posing a risk to anyone who is in the vicinity of the 
dangerous conduct at the time it occurs.
628
 Fletcher notes that more prohibitions and 
greater punishment are reasonable when a public interest is under threat, as ‘the need 
for social protection may dictate a higher punishment in this situation’.629 This point 
is illustrated by the example of possessing an offensive weapon in a public place, as 
this conduct risks causing public harms. While individuals might feel that to secure 
their safety they require a weapon, as its possession increases the danger to society, 
the balance falls in favour of protecting society as opposed to a non-identified 
individual, who may or may not encounter a situation necessitating self-defence.  
 
Possession offences are sometimes referred to as victimless crimes. As with many 
drug offences, there are no individuals identified in the circumstances that regard 
themselves as victims, but there is a significant risk of harm to others.
630
 With the 
example of drugs offences, the only persons who could be considered as victims have 
in fact chosen the action. Another example arises in cases where people request 
assistance to die. When someone decides to terminate their own life (and would 
commit suicide independently if they were able bodied), if another individual 
provides assisted suicide after succumbing to their pleas and demands, the death 
would arguably not produce a victim.
631
 Again, the reasoning here is that the person 
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suffering the harm of death has chosen of their own will to end their life in this 
way.
632
  
 
Despite the perceived appropriateness of the term “victimless” within the examples 
above, there is a compelling argument against the use of the term. Only actions that 
do not give rise to any harm at all can truly be victimless. Most proscribed actions, or 
conduct that is viewed with disapproval, are criminalized due to the fact that they 
cause a degree of harm.
633
 This harm might not be to a specific, identifiable individual 
or groups of society; it can merely present a risk to all people, or the state, or to 
corporate entities.
634
 It is therefore difficult to imagine a crime, which does not cause 
any harm at all, as even the mere possession of offensive weapons create a risk and a 
corresponding potential of harm.
635
 While the conduct of possession itself may not be 
harmful, it has the potential to be very dangerous, requiring criminalisation.
636
 It is 
even harder to imagine a victimless crime considering the fact that the perpetrator can 
become his own victim; if he is the only person that could possibly be harmed by his 
conduct, his actions cannot be held to be victimless.
637
 Within the same appreciation 
of the harm principle, even a fully consenting adult can be harmed by the actions of 
another, despite his consent to the activity - thus, again falling beyond the notion of a 
victimless crime.
638
  
 
Following this assessment, it is difficult to maintain the notion that there are instances 
involving offensive weapons that do not create victims. Although no fixed individual, 
or group of people, are directly harmed by the act of possessing a weapon, the 
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potential for societal harm is substantial. The notion of a societal harm can be 
described as being a:  
 
‘collection of specific interests of the same kind possessed by a large and 
indefinite number of private individuals ... produced by generally 
dangerous activity that threatens no specific persons nameable in 
advance, but almost anyone who happens to be in a position to be 
affected. These activities produce some common danger to all the 
members of the community’.639  
 
Public interests, and public harms are therefore wide in scope, not specifically 
identifiable other than by posing a risk to anyone who is in the vicinity of the harmful 
conduct at the time it occurs. Considering also that the perpetrator can be a victim of 
his own actions,
640
 it is hard to maintain the view that such crimes are ever truly 
victimless. At the very least, an individual who decides to carry a weapon is putting 
his interest of liberty at risk of being set back,
641
 as if he is caught in possession, he 
will be punished and may be deprived of his liberty by being incarcerated, a potential 
harm in itself.  
 
The law on weapons regulation is therefore a perfect example of harm prevention. 
The very decision to prohibit possession of dangerous articles is a specific step to 
reduce crime, and thus, to reduce harm or the potential to cause harm. However, by 
regulating such activity, liberty is taken away from individuals, and the entire 
population. This is potentially an obstacle for the perceived sense of safety of those 
who live in dangerous environments, where they constantly fear for their lives.
642
 
While this can be considered unfair to people in such circumstances, the gains of 
avoiding harms to the masses outweigh the arguments of the minority. It is therefore 
clear why this behaviour must attract criminalisation, as the potential harms outweigh 
the restriction of autonomy to carry weapons. While personal autonomy is a right 
encompassed under Article 8 of the ECHR, it is merely a qualified and not an 
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absolute right.
643
 The State is therefore permitted to restrict the exercise of such rights 
when necessary.
644
 
 
This is reflected by Feinberg’s treatment of the control of handguns. He says that the 
banning of such dangerous articles, which have severe, irremediable consequences 
when used, effectively prevents ‘thousands of accidental and deliberate maimings 
and killings’.645 Clearly the benefits gained are so substantial and attractive that the 
prohibition is warranted and necessary. Some people who require such articles to 
protect themselves may well be trustworthy and upstanding members of the 
community, who would not harm anybody, other than in a situation of self-defence. 
However, the dangers of making such dangerous weapons widely available, is that for 
every responsible individual who possesses them, there will be a dangerous individual 
who should never be granted permission to possess such articles. Thus, in order to 
protect everyone, regulation must be universal. As Feinberg proclaims, ‘if the state 
prohibits these persons from possessing handguns, it must tell them, in effect, that 
they cannot do something which is harmless, because others cannot be trusted to do 
the same thing without causing grievous bodily harm’.646 There is potential for abuse 
of licenses permitting the possession of weapons, as some individuals will undeniably 
fall through the net or obtain illegal weapons instead. On the whole, however, such 
licenses are worthwhile as they provide an extra measure of safety for the public from 
the dangers posed by widespread weapons ownership. 
 
It is almost obvious to say that ‘other things being equal, it is worse to engage in 
action that brings about greater compared with lesser harm’,647 and this is true in the 
context of offensive weapons. It is necessary to deter people from carrying offensive 
weapons as they increase the dangers for everyone. Such activity provides 
opportunities for serious crimes; it facilitates criminal behaviour that would not 
otherwise be possible, and thus must be restricted and controlled. The carrying of 
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weapons presents unacceptable and unjustifiable risks to the whole of society, while 
arguably only providing a false sense of security to one individual.
648
 The balance 
clearly tilts towards the protection of the majority, even if this is done at the expense 
of the minority. This reasoning follows the approach of utilitarian thinking, which 
prioritises the greatest good for the greatest number.
649
 As Fletcher says, ‘the mere act 
of possession causes no harm - though it may generate a risk of accidental discharge 
or of purposeful misuse’;650 it is a violation of the law and a harm in itself.  
 
The levels of potential risks involved can increase depending on the nature of the 
weapon, as some weapons are far more dangerous than others. As will be seen, there 
is no concept of a defensive weapon in law, thus a defensive purpose does not excuse 
the possession of a lethal weapon.
651
  
 
3.3 The Nature of the weapon 
 
The nature of the weapon is an instrumental consideration, as varying levels of 
dangerousness can influence the reasonableness of its possession for self-defence. 
This point is emphasised by Loveless: “when it comes to the legality of carrying 
around, for example, pepper sprays, knuckle dusters, truncheons for use in case of 
attack, none would be lawful in the absence of a specific threat of a specific, imminent 
attack”.652 The reason for this is that these articles are offensive per se; they are 
intrinsically offensive, as they have been made for the purpose of causing injury to the 
person.
653
 These categories of weapons are inherently dangerous and are capable of 
producing fatal results. Some weapons are particularly problematic due to their 
nature. For example, firearms are placed at the upper end of instrinsicly dangerous 
weapons. The advantage of firearms for the defender is that they facilitate a defence 
from a safe distance. However, the strength of the weapon for defensive purposes is 
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also its downfall. While firearms enable greater scope for successful self-defence, 
they also present an increased level of danger generally, whether carried in public or 
used in the home,
654
 due to their force and the distance at which they are effective.  
 
However, other articles that have not been created for the purpose of causing injury 
are also capable of devastating effects when used as weapons. For example, there are 
many dangerous household items, such as kitchen knives, that are used on a day-to-
day basis and pose a risk beyond their designed use. It can be argued that because of 
their easily accessible nature, they pose an even greater danger. Indeed, they account 
for many of the cases involving young people, as they can easily be acquired from 
their homes. The effectiveness of laws prohibiting sale to under eighteen year olds is 
therefore questionable in this respect.
655
 Such articles are especially problematic when 
taken out of their natural context. While knives would require the aggressor and 
defender to be in close proximity before they could be used offensively,
656
 they 
increase the risk of injury to severe levels. Even if intended merely as a mode of 
defence, the carrying of knives in public presents a danger to both the carrier and the 
general public. Failure to use such weapons effectively for defensive purposes could 
also have a fatal result for the defender, and entails a significant risk. 
 
As expressed in the case of Evans v Hughes,
657
 the law does not recognise the concept 
of a defensive weapon. Even if possessed for defensive purposes, the article remains 
an offensive weapon.
658
 This is an important point, as the carrying of weapons for 
protection is incompatible with the legal position. However, in certain circumstances 
it could be permissible to use a weapon for the purposes of self-defence, but this is 
problematic. As Murdie states, ‘Given the prohibition in law against excessive force, 
the use of a weapon with an honest intention of personal preservation may be 
considered disproportionate to the danger ... simple possession may be put forward as 
an intention to engage in unlawful violence outside the justification of self-
defence’.659 There have been many cases where this issue has arisen, requiring careful 
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consideration of the circumstances in each instance to determine whether or not self-
defence is a reasonable excuse.  
 
The plea of self-defence failed in the case of R v Spanner,
660
 which involved the 
prosecution of a security guard who carried a truncheon with him to defend himself in 
the course of his duties. He was not permitted to do so as part of his uniform, and 
therefore failed to secure a defence by lawful authority or reasonable excuse. The 
actions of the defendant in this case reflects the perception that high risk occupations 
entitle individual workers to carry weapons, but this is not something which an 
individual can personally decide, without law enforcement authority. Even the 
carrying of weapons by the police is heavily regulated. Only authorised firearms 
officers may carry firearms; rules state which ‘less lethal options’ may be executed, 
such as tazers, and guidelines are provided on how to assess whether the use of force 
is reasonable in the cirucmstances.
661
  
 
The impact that the type of weapon has on the reasonableness of its possession is 
illustrated in the case of Ford v Lindholm,
662
 where it was stated that it is not 
permissible for persons to carry knives with them for self-defence. It is obviously 
doubtful whether there can ever be a reasonable excuse for carrying a knife in public, 
because of the gravity of the damage that may be caused by its use and presence on 
the streets.
663
 This is a pivotal consideration when it comes to the issue of sentencing 
these crimes. 
 
The case of R v Davis
664
 is interesting in this context, as originally the trial judge 
considered that a screwdriver could be regarded as a bladed article for the purposes of 
the 1988 Act. An appeal was allowed on the basis that section 139 of the 1988 Act 
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was deemed to cover knives and sharply pointed instruments and that a screwdriver 
did not fall within this category. The language of the Act was considered to refer to 
articles with a cutting edge, and not as the judge had suggested, to any article capable 
of causing injury, so the wording was to be ascribed its literal meaning.
665
 This is 
perhaps surprising as it seems that the purpose of both the 1953 and 1988 Acts is to 
deter the carrying of weapons because of the harms that doing so could cause. Yet, in 
this case, it appears that the capability to cause injury is not the defining feature of 
these offences, as this would give the provision far too broad an ambit. Perhaps 
rightly, a screwdriver is not a bladed article under the 1988 Act, but would it not 
therefore possibly be better placed as an offensive weapon, according to the Act of 
1953 instead?
666
 According to the learned judges in the case on appeal, this would not 
be appropriate in this instance as the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 ‘limited itself to 
objects made or intended for the purpose of causing injury’,667 and therefore would 
not apply in this case, as the screwdriver fell outside its scope.
668
  
 
It is partly due to the fact that legislation governing the prohibition of offensive 
weapons does not refer to self-defence specifically,
669
 that it is difficult to assess to 
what degree self-defence applies as a defence to weapons offences. Therefore, 
whether or not the defence is available is likely to turn on the specific circumstances 
of individual cases, and will be decided on a case-by-case basis. The legislation does 
however contain generally worded defences, such as ‘reasonable excuse’ and ‘good 
reason’, which are capable of covering actions of private defence which is the next 
topic for consideration.  
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3.4 Statutory defences – ‘reasonable excuse’ and ‘good reason’ 
 
Both the Acts of 1953 and 1988 include exceptions to the offences for which they 
prescribe, thereby offering potential defences for their commission. These defences 
are similar in both provisions although the wording varies slightly. The Prevention of 
Crime Act 1953 provides an opportunity to prove that there was a ‘reasonable excuse’ 
for possessing the weapon in question,
670
 while the Criminal Justice Act 1988 requires 
one to have ‘good reason’ for possessing bladed articles.671 Despite the variation in 
their construction, these defences are generally applied and interpreted in the same 
manner,
672
 although it has been debated whether this is the appropriate approach. For 
example, Ormerod states that case law addressing the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence for 
offences involving offensive weapons could provide a persuasive precedent, and be 
influential upon considerations of the ‘good reason’ defence in cases involving bladed 
articles.
673
 Indeed, it was confirmed by the court in R v McAuley,
674
 with reference to 
the earlier case of R v Jolie,
675
 that there was ‘no distinction between “good reason” 
in the one statute and “reasonable excuse” in the earlier one’.676  
 
Contrarily, Finn claims that the good reason defence has a much ‘tighter 
interpretation’ than that of reasonable excuse.677 Smith shares this view, and claims 
that ‘it is understood that this is not an accidental difference but that “good reason” 
was intended to imply a narrower defence than reasonable excuse’.678  Therefore, 
having a reasonable excuse does not necessarily equate to having a good reason. 
Smith’s comments were made with regard to the earlier case of R v Emmanuel,679 
where the defendant was convicted of having a bladed article in a public place, when 
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he was found with a knife in his shoe. Despite Smith’s view that the defences do not 
necessarily carry the same construction, in the same case comment on Emmanuel,
680
 
he concedes that no apparent difference was drawn between the two defences in that 
particular case.
681
 
 
A potential reason for the distinctions in the language used for the separate defences 
may relate to the statement of the court in R v Davis,
682
 (discussed in section 3.3). The 
court stated that the 1953 Act is aimed at weapons made or intended for the purpose 
of causing injury, while the 1988 Act is merely targeted towards articles which have 
blades or which are sharply pointed. It is therefore both the manufacturing purpose 
and intention which sets them apart. While the former are designed, modified or 
intended for the purpose of causing injury, the latter are not so made, adapted or 
intended, but may cause injury to the person. This is a fine distinction, and it is not 
obvious that the test of reasonable excuse under the 1953 Act should attract a wider 
ambit than that of ‘good reason’ under the 1988 Act as a response to these linguistic 
nuances. For the purposes of this study and on the tenets of the later, more recent, 
case law interpretations, unless stated otherwise in specific instances, the two 
defences will be treated as having the same requirements and meaning.  
 
In relation to their ascribed meaning, the case of R v Manning
683
 is regarded as the 
authority for the principle that the words ‘good reason’ do not require any judicial 
gloss, as it is an ordinary phrase and a part of everyday language.
684
 It was stated later 
in R v Jolie
685
 that the factual nature of these defences is a key factor in their 
application, ‘the whole point is that they are infinitely context-sensitive, and should be 
left so’.686 Thus, the wording of the defence is stated quite clearly, and the common 
law interpretation appears to have reached a conclusive understanding that they are 
ordinary terms for the deliberation of the jury. It was recently confirmed in the case of 
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R v Clancy,
687
 that the defence of ‘good reason’ is a question of fact for the jury to 
consider, and that it is to be given its natural and ordinary meaning, therefore not 
requiring further judicial explanation.  
 
Notably, the case of Clancy
688
 involved a woman who had carried two knives in her 
bag due to fear after an alleged attack on her by a taxi driver. Surprisingly, the court 
regarded that fear of attack could be a ‘good reason’ under section 139(4) of the 1998 
Act.
689
 This is a significant finding considering that fear is the main reason for 
weapons carrying. Fear is closely tied to protection, as fearing a future attack or 
realisation of a threat, influences individuals to carry weapons for their own 
protection. Clough agrees that this is a significant result, and states that the case 
provides a welcome clarification of the law.
690
 However, this assertion of clarity may 
be overly optimistic. As will become evident, the circumstances will dictate whether 
or not a good reason will be constituted by fear of attack alone. It is not simply a 
matter of saying that fear of attack may be a sufficient reason, as there will generally 
be an additional requirement for a degree of imminence to be present in relation to 
that fear of attack. 
 
3.4.1 Imminence and the importance of the circumstances 
 
The requirement of imminence has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 on self-
defence. It is particularly relevant to the possession of offensive weapons, as 
forearmament may be regarded as preparatory or pre-emptive action in self-defence. 
Although such actions are sometimes permitted, it is crucial that the defender does not 
act too soon, otherwise the defence might not be available.
691
 Ashworth claims that 
‘the law should require a greater restraint and sense of proportion from an individual 
who has forearmed himself’692  because of the need to disprove any doubt about 
premeditation and to ensure that the defendant was indeed acting in self-defence. This 
is the reason why there must usually be evidence of an imminent, specific threat 
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before pre-emptive action may be taken for self-protection. Alexander compellingly 
notes that ‘self-defence is always pre-emptive. That is, we employ self-defensive force 
before the attack we fear has fully materialized’.693 His statement is realistic and 
logical. Before any self-defensive act is carried out, the defender must make a 
decision to act, and at what point to react. Waiting too long could be detrimental to a 
person’s defence. The reason pre-emption is relevant is the proximity of the defence 
to the attack. While every defence entails a degree of pre-emption, the level and 
extent of preparation makes a difference to the reasonableness of the action. The 
context for the defensive action is therefore a central consideration, and the 
circumstances require careful consideration to detect a sufficient level of imminence. 
 
Although many would argue that it is morally wrong to carry weapons in public, the 
circumstances surrounding the possession of an offensive weapon are important when 
considering potential defences. It is necessary to assess the offender’s motive at the 
time, to discover why he chose to carry the weapon. In R v Morse
694
 it was held that 
the use of a razor in reaction to a fist fight was not reasonable, especially as the 
defendant carried it with him as a matter of course and did not happen to pick it up in 
the heat of the moment. The intention did not respond to a threat or attack, rather, it 
was a matter of regular occurrence that the defendant carried the prohibited article, 
which cannot be considered as reasonable behaviour. Similarly, in the case of R v 
Field,
695
 it was considered important to the reasonableness of the use of a knife, to 
question whether the knife was carried as a matter of course, whether it was carried 
upon the knowledge that an attack was imminent, or whether it was picked up as an 
instinctive reaction to an active threat. These nuances are essentially the difference 
between an offence and a defence, between an unacceptable decision and a good 
reason. They are crucial considerations when evaluating the availability of the 
defence, as ‘the decision to carry a weapon negatives the suddenness and 
unpreparedness which form part of the paradigm of self-defence’,696 and may appear 
to be a calculated act of criminal intent. 
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The court stated in R v Peacock,
697
 that it must be a very rare case that someone 
carrying an offensive weapon in case they may be attacked could plead self-defence 
without evidence of an imminent attack. The defendant in Peacock
698
 was denied the 
defence for carrying a knife out of fear that he may be involved in a fight with a rival 
group, which was not a good reason for its possession. It is interesting to ask just what 
may be permitted as a ‘very rare case’? There is no real indication from the common 
law that such an exception could be sanctioned.
699
  
 
The Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2) of 1983700 case recognised a situation of 
rioting as being exceptional. Would this perhaps include the rioting and looting crisis 
in London and other English cities in the summer of 2011 as special cases?
701
 The 
social developments during that time could potentially have provided a reasonable 
excuse for persons to possess offensive weapons on the streets because of the high 
risk of attack and strong sense of fear within communities. The difficulty in such a 
circumstance would be differentiating between those possessing weapons for the 
purpose of self-protection, and those possessing weapons to facilitate their 
criminality. In reality, that is always where the difficulty lies, in distinguishing 
between lawful and unlawful instances of weapons carrying. 
 
The facts of the Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2) of 1983702 case were that the 
defendant was charged with making a petrol bomb, an explosive substance, contrary 
to the Explosive Substances Act 1883. He claimed that he did so in order to protect 
his business premises from rioters, which was a lawful object under the legislation, 
and the defence was successful.
703
 This was expressed to be an exceptional case 
which distinguished actions taken in self-defence from preparatory actions, noting 
that the possession of the explosives was unlawful until the moment they were 
required for use in self-defence of an imminent attack. The court stated that ‘In our 
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judgement a defendant is not left in the paradoxical position of being able to justify 
acts carried out in self-defence but not acts immediately preparatory to it ... He may 
still arm himself for his own protection, if the exigency arises, although in so doing he 
may commit other offences’.704 The reference to ‘other offences’ here indicates that 
possession of the explosives prior to the need for use, or after a threat has passed, 
would be unlawful. Therefore, despite the lawfulness of using such weapons for 
protection if the exigency arises, any possession beforehand remains an offence. This 
authority suggests that possessing weapons can only be acceptable when there is an 
imminent threat of attack,
705
 emphasising the importance of the requirement of 
imminence. 
 
Without some element of imminence or immediacy of an attack, it would most likely 
never be possible to rely on self-defence as a complete justification for possessing an 
offensive weapon. This condition is important because ‘the very pre-emptiveness of 
the strike implies that the threat being averted was not ‘live’,706 and it is crucial to 
identify whether the possession, or defensive force was required at all, in order to 
satisfy the test of reasonableness and claim self-defence. Because of the gravity of the 
potential harm that may be inflicted by certain weapons, if carried, they will require 
greater proof of the imminence of harm in order for their possession to constitute a 
reasonable excuse or good reason. 
 
The requirement of imminence was narrowly met in the case of Evans v Hughes.
707
 
The defendant in this case had carried a metal bar with him for protection, and was 
charged with possessing an offensive weapon contrary to the 1953 Act. He had 
carried the article since being attacked during the previous week, as he feared he 
would be victimised again. This is a rare and exceptional case, as he was held to have 
a reasonable excuse. Despite having a reasonable excuse on this occasion, the court 
questioned the reasonableness of his actions a week after suffering an attack. The 
imminence here was rather distant, and it was therefore regarded as a borderline case. 
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Indeed, it is possible that the same decision would not have been reached had the 
possession been discovered a month, or even a week later than it was.  
 
In the more recent case of N v DPP,
708
 the appellant had carried a metal bar with him 
five minutes after he had been in a confrontation with a group of men. He claimed 
that he had a reasonable excuse for possessing the weapon because he feared an 
imminent attack. He attempted to rely on Evans v Hughes
709
 as an authority for 
construing five minutes as being ‘well within the margin of “imminence”.710 This 
argument was rejected by the Divisional Court, which maintained that it is a matter 
for the jury to determine how imminent and likely an attack must be in order to 
provide a good reason for possessing a weapon. The former case had not made the 
test of anticipation of an imminent attack a part of the statute, and was distinguished 
as there was no evidence in N v DPP
711
 that an attack was likely. The men did not 
appear to be in pursuit of the defendant and had driven away. The threat had passed, 
and the defendant had not seen any weapons in their possession which would have 
justified his own possession. Despite the prima facie similarities of these cases, (the 
possession of a metal bar as a weapon, and the fear of an attack following a particular 
incident), the case of Evans v Hughes
712
 was distinguished. The lack of evidence 
indicating a risk of an imminent attack denied a ‘reasonable excuse’ in N v DPP. 713 
 
The defendant in N v DPP
714
 also claimed in his appeal against conviction that the test 
of self-defence should apply in his case. The contention was that the action of 
carrying a weapon in anticipation of an imminent attack was one of pre-emptive self-
defence, and the circumstances should therefore be considered subjectively as the 
defendant believed them to be at the time, as is the test with self-defence. However, 
this argument was again rejected. It was held that there was no authority for a 
subjective assessment of ‘reasonable excuse’, and the judgement emphasised the fact 
that the tests and burdens of proof are very different for these defences. While in self-
defence the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that the defence is not 
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available to the defendant, with reasonable excuse it is the defendant that must prove 
both his belief, and the reasonableness of his belief, on the balance of probabilities.  
 
The case of R v Clancy
715
 also discussed the comparison between self-defence and the 
defences of reasonable excuse and good reason, when the argument arose that the 
‘jury should have been directed to reach their decision relying on the appellant’s own 
view of the situation’716 as would be the case with self-defence. However, the court 
dismissed this claiming that ‘there is no true analogy between self-defence and the 
defences of reasonable excuse and good reason because the legal principles and the 
burden of proof are different’.717 There are nevertheless, notable similarities. 
 
In principle, there are similarities between the imminence requirement before force 
may be used in self-defence, and the imminence requirement applied to an attack 
triggering fear and influencing a decision to carry a weapon. However, it seems that 
the manner in which they will be assessed must remain different. For a ‘reasonable 
excuse’ or a ‘good reason’ for possessing an offensive weapon or bladed article to be 
proved, the entire circumstances will be fully considered. While that is also true of a 
case involving pre-emptive self-defence, a distinction appears in relation to the 
perspective from which those circumstances are examined. For self-defence, a degree 
of subjectivity is considered as the circumstances are viewed according to the 
defender’s belief at the time.718 On the other hand, with possession offences and their 
statutory defences, generally, the analysis will be objective.  
 
However, this does not mean that the defender’s state of mind is completely 
irrelevant, and that there is no room for a degree of subjectivity in the assessment at 
all. As held in the case of Clancy,
719
 the very fact that fear of an attack can constitute 
a good reason means that the decision cannot be entirely objective, as the nature of 
fear is that individuals subjectively feel or experience it.
720
 It can therefore be argued 
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that there is uncertainty within the law in this area. Although some judgements clearly 
draw a distinction between the tests for the statutory defences of reasonable excuse 
and good reason, and that for self-defence, in other decisions the line between these 
objective and subjective elements is far less prominent. This makes the tasks of 
predicting outcomes and finding an absolute authority on this matter difficult. 
Considering that the very nature of a question of fact means that different courts and 
juries may reach different decisions to others, the circumstances can be greatly varied. 
 
When considering imminence within the circumstances, timing appears to be a vital 
consideration regarding these defences, as is clear from the cases of Evans v 
Hughes
721
 and N v DPP.
722
 The defences of ‘good reason’ and ‘reasonable excuse’, 
relate to the time at which the defendant carried an offensive weapon or bladed 
article. The case of R v Giles
723
 involved the carrying of a multi-purpose utility tool, 
which included a prohibited blade, and was therefore contrary to the 1988 Act. It was 
held that the fact that the article included non-prohibited features did not provide a 
defence of ‘good reason’ for possessing the article. Although the defendant had used 
the knife earlier in the evening while at home to assist with renovation work, he had 
placed it back in a pouch on his belt, not intending to use it as a weapon, and gone out 
to a public place. The timing was thus an important matter, as his reason for use 
earlier at home did not extend to the time at which it was found in his possession.  
 
The case of Giles
724
 was commented upon in Archbold News, questioning whether the 
jury should in fact be left to consider that a good reason could be found through the 
intention of carrying such an item for a legitimate purpose.
725
 This review highlights 
the dilemma raised through the example of a pair of scissors in a manicure set carried 
as a matter of course for accessibility and convenience when needed. It contends that 
according to the decision in Giles,
726
 the defence of good reason might require the 
owner of the manicure set to have an intention to cut their nails on the very occasion 
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that the scissors are discovered.
727
 That seems preposterous, taking the intention of 
the statute too far. It seems that one must either reconsider what they perceive to be 
reasonable and legitimate actions, and follow the exact letter of the law, (in which 
case the defence of good reason is practically redundant), or on the other hand, to rely 
on the discretion of the police and prosecution in deciding whether an offence has 
been committed.
728
 This is an exaggerated interpretation of the provision and is in 
conflict with the aim of the legislation, which is to minimise the risks presented by the 
carrying of dangerous articles. 
 
Again on the issue of the importance of timing to such defences, it was held on appeal 
to the Court of Appeal that the act of armament in R v Emmanuel
729
 was capable of 
being considered as an act of self-defence. The defendant had been convicted of 
having a bladed article in a public place, which was a knife that he had in his shoe. He 
carried the knife due to fear of a resumed attack following an incident that occurred 
only half an hour before the defendant was found in possession of the article. 
Therefore, despite the fact that his defence was relatively weak, the judge should have 
left self-defence as a good reason for the determination of the jury, and the appeal was 
permitted on the basis of the misdirection.
730
 This is in contrast to the case of N v 
DPP
731
 where the decision and distinction related to the lack of evidential risk of an 
imminent attack in the case. The question of imminence of attack and reasonableness 
of the belief should have been open to consideration by the jury in Emmanuel,
732
 
rather than being declined as a good reason by the judge.  
 
Another relevant but much older case is Evans v Wright
733
 in which a man was 
stopped while driving and was found to have a knuckleduster and a truncheon in his 
possession. Charged under the 1953 Act, he argued that he used the car to collect 
large sums of money to pay wages, and that he carried these articles with him for 
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protection. At the time they were found in his possession, he was not collecting 
wages, and therefore lacked a reasonable excuse. The element of reasonableness is 
concerned with the time at which the weapon is carried, and so similarly, the defence 
of self-defence failed for lack of reasonable excuse in Grieve v Macleod.
734
 
 
3.4.2 The relevance of self-defence to the statutory defences 
 
In theory, self-defence could provide ‘reasonable excuse’ for carrying articles 
contrary to the 1953 Act, or ‘good reason’ for possessing articles contrary to the 1988 
Act.
735
 Therefore, it could be a potential defence to the offence of possessing an 
offensive weapon. However, as will become evident shortly in the discussion in 
section 3.5 on self-defence, a reasonable excuse was lacking in the case of Butler,
736
 
where the purpose of self-defence and carrying the item as a matter of necessity was 
not enough to justify the possession of the article in that particular case. It is difficult 
to know just what might constitute a reasonable excuse in this context. Most people 
carry weapons for protection, but the courts have taken a strict approach on this 
matter, and fearing an attack at some point in the future is not sufficient by itself to 
provide a reasonable excuse. This is a key point regarding the interplay between the 
different defences of self-defence, reasonable excuse and good reason and what 
satisfies their tests.  
 
The same is true regarding the difficulty of determining what falls within the terms 
reasonable excuse and good reason as that of self-defence, and many cases have 
discussed what kind of justifications are capable of satisfying these provisions. The 
case of R v McAuley
737
 confirmed previous decisions that a good reason could be 
found if the defendant had carried a knife for protection and was able to prove, on the 
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balance of probabilities, that he feared an imminent attack at the time. The facts of the 
case were that the defendant had been stabbed by a man in January 2008 in Brixton, 
and upon seeing him again in May of that year in the same area was again approached 
and threatened by him. Therefore, the next time he travelled to Brixton, he decided to 
arm himself with a knife in case he encountered him again. The judge had ruled that 
fear of attack in such a situation did not constitute a good reason because ‘if this was a 
good reason, knife-carrying could be carried out by virtually anybody in the Brixton 
area’.738 However, his appeal against conviction was permitted, because a fear of 
attack could potentially be a good reason, and the judge should have heard the 
evidence before making such a declaration. As decided in R v Bown,
739
 ‘a court 
should be slow to rule that the evidence was, as a matter of law, incapable of 
amounting to the s.139 (4) defence’.740  
 
The facts of Bown
741
 are fairly unique in that a knife was carried for the purposes of 
self-harm. The defendant argued that this was a good reason for its possession, and 
that he was accordingly not guilty of the offence of its possession. It was held that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s claim to allow his appeal 
against conviction. However, the trial judge had been wrong to declare that self-harm 
was incapable of being a good reason for possessing the bladed article in a public 
place.
742
 If protecting the public is the objective of legislating to prohibit weapons 
possession, it seems that this instance falls outside the direct intention of Parliament. 
If the defendant only intends to harm himself, his actions would not present a danger 
to others. Therefore a claim of possession for the purpose of self-harm has the 
potential to provide a good reason.  
 
It is for the judge to decide whether or not a reason is capable of being a good reason, 
and for the jury to consider whether it is adequate on the facts of the case. However, 
‘where ordinary English words are used in a statute, a judge should be slow to rule 
that the particular facts cannot as a matter of law fall within the scope of a “good 
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reason”.743 The judge’s role can be considered fairly difficult in this regard, as it is a 
matter of interpretation. This undoubtedly means that different people will have 
different views, and concluding that self-harm is not a good reason for possessing a 
bladed article in a public place might also have been considered sensible by others. 
After all, as previously mentioned, the presence of any weapons in public presents a 
potential danger.  
 
The matter is further complicated by the fact that it is not merely the need to find a 
good reason for possessing the article in question that is considered, but rather that 
there is a good reason for its possession in a public place.
744
 The public place 
requirement will be discussed further in Chapter 4 as it will be necessary to compare 
the law’s approach to self-defence in public and private spaces.745  
 
The specification of public places is closely linked to the issue of forgetfulness. This 
connection is based on the fact that often individuals use articles at home or at work, 
where it is lawful to do so, but thereafter forget that it remains in their possession 
when leaving the property. Thus, the matter arises whether a reasonable excuse or 
good reason for its possession can be found by way of forgetfulness.  
 
The potential for forgetfulness to provide a defence to weapons possession has arisen 
in case law, and was deliberated in the case of DPP v Gregson.
746
 The defendant had 
used a knife at his work and forgotten that it remained in his pocket six days later 
while he was not at work. It was held that forgetfulness did not constitute a good 
reason.
747
 Although he had a good reason for its possession six days earlier, he lacked 
a good reason at the time it was found in his possession.
748
 Comparatively more 
                                                        
743
 Case Comment: R v Jolie & R v Manning: Having Bladed Article - Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.139 
- “Having With Him”, op cit fn 686 at 2. 
744
 R v Bown [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 13. 
745
 See section 4.3.1. This will also be developed in Chapter 5. 
746
 DPP v Gregson [1993] 96 Cr. App. R. 240. 
747
 ibid. 
748
 S.Mercer ‘Divisional Court - A Good Reason for Having an Offensive Weapon: DPP v Gregson, 
Godwin v DPP, Harris v DPP, Fehmi v DPP’ (1993) 57 Journal of Criminal Law 308, at 308. In the 
case of Godwin, the defendant was found with a kitchen knife in a public place and claimed he was 
merely moving it to his new home. This was rejected as a ‘good reason’ as he had drawn the knife 
when he saw one of his adversaries. Both the cases of Harris and Fehmi involved the possession of 
‘lock-knives’, and discussed whether such an article was covered by the provision in section 139 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. The argument was raised that the articles in question were folding knives, 
therefore falling under the statutory exception, but the court rejected this argument. 
 147 
recently, the case of R v Jolie
749
 also discussed the issue of forgetfulness, with the trial 
judge holding initially that forgetfulness could never amount to a good reason in such 
cases. However, an appeal was allowed on the basis that in terms of possession, the 
jury should be directed that the defence relies upon either the defendant’s knowledge 
of the location of the article, or that he was responsible for placing it where it was 
found, even if he forgot about it sometime afterwards. Forgotten possession is still 
undoubtedly classed as possession.
750
  
 
3.5 Offensive weapons, bladed articles and self-defence 
 
It has already been mentioned that the connection between crimes involving offensive 
weapons, bladed articles and the defence of self-defence is based on the fact that most 
people who carry weapons do so in order to protect themselves. Research by the 
Centre for Crime and Justice Studies in London has found that fear is the primary 
motivator for weapons carriers.
751
 The study explains that fear is a much more 
common reason for possession than aggression or other motivational factors. The 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey ran from 2003-2006,
752
 and the 2006 results 
found that among respondents who had admitted to having carried a weapon, 85 per 
cent explained that they had done so due to fear.
753
 It may be deduced from these 
findings that on the whole, people carry weapons in order to facilitate self-defence 
against the threats that they fear.
754
 The key factor is feeling unsafe and a need to 
carry something for self-protection.
755
 Nevertheless, despite the relatively certain 
intentions of the offender being defensive, not aggressive, the ability to plead self-
defence in such cases in unclear. At first instance, regarding the intention alone, it 
would appear that self-defence is potentially available. However, the complication 
arises due to the other requirements of self-defence, namely imminence of attack. 
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When an individual forearms oneself, this is a pre-emptive action that occurs before a 
situation necessitating self-defence has arisen.  
 
As already seen, the law does not prohibit the use of a weapon in self-defence if there 
is a genuine need for it, and if it is reasonable in the circumstances to use one. This 
point was advanced by Beale who supported the view that weapons are permissible 
for use in self-defence, expressing that ‘if nature has not provided the means for such 
resistance, art may; in short, a weapon may be used to effect the unavoidable 
necessity’.756 The case of R v Butler757 is particularly intriguing in this context. Mr 
Butler used a sword-stick to assist him while walking. He was attacked by a youth on 
a train and in the circumstances he used the sword ‘perfectly properly in self-
defence’758 to stop the youth from strangling him. While he had a good reason for 
carrying a stick, this did not amount to a reasonable excuse for carrying a sword-stick. 
Although it was acceptable and justifiable for him to have used the article in the 
circumstances to protect himself, it was nevertheless illegal for him to carry the 
sword-stick up until the point at which it was reasonable to use it in self-defence. In 
this case, it was an offence to carry the article in public, as it was an offensive weapon 
per se.
759
 However, it was not unreasonable to use the article in self-defence when the 
necessity arose.
760
 While, Mr Butler had a defence to the act of wounding the youth, 
he remained accountable for the offence of possessing an offensive weapon.  
 
The law appears contradictory here - while it may be justifiable to use a weapon in 
self-defence, an offence of possession will be committed until the moment it is 
required for self-defence.
 
It seems unfair that one would remain liable for the lesser 
offence of possession, while being released from accountability for the use of the 
weapon in self-defence. Hsiao argues that such an approach ‘though appearing to 
recognize the value of human life, actually cheapens it by disallowing the citizenry the 
ability to mount a reasonable defense of their own lives’.761 Providing that there is 
evidence of an imminent attack, self-defence can provide a reasonable excuse for 
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possessing an offensive weapon. However, in the absence of a clear threat the 
possession will be unreasonable and individuals are not permitted to carry weapons as 
a matter of precaution.
762
 
 
There is a distinction to be drawn between resorting to using any accessible item at 
the moment of necessity, and carrying a weapon to ensure that if the need arises the 
individual would be able to use it for protection. It is ordinarily acceptable for a 
person to use a weapon of opportunity, namely anything that happens to be available 
to them at the time, where it is reasonable to do so. However, the situation involving 
an act of forearming involves premeditation and preparation, and is problematic. 
Smith famously illustrated this point in the following hypothetical scenario: 
 
 ‘If I happen upon a bank robbery and, being shot at by one of the robbers, 
I pick up the revolver which has been dropped by a wounded policeman 
and, quite reasonably fire it in self-defence, I am surely not guilty of an 
offence under the Firearms Act 1968, section 1, of being in possession of 
a firearm without holding a firearm certificate - unless I retain possession 
of the revolver for longer than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of 
self-defence or the prevention of crime. It can hardly be the law that the 
circumstances might justify me in, or excuse me for, killing my assailant 
with the revolver and yet not justify or excuse my being in possession of it 
... If an act is justifiable or excusable because done in self-defence or the 
prevention of crime, that ought to be a sufficient answer to a charge of 
any crime alleged to be involved in the doing of the act’.763  
 
The quote emphasises the contradictory nature of the law. The more serious action of 
using a weapon would be excused, while the less serious action of possession would 
be a punishable offence.
764
 The argument made by Smith is that the defence should be 
permissible in relation to all offences that ensue; after all, it is as a matter of necessity 
for self-protection and protection of others that the offence is committed. The danger 
with allowing such an approach would be that some people would take advantage of 
the legal position. Individuals may carry weapons deliberately with intent for 
defensive use, knowing that the possession would be justified once defensive force 
became necessary. Persons who regularly engage in dangerous activities, such as gang 
behaviour, might receive no punishment, as they are constantly facing imminent 
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threats. With such an approach, one would have to be caught in possession when no 
threat appears likely, before being penalised for the offence of possession. This would 
encourage the carrying of weapons, as there would be no negative consequences. This 
runs contrary to the deterrence objective within the legislation.  
 
Perhaps this complication could be addressed by applying different standards to 
preparatory weapons and weapons of opportunity.
765
 While the former entails blame 
on the part of the offender, the latter can be justified as it is committed as a matter of 
human instinct in a moment of desperation. It is worth emphasising again the 
distinction between weapons of opportunity and preparatory weapons. Smith’s 
scenario involves a weapon of opportunity with no deliberate act of forearming. In 
reality, these situations are diverse and encompass different intentions on the part of 
the defender. While the former example portrayed involves a merely instinctive 
reaction in the heat of the moment, and luck that a weapon of opportunity is close by, 
the latter situation is preceded by deliberation, preparation and pre-emption of a future 
attack. It must be conceded that the notion of a weapon of opportunity seems almost 
unavoidably hypothetical in itself, as the odds of finding oneself in a situation 
necessitating defensive action, and at the same time finding a weapon to use for this 
purpose are probably remote.
766
 
 
This is problematic for self-defence. While in theory it is available for these offences, 
in practice, it rarely extends its protection to offensive weapons offences. Lanham 
argues that in order for the defence to apply in such cases, an understanding must be 
reached that the balancing scales tip in favour of the self-defensive actions rather than 
the risks posed by possession offences.
767
 This involves a delicate balancing act to 
promote the welfare and safety of the individual, alongside the collective interests of 
society. When an article is picked up in the heat of the moment, as a weapon of 
opportunity, it is far easier to argue that the possession offence should be waived. 
However, it is a far greater challenge to argue the same in relation to a preparatory 
weapon, carried in case the necessity for defensive action arises. The danger posed by 
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this situation is clearly conveyed by Lord Woolf: ‘The problem is that if a person 
arms himself with a knife and there is then an incident, it is all too easy for him to 
make use of the weapon in a way wholly disproportionate to the danger in which he 
finds himself’.768 Thus, waiving the possession offence when it is deliberately carried 
is more problematic, as it strengthens the defender’s position to a potentially 
disproportionate level, enabling use of far more force than might be sufficient to 
overcome the threat. 
 
It must be seriously questioned whether self-defence should or should not provide a 
defence to possession offences. It currently appears that it does not, but if it were 
decided that the defence should be available for these offences, it should be expressly 
stated in statute. A self-defence exception could be added into the defences permitted 
under the Acts of 1953 and 1988,
769
 and specified within the explanation of 
‘reasonable force’ in section 78 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
This would enable the courts to interpret the legal position more consistently. As has 
been shown from case law examples such as Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2) of 
1983
770
 and R v Butler,
771
 it is a contradiction that an individual could be released 
from the criminal liability arising from their use of force, and yet be punished for the 
lesser offence of possessing the weapon in question. The courts have generally 
approached this issue in a restrictive manner. Self-defence has not been regarded as a 
potential defence to the possession of an offensive weapon, although the defence may 
justify the use of the weapon. This approach indicates that it is unlikely that self-
defence will provide a defence to a charge of possession.  
 
It must be asked whether the preceding approach is the appropriate method to employ. 
Sangero regards this approach as correct, as he argues that self-defence is not an 
appropriate defence to possession offences.
772
 His view is closely tied to the careful 
balancing act required between protecting the individual and the collective society. 
He believes that possession offences are not subject to the protection offered by self-
defence. The reasons for this are premised on the lack of injury caused to the 
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aggressor, a non-identifiable individual victim, and the fact that the harm in such 
cases is suffered by society.
773
 Under this reasoning, the defence can only be relevant 
if and when the weapon is used to inflict injury. Despite this compelling view, it is 
argued here that providing the requirements of self-defence are indeed met, and that 
there is a threat of imminent force against the defender, the defence may well be 
considered morally applicable in such a context. In such an instance, the defender’s 
intent would not be unlawful, as it is solely focused on the securement of self-
protection. Further support may be gained from appreciating that for the purposes of 
the common law, self-defence is occasionally permitted where conduct amounts to 
less than force, as was the circumstances in the petrol bomb case discussed earlier.
774
  
 
When considering the availability of self-defence in relation to offences involving 
offensive weapons, the legal path is uncertain. Although the defence may apply in 
cases where the weapon has been used, the offence of mere possession is unlikely to 
be justified. While the defences of reasonable excuse or good reason may excuse a 
charge of possession, it would appear that fear and protection alone are unlikely to 
provide an excuse for carrying a weapon. This means that the most common 
motivations for carrying weapons, fear and protection, will sometimes fall short of 
any of the available defences. A more inclusive approach would be to ascertain the 
full circumstances of the case, and providing there is a genuine concern, the defence 
of good reason or reasonable excuse could be found. Such a position acknowledges 
that self-defence is probably not the appropriate defence for the offence committed, 
but permits a consideration of defensive intentions within the statutory defences. On 
the contrary to the current position, this suggestion offers a viable excuse for the 
fearful individual through the defences of ‘reasonable excuse’ or ‘good reason’. This 
would not involve the extension of self-defence to possession offences. Rather, it 
would recognise that in cases where self-defence has justified the use of a weapon, 
                                                        
773
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that fact should provide compelling evidence of ‘good reason’ or ‘reasonable excuse’ 
to provide a defence to the offence of possession.
775
  
 
Nevertheless, in considering fear and need for protection as potential reasons to 
reduce punishment for weapons offences, it is necessary to question whether or not 
the individual has caused the circumstances and need for defence. Thus, it is relevant 
to consider whether the decision to carry a weapon triggers an element of blame on 
the part of the defender.
 
 
3.5.1 Self-generated self-defence
776
 
 
This title refers to situations where the defendant is partially to blame for the need to 
use defensive action by having contributed in some way to the generation of the 
situation. According to Leverick:  
 
 ‘the majority of reported self-defence cases are self-generated. Cases of 
‘pure self-defence’ - where the accused uses defensive force to repel a 
sudden and unexpected attack for which she is in no way to blame - are 
rare. Far more common are cases in which the accused played some part 
... in contributing to the situation that ultimately led to the need to use 
self-defensive force’.777  
 
Research evidence supports the view that the mere possession of an offensive weapon 
increases the carrier’s risk of becoming a victim of a violent assault.778 The fact that a 
person carries an article in order to use it for self-defensive purposes if a situation of 
necessity arises, contributes to the harm that ensues. It may be argued that one is 
partly responsible for the situation one faces, and indeed, to some degree, can even be 
said to anticipate that such a circumstance will arise. Kleck and Gertz have also noted 
that often those acting defensively have contributed in some way to the situation, and 
that ‘the notion that much violence is one-sided and that many victims of violence are 
                                                        
775
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largely blameless is dismissed as naïve’.779 The carrying of a weapon is thus regarded 
as being too pre-emptive. It can even be considered as evidence of prior intention; of 
a mental element or indication of preparation and willingness to use a weapon not 
only defensively, but perhaps also offensively.
780
  
 
Historically, by having a part to play in the attack, the defendant may be unable to 
rely on the defence of self-defence.
781
 It was held in the case of R v Browne,
782
 by the 
then Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland,
783
 that the need for defensive force must 
not have been created by the defender’s conduct in the immediate context of the 
attack. However, it was later decided in the Scottish case of Burns,
784
 followed and 
confirmed in R v Rashford
785
 that the defence should not be ruled out altogether 
merely because of the defender’s initial culpability. In the case of Rashford,786 the 
circumstances were that the defendant had quarrelled with the victim before they got 
into a fight and he killed him in self-defence. Situations may occur where the 
defender provokes a response, or causes some harm to the aggressor, and the 
aggressor reacts with disproportionate force.
787
 Although responsible for initially 
sparking the aggression, the defender may nevertheless lawfully use force against the 
aggressor, the original victim, in self-defence. The Court of Appeal suggested in 
Harvey
788
 that this depends on whether the ‘the tables had been turned’.789 Whether 
the defence will be available to one who is partly to blame for the circumstances will 
naturally depend on the circumstances of each individual case. However, the idea is to 
prevent the plea in a situation where the defendant has provoked an attack deliberately 
with the objective of taking revenge on the aggressor, and then claiming self-defence, 
(unless the response is disproportionate).
790
 Having a role to play in the violence that 
ensues renders the defendant morally blameworthy for his actions. Therefore, an 
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individual forearmed with a weapon for protection, in case there is a need to act in 
self-defence, may be acting immorally and illegally, and may be unable to claim self-
defence.  
 
Lanham has described the connection between self-defence and offensive weapons as 
“an uneasy synergy”.791 This tension is certainly evident. The uneasiness arises from 
the complex position surrounding the carrying of a weapon out of fear or for 
protection, to enable its use in self-defence if required. There is uncertainty regarding 
when self-defence may provide a defence, and when it will be restricted. Additionally, 
there is a need for clarity on the interplay between the defence of self-defence, and the 
statutory defences of good reason and reasonable excuse. The law allows the use of 
weapons if it is reasonable and necessary for self-defence. However, the act of 
possession is only reasonable from the moment it is required to be used in self-
defence, and no earlier. Therefore, while the use of a weapon must be reasonable 
according to the circumstances, the mere act of possessing a weapon does not negate 
one’s ability to claim self-defence entirely.792  
 
The carrying of weapons in public may be considered as dangerous, threatening, and 
anti-social behaviour that increases the risks of violence and serious harm within 
communities. The line is difficult to draw between what may be done in lawful self-
defence and what exceeds the scope of the defence. Although self-defence is 
theoretically a possible defence to weapons possession offences, it has scarcely been 
reflected in practice in the decisions of the courts, and it appears that it does not 
provide a defence in this context. While the general application of self-defence is 
satisfactory, it is not within the context of offensive weapons. It is therefore necessary 
to consider potential solutions and clarifications to the complex legal position, as well 
as initiatives to prevent the prevalence of weapons possession. 
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3.6 Legal and non-legal proposals 
 
3.6.1 The legal proposal 
 
To offer a suggestion as to how things could be somewhat clarified here, the 
differentiation between the varying categories of offensive weapons needs to be 
highlighted. As has been shown, there is a distinct difference between an article made 
or adapted for use to cause injury, and one intended to cause injury. The former 
category refers to articles that are offensive per se, namely they were designed to be 
tools for inflicting injuries, to be weapons. The second category also contains a strong 
indication towards inflicting injury, as there is intent to use the item as a weapon, and 
positive steps have been taken to facilitate such use. However, the final category 
relies only on the intention of the carrier. Therefore, within this category are innocent 
or non-offensive items, which are either carried with a formed intention to use as 
weapons, or possibly, include the intention to use them defensively if faced by an 
unlawful attack. The final example is fundamentally different to the previous two 
categories, as this is essentially a defensive, innocent intention.  
 
This could be an opportunity to achieve clarity, as the former categories should surely 
be treated differently to a genuine case of an article being carried with the intention 
for defensive, not offensive, use. While carrying an innocent article with the intent to 
use it offensively can lead to it being an offensive weapon, on the contrary, an 
intention to use it defensively perhaps should not. This could provide some clarity in 
the law, but there is a further challenge to overcome here, and that is the problem of 
proving the lawful defensive intention. Questions of intention are always difficult as 
they are substantially subjective, and this would be open to abuse as anyone could 
easily argue the defensive use ground.  
 
Despite the additional dilemma here, it must be emphasised that this would only apply 
in relation to ordinarily innocent articles. Items such as umbrellas and walking sticks 
that the individual has considered could be utilised for defensive purposes if required. 
These items are not usually prohibited, there is no reason for them to be, and if the 
law accepts the concept of a weapon of opportunity, then surely self-defence can 
encompass such items. These would likely be permitted under the ‘reasonable excuse’ 
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defence, as there are no restrictions on carrying such items from day-to-day in public. 
They should not therefore gain the title of offensive weapons if carried with the 
possible intention of using them defensively against unlawful attacks.
793
  
 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that weapons that are offensive per se, and articles 
adapted to cause injury pose more significant threats to public safety, and should be 
subject to the legislative restrictions.
794
 The most significant factor here is the 
fundamentally opposite concepts of offensive and defensive. While the former should 
be considered always unlawful, the latter can be lawful. Accordingly, possessing 
innocent objects, albeit with an intention for use to cause injury (defensively), should 
be within the remit of self-defence; while possessing weapons that are offensive per 
se will give rise to a charge of possessing an offensive weapon, and therefore not be 
encompassed by the defence. 
 
It is challenging to present a solution that could improve the law in relation to self-
defence and offensive weapons. Attempts to improve the law and social interaction 
regarding self-defence and offensive weapons require a combination of different 
approaches. Criminological considerations of changing behaviour, environments
795
 
and social structures
796
 should be consulted in conjunction with legal methods, to 
ensure that the law is effective in terms of its provisions and implementation. 
Therefore, it is futile to address the criminal activity without also exploring and 
redressing the underlying reasons and causes that produce the incidents.
797
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3.6.2 The non-legal proposal 
 
One causal factor for possession offences is the easy accessibility to knives that can 
inflict serious and lethal injuries. Consequently, the medical profession has advanced 
a more practical, tangible suggestion for change. It has been argued that the design of 
the kitchen knife should be modified to produce a safer tool. Support has been shown 
for a complete redesign, although it is acknowledged that this would be a gradual 
approach, and people may require incentives to encourage replacing the ones 
currently used in their homes and businesses.
798
 The reason for this is that ‘a dagger 
type knife … can penetrate deeply. Once resistance from clothing and skin is 
overcome, little extra force is required to injure vital organs’.799 An editorial in the 
British Medical Journal found that a survey of chefs did not conclude that a long 
pointed knife was essential for food preparation. Similarly, manufactures noted that 
the design was traditional and not a functional requirement for the effective use of the 
item. Thus it was concluded that there is no fundamental reason why such designs 
could not be changed to a safer shape, and it was recommended that ‘banning the sale 
of long pointed kitchen knives is a sensible and practical measure’,800 that could 
contribute to a reduction of knife crime.  
 
This is a relatively simple solution, however Bernard states that ‘it is human 
willingness to injure and kill that is the all-important characteristic that needs to be 
addressed, rather than the presence of any particular device’.801 Therefore in reality 
this might have little to no impact, as people who wish to carry weapons will always 
find a way to access weapons, or simply alter their choice of weapon.  
 
3.7 Initiatives directed at preventing and restricting the carrying of offensive 
weapons 
 
The core problems and trends in respect of these offences were identified at the 
beginning of this chapter, and it is notable that there are many initiatives in operation 
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to prevent such crimes. The law alone is an insufficient method to deter the carrying 
of offensive weapons and bladed articles, as essentially it is only engaged 
retrospectively: enabling the punishment once the offence has been committed. It is 
therefore necessary to consider some of the programmes that have been developed in 
an attempt to tackle this issue on a preventative, societal level. 
 
The Home Office has implemented a number of strategies to tackle crimes involving 
knives over the past few years, including its Tackling Knives Action Programme 
(TKAP)
802
 and Youth Crime Action Plan,
803
 to send out the message that people who 
carry knives are now more likely to get caught, be prosecuted and receive tough 
punishment.
804
 The Home Office’s 2008-2011 plans were to reduce crime and protect 
the public, addressing the problem by working in partnerships
805
 with agencies and 
using visible policing.
806
 The idea of visible policing is to provide a sense of security 
to people, who are more likely to trust the police if they believe that they are active in 
their local communities and are quick to respond to criminal activity in the area. This 
in turn could decrease the perception that individual’s need to be armed with a 
weapon for use in self-defence, by producing a sense of security within the 
community.  
 
The ‘stop and search’ powers of the police807 are located in section 60 of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 1994,
808
 which provides the right to search individuals 
where there is good reason to believe that ‘there is the possibility of serious violence; 
or that a person is carrying a dangerous object or offensive weapon; or that an 
incident involving serious violence has taken place and a dangerous instrument or 
offensive weapon used in the incident is being carried in the locality’. 809  As 
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previously mentioned, the detection of possession offences is a challenge, and these 
powers are important in this context. Unless the article is used, without the ability to 
conduct searches, many more of these offences would simply occur unnoticed without 
any punishment being imposed.  
 
It is worth noting observations by Hitchcock about the success of the TKAP, which 
did in fact reduce knife crime, (possession and use), in the areas targeted. ‘In its first 
year the programme saw a 17% reduction in Police reported wounding and a massive 
32% reduction in hospital admission of serious wounding’.810 The continuation of this 
success is only possible through sustained focus and support in these targeted areas. 
The fact that reductions have been seen does not mean that the issue has been solved. 
Should attention be diverted away from these activities, it is possible that they could 
resurface. The cycle of fear that influences the belief that weapons are vital tools for 
effective self-defence could easily restart again. 
 
This is a continuing risk as the carrying of knives and other weapons can be 
considered a form of anti-social behaviour, which is a multidimensional and wide 
ranging issue that can have devastating effects on communities and society as a 
whole. Although sometimes considered less serious than some other forms of criminal 
behaviour, it is a serious matter.
811
 Those who experience anti-social behaviour and 
live in fear of it are a testament to its potentially debilitating harms to personal safety, 
social activities and community spirit. As already stated, the knowledge that others in 
the local area are engaging in such activities has an impact on those who fear their 
behaviour, thus increasing the number of weapons carried as a matter of self-defence 
and security. 
 
 
Anti-social behaviour has been normalised and thus we accept too easily things that 
are and should be unacceptable, such as avoiding specific areas at night or taking 
different routes in order to avoid confrontation.
812
 There exists a need to challenge 
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this submissive behaviour,
813
 to make our streets safer for everyone, to make public 
places ‘public friendly’ and accessible. In order to achieve such an aim, work needs to 
be targeted at community level, to change the views that individuals require weapons 
to stay safe in public spaces. There are many organisations; charities and youth clubs 
dedicated to making a difference in this context, working with young people to 
enhance their potential and future opportunities, so that they have an incentive to 
choose different paths in their lives.  
 
There are several success stories and evidence of responses that combat anti-social 
behaviour. A report by the Home Office
814
 noted that there is a need for greater 
cooperation with schools so that more young people are educated about the dangers of 
carrying weapons. It reported findings from many visits to various schemes and 
projects across several cities experiencing trouble with young people and weapons, 
such as London, Birmingham and Manchester, and highlighted the key factors 
indicative of success. Among these was an interactive organisation called Fear & 
Fashion, run by Leap in Westminster, which use games and workshops to challenge 
pre-conceived opinions.
815
 They worked with young people to target the issues of fear 
and fashion as motivations for carrying weapons, namely, fearing harm from others, 
and the belief that such behaviour provides status. A vital component of the effective 
running of the programme is the input from individuals who have either been victims 
themselves or previous offenders, who had real experience of the damage that can be 
caused by weapons. Young people listened to their advice and stories as they could 
relate to them.
816
  
 
Other examples reviewed by the study were targeted towards improving relationships 
between young people and the police, which can be tense and full of resentment, with 
young people feeling particularly disrespected and victimised during stop searches. 
One project aimed to deliver fairer policing, by training the constabulary to conduct 
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searches in a less threatening manner, so that they gain the trust of local residents, 
while another enlisted the experience of police officers to run workshops and 
presentations debating actions and their consequences, with the aim of deterring those 
present from carrying weapons in the future.
817
  
 
The key is to address the root of the problem and understand the reasons behind the 
behaviour and attitudes towards carrying offensive weapons. As Grimshaw notes, 
‘knife carrying and knife use is merely one expression of interpersonal violence, and 
a reduction in the use of knives will only occur if the incidence of violence is 
addressed by a long-term strategy. The knife is merely an implement used in 
crime’. 818  This statement demonstrates that the carrying of weapons is merely a 
symptom of underlying causes. Reaching the source of knife carrying requires the 
most problematic regions and the individuals most at risk to be identified and 
addressed. This involves education, changing views and prospects, and increasing the 
opportunities available. Part of this education should involve an explanation of the 
legal position with regard to offensive weapons.
819
 This should highlight the 
limitations on claiming fear as a reason for possession, as self-defence appears only 
available when the weapon has been used, and there is uncertainty whether fear is 
sufficient for the defences of ‘reasonable excuse’ and ‘good reason’. 
 
Enhancing opportunities and education provide examples of preventative measures 
that can be taken as opposed to reactive measures, ultimately leading to more positive 
results. It is promising to note the success of many community centres across the 
country, but also troubling to note the risks of closure as a result of the government’s 
spending cuts.
820
 It is a sobering fact of life that financial resources are finite and as a 
result some undesirable consequences become inevitable reality.
821
 However, this 
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does not justify moving backwards and losing services that have not only successfully 
reduced crime and anti-social behaviour, but have also had a positive impact on the 
lives of disadvantaged people. It is essential that such initiatives be designed in a 
manner that is sustainable for the future, to enable the issue of weapons possession to 
be addressed at every level.  
 
It seems that the target should not be to eradicate knives from the streets in their 
entirety, as this would be an impossible task. Despite amnesties and the police’s stop 
and search powers, knives will continue to have a presence in public, due to their 
accessible nature.
822
 These methods only provide short-term solutions - they are not 
effective on their own in the long-term.
823
 While ‘tough on crime’ approaches appear 
attractive to politicians, to demonstrate proactive measures are being taken, there is a 
need to address the issues at the heart of knife crime. It must be acknowledged that 
arbitrary zero tolerance policies can in fact have counterproductive consequences.
824
 
It is problematic that young people in particular feel that they have become targets, 
with some subjected to searches on a regular basis. This can harbour feelings of 
resentment and anger in response to the sense of disrespect projected.
825
 Indeed, there 
is evidence to confirm this assertion, and Newburn has discussed this within the 
context of his research on the English riots in 2011.
826
 He led a team of researchers 
from The Guardian and the London School of Economics that conducted a series of 
interviews immediately after the riots to gain a detailed understanding of the reasons 
behind the outbursts across English cities. The research project found that anger 
towards the police, and the strong sense of injustice deriving from ‘stop and search’ 
practices were causal factors in the riots.
827
 This confirms the need to target the root 
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causes of the issue of weapons possession, as opposed to merely touching the surface 
and creating ripples in the water with ‘tough on crime’ approaches.828 
 
People who live in dangerous surroundings and feel under threat in their day-to-day 
lives will not be deterred from carrying weapons for protection without some 
incentive.
829
 There must be a sense of improvement in their living conditions and the 
quality of their lives before behaviour and trends will change. Namely, there needs to 
be a realistic alternative available through increased opportunities for education, 
future careers, and social life. The law alone cannot address this dilemma; 
fundamental societal changes are also required. In times of austerity this is a 
significant challenge, as the achievements made by various organisations are lost 
when funding cuts means that the provision becomes unsustainable. These services 
are essential to the young people themselves, to their communities, and to society 
more broadly. The dedication of the staff and volunteers who are broadening 
perspectives, offering training and support, play a key role in addressing the void that 
the law cannot reach.
830
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The interplay between self-defence and offensive weapons offences is far from clear. 
There is much uncertainty and unpredictability in the legal position. There is also a 
contradiction in the tendency to punish the lesser act of possession more severely than 
the graver act of using the weapon to inflict injury. In other words, the conflict 
emerges in prohibiting the act of carrying, (until the moment its assistance is 
required), yet justifying the use of the article if it is reasonable in self-defence.  
 
There is certainly an inconsistency in sentencing practice and the allocation of 
punishment according to the level of harm caused. While some would argue that this 
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is unfair, the stronger argument is that the law cannot allow people to carry weapons 
just in case they might need them, because this escalates and increases the potential 
dangers to everyone. The dangers posed by offensive weapons to the public eclipse 
the ever-present element of chance that an individual will need to use force in self-
defence.  
 
Although the law protects each individual, there is no right to arm oneself in case of 
future attack, as that creates a danger that would not otherwise exist to society. Again 
this is a matter of balancing the competing interests involved, and reducing harms to 
society is prioritised over securing self-defence for individuals against unidentified 
future attacks or threats. Permitting preparatory weapons would be risky, especially as 
studies have found that carrying weapons increases the carrier’s risk of falling victim 
to violence.
831
 This statement does not contravene the human rights of the individual, 
as human rights are not unlimited, and where a threat is posed to society, they can 
lawfully be restricted. While an individual would not be restricted from using a 
weapon for self-defence against an imminent attack or threat of attack, there is no 
basis for finding a right to forearmament generally. Therefore, one is not entitled to 
carry a weapon at all times in case one becomes the victim of an attack.
832
 
 
Some may consider this a harsh approach, and it is not without its critics.
833
 The 
thought of individuals unable to protect themselves without the assistance of a 
weapon is an emotive and provocative dilemma. There is a need for enhanced clarity 
in this area of the law and wider education for the public to ensure greater 
understanding of the protection afforded under the law.
834
 There is uncertainty 
regarding what actions may be taken in anticipation of an attack, and whether 
preparatory weapons can ever fall under the scope of the defence prior to being used 
for protection. The law’s position in relation to possessing offensive weapons and 
self-defence is confusing, contradictory and unsatisfactory. 
 
                                                        
831
 A.Silvestri et al. op cit fn 564 at 21. 
832
 As held in the case of R v Taikato op cit fn 619. See previous discussion on this case on page 124. 
See also J.C.Smith, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, op cit fn 621 at 48-49. 
833
 T.Hsiao ‘Bearing Arms in Self-defense: a Natural Law Perspective’, op cit fn 344 at 119. His 
opinion was discussed on page 148 of the present chapter.  
834
 F.Llewelyn, op cit fn 494 at 22. 
 166 
What has emerged during the course of this discussion is that the only defences to 
possession offences are ‘good reason’, or ‘reasonable excuse’. Self-defence does not 
provide a defence to possession offences. While fear alone is not usually sufficient to 
establish a defence of good reason or reasonable excuse, the case of Clancy
835
 has 
provided an authority that suggests fear of attack coupled with an imminent threat 
could be enough.
836
 While this case clarified that fear is a significant consideration in 
excusing an individual’s decision to carry a weapon, it does not go far enough to 
refine the legal position. Confusion remains as the terms ‘good reason’ and 
‘reasonable excuse’ have been compared to self-defence on occasion, when the latter 
is only relevant to a charge resulting from the use of the weapon. A further authority 
removing the confusion from this area is required to appropriately separate and 
delineate the ambit of these different defences.  
 
Due to the justificatory nature of self-defence, it must be applied within controlled 
limits. Add to this the clear deterrent objective of the offensive weapons legislation, 
and it seems this is the most appropriate way for the law to operate. If the position in 
relation to self-defence were to be more liberal, it could send misleading messages on 
the level of harm acceptable within society. As there is no legal concept of a 
defensive weapon, it is an inherently offensive action to carry a weapon,
837
 therefore, 
excusing the act of carrying for fear or protection alone could trivialise a serious 
offence.  
 
Although there is an undeniable contradiction between allowing a person to use a 
weapon if it is necessary for protection, yet penalising the possession of the weapon 
until the moment its use becomes necessary, there is simply no need for the carrying 
of such articles to be made lawful. Despite the criticism this attracts,
838
 there is a firm 
belief that permitting the carrying of dangerous articles will only lead to negative 
results. While their presence in public places presents a threat, the law has a limited 
influence. The ‘tough on crime’ approach of the legislation has constraining effects. 
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An example would be the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006
839
, which increased the 
maximum sentence for possession from two years to four years imprisonment. The 
problem with assessing the effectiveness of such ventures is that possession offences 
are notoriously challenging to detect. Many of these offences can occur without ever 
being noticed, and thus the effectiveness of legislation tackling sentencing is doubtful 
and hard to determine. As Husak states, ‘In reality, the criminal law proscribes, but 
does not always prevent. We can safely predict that some people will engage in the 
prohibited behaviour, whatever the law may say’.840 If it could be shown that the 
legislation instilled a clear sense of fear of detection amongst weapons carriers, the 
impact of the provision could be considered high. However, due to the nature of 
weapons possession as being often discrete and hidden, many offences occur without 
detection, and thus the impact of the legislation may only be minor.  
 
Generally, the fact that a person carries an innocent object, or carries an article merely 
for defensive purposes, does not make the article anything less than an ‘offensive 
weapon’, as the person may still intend to use the article to cause injury to the person 
if faced with an attack.
841
 When an article is offensive per se, there is no need to show 
any intention to cause injury with it in order for it to be an ‘offensive weapon’ 
because of the inherent dangerousness of the article.
842
  
 
In addition to explicit guidance on the issue of whether or not self-defence can 
provide a defence to offences of weapons possession, it is necessary to question the 
position of the law regarding the location of the defence and whether or not location 
should bear any impact upon the defence. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, 
location is of direct relevance to offensive weapons as it is an express requirement of 
the offence of possession that the article be carried in a public place. This means that 
a person acting in self-defence in a public place has less means available to assist their 
defence than a person in a private place would have, due to the restrictions on the 
articles that may be carried. Similarly, location certainly affects self-defence in 
respect of the test applied in householder cases, as enhanced protection is afforded in 
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this context. This is a controversial matter that requires clarification, and will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Self-defence – The ‘Householder’ Position 
 
 
4. Introduction 
 
The question of the location at which an incident occurs, be it in a private place or a 
public place, not only generates varying views of the circumstances, but is also 
capable of leading to entirely different legal outcomes. This chapter explores the 
subject of location, by questioning how and why self-defence in a public place is 
viewed and treated differently to self-defence in the home, to attempt to identify and 
penetrate the fundamental distinction in this context. It is submitted that greater 
protection is provided to homeowners defending within their own homes than is 
afforded to those acting in self-defence in public places. This is a direct result of new 
legislation,
843
 but may also have been indirectly evident prior to the legislative 
amendment.
844
 The chapter questions why individuals defending themselves in their 
own homes are more likely to be able to plead the defence than those who are 
attacked in public places. It will be disputed whether the law should operate in this 
manner, or whether it is arbitrary and unfair to draw distinctions based on location.  
 
The general position of the law was explored in Chapter 2, and it is necessary in this 
chapter to explain the householder position. There have been suggestions for many 
years that the law in this context requires reform,
845
 to increase the protection offered 
by self-defence. For example, the Criminal Justice (Justifiable Conduct) Bill 2004 
failed to introduce the permission for householders to use any necessary force against 
trespassers; and similarly, the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Householder Protection) 
Bill 2004, which would have only punished householders where they use grossly 
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disproportionate force, also failed to be enacted.
846
 However, the latter has since 
materialised in the law of England and Wales,
847
 as in April 2013 the law was finally 
amended in relation to householder cases. The most notable change in recent years is 
the introduction of a new standard based upon the location of the defence, with 
householders gaining increased legal protection than that afforded in non-householder 
cases. A critical analysis of the reasons behind the amendment and an examination of 
sociological perceptions of location will ensue.  
 
The first matter under consideration in this Chapter is the law itself. The reform will 
be assessed to consider whether or not it was necessary, and whether a substantial 
benefit will be gained. Secondly, the arguments for and against the amendment will 
be discussed, in order to gain insight into the debates that preceded the reform, which 
are also continuing post its enactment. Thirdly, the impact of location in relation to 
the use of weapons will be analysed, to appreciate whether there is a divergence 
within the law based on location in this context as well.  
 
4.1 The current position of the law 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the general test for determining self-defence is founded on 
the use of ‘reasonable force’. Therefore, it is usually vital to a successful plea of self-
defence that the defensive action is reasonable in the circumstances. To provide a 
brief overview of what has already been explained, a reasonable response is made up 
of two elements: necessary force and proportionate force. These requirements 
exercise a degree of control over the application of the defence. Necessity raises the 
additional considerations of the possibility of a retreat and the imminence of the 
threat, while proportionality requires the defensive force used to be proportionate to 
the offensive force it resists. However, following the enactment of section 43 of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013, the test has been amended in the context of householder 
cases. The test has been widened in this regard to allow the use of disproportionate 
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force, and anything up to ‘grossly disproportionate’ force. 848  Consequently, the 
second component of ‘reasonable force’ has been significantly changed.  
 
4.1.1 The application and scope of the new test for self-defence in the home 
 
It is necessary to consider what exactly the new change to the law entails. Following 
the enactment of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, there are now two separate tests for 
self-defence, which vary according to location. The first is a general test of self-
defence, the longstanding standard of ‘reasonable force’. The second is a specific 
standard applying only to householders, the controversial ‘grossly disproportionate 
force’ test. Thus, outside this context, the general test still remains; it is only in the 
context of householders that a new test has been introduced.  
 
The amendment to the law is set out in section 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, 
which amended section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 by the 
insertion of subsection 5A.
849
 The subsection states that ‘in a householder case, the 
degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the 
circumstances as D believed them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those 
circumstances’. 850  This creates a clearly distinct application of self-defence in 
householder cases in contrast with other situations of self-defence, widening the 
standard regarding what is reasonable in the circumstances. In contrast with previous 
legislation, this is not merely a clarification of the common law, but is a substantive 
change to the law.
851
 
 
The explanatory notes to the Act explain the provision as such: 
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‘Section 43 amends section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008 so that the use of disproportionate force can be regarded as 
reasonable in the circumstances as the accused believed them to be when 
householders are acting to protect themselves or others from trespassers 
in their homes. The use of grossly disproportionate force would still not 
be permitted. The provisions also extend to people who live and work in 
the same premises and armed forces personnel who may live and work in 
buildings such as barracks for periods of time. The provisions will not 
cover other scenarios where the use of force might be required, for 
example when people are defending themselves from attack on the street, 
preventing crime or protecting property, but the current law on the use of 
reasonable force will continue to apply in these situations’.852 
 
This explains the situations in which the householder defence will be available and 
when the general defence will remain applicable. Among the aims of the Act are 
listed: the establishment of the National Crime Agency; provisions relating to the 
judiciary and the administration of courts and tribunals; deferred prosecution 
agreements; border control; provisions relating to drugs and driving; and ‘for 
connected purposes’. 853  The Act addresses several varied matters, and this 
householder provision has been squeezed in under Part Two focusing on courts and 
justice. The Ministry of Justice notes in its guidance on the legislation that  
 
‘these changes go further than clarifying existing law; they strengthen the 
law in relation to householders who are defending themselves from 
intruders in their homes … householders who use a disproportionate level 
of force to protect themselves or others in their homes will not 
automatically be regarded as having acted unlawfully and treated as 
criminals’.854  
 
While the test clearly permits far greater force to be used than previously with regard 
to the circumstances in which the homeowner will be considered to have acted 
unlawfully, it draws the line at those acts that are considered ‘grossly 
disproportionate’, which will never be lawful.855  
 
However, there is no explanation provided in terms of what is considered 
‘disproportionate’ as opposed to ‘grossly disproportionate’, and in practice it might 
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not prove easy to distinguish between these fine lines.
856
 The Ministry of Justice 
states that the measure is designed to provide added protection for frightened 
homeowners who are acting under difficult circumstances, and that there are ‘no hard 
and fast rules about what types of force might be regarded as ‘disproportionate’ and 
‘grossly disproportionate’.857 The CPS guidelines explain that the provision does not 
provide householders with the absolute right to use disproportionate force in every 
single case, as the amendment must still be read in conjunction with the other 
requirements set out in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
This means that the force must, according to section 76(3), still be reasonable in the 
circumstances as the householder believed them to be at the time.
858
  
 
The new provision creates a specific test within the context of the home and 
householders. Section 43 (8) is instructive regarding what comes within the definition 
of a ‘householder case’: 
 
“(8A) For the purposes of this section “a householder case” is a case 
where— 
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence, 
(b) the force concerned is force used by D while in or partly in a building, 
or part of a building, that is a dwelling or is forces accommodation (or is 
both), 
(c) D is not a trespasser at the time the force is used, and 
(d) at that time D believed V to be in, or entering, the building or part as a 
trespasser. 
(8B) Where— 
(a) a part of a building is a dwelling where D dwells, 
(b) another part of the building is a place of work for D or another person 
who dwells in the first part, and 
(c) that other part is internally accessible from the first part, that other 
part, and any internal means of access between the two parts, are each 
treated for the purposes of subsection (8A) as a part of a building that is a 
dwelling. 
(8C) Where— 
(a) a part of a building is forces accommodation that is living or sleeping 
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accommodation for D, 
(b) another part of the building is a place of work for D or another person 
for whom the first part is living or sleeping accommodation, and 
(c) that other part is internally accessible from the first part, that other 
part, and any internal means of access between the two parts, are each 
treated for the purposes of subsection (8A) as a part of a building that is 
forces accommodation. 
(8D) Subsections (4) and (5) apply for the purposes of subsection (8A)(d) 
as they apply for the purposes of subsection (3). 
(8E) The fact that a person derives title from a trespasser, or has the 
permission of a trespasser, does not prevent the person from being a 
trespasser for the purposes of subsection (8A). 
(8F) In subsections (8A) to (8C)— 
“building” includes a vehicle or vessel, and “forces accommodation” 
means service living accommodation for the purposes of Part 3 of the 
Armed Forces Act 2006 by virtue of section 96(1)(a) or (b) of that Act”.859 
 
The section sets a number of conditions on the use of the wider test. There are several 
points worth noting about the provision. 
 
First, the individual must be using defensive force to protect themselves or others 
against a trespasser, as stated in subsection 8(A)(a) and 8(A)(d). While the defensive 
force must be exerted against a trespasser, there is no differentiation between different 
kinds of trespassers. This means that the section would be applicable to an aggressive 
intruder as well as an unarmed young intruder.
860
 According to the case of Day, this 
could also extend to an initially invited guest who subsequently refuses to leave.
861
  
 
Second, the defender must be acting within a building
862
 according to subsection 
8(A)(b), or part of a building, that is a dwelling or forces accommodation. It is not 
sufficient to be acting defensively outside, for example in the garden. This presents an 
obstacle for struggles that ‘spill over’ outside the structure of the home, or on the 
threshold of the property.  
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Third, the defender must not be trespassing at the time of the defence. The defender 
understandably, must be in the property lawfully to gain the increased householder 
protection, as provided by subsection 8(A)(c). This applies to all people who are 
lawfully at the property, for example guests, cleaners, or child minders; not merely 
the homeowner himself.
863
  
 
Fourth, the section covers places of work when connected to dwellings, and classifies 
that vehicles can also come under the title of building for the purposes of the Act. 
This is in accord with the definition of a building for the purposes of burglary under 
section 9(4) of the Theft Act 1968, which includes inhabited vehicles as buildings that 
are dwellings.
864
 This means that the provision’s ambit is much wider in some 
respects than previously provided by the law, providing increased protection in 
householder cases.
865
 
  
In its introduction to the guidance issued on the new legislation, the Ministry of 
Justice provided a statement demonstrating the reasons behind the change. It 
acknowledges that public perception had a great impact on the change, and that cases 
involving householders rarely reach the courts: 
 
‘It is rare for householders to be confronted by intruders in their homes 
and even rarer for them to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted as a 
result of any force they used to protect themselves. When such cases do 
occur, the Government believes they can give rise to a public perception 
that the law is balanced in favour of the intruder. In response to these 
concerns the Coalition Agreement committed ‘to ensure that people have 
the protection that they need when they defend themselves against 
intruders’’.866 
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This answers the claims of critics affirmatively, that the change of law was not based 
on a need to redress an injustice to the public. The statement itself indicates that not 
only are these specific cases rare, but the number of defendants facing legal 
proceedings are even rarer. It can therefore be said that the section was enacted as a 
precautionary measure to satisfy the public perception, and not in response to an 
evident inequity within the law.
867
 
 
Before the Act of 2013, it was clearly acceptable for householders to use reasonable 
force against intruders in their own home. The law in this context was clear, as stated 
in the case of Palmer,
868
 that providing no more than reasonable force was used, in 
the circumstances as the homeowner believed them to be at the time, he will not be 
prosecuted. This is reflected in the decision by the Court of Appeal in Faraj,
869
 where 
it was decided that even in situations where the homeowner does not believe that he is 
under a personal threat himself, and that it is merely his property which is threatened, 
he may detain the intruder to secure arrest by using force, providing it is not 
aggressive force. It is clear that people who are attacked in their own home are not 
under a duty to withdraw.
870
 However, where a safe retreat is a possibility, it is 
preferable for this route to be taken as opposed to using force against the intruder or 
burglar. This is because property interests should not be prioritised over human life, 
which is far more valuable and sacred.
871
  
 
Consequently, there is generally a need for an attack or threat to take place against the 
homeowner before lethal force may be used in self-defence. Merely protecting one’s 
property is insufficient. Leverick has stressed that killing in defence of property is 
never acceptable as there must be an unjust threat against one’s life before it is ever 
justified to use lethal force in self-defence.
872
 Ormerod states that it is only in 
extremely rare circumstances, if ever, that killing to protect property will be 
considered reasonable.
873
 Although the modification in the 2012 Act to include the 
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defence of property could have the result of allowing the use of reasonable force 
against threats to property alone, with no need for the defender to fear for his life, 
killing for this purpose is unlikely to be regarded as reasonable force.
874
  
 
However, with the test now changed to permit disproportionate force, the outcome 
could be different. The lines between permissible and impermissible action has been 
blurred due to the legislative amendments. For example, consider a situation where a 
householder finds an intruder in the kitchen during the evening. The intruder is 
homeless, has not eaten in days, and intends only to steal food without disturbing 
anyone in the house.
875
 The startled householder is naturally unaware of the intruder’s 
intentions and perceives a threat to his life. In his fear, he grabs a knife and stabs the 
intruder. If the intruder is killed, it is unlikely that the circumstances as he honestly, 
but mistakenly believed them to be would meet the reasonable force requirement in 
the defence. It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret disproportionate force 
in self-defence when it transpires that only property is threatened under the 
householder provision. In relation to the example provided above, the crux of the case 
would rest on whether the reaction is deemed disproportionate, thus permitting a 
defence, or grossly disproportionate, which would deny the defence.  
 
The legislative amendments have therefore caused confusion. Paul Mendelle QC, 
former chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, argues that the inclusion of the 
words ‘defence of property’ was unnecessary, as the law already permitted the use of 
force to prevent crime, which would cover situations in the home involving burglars. 
He states that ‘it would rarely be reasonable to kill in defence of property as opposed 
to defence of the person. Or would this government feel it right to sanction the extra-
judicial slaughter of burglars to prevent a crime for which parliament has decided the 
maximum penalty is 14 years in prison?’876 The result of the change to the test in the 
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context of householders may be that the balance has been tipped away from the 
sanctity of life, towards the protection of property.  
 
Nevertheless, as explained in the Chapter 2, it should be stressed that the general test 
of self-defence, which requires reasonable force, is a lenient test. It appreciates that 
while the court will have the benefit of time to consider the element of 
reasonableness, the defender must act instantaneously without having the time to 
consider and determine his actions accordingly. Therefore, exact proportionality is not 
expected nor required.  
 
Despite some claims from the media that the law of self-defence is too limited and 
should be extended to give people enhanced rights to fight off attacks, particularly for 
householders,
877
 the situation was already adequately covered by the law. This 
statement is supported by research conducted by Almandras, who refers to the number 
of prosecutions that take place and notes that they are generally rare, ‘between 1990 
and 2005 there were only 11 prosecutions of people who had attacked intruders in 
houses, commercial premises or private land’.878 Providing a person does no more 
than he honestly and instinctively believes is reasonably necessary in the heat of the 
moment, a prosecution will not take place.  
 
While there have been many cases reported in the media involving homeowners 
facing legal proceedings, these cases have not resulted in convictions. Indeed, most 
are not taken to court, they merely go through the initial stages of due process, to 
discover the nature of the incident, and as soon as it is held that they acted in lawful 
self-defence, the case is not pursued further. These media representations may be 
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responsible for the public perception that the law of self-defence is unfair,
879
 but in 
fact, those that understand the operation of the law, agree that it was already fair and 
did not require expansion. This will become clearer in the following discussion on 
law reform.  
 
4.1.2 Tracing the road to law reform 
 
Over the past few years there have been many attempts to change the law in this 
area.
880
 The Prime Minister, David Cameron said in 2011 “we will put beyond doubt 
that homeowners and small shopkeepers who use reasonable force to defend 
themselves or their properties will not be prosecuted”. 881  He has taken a strong 
approach to the matter, providing several noteworthy statements, including ‘burglars 
“leave their human rights outside” the moment they break in to someone else’s 
property’,882 and ‘my mission is to make sure that families can feel safe in their own 
homes’.883 This promise has since been acted upon through the enactment of two 
pieces of new legislation; the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012, and the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The 2012 Act is a further attempt to clarify 
the law, by explaining the meaning of ‘reasonable force in self-defence’;884 and the 
latter, by far the most controversial, changes the test of self-defence in householder 
cases to allow anything up to ‘grossly disproportionate force’.885 
 
Section 148 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
amends the provision in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, 
                                                        
879
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and was explored in Chapter 2.
886
 The aim is to ensure that the law regarding self-
defence and other related defences is clear, and set out in one place. The purpose of 
section 148 is to provide greater reassurance to home owners about exercising their 
rights, by making it clear that a person can use reasonable force to defend property (in 
addition to defending himself or other people or preventing crime),
887
 and that he is 
under no legal duty to retreat. However, following these clarifications, issues 
remained. Discussions continued over the reasonable force test to determine actions 
of self-defence. Politicians, especially within the Conservative party, pushed for this 
test to be changed to one of grossly disproportionate force. Despite significant 
opposition, and the mystery of why so much emphasis is placed upon the rights of 
self-defence for householders,
888
 this change was finally put into effect with the 
passing of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. However, before the Act was passed, the 
Public Bill Committee displayed a reluctance to offer examples of how the test would 
operate in practice and to explain its necessity.
889
  
 
4.2 The debate on the Crime and Courts Bill 
 
The House of Commons Public Bill Committee met on 5, February 2013 to discuss 
the Crime and Courts Bill. Clause 30 of the Bill included the proposed amendment to 
the law of self-defence in the context of householder cases. While many objections to 
the clause were voiced, the most important questions remained unanswered; for 
example, probing the difference between the interpretation of ‘disproportionate’ and 
‘grossly disproportionate’, and how the new test would differ from the general 
position in practice. Therefore, it was not a wholly satisfactory debate, and indeed, it 
may be argued, inadequate. This section contains extracts from the transcript of the 
debate in order to convey the frustrating and incomplete nature of the discussion.  
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Mr Shailesh Vara
890
 supported the amendment and considerd the clause to be an 
important change to the law. He had himself attempted to propose the change in a 
Private Members Bill, although unsuccessfully, in 2006.
891
 However, there are several 
opposing views, for example, Jenny Chapman
892
 is critical of the proposed 
amendment in the Bill. In her challenges, she refers to the opinions of many who 
work in the legal profession, from the DPP at the time to senior judges, including the 
former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Judge. These expert, 
experienced and knowledgeable individuals expressed that the standard of reasonable 
force works well, and that it allows sufficient protection to homeowners faced by 
intruders in their homes. Therefore, she probed on several occasions, what difference 
the amendment would in fact make. She acknowledged the desirability of providing 
clear protection for victims, but also emphasised that it appears that the law is already 
succeeding to provide fair protection.
893
  
 
A notable argument was the increased confusion that the amendment would bring to 
the law. Chapman expressed that: 
 
‘we are concerned that the Government’s proposed change does not 
really add protection; it just adds more confusion. The point is that the 
line between disproportionate and grossly disproportionate is still not 
clear … there is wide-ranging consensus out there that the Government’s 
changes are at best unnecessary, and that they could increase risk and 
confusion … we are giving the judges the seemingly impossible job of 
concluding that a particular act is both reasonable and 
disproportionate’.894  
 
This raises several important points.
895
 There is the issue of legislating confusion into 
the law, the uncertainty of interpretive definitions, and the lack of evidence of 
necessity. However, these concerns were not dispelled during the debate.  
 
By way of response to the challenges made by Chapman, Mr Vara replied that the key 
objective behind the proposal is ‘to avoid an individual going through the misery, 
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pain and suffering of getting to the prosecution stage in the first place. If a decision 
can be taken instantly that the incident is not worth taking to court, the individual can 
get on with their life, rather than having a year or so of their and their families’ lives 
completely disrupted’.896 This goal is understandable, but as will be explained in the 
arguments against the change, it is not practical. It is undeniable that some degree of 
procedure must follow the action of self-defence. It is simply inconceivable to state 
exclusively that in the case of householders the case should not go through the usual 
processes of the criminal justice system. This would be contrary to the fundamental 
principles of criminal law, and would impede the role and responsibilities of the CPS.  
 
It is worth highlighting the Code for Crown Prosecutors here, which provides a two 
stage-test that the CPS must apply before a prosecution will take place.
897
 As this test 
applies to all cases, it is unnecessary to develop a different standard for cases of 
householder self-defence. The first part of the test is the evidential hurdle. This 
requires sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction. If this hurdle is not 
surmounted, the case will not proceed. The second part of the test is the public interest 
factor. This requires the prosecution to be in the public’s interest, if it is not, then 
again the case will not proceed.
898
  
 
A clear case of self-defence would fall at the first hurdle, as a defence would be 
provided to any charge arising from the defensive action. Other cases may be more 
complex and uncertain, and would perhaps progress to the public interest stage. Here, 
prosecutors consider several different factors including the seriousness of the offence; 
the culpability of the suspect; the circumstances and level of harm caused; the impact 
on the community; and the proportionality of a possible prosecution.
899
 Again, there is 
a filter for lawful actions to ensure that only cases requiring a trial will proceed 
further. A householder’s position in self-defence will rarely require a prosecution, 
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unless it is beyond the scope of the defence. Thus, the arguments for a different test 
for prosecutors here is redundant, as a successful standard is already in place across 
the criminal justice system. The suggestion of creating a different test for the CPS to 
apply throughout the process in householder cases is concerning. This would form an 
inconsistent practice and would call into question the standard across the whole 
criminal justice system. Namely, if this category merits a separate test, then should 
there be many more variations of the standard to encompass different types of crime? 
This would create a slippery slope calling for intensive scrutiny of the application of 
the test across the large body of criminal offences, and is completely unnecessary.  
 
A persuasive opposing argument was raised by Steve McCabe,
900
 reaching the root of 
the problem, that ‘on the wider point, this represents the danger of trying to translate 
party speeches – maybe necessary for that occasion – into legislation … We almost 
seem to be inviting people to use disproportionate force, irrespective of the 
circumstances’.901 This reflects the argument that it was due to political expediency 
that the clause was introduced, as a way of attracting political votes, and not because 
there was a true need for a change in the law. It also highlights the unacceptable 
nature of the desire to avoid any procedure at all for householder cases. This would 
extract the justice element from the criminal justice system. 
 
Despite the challenges, Damien Green (The Minister for Policing and Criminal 
Justice)
902
 replied in defence of the Bill, that  
 
‘the provision is first and foremost about householder defence. The home 
is the one place where a person should have the right to feel safe … the 
provision will apply to anybody lawfully in a dwelling who may come face 
to face with an intruder. That would include the householder and his 
family, but it would also include friends or visitors – for example, a child 
minder – who are lawfully in the dwelling when the attack takes place’.903 
 
Thus, he clarifies a potential confusion over the application of the defence, explaining 
that it encompasses all who are lawfully in the dwelling at the time of the attack, not 
merely the homeowner. This demonstrates the importance of the trespasser 
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component and centralises the need for a right of entry to be present. It reflects the 
principle of protecting those who act within the law and punishing those who offend 
by extending the increased householder defence to anyone lawfully present in the 
dwelling at the time. 
 
The limits regarding to whom the defence would be available are explained, and 
whilst it would be of benefit to shop keepers, it would not apply to other people 
visiting the shop, such as customers. This distinction is based on the difficulty of 
application: 
 
‘if we widen the defence beyond householders in their dwellings so that it 
covers customers visiting a shop, for example, it would be difficult to 
justify not extending the defence to other scenarios where a person might 
come under attack such as when they are confronted by a mugger on the 
street. The current law on the use of reasonable force will continue to 
apply in those situations … The provision is designed to focus on 
householder defence because those cases tend to concern the public the 
most. Householders want to feel safe in their homes …’904 
 
This argument and explanation is flawed, as the public are affected and alarmed by 
attacks necessitating defence in both public and private places. While home intrusions 
are naturally frightening and can lead people to fear that they will also become a 
victim of other crimes, attacks occurring in public have potentially wider scope to 
cause public concern.
905
 Attacks occurring in public are more likely to be perpetrated 
by strangers, and as Kleck explains: ‘Violence among strangers is more frightening 
because it is perceived as more random and unpredictable, and thus a risk that can 
affect anyone, not just those with relatives and other associates known to be 
violent’.906 While burglars are also likely to be strangers, the point made here is that 
most violence occurring within the home is not perpetrated by strangers, but rather by 
a non-stranger.
907
 Placing the emphasis in the new provision on the use of force 
against a trespasser does not reflect the true nature of the range of threats present 
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within the home, and suggests a lack of research into both fear and risk of crime prior 
to the preparation of the Bill.  
 
The range of people who are excluded from enhanced protection exemplifies the 
problems of this new defence: it introduces far more confusion as different tests apply 
to different people within the same situation. Why should a customer have a lesser 
right than the shopkeeper if they are facing the same attack at the same time? 
Previously both could use reasonable force in the circumstances. Now however, the 
measure of what is reasonable must be proportionate for one, while the other may act 
disproportionately providing the action is not ‘grossly disproportionate’. It is unclear 
how different these standards are, and how much more one would be permitted to do 
than the other. It appears to be an arbitrary distinction lacking a persuasive rationale.  
 
Hypothetical questions were posed in relation to the scope of the amendment,
908
 but 
Green completely avoided the questions and could not provide a single example of 
how the law would operate.
909
 He explained the difference between the previous and 
the new test as follows: ‘The key difference is that disproportionate force will not of 
itself be deemed unreasonable … That is the difference; it is an extra protection for 
householders’.910 However, this does not explain the additional protection this would 
achieve, nor provide an example of the shortcomings of the previous test.  
 
The opposition, along with many academics and legal practitioners,
911
 share the 
position advanced in this thesis that the test of reasonable force was wide enough in 
its application to safeguard those who acted in lawful self-defence. It is 
understandable that the public seeks reassurance over their rights to react in instances 
of home invasions. However, the evidence suggests that most people naturally 
respond within the limitation of reasonable force. It appears that the safeguards of 
assessing the circumstances as the defendant perceived them at the time, along with 
the two-stage test employed by the CPS, ensure a balanced application of the defence 
with no further need for expansion.  
 
                                                        
908
 For example, how it would affect someone acting in self-defence in their garden. 
909
 Crime and Courts Bill Deb, op cit fn 891, col 278. Quoting McCabe and Green. 
910
 ibid, col 280. Quoting Green. 
911
 Examples are provided on page 181 and in section 4.2.2 of the present chapter. 
 186 
Green emphasised the reasons behind the proposal, stating that ‘there is genuine 
public concern about people who are fundamentally victims of crime being 
criminalised themselves. That is at the root of the changes’.912 Although this view is 
understandable, this risk is mitigated by the adaptability of the standards applied in 
self-defence to individual cases. The reasonable force test is an appropriate standard, 
as it takes the householder’s view of the situation into consideration, and does not bar 
the defence when an individual is mistaken in relation to the need for defensive 
force.
913
 Therefore, instances of innocent people being punished should not occur. 
The new standard has created confusion by splitting the law of self-defence into two 
different tests.
914
  
 
The conclusion of the debate at the House of Commons Public Bill Committee, 
despite the persistent questioning and lack of adequate answers or logical reasoning, 
was disappointing. Clause 30 was accordingly ordered, and was to stand as part of the 
Bill. There are several matters that have not been addressed, such as the practical 
difference between ‘disproportionate’ and ‘grossly disproportionate’ force, which 
must unfortunately now await interpretation by the courts when relevant cases come 
to trial.  
 
Despite the lack of answers from the Public Bill Committee, the discussions 
highlighted a number of competing views on the householder test. Indeed, the debate 
alluded to some of the key arguments supporting and opposing the change. The 
arguments in favour of this amendment will first be explored, followed by the 
arguments against. It is submitted here that the change was unnecessary and 
undesirable, and as stated by Liberty, that it ‘sets a dangerously low threshold for 
what will be considered acceptable violence used in the context of self-defence in the 
home’.915  
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4.2.1 Arguments supporting the change to the ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test 
 
There are a number of arguments that support the change in the law in respect of 
homeowners. Accordingly, there are several reasons why the amendment will have 
been well received, and welcomed by some. These include (i) “the author of his 
misfortune approach”;916 (ii) the need to increase the protection afforded to the public 
and increase the comfort zone before prosecutions take place; (iii) the uncertainty of 
the reasonable force test; (iv) the assertion that weak standards of self-defence 
increases crime rates; and, (v) the previous prosecutions of householders. These five 
issues will be dealt with in turn. 
 
4.2.1(a) The intruder has caused the need for self-defence 
 
The first argument in favour of permitting ‘disproportionate force’ is that the intruder 
has caused the need for the defence, and should accept responsibility for all actions 
that ensue. This is a forceful and common approach and is not exclusive to the 
householder defence.
917
 It is said to be a view held by many members of the British 
public. ICM Research conducted a poll on behalf of The Sunday Telegraph in 2009, 
which found that ‘79 per cent of all voters would support changing the legal test from 
“reasonable force” to “grossly disproportionate” force’.918 One argument why this 
approach would be favoured is captured by the saying, “the author of his own 
misfortune”. In other words, a person who attacks property infringes the rights of the 
owner and in so doing, should accept that there is an accompanying risk to his own 
life. However, most people who are familiar with the law would reject this idea, as the 
law is already positively skewed in favour of the householder. Usually, unless there 
are exceptional circumstances that fall outside the scope of self-defence, no 
prosecutions or convictions follow in householder cases. There is a risk that the 
changes could be detrimental,
919
 and this will be discussed shortly. 
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Nevertheless, it seems that the change to allow anything up to ‘grossly 
disproportionate force’ is considered insufficient in many people’s opinion. Research 
by YouGov has found that 75 per cent of those who took part in their survey 
supported further changing the test to allow any force that the individual deems 
necessary.
920
 This would be an extensive expansion of self-defence, removing the 
reasonableness requirement. In the article accompanying the survey result by 
Dahlgreen on the YouGov website, which sets out the legal position, the legal 
interpretation is unfortunately misleading.
921
 If the same misleading information 
within the article was provided to the participants prior to answering the survey, this 
could be a contributing factor to the high percentage supporting further change 
beyond the grossly disproportionate force test. For example, the article discusses the 
case of Andrew Woodhouse, and comments that there are far too many loopholes 
within the law. Dahlgreen states that ‘A fight cannot take place outside (as did Mr 
Woodhouse’s), for example, nor can it be to protect oneself or one’s family – only the 
home’, 922  but this is not entirely accurate. Under the householder provision, the 
requirement is merely that the attack occurs within the home. Providing that this 
requirement is met, then acting to protect oneself or another will be sufficient. It is a 
misleading statement as it implies that the individual must merely be acting to protect 
the home itself. Thus, the public opinion, although based on a potentially incomplete 
understanding of the application of the law, is a significant factor in the arguments 
supporting the change. 
 
4.2.1(b) Providing increased protection to the public by increasing the ‘comfort 
zone’ before legal intervention 
 
The second argument in favour of the changes advances that there is a need to provide 
increased protection to the public, and a wider safety net for those defending 
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themselves against intruders in their homes. The Justice Secretary at the time, Chris 
Grayling, presented this argument by emphasising the importance for the public to 
have confidence that the law is on the householder’s side.923 There is a concern that 
occasionally it appears that the true victims of crime are more readily prosecuted than 
the criminals who assail them.
924
 This is connected to the previous argument, but 
focuses on ensuring that the law is balanced in favour of the householder as opposed 
to intruders. While it is indeed a worrying notion that the innocent defender is 
punished, it is asserted that lawful instances of self-defence will not result in criminal 
charges, as the test of reasonable force will provide sufficient protection.  
 
The basic claim of this argument is that there is a need to provide a greater ‘comfort 
zone’ before legal intervention takes place in the chain of events following an incident 
where defensive force has been used. Grayling asserted that the criminal justice 
process, even if the case does not eventually reach the court, is extremely distressing 
for the individuals concerned and their families. He therefore claimed that unless it 
appears that the homeowner has used grossly disproportionate force, they should not 
have to go through the process at all.
925
 This view aims to avoid the difficult 
experience of the criminal justice process for the true victim of crime, to ensure that 
they are not punished for their defensive actions.
926
 However, as already 
mentioned,
927
 this argument is flawed, as some degree of procedure is inevitable. In 
order to determine whether ‘grossly disproportionate force’ has been used, some level 
of investigation is required. There must be a degree of accountability, and a level of 
procedural judgement to go through when such sensitive and serious matters are 
concerned. The Code for Crown Prosecutors and their two-stage test effectively 
achieves this aim, and strikes an appropriate balance.
928
 Claiming that homeowners 
who have killed in self-defence should not go through any mechanism of criminal 
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procedure is untenable. Applying a standard of ‘grossly disproportionate force’ 
merely replaces one test with another. This, in itself, changes but does not remove the 
requirements placed on defenders by the criminal justice system.  
 
Another similar argument prioritizing the protection of the householder is provided by 
Watson, namely, that ‘a strong case can be made for establishing a presumption that 
force used in self-defence – and defence of the home – is reasonable and lawful’.929 
Watson argues that when a society has been disarmed, (appreciating that few would 
wish to live in a society where weapons are necessary for protection), it becomes the 
responsibility of the state to protect its citizens by ensuring safe standards of living 
through adequate measures of crime prevention. He claims that ‘If the state cannot 
fulfill its side of the bargain, its courts should not be too hard on those who (in the 
heat of the moment) use more force than may later seem reasonable’.930 This is a 
logical premise. However, on a literal interpretation, this burdens the state with 
bearing the blame for the commission of any and all crimes, by virtue of failures in 
prevention. It is also problematic to assume in all cases that the defensive force used 
in the home was reasonable and lawful. The establishment of this wide presumption 
could lead to significant injustice, and complete disregard of the human rights 
considerations in respect of the intruder. 
 
4.2.1(c) The uncertainty of ‘reasonable force’ 
 
The third argument in favour of the change claims that the test of ‘reasonable force’ is 
too unclear and uncertain.
931
 This is based on the perception that the applicability of 
the defence is unpredictable, and that the rules of self-defence should be more 
specifically defined. The desired effect is therefore to reach a position where people 
know exactly what they may and may not do in lawful self-defence. 
 
The new test, however, will not ensure greater clarity in the law. It is likely, rather, to 
have the opposite affect by adding more confusion. Extending the actions that may be 
taken in self-defence in the home, but changing the subjective test of reasonable force 
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into another subjective test of grossly disproportionate force, leads to two different 
tests of self-defence. The determination of which test applies is dependent on location 
and the status of the aggressor and defender as trespasser and householder, and thus 
further complicates the application of the defence.  
 
This topic splits public as well as academic opinion. While the majority of academic 
writing supports the test of ‘reasonable force’ for self-defence,932 it appears that there 
is a substantial clash between popular opinion and the academic view on this issue.
933
 
As previously discussed, the reasonableness requirement allows appropriate flexibility 
within the law, while barring actions that go beyond self-defence.
934
 However, 
Malcolm to the contrary argues in support of the ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test. 
She has written extensively on the subject of self-defence and gun control, within 
comparative studies between the US and the UK.
935
 Malcolm’s arguments are 
discussed below.  
 
4.2.1(d) Weak standards of self-defence result in increased crime rates 
 
The fourth argument for the test is the assertion that the approach of the law in 
England and Wales has had a damaging effect on crime statistics.
936
 Malcolm claims 
that the results of the law of self-defence in England and Wales have been drastic, that 
there has been ‘a doubling of gun crime in the last decade, a 25% increase in contact 
theft … a 23% risk of being a crime victim’.937 While there may be a degree of truth in 
this assertion, it must be stressed that changes in the incidence of crime cannot simply 
be ascribed to the law of self-defence alone, without adducing further correlative 
evidence. Such proof is not provided in her research. Ashworth provides a context for 
this argument, and contrasts slightly with Malcolm’s claims in terms of the incidence 
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of crime, and the impact of weapons legislation on crime. Ashworth highlights the 
difference between the USA and Britain, and says ‘… it seems that there are around 
12,000 homicides a year in the United States involving guns … Gun control is also a 
major issue in the United Kingdom: even though the scale of the problem is very 
different’.938 This raises questions regarding Malcolm’s claims.939 While she contrasts 
the position in the UK and the US, where there are greater rights of self-defence and 
the right to bear arms, she claims that the restriction of these liberties has resulted in 
increased crime rates in England and Wales.
940
 The situation across the Atlantic 
suggests otherwise, as the crime rates in the US are significantly higher, despite the 
more lenient approach to self-defence employed.  
 
There is some support for Malcolm’s assertion regarding crime rates in a statement by 
Samuels explaining that dwelling burglaries are rare in the US because householders 
are armed with firearms.
941
 Unfortunately, Samuels does not supply any corroborative 
evidence or detailed discussion, and therefore this statement alone does not strengthen 
the argument. Similarly, Bernard argues that there was far less armed crime in 1900, 
when gun control was minimal, than there is now under extensive regulation.
942
 
Nevertheless, there is no acknowledgment that there are more variables here than 
merely the regulation levels, as society has evolved significantly during this period. 
Further, considering the downward trend in crime overall in England and Wales, as 
found by the Crime Survey for England and Wales 2013, and the surveys in previous 
years, these arguments are unconvincing. The estimates for burglaries for the period 
of 2012/2013 were down by 11 per cent compared with 2007/2008;
943
 although there 
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was a 2 per cent increase in thefts from the person from the previous year, this was 
not considered statistically significant.
944
 Offences involving firearms are also in 
decline, down by 5 per cent on the previous year.
945
  
 
While it is difficult to compare these statistics accurately as they are based on 
different crimes and recording methods, the reliability of Malcolm’s claims must be 
questioned in light of the statistical data available. 
 
Malcolm also argues that the new test allowing anything up to ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ force is commendable as it prioritises householders by increasing 
their rights.
946
 Writing before the changes came into force, she concluded that ‘there 
is reason to hope that former standards of respect for what Blackstone saw as the first 
great and primary right, the right of personal security will return to Great Britain’.947 
However, nowhere in her article does she mention the justification behind self-
defence. She merely refers to it as a ‘right of self-defence’ without attempting to 
substantiate why it should be considered a ‘right’. As previous discussion has 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, it is considerably harder than it seems to justify the 
defence. Therefore, although she alludes to the history of self-defence and specifically 
the laws regarding weapons as a basis for the right, this is insufficient in light of 
considerable societal changes, requiring more robust arguments to provide a 
foundation for supporting the ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test.  
 
4.2.1(e) Previous prosecutions of householders 
 
A final argument for the change is based on previous cases where homeowners have 
been punished for their defensive actions. Watson discusses cases involving defensive 
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force against intruders.
948
 He mentioned the case of Mr Newbery, a 76-year-old man 
who shot an intruder whilst he attempted to break into his garden shed. Mr Newbery 
was arrested, prosecuted, and the jury acquitted him of criminal charges, but his 
aggressor was awarded damages for the injury he suffered.
949
 Although the case did 
not result in a conviction, it does demonstrate the difficult position facing 
homeowners when proving self-defence.  
 
A different outcome was reached in the case of Barry Lee Hastings in 2002, a 25-
year-old man who arrived at his wife’s (from which he was separated) and children’s 
home to find a burglar inside. The burglar was on the run from the police at the time, 
and was stabbed by Hastings. He had mistaken the burglar’s weapon; he had thought 
the crowbar was a machete. The result of the case was that Hastings was convicted of 
manslaughter and given a five-year sentence, as ‘a householder is not entitled to use 
more than reasonable force to defend himself’.950 The force was deemed unreasonable 
in this case.
951
 The fact that he had mistaken the nature of the weapon was immaterial, 
as he had repeatedly stabbed the intruder 12 times, while outside the property and not 
facing a direct threat to himself. This is a clear example of excessive force. While the 
court accepted that it is reasonable for individuals to pick up a weapon, the manner in 
which the kitchen knife had been used in this case was inconsistent with self-defence, 
although provocation could be relied upon.
952
 
 
There will always be cases that fall outside the scope of self-defence, because it is a 
complete defence, and certain conditions must be met in order for the defence to be 
available. Indeed, even the test of ‘grossly disproportionate force’ would not change 
the outcome in some cases, such as that of Hastings, as the force will go beyond the 
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standard required.
953
 While one may be able to rely on the use of disproportionate 
force, one would still have to prove that the force was necessary, and therefore might 
not gain the enhanced protection.  
 
Although there are a number of arguments in favour of the change, it is submitted that 
there are many more and potentially stronger arguments in opposition to the new test. 
These will now be discussed.  
 
4.2.2 Arguments opposing the change to the ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test 
 
There are a number of reasons why the test of ‘reasonable force’ should not have been 
amended. In contrast to the views supporting the test of ‘grossly disproportionate 
force’ in self-defence, the majority of academic and media debate in the UK on the 
matter takes the opposite view.
954
 The arguments advanced include (i) the potential 
incompatibility with the ECHR; (ii) the lack of justification behind the amendment; 
(iii) the creation of confusion; (iv) the risk of vigilantism; (v) the scope for revenge; 
and (vi) the role of politics and public perception as the instigators of the law reform 
and the lack of understanding of the law.  
 
4.2.2(a) Possible incompatibility with the European Convention of Human Rights 
 
The first argument against the test relates to the ECHR, which states clearly in Article 
2(2) that the force used must be no more than ‘absolutely necessary’. There is a real 
possibility that the new amendment would breach this exception to the general 
prohibition on interference with one’s life. Disproportionate force inherently suggests 
a lack of necessity, that there was another, less grave alternative available, and that 
the individual used excessive force. Harris refers to the implicit need for 
proportionality within a standard of ‘absolutely necessary’, explaining that lethal 
force should be ‘strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted 
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purpose’. 955  This is certainly appropriate, and as Uniacke proclaims, the 
proportionality requirement merely instigates ‘an upper limit to the harm a defender 
might inflict on an attacker’.956 It is not an overly onerous standard for the defender to 
adhere to, and allows a balancing of the competing human rights.  
 
In 2008 the Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern about the 
safeguarding of Article 2 within the law of self-defence in England and Wales.
957
 It 
clearly stated:  
 
‘If the criminal law were amended to permit the use of disproportionate 
force in self-defence or to prevent crime, the UK would be in breach of its 
obligation to ensure that its criminal law provides adequate protection for 
the right to life in Article 2 ECHR and the right to physical integrity in 
Article 8 ECHR’.958 
 
This ground is therefore a strong opposition to the new test. Before the change came 
into effect, during the Bill stage, letters were exchanged between the then Minister of 
State for Justice, The Right Honourable Lord McNally, and the then Chair of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, Dr Hywel Francis MP. The former wrote to the latter 
addressing these concerns.
959
 It was explained that the Government considered the 
changes to be compatible with the right to life as provided in the Convention, as the 
overarching test would remain one of reasonableness.
960
 As the new standard would 
only apply where a householder genuinely believed that there was a trespasser in his 
home, this was regarded as a sufficient standard to safeguard the right of the 
aggressor. This fails to indicate precise reasons for such a finding, and displays a 
disappointing lack of regard for the issue. 
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It can be argued that the new amendment to the law of self-defence in England and 
Wales is incompatible with the Convention’s right to life. This is a serious contention, 
but is a realistic problem with substance. The answer to this question is for the 
European Court of Justice to determine if and when a case of incompatibility is 
directed. The householder provision has not yet been directly challenged, and 
previous decisions such as McCann v UK
961
 have addressed a different issue, namely 
the use of lethal force by the state against private citizens, and the question of 
mistaken belief. Although pivoting on a different question of incompatibility, the case 
law suggests that there is a need for good reason, or a reasonable belief, whereas the 
law of England and Wales permits an honest belief. Despite the fact that the court 
found no incompatibility,
962
 it may be argued that the standard required to safeguard 
convention rights is higher than that applied.
963
 While forming a persuasive authority, 
the case clearly did not consider the use of disproportionate force, and should not be 
relied upon as refuting a claim of incompatibility.  
 
4.2.2(b) The lack of justification for the amendment 
 
The second argument is that there is a lack of clear justification for the changes which 
cannot easily be reconciled with self-defence theory. Bleasdale-Hill has attempted to 
find a justification for the changes introduced by the 2013 Act.
964
 She draws attention 
to the flawed generalisations made whilst debating the Act during its Bill stage, 
claiming that the amendment to the law had been justified by ‘political 
expediency’.965 Section 4.2 of this chapter has already examined the debate of the 
Public Bill Committee, but Bleasdale-Hill’s examination of individual justifications 
merit further consideration. In her analysis, she referred to the theories of 
consequentialism, rights and forfeiture, autonomy, and the social-legal order.
966
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Consequentialism, of course, gives considerable weight to the consequences of the 
action concerned. Bleasdale-Hill considers that there is nothing to prove that an attack 
occurring in the private sphere is any worse in terms of consequences than an attack 
in the public sphere. This view is logical and will be considered in relation to the 
discussion on the sanctity of the home shortly. The consequences of an attack could 
be the same, or worse in a public place than in the home, therefore it is impossible to 
state with certainty that attacks in the home always produce graver consequences. 
This leaves an unfilled void in respect of why greater force should be permitted in the 
home than in a public place. The theory fails to address the enhanced level of 
protection to householders.
967
  
 
Therefore, she considers the theory of rights and forfeiture in pursuance of a potential 
explanation for the division of the tests of self-defence. A possible argument is that 
the forfeiture of rights occurs more readily in the private sphere than in the public 
sphere.
968
 This suggests that aggressors retain their rights more in public places, than 
they do in private places. This is often one of the most cited reasons for the change, 
namely that an intruder into one’s home offends the homeowner’s property and 
privacy rights so severely, that the intruder’s own rights must be regarded as 
forfeited.
969
 However, this does not in itself justify the change in the test, as the 
previous standard already took this into account. There is no clear reason why a 
different level of forfeiture should apply depending on the location of an attack. The 
aggressor’s position should not change in this regard, as location is not the 
justificatory element in the theory of forfeiture; it is the posing of an unjust attack that 
matters.  
 
Bleasdale-Hill turns to consider the principle of autonomy as a possible justification. 
This could be considered the most convincing option, as all individuals have a right to 
their own autonomy, in other words, to be free from outside interference. In this 
respect, it is the defender’s autonomy that is considered, as it is this right that is 
infringed by the aggressor. What may be argued here, as a justification of the change 
                                                        
967
 See for example, L.Bleasdale-Hill ‘“Our Home is Our Haven and Refuge – a Place Where we Have 
Every Right to Feel Safe”, op cit fn 12 at 413-414.  
968
 ibid, at 415.  
969
 As discussed in section 4.2.1(a) of the present chapter, the ‘author of his own misfortune’ approach. 
 199 
of test, is that a greater interference of autonomy occurs when an intruder is in the 
defender’s home, than when an attack occurs in a public place. However, this does not 
conclusively justify the changes in the law either, as Bleasdale-Hill highlights - there 
is no absolute right to autonomy.
970
 If autonomy is something that all individuals 
usually possess, then that must be so regardless of their particular location, which 
should have no bearing on the matter. Thus, householders defending in their homes 
possess the same level of autonomy as if they were in a public place. Nevertheless, it 
may be said that one’s autonomy is possibly reduced in public places as one must 
comply with standard rules of behaviour, and that due to the connected rights of 
privacy and ownership, one would have slightly more autonomy in one’s own 
home.
971
 For this reason, this argument appears to provide some support for the 
statutory changes, but it is unconvincing.  
 
The final theory that she considers is a justification presented by Sangero,
972
 that of 
the social-legal order. According to this justification, the permissibility of using 
defensive force strengthens the public’s confidence in the legal system, and clarifies 
the individual’s place within the system. While this certainly appears to be the most 
obvious reason why the test was changed, to satisfy the public that the law favours 
innocent householders over criminals who invade their homes, the extended 
protection does not benefit the social-legal order. Bleasdale-Hill regards this 
justification as being too vague to present a compelling argument,
973
 and unsuccessful 
as it cannot permit disproportionate actions.
974
 Indeed, considered by itself it is an 
insufficient explanation, as it does not rely on any evidence of a failure in the law 
causing injustice.  
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Thus, none of the common theories of justification of self-defence succeed in 
explaining the need for a ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test for householders. This 
is problematic as any test of self-defence must be theoretically justifiable before it 
may be considered a valid and appropriate standard to apply. It further highlights that 
standards of self-defence should be applied in the same way regardless of location, 
and that the relevant consideration that should be applied is whether the force used 
was reasonable in the circumstances.  
 
4.2.2(c) Creating confusion not clarity 
 
The third argument against the new test is that it will not produce the enhanced clarity 
in the law that is desired. One of the main calls for a change in the law arises from a 
belief that the reasonable force test is too vague. While it is both necessary and 
advisable to ensure enhanced clarity in the law, and attempt to make it more 
accessible to the public to understand the parameters and limits of the defence, 
achieving the certain answers that the public seek is not practically attainable. It is not 
possible to state exactly what actions are permissible and impermissible in self-
defence, and to specify what type of injury may and may not be inflicted on an 
intruder,
975
 because flexibility is a fundamental part of the defence. Attempts to make 
the law more prescriptive on the matter could in fact have the opposite effect of 
making it far more restrictive, as it would specify each individual circumstance that 
satisfies self-defence, and would naturally have to draw the line with some actions.  
 
It is unlikely that changing the test to grossly disproportionate force will provide any 
improvement regarding the clarity or certainty of the law. The test of ‘reasonable 
force’ is formed in a way that a householder who kills or injures a burglar will have a 
complete defence, if the force used was reasonable in the defence of oneself, one’s 
family, or property. It is unclear why this required changing. In response to the 
argument that the ‘reasonable force’ test is unclear and does not provide certainty, 
Miller says that, ‘widening the scope with regard to what homeowners can do to 
intruders only extends the permitted violence – it does not clarify the law any further. 
It is still within the court’s discretion to judge what is ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
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rather than ‘reasonable’. 976  For this reason, to be a valid justification of the 
amendments made to the law, it would surely have to apply across the board, in all 
instances of self-defence, not merely within householder cases. If ‘reasonable force’ is 
such an unclear test, how can it be logical to change its application in only one 
circumstance? Most likely, the reason for this rests precisely on the unnecessary 
nature of the amendment. The ‘grossly disproportionate’ force test would be 
unworkable as a general standard, as it is an inappropriate measure of self-defence.
977
  
 
Catherine Elliott considered the difficulty in changing the test of reasonable force to 
‘grossly disproportionate’ force in the context of the home. She argued that 
Parliament was attempting to change the definition of what is reasonable, by 
extending its contours to include disproportionate force, thus, claiming that 
disproportionate force is reasonable.
978
 This argues that the test is therefore at odds 
with the interpretation of the word ‘reasonable’. It clearly conflicts with the previous 
standard applied, and expands the scope of what can be considered ‘reasonable’, as 
until the Act of 2013 came into force, in order for an action to be considered 
reasonable, it also had to be proportionate.  
 
Elliott challenged this wider interpretation of reasonableness,
979
 arguing that the 
courts should interpret the new statutory test in accordance with the rule of law; the 
common law’s long established concept of reasonableness; and also, in line with the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
980
 She reinforced the belief held by many 
academics and criminal lawyers that the test of ‘reasonable force’ strikes the correct 
balance in cases of self-defence, regardless of the location at which the defence 
occurs. This is a logical argument which demonstrates the complications which may 
arise as a result of the change, as the standard required will need to be reinterpreted to 
fit this specific instance.  
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4.2.2(d) Creating a risk of vigilantism and the irony of increasing the dangers faced 
by householders 
 
The fourth argument against the new test relates to the potential dangers that are 
created by allowing ‘grossly disproportionate force’ to be used. It is suggested that 
people will be more likely to take matters into their own hands, and the likelihood is 
far greater that they will act beyond what is necessary in self-defence.
981
 Turner 
discusses the risks created by the new legislation, and claims that ‘it may even 
encourage people to think that acts of vigilantism are now ratified. As the Trayvon 
Martin case has demonstrated, this can go horribly wrong’.982 The Trayvon Martin 
case is a tragic example from Florida, demonstrating how increased rights can lead to 
extreme acts, which would formerly fall outside the law, being held lawful.  
 
Trayvon Martin was shot dead in February 2012 by George Zimmerman, who was 
acquitted of the crime due to Florida’s ‘stand your ground’ law. Martin was an 
African-American high school student and Zimmerman a neighbourhood watch 
captain who considered him to be acting suspiciously, and claimed to have shot him 
in self-defence. The case sparked international outrage as Martin was unarmed, and 
although Zimmerman had received some injuries from the altercation, he had pursued 
Martin, ignoring advice from the police, and used extreme force. Following this case 
and subsequent examples, there have been calls to repeal the ‘stand your ground’ 
approach of the law.
983
  
 
Thus, as well as the danger of permitting greater force than necessary, the amendment 
also increases the risks to householders. Far from providing greater protection for 
homeowners, it could also have the counterproductive effect of placing them in 
                                                        
981
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danger, as criminals will be more likely to carry dangerous weapons knowing that 
they might need to fight for their lives.
984
 Therefore, the level of violence is escalated 
as opposed to controlled.  
 
4.2.2(e) Leaving the door ajar for revenge 
 
This leads onto the fifth argument against the test, namely that it is contrary to the 
purpose of self-defence, and thus, creates room for revenge attacks. The Tonight show 
on ITV broadcast a special episode on self-defence and homeowners in September 
2012, examining the story of Vincent Cooke, who had stabbed a burglar to death in 
his home. The show claimed that their research had found that thirty per cent of the 
British public did not believe that homeowners who have killed an intruder on their 
property should be arrested at all considering the circumstances. However, as Michael 
Wolkind QC, stated on the programme, this is undesirable because it leaves space for 
revenge within the defence.
985
 An example of what is envisioned as a revenge 
situation in this context is a scenario where the defender is initially acting in self-
defence, in desperation to save himself. However, when the defender succeeds in 
overpowering the aggressor, he exercises greater force than necessary, due to his 
feelings of wanting the aggressor to pay for his actions. The householder standard 
might consider the position reasonable, while the general standard might consider it 
excessive.  
 
In a televised interview between Wolkind and former Justice Secretary Chris 
Grayling, (the Shadow Home Secretary at the time), the barrister stated that the 
grossly disproportionate test is ‘a horrible test’. He provided a contextual example of 
the stages that one might go through under the test, progressing along a gradient of 
disproportionality. He explained that the situation of self-defence, could develop as 
such:  
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“If I manage to tackle a criminal and get him to the ground, I kick him 
once and that’s reasonable, I kick him twice and that’s understandable, 
three times, forgivable; four times debatable; five times, disproportionate; 
six times, it’s very disproportionate; seven times, extremely 
disproportionate - in comes the Tory test - eight times, and it’s grossly 
disproportionate. It is a horrible test. It sounds like state-sponsored 
revenge. I don’t understand why sentencing should take place in the 
home. Why can’t it go through the courts? Why can’t the jury, as they 
always do, decide what is reasonable?”986  
 
The ‘grossly disproportionate force’ test stretches too far beyond what should be 
considered as lawful actions of self-defence, which the law has aimed to preserve for 
so long. Although this is an exaggerated example, it conveys the extended nature of 
the test in a practical form. 
 
The problem that this extension creates is that ‘the law should always encourage 
people to be reasonable, not unreasonable, to be proportionate, not 
disproportionate’.987 The general standard required by the law achieves the goal of 
reasonableness by requiring necessity and proportionality. The change of test within 
the context of the home erodes the principles of self-defence, and reverses years of 
rational thinking. The high profile oppositions have been numerous, with Keir 
Starmer, the previous Director of Public Prosecutions, also expressing support for the 
test of reasonable force, rejecting suggestions that it should be changed. He 
emphasised that there are “many cases, some involving death, where no prosecutions 
are brought’,988 providing another argument against the change of test; namely that 
there is nothing to prove its necessity. Very few householders were charged, which 
indicated that the law worked satisfactorily. A fair balance is already struck in the 
circumstances by considering the reasonableness of the action taken.  
 
4.2.2(f) Politics, public perception and the lack of understanding of the law 
 
The sixth argument against the change relates to the reasoning process behind the 
amendment, namely on what grounds it was justified. It is claimed that the main 
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reason driving the amendment revolved around politics and public opinion. This view 
was asserted by the human rights organisation Liberty, which commented that the 
reform enacted in the Crime and Courts Act 2013, is ‘grim, head-line chasing at its 
very worst with dangerous repercussions for our society’.989  Similarly, Mendelle, 
writing prior to the recent amendments, proclaimed his dismay at the manipulation of 
legislation for political gain: 
 
‘recent changes to the law of self-defence illustrate how much political 
posturing has supplanted reasoned debate in the field of criminal law … 
the two main parties now take turns to pass wholly unnecessary 
legislation, for no better reason, as far as I can see, than to demonstrate 
how responsive they are to what they perceive to be the popular mood. 
Legislation is now deployed as a weapon in a PR war’.990  
 
The same opinion is held and is supported in this research, that the recent changes 
have been a product of party politics, and unsubstantiated evidence.
991
  
 
Sensationalist reporting by the media can have a damaging impact as it applies 
pressure for action, when sometimes no action is required.
992
 While public opinion 
can be an important and vital method of campaigning for law reform, and indeed can 
have substantial results, in this case it appears that the calls were misguided.
993
 It 
would have been wiser in this instance for politicians and lawmakers to refrain from 
acting based on these grounds, and rather to heed the advice of those working within 
the system and dealing with the real cases. Husak is critical of legislating as a reaction 
to the power of public perception, and says: 
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‘The characteristics of criminal law are changing rapidly; whole new 
kinds of statutory schemes have been created. Largely in response to 
sensationalistic media accounts and the influence of political pressure 
groups, criminal laws are routinely enacted as though they were the 
natural response to any and all social problems’.994 
 
The media is arguably responsible for the public perception of the protection afforded 
by the law to homeowners to defend themselves in their homes against intruders.
995
 
This view is sometimes misinformed
996
 and it can be dangerous to rely on these media 
representations,
997
 which have led to public outcries demanding that the law be 
reformed to provide increased rights to homeowners who use force against intruders 
at their home.  
 
One of the first cases to spark the public’s fury at the law in this field was that of the 
Norfolk farmer, Anthony Martin, who shot two burglars on his property, killing one 
and seriously injuring the other.
998
 Another later widely reported case refuelled this 
anger within society when Munir Hussain was convicted of causing grievous bodily 
harm after he chased a man who held his family at knifepoint in their home and beat 
him with a cricket bat.
999
 
 
However, according to Hogan ‘one thing we must not do is allow sympathy to cloud 
judgement’, 1000  which is pertinent in these cases. While home intrusions 
understandably generate strong emotions of fear and anger, the law already provides 
leniency and flexibility (through the test of reasonable force) in these situations. It is 
difficult to understand why people call for further protection, unless they simply do 
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not understand the law in this context.
1001
 It is true that the law is not absolutely 
precise, but the reason for this, as has already been mentioned, is that flexibility is 
crucial to its fair and just application in individual cases.  
 
The problem does not lie in the law itself, as it provides a complete defence to those 
who use reasonable force against aggressors, but rather in the understanding of the 
law. Increased public awareness and improved guidance supplied to homeowners, 
rather than reforms, are likely to be the best way of dealing with this predicament. 
There appears to be confusion between the defence of property and the householder’s 
right to defend oneself and one’s family against intruders.1002 Where there is a fear for 
safety, the use of force, even deadly force, is permitted. The very nature of home 
intrusions carries a risk to the homeowners and an instinctive reaction of fear. 
1003
 
Therefore, unless there is clear evidence that the homeowners have no reason to fear 
for their safety, it is likely that the fear they felt when faced with an intruder would 
support a case of self-defence. The decision to change the test assumes an 
unreasonable legal standard, which is far from the reality of the legal approach, and 
has unnecessarily produced another statutory provision. 
 
It is clear that the law of self-defence discriminates based on location, with separate 
standards applying for householders and people in public places. Another way in 
which the law in relation to householders and public places discriminates based on 
location is the situation regarding offensive weapons. The fact that one may have 
more objects (that may be used as weapons) to hand when defending in the home than 
in public places is a matter of chance as well as law, because the act of carrying a 
weapon is intrinsically offensive, not defensive. This is the next topic under 
consideration. 
 
4.3 Location and its relation to weapons 
 
According to the legislation prohibiting the carrying and use of offensive weapons 
and bladed articles, these offences must be committed in a public place. As noted 
                                                        
1001
 F.Leverick Killing in Self-defence, op cit fn 8 at 139. 
1002
 ibid at 138-139. 
1003
 ibid at 139; L.Fox ‘The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?’ (2002) 
29(4) Journal of Law and Society 580, at 594. 
 208 
earlier, section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 provides that, “any person 
who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on 
him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an 
offence”.1004  Similarly, section 139 of The Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides a 
separate provision for the prohibition of the carrying of articles with blades or points 
in any public place, this time without ‘good reason or lawful authority’.1005 It can be 
argued therefore, that the same articles can be considered lawful or unlawful 
depending on the location at which they are possessed.
1006
 This is logical in that 
articles are normally created and designed to serve a particular function, (i.e. the 
kitchen knife, garden tools and DIY tools), and it would be strange to prohibit their 
possession in their place of use to perform their natural functions. Therefore, such 
articles will be reasonable to possess in the home, or workplace, but not out of their 
context of normal use, and not in public places. Such articles are easily accessible 
when attacks occur in the home, and their use in self-defence in such situations will 
be acceptable.  
 
This is another way in which self-defence in the home differs from self-defence in a 
public place. Not only are items that may be used to assist a defence more accessible 
and useable in the home, but the legal implications of having such articles available 
and acting with their aid is far less serious. Important considerations in cases 
involving weapons will be the way in which force was applied, the type of weapon 
that was used, and the existence of pre-meditated force. These factors represent the 
public interest, which could affect the plea of self-defence. Particularly dangerous 
weapons will need careful consideration, as will the level of unexpectedness of the 
attack and defence. If an individual has planned one’s response and armed oneself 
accordingly, that could be a determining factor. Case law has declared that  
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‘it was always an aggravating feature of any case involving injury or 
death that the injury or death had resulted from the use of a knife or any 
other weapon ... The court would repeat that anyone who went into a 
public place armed with a knife or any other weapon and used it to kill or 
to cause injury must anticipate condign punishment’.1007  
 
Therefore, it is a serious offence and the punishment will reflect this. The use of a 
weapon is clearly always an influential consideration. The condemnation of carrying 
and possessing a dangerous article in a public place is far worse than picking 
something up in the heat of the moment within the privacy of the home.  
 
While the law firmly prohibits the carrying of ‘offensive weapons’ in public places, it 
takes a different approach to the possession of such articles in one’s own home, which 
is not a criminal offence.
1008
 Location certainly impacts upon what is deemed 
reasonable in the circumstances. While it is permissible to use anything that comes to 
hand to secure self-protection, as a weapon of opportunity, the act of possessing and 
forearming oneself with an offensive weapon is a criminal offence. This undeniably 
means that the individual acting in self-defence in a public place is at a disadvantage 
compared with those in private dwellings.
1009
 This is accentuated by the fact that the 
narrower test of self-defence requiring proportionality is applied in public places, 
while the use of a weapon in the home is subject to the more lenient standard 
permitting disproportionality.  
 
4.3.1 Interpreting public place in weapons offences 
 
Of particular interest and relevance are cases involving the possession of knives in 
which the issue of a public place was raised. In the case of Roberts,
1010
 the appellant 
was arrested in his own garden and upon being searched was found to have a lock 
knife in his pocket. He was therefore charged with having a bladed article in a public 
place contrary to section 139 of the 1988 Act. Although the front gardens of 
properties are not usually considered places to which the public have access, the judge 
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considered the particular garden in question to be a public place because, ‘a public 
place was not merely land to which the public was permitted access but might also 
include land adjacent to areas where the public had access, provided that the harm 
against which the section was designed to provide protection could still be inflicted 
from such a place’.1011 This decision was considered to be wrong by the appeal court, 
as such a construction of a public place was far too wide an interpretation and would 
be difficult to enforce. The decision was indeed unfair, as Roberts was within the 
contours of his home at the time. It would be different if, for example, he had left the 
garden and was walking down the street away from his house at the time of his 
arrest.
1012
  
 
This is reflected in the case of Harriot,
1013
 which involved the possession of two 
knives in the forecourt of a bail hostel where the defendant lived. It was held that 
despite there being no signs restricting public access to the area, it remained a private 
place and thus could not be considered a public place for the purposes of the 1988 
Act. This seems reasonable. However, questions could be asked over where the line 
should be drawn in apartment blocks or flats. Would the limit be the resident’s own 
flat, or would any part of the building be considered as a private space? These 
buildings are commonly gated communities, allowing access only to those who dwell 
there. However, the communal areas, such as stairways, may be viewed differently. 
The dangers of one resident carrying a weapon in such areas are comparable to the 
same situation in a public place, as all the other residents could be affected.  
 
While it may be useful to note the requirements in relation to parts of a building for 
the purposes of burglary here,
1014
 it is difficult to extend its interpretation within this 
context. The term ‘part of a building’ has been constructed as encompassing all areas 
to which there is no general access.
1015
 This could mean that the communal areas fall 
under this scope, and are therefore private areas, where the defendant may feel 
permitted to carry a weapon. It is arguable that these areas should in fact be regarded 
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as public areas, as they are places in which persons other than the defendant may be 
affected negatively by the presence of a weapon. It is a problematic example, as 
apartment blocks requiring codes or keys for access possess an element of privacy 
without being truly private, as several individuals share them.  
 
What are the reasons for the differences relating to what is regarded as offensive 
weapons in the public and private domain? While the possession of such articles in 
public is clearly unlawful, their possession and use in private spaces may be entirely 
lawful and permissible. What is the varying element in these locations? Why is there 
only a mention of a public place in the legislation – is it never an offence if it occurs 
in the home? Is it perhaps due to the different purpose of the article? It has been 
designed for use in the home, in which case it is not created with the intention that it 
comes into regular contact with the public. For example, the possession of a kitchen 
knife in public would cause concern, whereas if it is used in self-defence in the home, 
the action will be much easier to explain, accept and defend. Perhaps it is due to the 
overall level of harm that may be caused, that the same action is viewed completely 
differently depending on the space in which it occurs.
1016
 While a stab inflicts the 
same harm on an individual regardless of its location, a stabbing incident in a public 
place may involve more individuals, and thus produce more harm overall. What 
exactly is it about the home that sets it apart from a public place and provides the 
homeowner with extensive liberty that would not be accepted in a public place? This 
is a challenging yet important question. The following section as well as the substance 
of Chapter 5 will attempt to address it. 
 
4.3.2 The private place approach 
 
The onus of proof is much higher when a weapon is carried in the public sphere, than 
when it is used in a person’s home. This is evident in the fact that in many cases 
where a weapon has been used against an intruder or burglar, the defender was either 
acquitted
1017
 or was not prosecuted.
1018
 This was the outcome followng an incident in 
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Manchester in July 2011. Peter Flanagan stabbed a man who had broken into his 
home as part of a gang, leading to the intruder’s death. His actions had been taken in 
the course of lawful self-defence as it was deemed that the force he had used was 
reasonable, and therefore he was not prosecuted.
1019
 The intruder was armed with a 
machete, and therefore presented grave danger to the homeowner, and justified his 
use of lethal force. Lanham states that there is no need ‘to insist on imminence in the 
case of ordinary household goods. Possessing them for self-defence on private 
premises would normally not present a danger which outweighed the interests of 
effective self-defence’.1020 However, it is interesting to note an incident involving TV 
presenter and former musician Myleene Klass, who spotted intruders in her garden 
and waved a knife at them through the windows of her home to frighten them away. 
She received a warning from the police for doing so.
1021
 Her actions seem to be in 
accordance with the law, and this case may be an example of an overly cautious 
approach by the police. Usually, possession in the home is acceptable, while outside 
the confines of the home any weapon carried will attract a need for greater proof of 
the imminence of harm to render the possession reasonable. 
 
Sangero notes that the home is afforded a privileged status in this respect because ‘the 
invasion of a person’s home constitutes a severe intrusion into his living space and in 
itself harms his autonomy’,1022 and as Fletcher notes, an intrusion in one’s home 
creates a ‘presumption of mortal danger to the homeowner’.1023 This principle has 
always been accepted, but the modern justification has moved away from the emotive 
explanation that the home is one’s castle and fortress,1024 and focuses on the danger 
and fear that confronts people when someone breaks into their home.
1025
 It is the 
reasonable fear that one experiences when faced with intruders in the home that 
renders resort to force against them lawful, as, although burglars may not intend on 
harming the homeowner, ‘there is a chance that they will and no certainty that they 
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won’t’.1026 This idea of the uncertainty of the aggressor’s intentions will be revisited 
and further developed in Chapter 5. 
 
Despite the emphasis on public places in the legislation, as it happens, many of the 
householder cases that have arisen indeed involved the use of dangerous weapons in 
self-defence. This reflects the discrimination based on location that exists in the law 
regarding weapons. In September 2012, Andy and Tracey Ferrie were arrested on 
suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm after firing a legally held shotgun at 
intruders during a break-in at their farm, injuring two of the intruders. The case was 
not taken further as the CPS decided that it was clearly a matter of reasonable self-
defence. The householders were faced with a threatening and frightening intrusion, 
and only acted according to what they thought was necessary in the circumstances.
1027
 
This was different to the well-known case of Anthony Martin, whose actions did not 
constitute self-defence as they were excessive, and he had also used an illegally held 
shotgun to shoot the intruders.
1028
  
 
4.3.3 The infamous case of Anthony Martin 
 
Arguably one of the best known cases in this area, not a self-defence case strictly 
speaking, is that of Anthony Martin, the Norfolk farmer who shot two burglars on his 
property, killing one and injuring the other. Morris claims that during the course of 
his trial, the attention the case received ‘turned the Norfolk farmer into something 
approaching a folk hero’. 1029  His case for self-defence failed because the jury 
considered the fatal shooting of sixteen-year-old Freddie Barras, and intentional 
wounding of Brendan Fearon to be excessive force.
1030
 He was initially incarcerated 
for murder, but his conviction was later reduced to manslaughter by way of 
diminished responsibility. The reason for this was that he suffered from a paranoid 
personality disorder, which made him susceptible to viewing circumstances far more 
seriously than other people would, and he was therefore not fully responsible for the 
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actions he took.
1031
 Additionally, he had been victimised on several previous 
occasions, and had suffered repeated attacks, intrusions and thefts on his property. 
Although he had reported these to the police he had not received any resolution or 
adequate protection. He was therefore reported to have taken matters into his own 
hands, and had taken to sleeping fully clothed with his illegally held shotgun by his 
side.
1032
  
 
This case demonstrates the importance of examining the principles of self-defence on 
a case-by-case basis.
1033
 A number of things weighed against Martin’s plea of self-
defence, eventually leading the court to decide that he had acted beyond the scope of 
the defence. The nature of the weapon, the circumstances, and the manner in which it 
was used were problematic. The fact that his firearms certificate had been revoked, 
following an incident where he had shot at a car, meant the possession was unlawful, 
and the use unreasonable. The Lord Chief Justice at the time, Lord Woolf, delivered 
the court’s judgement and said ‘we must make it clear that an extremely dangerous 
weapon cannot be used in the manner in which it was used by Mr Martin that 
night’.1034 It was also problematic that Martin had shot the intruders when they did not 
directly threaten his safety and they were unaware of his presence, which was not a 
proportionate response. He shot the teenager Fred Barras, in the back causing his 
death, and injured the older of the two, thirty-three-year-old Brendan Fearon in his leg 
as he fled.
1035
 Adding to these aggravating features, there was also an issue in terms of 
where exactly Martin was standing at the time of the shooting, whether he was on the 
ground floor with the burglars or whether he had pursued them down the stairs, as the 
latter was inconsistent with a situation of self-defence. The jury had felt that he had 
acted in anger, and accordingly found him guilty of the charges.
1036
 The public 
perception of the case demonstrates unawareness of the intricacies of the defence and 
the operation of the law in this particular instance. This leads to assumptions that the 
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law of self-defence was unfair in his case, without understanding the reasons why 
self-defence was not a viable defence.
1037
 
 
4.3.4 Householders, intruders, and weapons - restricting revenge 
 
There have been many high profile cases involving the use of weapons against 
intruders. Another case that received extensive media attention was that of Munir and 
Tokeer Hussain.
1038
 It must be explained that despite the widespread public outrage 
and disbelief that this attracted, it was not a case of self-defence. It is nevertheless, 
relevant to discussions of the law in this area. This was an exceptionally serious case 
in which the family had been tied up in their home, threatened, and told that they 
would be killed. The defendant arrived home at the scene and when the intruders fled, 
was assisted by his brother to chase after them. They caught one of the intruders and 
caused permanent brain damage by repeatedly hitting him with a cricket bat. 
Although they had been subjected to extreme provocation, this was not a case of self-
defence, defence of one’s family or the home, as the burglary and threat were over at 
the time the injuries were inflicted, and it had become a revenge attack.
1039
 Due to the 
nature of the circumstances, a prosecution was required, but the sentences were 
reduced to reflect the principles of justice, the good character of the defendants, and 
the fact that they had been subjected to extreme provocation. The sentencing Judge 
expressed in the case that  
 
“Sadly, I have no doubt that my public duty requires me to impose 
immediate prison sentences of some length upon you. This is in order to 
reflect the serious consequences of your violent acts and intent, and to 
make it absolutely clear that, whatever the circumstances, persons, cannot 
take the law into their own hands, or carry out revenge attacks upon a 
person who has offended them”.1040  
 
This demonstrates that even articles not normally regarded as weapons, a cricket bat 
in this case, can become offensive weapons, and emphasises the significance of the 
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circumstances. Had the injuries been sustained while at the defendant’s house, the 
outcome may have been different. A case of self-defence may have been arguable if 
this occurred at the family home as there would have been an imminent danger. 
However, it is likely that the force used would have been considered excessive.  
 
Uniacke has discussed the nature of revenge demonstrating how it does not fit within 
the scope of self-defence. She says that  
 
‘revenge is a type of retaliation which involves generally deliberate 
infliction of injury on another person … the rationale of all revenge is 
that it is a requital, a payback of injury in kind … arguably the motivation 
of all revenge … is morally inappropriate in that it derives satisfaction 
from another person’s suffering’.1041  
 
Looking at the Hussain case, the element of inflicting injury has gone beyond the aim 
of ‘payback of injury in kind’. Not only was the action disproportionate in the 
circumstances as the initial attack had ceased, but also the level of harm inflicted was 
disproportionate to the attack that had taken place in Hussain’s home. While the 
emotion that overpowered Hussain in the situation is understandable, and many are 
likely to feel the same level of explosive emotion at finding their family enduring 
such a situation, it remains immoral, as it acted upon a retributive intent that the 
aggressors must suffer. It is argued here that Uniacke’s choice of word ‘satisfaction’ 
is slightly unsuitable in this context, and does not carry its usual meaning, as it is 
more a matter of seeking justice than of gaining some sort of pleasure from the 
action.
1042
 The same was true in the case of Martin, as there was a sense that he was 
enacting retribution for the wrongs that he had suffered in the past. 
 
4.3.5 Cases where no prosecutions occurred 
 
Most cases of pure self-defence do not result in prosecutions or convictions. The 
cases that have resulted in the criminal convictions of householders injuring or killing 
intruders in their home, either do not involve circumstances of self-defence or are 
                                                        
1041
 S.Uniacke ‘Why is Revenge Wrong?’ (2000) 34 The Journal of Value Inquiry 61, at 64. 
1042
 ibid at 64. The case of Hussain illustrates that even people of a good nature, who do not usually 
harm others, can react in this way in the face of injustice and extreme circumstances. This element of 
emotion will be explored in Chapter 6.  
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clearly actions taken out of revenge or retaliation. One example where there was no 
prosecution was the case of Edwin Pitkin in 2008. Pitkin had stabbed a man who he 
believed was breaking into his home, only to discover it was his drunken neighbour 
mistakenly attempting to get into his own home. He was not prosecuted, as due to 
lack of evidence to prove unlawful killing there was no realistic prospect of 
conviction.
1043
  
 
Another example that demonstrates the types of situations where no prosecutions will 
follow is that of Cecil Coley, a seventy-two-year-old man who was faced with four 
armed intruders in his florist shop in Manchester in 2011.
1044
 He struck out at the 
intruders with a knife that was on the counter, killing one and injuring another. He 
was arrested initially on suspicion of murder, but was later released without charge. 
His was a clear case of self-defence involving extremely frightening circumstances, to 
which he had responded instinctively to protect himself while fearing for his life, 
using reasonable force as he considered necessary at the time.  
 
Lipscombe also provides examples where prosecutions did occur, and one such case 
shows the obvious difference in the nature of the circumstances: a man had laid in 
wait for a burglar on his premises in Cheshire, and when he appeared had tied him up, 
beaten him, and then thrown him into a pit before setting him on fire. This is an 
extreme example, but clearly demonstrates unreasonable actions.
1045
  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
A number of important issues have been exposed in this chapter. The extended 
householder provision has been highlighted, and many problems have been identified. 
The arguments for the change in the law proclaimed the importance of increasing 
protection for householders, and providing greater power to act defensively. However, 
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the arguments of the opposition demonstrate that a fine balance must be struck here, 
and that there is a need to discourage vigilantism. As Dicey states:  
 
‘The rule which fixes the limit of the right of self-help must, from the 
nature of things, be a compromise between the necessity, on the one hand, 
of allowing every citizen to maintain his rights against wrongdoers, and 
the necessity, on the other hand, of supressing private warfare. 
Discourage self-help, and loyal subjects become the slaves of ruffians. 
Over-stimulate self-assertion, and for the arbitrament of the courts you 
substitute the decision of the sword or the revolver’.1046 
 
This quote perfectly describes the problematic nature of the debate. While it is 
important to ensure that innocent defenders are not criminalised, expanding the test 
was unnecessary.
1047
 Reasonable force is a wide enough test to allow lawful instances 
of self-defence, and proportionality is a component of reasonableness.  
 
While the householder who suffers a home intrusion has been wronged, and subject to 
an interference with his rights to autonomy and privacy, that in itself should not 
provide an automatic permission to determine the punishment one’s aggressor must 
endure. This is the domain of the criminal justice system, and not a task for the 
general public.
1048
 The liberty to take reasonable actions in the circumstances to 
protect oneself, one’s family, and one’s property is a sufficient test in itself, as it is 
relative to the circumstances that the individual faces, and not some higher test of 
exceptional morality. The ‘reasonable force’ test is not too restrictive as it is 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Proportionality has always been an important part 
of self-defence, therefore, it is strange to suddenly allow disproportionate force. The 
change in the test to one of ‘grossly disproportionate force’, distorts the requirement 
of proportionality, potentially permitting far greater force than is necessary for 
effective self-defence, and is therefore at odds with the justifications behind the 
defence.  
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The test of self-defence should allow individuals the same level of defensive response 
regardless of the location. It would arguably be a better approach to allow the location 
element to be considered an aggravating factor when sentencing the aggressor for 
one’s criminal actions, rather than creating a completely different standard of self-
defence for householders. 
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Chapter 5: Location 
 
5. Introduction 
 
The law of self-defence in England and Wales draws direct and indirect distinctions 
between one’s home and a public place. The vast differences in perceptions relating to 
these locations form the topic for discussion in this chapter. The main focus of the 
chapter is to explore the reasons why location matters. This requires an appreciation 
of factors that are unique to the home environment, that distinguish the home as a 
place meriting enhanced legal protection. For the most part, the chapter concentrates 
on self-defence, but the latter half also considers the relevance of location in respect 
of offensive weapons.  
 
The first factor to be assessed is the status of the home or dwelling as a special 
institution, which demonstrates that individuals and societies attach significant value 
to the home. This influences opinions regarding what should be permissible acts of 
self-defence in these different locations. Historical notions and theories of home and 
dwelling will be explored to gain a deeper understanding of the special nature and 
sanctity of the home. This section will assess concepts of place, space and locality, 
and the attachments, meanings and identities which people form regarding specific 
places. The results of castle doctrine legislation will be examined as an example 
representing the sanctity of the home. Similarly, the right to autonomy and privacy 
may be perceived as being more pronounced in the home, and the level of fear felt by 
individuals also varies between public and private places. The crime of burglary will 
also be discussed as it epitomises the special nature of the home.  
 
Secondly, there are many dimensions to the debate on location that may contribute to 
an increased understanding of the issue of location in self-defence. Examples will be 
discussed drawing upon the discipline of criminology to gain insight into fear of 
crime patterns, criminological spatial design; opportunism; and the use of public 
places by young people. These subjects offer an alternative perspective to the study of 
location, and to reasons why certain locations attract crime, as well as to methods 
employed to reduce crime. It will be argued that crime prevention strategies should be 
promoted ahead of more liberal self-defence laws.  
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5.1 Theories about the home 
 
The home as a place of dwelling is often described as a special type of property. It 
provides a defined space of privacy and exclusivity from the outside world. In this 
regard it is considered a unique and vital feature of the lives of all people. Fox states 
that every single individual lives somewhere, even if they have no permanent address, 
such as homeless people; they too must dwell in some place.
1049
 As the example of 
the homeless demonstrates, the degrees to which this statement is true can vary. To 
the homeless this is evident in the sense of being located in a particular place rather 
than having a particular property to call home. The home itself is a distinct structure, 
and in order to assess this subject, it is necessary to attempt to discover what the 
defining feature of the home or dwelling is that sets it apart from other locations. 
 
5.1.1 Dimensions of place and space 
 
The main question for this chapter is: why is self-defence in the home considered 
worthy of more protection than self-defence outside the home? Surely, the right to use 
reasonable force against aggressors should be protected wherever the defence is 
necessitated? When an individual attacks another, the victim should be permitted to 
protect himself, regardless of whether the attack occurs in the privacy of the home, or 
outside the house in a public place. While the home provides a space for people to 
exclude others from their own property,
1050
 everyone has the same right to be in 
public places, which should be safe for everybody. A person assaulted in the street is 
attacked in a place which is accessible to all members of the public. It is argued here 
that the level of fear caused to the victim in this context could be the same as if the 
attack occurred in the home.  
 
It is a matter of the individual’s susceptibility to feeling frightened and their 
perception of fear. While it is possible that a greater proportion of people are fearful 
of home intrusions than they are of being attacked in the street, this is a very 
subjective consideration and it is not the place of the law to distinguish between these 
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scenarios.
1051
 Attacks occurring in public are frightening as there is the potential for 
anyone at that location at that moment in time to have fallen a victim to the crime.
1052
 
The aggressor and the victim have equal status in terms of their permission to be 
there, whereas when intruders break into homes and properties, the position is 
completely different. Only the householder has the right to be there, the intruder has 
stepped beyond the line of permission and violates the householder’s right to privacy. 
This is one possible explanation why self-defence is treated differently depending on 
its location. In order to explore the question and reach the roots of the difference 
between public and private areas, the concepts of space and place must be defined.  
 
5.1.1(a) What is the meaning of ‘space’ and ‘place’? 
 
First of all, it is necessary to consider a definition of the terms space and place. 
Although these are familiar and regularly used words, in the interests of clarity, their 
interpretation and application to a particular context must be explained. A brief 
definition is provided by Bottoms, who states that it is important to note that  
 
‘‘place’ is not the same as ‘space’. The former concept refers to a 
geographical location, with fairly definite boundaries, within which 
people may meet, engage in various activities, etc. ‘Space’ is a much 
broader concept, but … some social activities have become quite 
markedly spatially differentiated”.1053  
 
It is clear from this statement that place and space are different concepts. Place 
appears to be of fixed existence, and involves not only the physicality of being in a 
certain location but also includes the surrounding attachments, meanings and 
activities taking place there.
1054
 Place is a location and determinate spot, whereas 
space is an expanse within which people live their lives and interact with one another. 
Space is therefore a more abstract entity, with undefined parameters.
1055
 This is 
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demonstrated by Carrabine et al, who explain that ‘social life is conducted in social 
space ... Each space has its own internal rules of conduct ... Geographers argue that 
these spaces are not simply the ‘backdrop’ for our social interaction but that, by 
contrast, they help to shape the very nature of our social interactions’.1056 This is a 
useful explanation because it illustrates the broader perspective and relevance of 
space. The insights provided by geography, architecture, anthropology, environmental 
psychology and philosophy are of benefit to understand the difference that being in 
one’s home or in a public place has on perceptions of self-defence.  
 
Regarding an analysis of place, Gieryn identified three necessary and sufficient 
features of place; the geographic location; the material form; and the investment with 
meaning and value.
1057
 As to the first factor, the geographic location of place, he says 
‘A place is a unique spot in the universe. Place is the distinction between here and 
there, and it is what allows people to appreciate near and far’.1058 He goes on to 
explain the second element of place, its material form as follows: ‘Place has 
physicality. Whether built or just come upon, artificial or natural, streets and doors 
or rocks and trees, place is stuff. It is a compilation of things or objects at some 
particular spot in the universe’.1059 The third element, the investment with meaning 
and value, explains the emotional attachment and personal recognition of a place, 
which provides its context: ‘without naming ... identification, or representation by 
ordinary people, a place is not a place … A spot in the universe, with a gathering of 
physical stuff there, becomes a place only when it ensconces history or utopia, danger 
or security, identity or memory’.1060 Thus, people form opinions of places based on 
their experiences there, and this adds to the identity and understanding of the 
particular place. Applying these three concepts within the context of this research, 
one’s home is certainly to be regarded as a place, as are areas in the public domain 
that are accessible and used by the general public. It is likely that Geiryn’s third 
component is the most important to achieving an understanding of the distinction 
between one’s home and public places. This provides a conceptualisation of the 
meaning of place and space as applied in this thesis.  
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Indeed, it is the concept of place that has most relevance to this research, with its 
defined and meaningful nature, as it can describe a location as a dwelling. 
Nevertheless, references to space, as an abstract concept, may also be appropriate in 
relation to public areas that are unlimited and devoid of meaning. It is interesting to 
discuss the value of a sense of place and its impact upon individual perceptions of 
places. Banks says that:  
 
‘The ways in which we describe and understand our position in the world 
rely heavily on our sense of not being someone but somewhere, thus we 
harbour strong feelings for place. Place has a double articulation; it acts 
as a physical context for everyday life, a material situation, but it is also 
imaginary and subjective - place is space with ‘felt value’, emotionalized 
space or space with feeling’.1061  
 
This portrayal demonstrates the power of place to produce a sense of belonging and 
reflects the strong attachment people feel towards their homes. This insight can 
perhaps explain the different attitudes towards self-defence, depending on whether it 
occurs in the home or in a public place. It appeals to our human instincts and 
emotions, and explains why we feel strong connections to our homes. Research by 
Abbott-Chapman and Robertson
1062
 supports the idea that places develop our 
behaviour through implied standards of expected behaviour in different places. They 
provide the analogy that:  
 
‘place is space filled by people, practices, objects, and representations ... 
and places are interpreted, narrated, perceived, felt, understood and 
imagined so that meanings are not only experienced, they are learned 
through personal discovery ... the characteristics of home, the home’s 
surroundings, and the local neighbourhood ... sources of feelings of 
belonging’.1063  
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This demonstrates how important places are to our personal development and sense of 
self, as we form a picture of our place in the world by identifying with different 
places.
1064
  
 
This aspect of place identity will be discussed further shortly, but for now it is notable 
that private places by their very nature are full of meaning, identity, and feelings of 
attachment. Whether it is a place of work, or a home or dwelling, privacy is obviously 
an important feature of their existence. These experiences and associations within a 
place define its role and reflect its values to a person’s life and self-identity. Part of 
the construction of places relies on the qualities and emotions that they attract, such as 
perceptions of ownership, control, security and familiarity. Private places are 
construed as a closed space for only those who are permitted to be there, they are not 
open to all, and are therefore a respected, personal zone. 
 
Public places, in contrast, such as parks and promenades, are viewed as providing 
open permission to be present there. They are accessible and inviting to all. Such 
areas are a point of contact for many different people, all going about their own 
business, and living separate lives within the same spaces. Public places therefore, can 
be considered exciting and diverse, but also full of potential trouble and conflicts, as 
there is uncertainty over who will meet when and where. As a result, public places are 
often said to create more fear of crime than do private places. In particular, studies 
have shown that women experience higher rates of fearing crime than do men,
1065
 
especially the fear of stranger rape in public places,
1066
 as ‘public places are the sites 
for most stranger rape’. 1067  Gardner notes the importance of an individual’s 
appearance when conducting themselves in public places, as one’s appearance can 
cause one to be perceived as an easy target for crime.  
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The home’s perceived protective barriers, the locks, the doors, the walls, are 
obviously absent in public places and consequently people can feel more vulnerable. 
Despite the fact that some people, such as gangs engaged in postcode wars, develop 
strong bonds of loyalty and commitment to particular places, everyone is entitled to 
be in public places.
1068
 All people are equal while in public, and hence have no more 
control over those present or absent than anyone else. This is in contrast to the home, 
where individuals have control over inclusion and exclusion to the property. Public 
places therefore create enhanced fear of crime levels and individuals modify their 
behaviour and appearance accordingly.
1069
 The degree of control or lack of control is 
a factor in the distinction between private and public places.  
 
5.1.2 Attachment, meanings and identity 
 
Control is a factor connected to the sense of self that is formed in the home. Certain 
places function as a marker and formulator of identity, as they are a part of our 
everyday social existence and are inextricably linked to our lives. The association of a 
place as a home has significant emotional attachment. Home is where people feel 
most free and where they feel they can be ‘themselves’ in a familiar and comfortable 
private zone.
1070
 The dwelling thus provides a sense of belonging, normality, and 
security. As Fox states: ‘‘Home’ is not an easy concept to pin down. Although the 
term is instantly familiar, and the physical reality of home is an important and 
omnipresent feature of our everyday lives, the legal conception of home has received 
surprisingly little attention’.1071 She refers to lay person terms of endearment towards 
the home such as ‘a man’s home is his castle’1072 and ‘there’s no place like home’, but 
claims that a legal definition is not as easy to form, as home is a subjective matter and 
is not capable of a precise quantification.
1073
 This demonstrates the unique status of 
the home, and the reason why it is perceived differently from public places. Saunders 
and Williams refer to the home as ‘one of the most basic institutions in contemporary 
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western societies’.1074 Because of the personal nature of one’s attachment to one’s 
home, such sentiments are possibly trivialised and are therefore not considered 
adequate to form a legal concept. However, it appears that the incentive behind calls 
for a change in the test of self-defence, to extend the law evermore in favour of 
homeowners appears to be fuelled by emotional motives.
1075
 The claim that a ‘man’s 
home is his castle and fortress’ would be insufficient by itself to provide a lawful 
justification for any harm that a homeowner inflicts on an intruder in his home.
1076
 As 
noted in Chapter 4, this type of belief and reasoning appears to have supported the 
calls for tougher and clearer legislation on the matter, and the Government’s decision 
to extend the test for householders. 
 
The personal attachments that people form with places, the sensitive and emotive 
meanings that they cultivate, and the identities that are facilitated in different 
locations are important to an understanding of the public/private debate. The home 
forms a bubble-like surrounding, in which a person is separated from his public 
life.
1077
 This clearly explains the strong sentiments expressed by homeowners when 
they are confronted with an intruder in their home.  
 
Gunter has found that certain aspects are of particular relevance to one’s formation of 
feelings of attachment, security, and sense of belonging to a place. These are the 
length of time one has lived there, whether they were born there, and their family 
connection to the place. These all contribute to the creation of a sense of community, 
of a network of friends and family, and a sense of connection, which have a positive 
impact on the feeling of security that is experienced within the home and local 
area.
1078
 This demonstrates that the sentiments regarding the home are interconnected 
with the broader area in which it is located. Taylor noted that while some 
neighbourhoods possess this sense of connectivity, with residents contributing to the 
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community life and collective nature of the area, in others, people keep to themselves 
and do not interact with their neighbours, leading to a weakening sense of security, 
stability and familiarity.
1079
 The relevance of the home environment and location, 
particularly the surrounding neighbourhood, is significant to one’s ‘personal and 
social identity’.
1080
 The home within its wider community is far from a mere physical 
structure or place to live, it is a symbol of stability and its infringement can have 
devastating consequences. For example, for victims of burglary, these positive 
associations and attachments are damaged, requiring a long time to be regained and 
repaired.
1081
 This is a separate discussion, yet contributes towards the general 
perception and graver legal approach to self-defence in home invasions, than other 
cases of the defence.
1082
  
 
Gieryn’s view on the impact of location on behaviour is persuasive: ‘Place is 
imbricated in moral judgements and deviant practices as well. Conduct appropriate 
backstage is often not permissible out front ... Constructions of behaviour, 
appearances, or even people as deviant depend upon where they happen’.1083 It is a 
truism, that people act differently in public than they do in private, and that there are 
unwritten codes of acceptable standards of behaviour when in a public place. This is 
not the case in a person’s home where they are removed from outside judgement, and 
can freely express their idiosyncrasies.
1084
 This provides an additional reason why 
public places can be frightening, as there are expected standards of behaviour, and 
when these are broken, it can cause people to feel uneasy and fearful. This is another 
way in which the home and local community provide security, because there is a 
familiarity and stability in what occurs there.  
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The association of the home with security is a fundamental ingredient of the castle 
doctrine. This approach reflects the status of the home as a sanctuary,
1085
 based on the 
traditional view of the home as an autonomous area for individuals.
1086
 The theory 
behind the castle doctrine regards the home as possessing a form of sanctity, and a 
representation of the homeowner’s last line of defence. Levin explains the impact of 
the ‘no retreat in the home’ rule: ‘the home is … distinguished from the public space, 
creating a dichotomy between the public and private spheres and the law that applies 
in each’.1087 This approach clearly attaches great importance and significance to the 
home, explaining that the somewhat more relaxed approach of the law, within the 
context of the home is due to the special sanctity of dwellings.  
 
Dwellings are unique types of property which provide much more than their material 
value or physical structure, as they facilitate basic needs of rest, security and 
safety.
1088
 Historical notions of the home are not based on a concrete structure, but 
rather on the meaning and representations of the building itself. It includes the 
emotional attachments to the property already mentioned,
 1089
 and therefore home 
cannot be described purely on its physical structure without accounting for these 
subjective values.  
 
5.1.3 Castle doctrine 
 
‘Castle doctrine’ is an historical notion advancing the view that one’s home is one’s 
castle and fortress, a special area in which one is granted certain protections and 
immunities.
1090
 This principle offers an explanation of the differing attitudes and 
approaches to public and private places. Castle doctrine is primarily influential in 
respect of the rule of retreat, providing an exception to general retreat requirements 
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when self-defence occurs in the home,
1091
 and also beyond the home.
1092
 Traces of the 
castle doctrine are present within the law of England and Wales,
1093
 but it is not 
expressly operative. A weak rule of retreat is applied, namely, that the availability of 
retreat is a consideration but not a decisive factor of reasonable force. This same 
standard is applicable to all instances of self-defence - it is not removed in the context 
of the home. However, it is possible that the change of test to allow ‘grossly 
disproportionate force’ to be used by householders will change this. It will certainly 
expand on what is considered reasonable in the circumstances, which could mean that 
the consideration of the availability of a retreat will be given less weight.  
 
Other jurisdictions, such as some American Sates,
1094
 have implemented express 
provision of castle doctrine. Although less prominent following the widespread 
removal of the duty to retreat,
1095
 in states where an attempt to retreat has generally 
been required the home is an exception to this norm.
1096
 Where an attack occurs in a 
private dwelling, there is no consideration of an attempt to retreat before responding 
with force.
1097
 It was held in the US case of People v Tomlins
1098
 that persons faced 
with an attack in their own home can stand their ground, as they are in their usual 
place of shelter and sanctuary, and therefore should not be required to flee.
1099
  
 
Following the decision by the US Supreme Court in Brown v United States,
1100
 which 
removed the duty to retreat,
1101
 there is general acceptance of the no retreat rule.
1102
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As already mentioned, for States that have introduced ‘stand your ground’ laws and 
removed the retreat rule, a presumption has been created that whenever an intruder 
has entered one’s dwelling, the householder will be justified in using force. 1103 
According to Neyland, the presumption that force is reasonable places the burden on 
the aggressor as opposed to the victim, as should be the case.
1104
 Nevertheless, he also 
acknowledges that there is a danger that the  
 
‘presumption directly conflicts with the principle that before the use of 
deadly force is justified, there must be an actual or threatened harm to the 
person. The presumption does so by automatically establishing the 
reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary, even if it was 
not present in the situation’.1105  
 
This is also a danger present in the change of tests in the UK to allow anything up to 
‘grossly disproportionate force’ in self-defence.  
 
Another example is Texas, which widened its provision in 2007 to allow citizens the 
same level of protection outside the home as they had already been granted inside the 
home.
1106
 In the interest of fairness, the castle doctrine was extended in this way to 
reflect the instinctive reactions and priorities of people during moments of necessity, 
such as protecting themselves and their families, without having to worry about being 
punished for their actions in the future. In order to ensure that the new law does not 
disregard the life of aggressors, it retains the reasonableness requirement.
1107
  
 
In a way, the law of England and Wales has embraced the essence and sentiment of 
castle doctrine standard in permitting disproportionate force. However, it has done so 
only in the context of the home, and has not widened the net in terms of all general 
cases of self-defence. It remains to be seen whether in future the amendments will 
have paved the way for a broader general test for self-defence, and whether the same 
approach will eventually apply in all locations. 
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There are other examples of liberal jurisdictional approaches, for example, Miller 
compares the self-defence laws of the UK with those of South Africa. She refers in 
particular to the highly publicised case of Oscar Pistorius,
1108
 who shot his girlfriend 
thinking that he was shooting an intruder in his home. Miller mentions that the South 
African approach has historically been more lenient than that of the UK in relation to 
the defence of property, considering that intruders must accept that there is a risk to 
their own lives when they break into another’s home.1109 This reflects a liberal castle 
doctrine and ‘author of his own misfortune’ approach. She argues that the recent 
changes made by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 have brought the UK’s position 
closer to that applied in South Africa, by increasing the amount of force that may 
lawfully be used in self-defence in a place of residence.
1110
 Indeed, this is a fair 
comparison, based on the householder provision.  
 
A key difference between these countries is the crime rates, with South Africa 
experiencing far higher levels of violent home invasions than England and Wales.
1111
 
Indeed, it is curious that England and Wales should move to a comparable standard of 
self-defence as South Africa, when the cultural context is so different. Where the risks 
and dangers are far greater it is logical to have a stronger test, but it is debatable 
whether this is required in England and Wales. Miller asks the question ‘do we really 
want to create a legal justice system where people are allowed to shoot dead someone 
who is only trying to steal their TV?’1112 This reflects the nature of the change that has 
been made to the law as it prioritises property over life, and demonstrates that the 
danger in the test is down to permitting disproportionate force, as this does not 
distinguish between different types of intruders. It does not enforce an appropriate 
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defence according to the level of harm or threat faced; it permits greater force than 
necessary without sufficient regard to the true nature of the attack. The test appears to 
permit the use of disproportionate force against all threats, covering aggressive 
burglars but also non-armed innocent intruders, such as children.
1113
 
 
The sentiment behind arguments based on castle doctrine is strong. However, such 
arguments, on their own, should not form foundations for law reform without 
evidence of need.
1114
 As Fox’s proclaims, ‘The danger of describing home as 
associated with affection and love, is that this style of argument is unlikely to resonate 
with lawyers’.1115 This alone should not be sufficient to establish the reasonableness 
of using force in self-defence in the home.
1116
 Leverick rejects any claim of a ‘no 
retreat rule’ based on the castle doctrine alone as it disregards the aggressor’s right to 
life.
1117
 The requirement of retreat, whether as an absolute or weak rule, protects the 
preservation of life, and respects the principle of harm prevention.
1118
 However, the 
sentimental approach places property rights at the top of the hierarchy of rights, 
valuing property interests more highly than life, by virtue of not requiring the attempt 
to retreat before using force in self-defence. The reason for this is that it does not 
necessarily require individuals to be protecting themselves; they can choose to 
respond even if the threat is only to the property.
1119
  
 
5.1.4 Autonomy and privacy 
 
The special treatment of the home could be based on the right to autonomy and 
privacy. Thus, this offers another possible explanation of the different approaches 
towards private and public places, and utilises a modern approach to address the 
imbalance between property and individual rights. The emphasis is shifted from the 
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sanctity of the home, to rely more on acceptable principles of individual autonomy, 
(the right to be self-governed and self-determinate), and the fact that the dwelling is 
the ultimate place of safety and privacy for its residents. Home invasions constitute a 
severe infringement of another’s living space, and such actions in themselves result in 
grave harms to autonomy.
1120
 
 
These approaches support the different perspective and opinions regarding self-
defence in the home. They demonstrate appreciation of the special nature of the home 
without being based solely upon emotive reasoning. They appeal instead to the field 
of human rights for support. Sangero states that modern arguments more commonly 
focus upon each individual’s right to autonomy, and the fact that an invasion of one’s 
home constitutes a serious breach, not only of the right to autonomy, but also of the 
right to privacy.
1121
 Levin shares this view, and states that ‘the autonomy and right to 
self-preservation of the home dweller make for an alternative, more compelling 
foundation’. 1122  These identifiable rights provide stronger justifications for self-
defence in the home, and the higher level of permissible self-defence, than relying on 
the sanctity of the dwelling alone as a justification.  
 
While these claims may not be human rights per se, it has been asserted that 
‘protecting autonomy is one of the central benefits of law’,1123 and that autonomy and 
privacy are ‘intimately connected’.1124 They can therefore be considered protected in 
recognised rights, such as Article 8 ECHR: ‘everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence’.1125 Comparisons may be 
drawn here with the field of health and social care and home evictions by local 
authorities,
1126
 where it has been confirmed that autonomy and respect for the home is 
a protected right under Article 8.
1127
 This demonstrates the importance ascribed to 
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personal autonomy within the law,
1128
 and the positive obligation on the state to limit 
potential breaches by criminalisation and regulation. While these rights within Article 
8 explain conceptions about the home, it is another matter to explain the killing of an 
intruder in the home for violating these rights.
1129
 However, this is not the claim made 
in relation to these rights - they are merely discussed here as a contribution to an 
understanding of the home. 
 
Indeed, if a person should feel safe anywhere, it should certainly be in one’s own 
home, as the home can be said to provide for and accommodate needs so basic as to 
render it an integral part of one’s autonomy.1130 Such was the approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal in the case of R v Saw and others
1131
 where it was stated that ‘There 
is a longstanding, almost intuitive, belief that our homes should be our castles. The 
concept suggests impregnability and defiance against intrusion’.1132 The courts have 
recognised and reflected the special nature of the home as a private sphere.  
 
The nature of the home is undeniably private, as Saunders and Williams depict: 
 
‘The interface between the home and this wider setting is a crucial 
boundary in social life. It is marked out physically – with fences, front 
doors, net curtains, privet hedges, spyholes, burglar alarms, gates and 
signs – and socially – by rules governing ‘dropping in’, by rituals such as 
dinner parties, by reserved regions such as the ‘front room’ where 
‘guests’ and ‘visitors’ are entertained, by legal statutes governing rights 
of entry and exclusion (as in the search warrant or the meter reader’s 
card), and by norms regulating uninvited intrusion (such as when to 
telephone). The outside of the house is used to represent both a barrier 
and a signifier to the world beyond of the values and social placement of 
the household within’.1133 
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The privacy of the home stands in contrast to the control of the state over individuals, 
and also the outside world, thus the home is a defining feature of autonomy and a 
statement of privacy.
1134
  
 
The home is known not only for its security and right to privacy, but also for the 
familial relations that are conducted inside its confines,
1135
 playing a crucial part in 
the development of individual identities.
1136
 The home is a protective barrier for 
individuals and normally appears far safer than the outside world.
1137
 Townsend 
explains that there is a distinct difference between the inside and the outside of the 
home, and that privacy is perhaps the greatest value ascribed to the home.
1138
 This 
difference is based on the fact that only certain people are permitted entrance to the 
home, in contrast to public places where anyone can be present at any time. Uniacke 
demonstrates the importance of privacy by describing it as ‘a basic human need’,1139 
and her claim that ‘the right to privacy is often argued for as a necessary condition 
for freedom and personal autonomy’.1140 This explains the different treatment of the 
home and public places, with regard to self-defence. The reasons are based on the 
home’s provision of autonomy and privacy, and the grave interference of these rights 
that occurs during home invasions. 
 
5.1.5 The ‘fear factor’ in home invasions 
 
Thus far, in considering what features distinguish the home or dwelling from other 
spaces, it is clear that the home has a strong sentimental, emotive, and individual 
function. It produces strong public opinion about its protection and defence due to the 
violation of autonomy and privacy that occurs when it is invaded. However, another 
possible reason why the home or dwelling is viewed differently and more privileged 
is the fear factor associated with home invasions. It is a rare and frightening prospect 
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to be confronted by an intruder in one’s own home. 1141  It is believed that one 
experiences a heightened level of fear when one’s home is invaded,1142 although it 
would be difficult to quantify the level of fear and compare it to that experienced in 
an attack in a public place.  
 
There is a presumption that when an aggressor breaks into a dwelling, especially at 
night,
1143
 the endangered residents will be fearful for their lives.
1144
 For example, 
Leverick claims that ‘there is something about a threat of theft that takes place in the 
home that is intrinsically more dangerous than a threat of theft outside the home’.1145 
This presumption of immediate danger involved in a home intrusion could also be 
true of attacks occurring in public places. The intentions of the offender are unlikely 
to be clear and may cause the victim to fear for his life. What underlies such 
presumptions about danger? Is it perhaps the issue of restrictions of space? The 
feeling of being trapped in one’s own home, the one place where the homeowner has 
exclusive control over decisions as to who may enter and who may not,
1146
 by virtue 
of one’s rights in the property? This is a potential explanation, as it may be argued 
that there are fewer escape routes available from one’s home. Nevertheless, this 
would depend on the location of the attack in a public place, as similar restrictions or 
obstacles to retreat may also be present there. Therefore, it does not provide a 
complete explanation. 
 
In attempting to understand the strong opinions that are commonly held on the 
public/private debate, the effect that intrusions have on feelings of home and dwelling 
is a significant consideration. Such invasions can be very negative as ‘when home 
becomes a place of danger, the positive associations of home, as a place of safety, of 
security, of control over oneself and one’s environment, become subverted, and the 
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effect can be psychologically very damaging’.1147 This is a significant statement as it 
shows how much disruption home invasions can create.
1148
 It is not merely the initial 
shock and fright when the attack is active, but the burden of recovering after such an 
experience and trying to conduct a normal life again, perhaps within the same house, 
which may no longer feel like a home. When emphasis is placed on the home as a 
structure of safety, familiarity and security, it implies that life outside the home is 
mysterious and dangerous, ‘within the idea of home as a ‘haven’ is the implicit 
suggestion that the outside world is a place to be feared’.1149 It is perhaps the element 
of the fear of the unknown that defines these approaches to public/private life. 
Anything is possible outside on the streets, and this is beyond an individual’s control. 
On the other hand, within the four walls of the home, the householder usually has, and 
expects to have, control over all entry to the house, therefore with a break-in, an 
increased level of threat is experienced. The infringement of this structure causes 
great offence. 
 
Possibly, the heightened sense of fear experienced when a home has been invaded is 
also partly due to the possibility that the house will be targeted again and therefore no 
longer feels safe. Research has shown that ‘a burglary event is a predictor of 
significantly elevated rates of burglary for properties within a range of up to 300-400 
metres from a burgled home for 1-2 months following the initial event, and, that this 
is especially a feature of more affluent neighbourhoods’.1150 This certainly projects a 
deep feeling of unease and it would naturally take a long time for the homeowners to 
re-establish a sense of security in a victimised home. An instructive example is that of 
Vincent Cooke
1151
 who had endured an aggravated burglary, eventually managing to 
defend himself against one of the intruders, which resulted in the intruder’s death. 
Even though he and his family were not physically harmed in the incident, the fear 
and violence that they had been subjected to changed their lives dramatically. 
Although he saved himself and his family and was not charged with murder as he had 
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acted in self-defence, he struggled to come to terms with the fact that he had taken a 
life. Following the incident, he suffered from anxiety and was reliant on daily 
medication. This was a clear case of fear for one’s life, and for the life of one’s 
family, but there is a separate issue when it is the property, and not a person, that is 
under threat.
1152
  
 
5.1.6 The defence of property 
 
The reasonableness of the degree of protective force used may be reliant on what 
exactly it seeks to protect. Responding with deadly force where it is merely the 
property that is threatened will not be reasonable.
1153
 All individuals have a right to 
life as protected by Article 2 of the ECHR. As human life is valued above 
property,
1154
 in situations where it is solely the defence of property that is concerned, 
a higher standard of reasonableness and proportionality will be required.  
 
This involves a comparison of the harms that are at stake, namely, the harm that the 
defender would suffer and the defensive harm that he inflicts on the aggressor. Kadish 
has explored the difference between various crimes that may justify the use of force 
against those attempting to perpetrate them, and says that harms to property and home 
invasions are not comparable with harms to life.
1155
 He argues that in such situations 
it is not acceptable to use deadly force against one’s aggressor. This view is also held 
by Leverick and Sangero,
1156
 and represents the appropriate approach in modern, 
civilised society. When considering interests that are comparable to causing the death 
of the aggressor, the prevention of rape is applicable as a serious crime against the 
person. However, the defence of property by a householder against an intruder is 
clearly not a comparable harm.
1157
 The demand for increased protection within the 
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home is a ‘reflection of the autonomy principle, which extends the right to resist 
aggression broadly to cover threats to the personality of the victim ... the moral claim 
of the person to autonomy over his life’.1158 It is contended here, that the amendment 
to the law changing the test of self-defence to one of disproportionality
1159
 may have 
pushed the law too far in the direction of the autonomy principle, diminishing the 
requirement of proportionality.  
 
This could be a dangerous development that could potentially infringe the European 
Convention of Human Rights, as it disregards the offender’s right to life under Article 
2.
1160
 Although the offender is breaking the law, and as discussed previously, might 
cause his human rights to be temporarily forfeited as a result of his actions, this does 
not place him in a position that an unlimited degree of force can be used against him. 
Those who support the change to the law may argue that this is not the case, as a limit 
is placed upon the degree of force that may be used, namely, that of anything up to 
grossly disproportionate force. However, this greatly extends the previous test of 
reasonable force, so that the effectiveness of the limit as a barrier has been 
significantly weakened. Due to the importance of the sanctity of life principle, the use 
of force against any individual, despite their personal actions, must be necessary and 
proportionate in order to reflect the pivotal principle of justice.
1161
 Therefore, diluting 
the requirement of proportionality could be in discord with these fundamental 
principles,
1162
 and disrupt the balancing of the competing rights of the defender and 
aggressor.
1163
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A potential argument against this limitation upon the use of force is that a person who 
attacks property infringes the rights of the owner and in so doing should accept that 
there is an accompanying risk to his own life. This approach treats the aggressor as 
the author of his own misfortune.
1164
 While this view is understandable, there is 
certainly some confusion between the defence of property, and the householder’s 
right to defend oneself and one’s family against intruders. These are distinct 
situations. It should be noted that there is also a separate statutory defence of 
property, included in section 5(2)(b) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971
1165
 and it is 
not limited to residential homes; it also covers other property and possessions.
1166
 
However, to avoid confusion, it is emphasised here that this does not involve the use 
of force against another person in defence of property, but rather the causing of 
damage or destruction to another’s property.  
 
The misinterpretation of this distinction between defence of property
1167
 and self-
defence partly underlies the change of test to disproportionate force for householders. 
What needs to be clarified and emphasised is that where there is fear for the safety of 
oneself and others, self-defence will be permitted. In such cases, the circumstances 
permit a greater degree of force to be used than where the threat posed is merely to 
the property, and not to the individual. The pressure to provide enhanced protection to 
householders is driven by the presumption that any home intrusion poses a risk of 
physical harm. It is conceded that when an intruder enters property, it is likely that if 
the householder is home, he will fear for his life. Indeed, Lambeth explains that 
residential burglaries naturally generate a fear and risk of personal harm and that such 
situations are characteristic of self-defence as opposed to defence of property.
1168
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Generally, providing the actions taken and the defensive force used are reasonably 
necessary and proportionate to the threat faced, no prosecution will follow for the 
offence committed.
1169
 However, the exception to this general principle is that where 
a mere threat to property is faced, it will not be reasonable to use lethal force to repel 
it. There must be a degree of threat, or a perceived threat, to the defender or someone 
else’s life before the aggressor’s life may be taken.1170 It remains to be seen whether 
this position will change with the introduction of section 148 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which specifically includes the 
defence of property within the defence of self-defence. Similarly, only time will tell 
what impact the new provision in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 will have on this 
aspect of the law, as it extends the limits of reasonable actions inside the home, and 
may affect the response to threats against property. 
 
When discussing location and particularly what type of property is considered, the 
approach taken in the context of the home, may extend over other properties as well 
such as rented accommodation, flats or apartments, being a resident at a hotel, or even 
one’s place of work or business premises. This is due to the fact that one is considered 
to be the occupier or can expect a certain degree of privacy, and therefore is granted a 
certain privilege over that space over other people.
1171
 Thus, an intruder into such 
spaces will be violating the resident’s rights, in the same way as an intruder into a 
home violates the rights of its inhabitants. This would include, for example, a 
babysitter or a guest inside the home. Therefore, it would transpire that anyone who 
has permission to be in that place at that time has the right to use defensive force 
against another who unlawfully invades without permission.
1172
  
 
Nevertheless, the reality is not quite this straightforward. While it is true that people 
in such situations would have the right to defend themselves in a place they were 
lawfully permitted to be at the time, the standard of self-defence applying may be 
different based on their status. During the debate on the Crime and Courts Bill in 
                                                        
1169
 As explained in Chapter 2. 
1170
 This is similar to the position in relation to rape. In the case of R v Olugboja [1981] EWCA Crim 2, 
where although force was not used on the victim, she complied due to fear, and did not consent to 
sexual intercourse with the defendant.  
1171
 B.Sangero Self-Defence in Criminal Law op cit fn 73 at 273; D.J.Baker, op cit fn 466, at 725. 
1172
 As confirmed during discussions on the Crime and Courts Bill Deb, op cit fn 891, col 277. See 
Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
 243 
2013, it was expressed that the higher protection afforded to householders and 
business keepers, does not apply to customers who are in the shop at the time in 
question.
1173
 The extent of the action that may be taken is different depending on 
one’s status in relation to the property. However, in contexts other than the 
customer/shopkeeper example, there certainly is a right to defend which is arguably 
based on the inside/outside dimension of the intrusion, rather than the home/non-
home aspect. This means that anyone who has a right to be somewhere, for example 
at their own place of work, or a child minder at their employer’s home, can lawfully 
defend themselves against unlawful intrusions from the outside. This applies due to 
the nature of facing an intrusion from the outside and is not based solely on an 
occurrence in one’s home; it also applies to other properties that are not homes, such 
as businesses. This has arguably introduced an element of confusion and arbitrariness 
into the law, as it seems that the application of the new standard is inconsistent.  
 
Thus, while the castle doctrine suggests that the home/non-home dimension is what 
justifies the action, there is also an emphasis on the inside/outside dimension. The law 
on burglary reflects this, in the importance ascribed to an intrusion from the outside to 
interfere with the rights of ownership and privacy on the inside, and is intertwined 
with the debate on self-defence and location.  
 
5.1.7 Burglary 
 
The criminal law offence of burglary reflects the special nature of the home. It is 
necessary to explore the offence briefly, as this is the primary crime that will be 
committed when an individual breaks into another person’s home. It is important to 
be aware of the specifications of the offence to gain an insight into the manner in 
which the law protects properties, and thus relates to the discussion on the location of 
self-defence.  
 
Under the law of England and Wales, the relevant statutory provisions can be found in 
the Theft Act 1968. The provision of primary concern to the discussion of self-
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defence in the home and the crimes committed by the intruder is the statutory 
provision for burglary, which is found in section 9 of the Theft Act 1968:  
 
‘(1) A person is guilty of burglary if - (a) he enters any building or part of 
a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is 
mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered into any 
building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal 
anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict 
on any person therein any grievous bodily harm.  
(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of 
stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of 
inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any 
person therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything 
therein’.1174  
 
This is a fairly broad provision, safeguarding properties from any commission of 
crime therein, and protecting residents or owners from any harm that they may suffer.  
 
The offence requires more than a mere trespass onto property, in other words, more 
than the unlawful presence without permission. It also requires the intention to 
commit a further crime therein. Suk explains this requirement:  
 
‘A person in his home had the right to be free from intrusion ... A 
prohibition on unlawful entry would completely address the concern to 
protect the home boundary from breach. But the additional specific intent 
requirement constructs the home as a space that should be especially free 
not only from intrusion, but from crime. The home is a spatial metaphor of 
private refuge from crime - a crime-free zone’.1175  
 
This offence epitomises the importance of the dwelling as a space in which the owner 
or resident takes control, a sphere of private governing where the issues of the outside 
sphere, such as crime, should not be present. Burglary has been categorised in some 
studies as a personal crime rather than a property crime, because if the residents are at 
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home at the time, it may also entail direct harms to their person.
1176
 It must be noted 
however, that the definition of burglary is not limited to dwellings and is phrased to 
include buildings and structures, and therefore ‘it has often been noted that burglary 
is best understood not as a crime against property itself, but rather as a crime against 
a person’s “right of habitation”’.1177 
 
The law reflects the importance of property rights and supports the special nature of 
homes. It also highlights why private spaces require high levels of protection, as it 
responds to the assumption that an intrusion into the home carries significant risks to 
the resident, by requiring the intention to commit further crimes therein. It therefore 
contributes to the fear that is induced by home intrusions, as the residents will expect 
further harm to be caused. It may be said to provide support for the notion that a more 
generous test of self-defence should apply in such contexts.  
 
Perhaps it is the types of offences and crimes involved that set public and private 
spaces apart. When a home has been invaded, it is relatively certain that the intruder 
will not only trespass but will also commit a burglary.
1178
 While this may also entail 
the possibility of the commission of extra crimes within the home such as assault, 
serious identifiable crimes have already been positively committed by the very 
breaking and entering of the home, and the unlawful presence of the intruder within 
the dwelling of another. Indeed, studies have found that fear of burglary is directly 
related to the fear that it might cause physical harm.
1179
 In contrast, when an attack 
necessitating the use of self-defence occurs in a public place the crimes involved can 
range from assault, theft (mugging), rape, ABH, and GBH - it could be any of these 
and the victim cannot be certain which, if any, of such offences will be committed 
against them.
1180
 Therefore, when incidents occur in public places, unless a clear or 
fixed commission of a crime can be identified, there is greater uncertainty as to the 
seriousness of the wrong that the individual is using defensive force against. Perhaps, 
therefore, it is the added element of uncertainty and ambiguity that provides a crucial 
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distinction between these locations. As Nelkin notes, ‘we rarely know exactly what a 
person’s intentions are or the strength of her commitment to a course of action. One 
(admittedly fallible) indicator is whether she succeeds or not’. 1181  Although the 
aggressor’s intentions can never be truly obvious, it may be fair to say that when an 
attack occurs in a public place, the intentions are even less clear. In such a situation it 
is not clear which offence or crime is attempted, whereas with home invasions, there 
are clear indicators and proof of the commission of certain offences, as in the first 
place, one has intruded into the home of another. 
 
Research conducted by Chang examined the incidence of burglary and where the 
crime is most likely to occur. It found that the types of properties most targeted are 
single houses and commercial buildings,
1182
 and that burglary is more likely to occur 
in buildings adjacent to paths or alleys for cars and pedestrians.
1183
 Thus it appears 
that certain risk factors are operative, which might drive people living within targeted 
areas to take increased measures to prepare for intrusions. Following the amendment 
in the standard for householders, this could increase the rate of householders who 
prepare for an incident of self-defence,
1184
 which is fundamentally at odds with the 
role of defensive action. If the primary crime committed during intrusions is burglary, 
the usual punishment for that offence would be fourteen years in the case of 
dwellings, and ten years in other contexts.
1185
 Accordingly, permitting the use of 
disproportionate force with fatal consequences, despite the fact that the individual 
may have essentially acted pre-emptively, (for example by ensuring the availability of 
weapons), would greatly exceed the level of punishment proscribed for the offence 
committed. Namely, the burglar’s punishment would be the loss of his life, as 
opposed to the incarceration period prescribed by law.  
 
It may therefore be said that the law of burglary parallels the reasons behind the 
change to the law of self-defence. It clearly demonstrates that intrusions from the 
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outside deserve punishment because of the serious wrong that the householder suffers. 
It supports the basis for defensive action, namely to protect against any crimes 
committed within, providing the force is used against a trespasser.
1186
 Despite 
similarities, the offence of burglary is broader than the self-defence standard for 
householders. The offence encompasses a wider category of buildings than the 
defence. This implies that when dealing with self-defence, the home/non-home 
element does have importance, because the extended test will primarily only be 
permissible in the former category.  
 
While it is clear that emotive values have shaped the law in this area, there are many 
more elements that highlight and explain the differences between public and private 
spheres. The next section of this chapter draws upon the field of criminology to 
examine the breadth of the location dimension of this research. It is a component of 
not only the self-defence aspect of the research, but also the inquiry into weapons 
offences.  
 
5.2 Understanding the law in context 
 
This section searches for a broader understanding of the concepts surrounding the 
public/private divide. First, the fear of crime level will be assessed. Secondly, 
criminological inputs on the design of environments, and the impact spatial design 
and opportunism can have on crime will be considered. Thirdly, the impact and views 
of young people who are unique in their use of public places will be evaluated, 
providing an insight into trends and patterns involving space. Finally, the theory of 
moral luck and its application will be deliberated.  
 
5.2.1 Fear of crime 
 
The aim of this research to understand why self-defence in the home is given far more 
attention than self-defence in public places would be unattainable without 
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consideration of the field of criminology. There are many important inputs and 
insights to be gained from considering the approach and study of criminological 
theories. One factor which is influential in the different perceptions between public 
and private spaces is the fear of crime level. Fear of crime has already been touched 
upon in the previous section, and will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 6 when 
considering the influence of the media. It is discussed here to highlight another reason 
why location matters in the legal analysis relating to self-defence and offensive 
weapons.  
 
Public perception and fear of crime can be shaped by official statistics, especially 
considering that such statistics can sometimes be misleading and confusing. Issues 
mainly arise from different levels and goals of policing, recording methods and the 
participation of the public in reporting crime.
1187
 These variations can paint a mixed 
picture and lead some to believe that certain crimes are rife in their location, whereas 
in fact, it could be down to a decision to enforce proactive policing for that particular 
type of offence.
1188
  
 
Despite the incidences of crime declining since the 1990s, public fear of crime has not 
reduced, and in particular anxiety mainly remains regarding offences occurring in 
public places. Bottoms reports that  
 
‘the most commonly identified ‘top signals’ are all disorderly events 
occurring in public space. Thus, perhaps, these kinds of incidents send a 
powerful signal to residents (in a way that residential burglaries do not) 
that ‘my area is out of control’ ... even quite minor incivilities in an area 
can, on occasion - and especially if persistent ... be perceived as major 
threats to local safety’.1189  
 
This is particularly relevant to the expansion of self-defence law in the home. It 
appears that a threat in the home is not the most prominent type of fear experienced 
by the public. The public is, in general, more concerned about matters occurring in 
public places. The concentration of law reform efforts on the home sphere alone is 
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therefore misguided. Instead of producing modifications to existing standards and 
tests within the home, what is needed, is a clarification of the application of self-
defence across the board, in all locations, not only in particular scenarios.  
 
Perhaps the media has a role to play in this fear of crime phenomena and particularly 
the anxiety reported over public space disorders. Offences occurring in public places, 
such as muggings, have been widely reported, presenting the opinion that crime is 
very prevalent in public places and that it occurs on a regular basis. Banks notes that 
there is a link between media reporting and individual fear of crime levels, ‘it has 
been suggested that the media may be one of various stimuli that create ‘geographies 
of fear’, affecting our orientation to an use of public and private spaces’.1190 This will 
be examined in greater detail in the following chapter.  
 
The use of public spaces and the adaptation of behaviours in such places has been 
analysed by Gardner.
1191
 Her study focused on the advice that is often issued to 
women,
1192
 which is simply not to go out at night on their own, and to always ensure 
that they have a companion to secure their safety in public. The study shows the 
extreme lengths that some women go to in order to feel safe. Precautions ranged from 
walking in the middle of the road, and dressing in a way that will not attract attention, 
to following a group of people, or pretending they are meeting someone, to leaving 
the television on at home when they leave, on a sports channel, and shouting a 
greeting to a pretend person as they approach the door on their way home.
1193
 This 
suggests that there are many predators waiting around corners to pounce on 
unsuspecting lone women at night, and that there is an agreed consensus that women 
should take precautions to protect themselves from such dangers. Whilst this fear and 
reaction may initially seem like a bleak outlook, it can potentially produce positive 
outcomes. This occurs as the fearful individuals feel like they can take measures to 
prepare themselves for or to avoid danger. Modifying one’s behaviour provides an 
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element of control over the fear, and studies have found that one-quarter of people 
who reported feeling fearful of crime also took precautions to decrease their risk of 
becoming a victim, and confirmed that in doing so they felt that it increased their 
sense of safety.
1194
 
 
Research by Gray et al
1195
 questioned the responses provided to crime surveys that 
seek an insight into the level of fear of crime felt in a community. Their study 
suggested that the individual answers received from respondents are less influenced 
by their actual experiences, than by their general worry that they might be at risk of 
future victimisation.
1196
 Thus, the results might say more about the individual 
personalities than the causal link between the crime rate and fear of crime,
1197
 which 
appears to be only loosely correlated.
1198
 Additionally, another aspect that may be 
more indicative and influential on the fear of crime experienced by individuals is the 
environment itself, with neglected neighbourhoods producing heightened fear of 
crime rates, as well as potentially impacting negatively on health and social well-
being.
1199
 It therefore appears that location and the environment are causal factors of 
relevance to the levels of fear of crime experienced by the public. This leads onto the 
next matter for exploration, namely, the criminological discussion about the links 
between the environment and crime.  
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5.2.2 Environmental Criminology  
 
The field of environmental criminology has ascribed to the environment a causal 
influence in the occurrence of crime.
1200
 It covers a vast area, which considers the 
risks of victimisation present in specific places,
1201
 opportunism, as well as concepts 
of territoriality and the defensibility of space as factors capable of preventing 
crime.
1202
 Notably, neighbourhoods can be directly related to fear of crime levels and 
may lend themselves to certain criminal activity and trends in offending.
1203
 Thus it is 
possible that a neighbourhood can affect and contribute to offending behaviour.
1204
 In 
the same way that some people are more likely to commit crimes than others, some 
places possess a higher likelihood of becoming vulnerable to frequent incidents of 
crime.
1205
  
 
The theory of environmental criminology is accompanied by the belief that people 
should feel that they own public space and share a responsibility for it, therefore 
creating a sense of place.
1206
 This can act to curb crime due to societal or community 
control. This theory is beneficial to examine the locality of crime, and therefore 
defences such as self-defence, because crime can be, and often is, highly localised.
1207
 
This is true in relation to, for example, the weapons culture among some youths in 
certain localities.
1208
 Location can become a crucial part of a group or gang’s 
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identity
1209
 as they develop boundaries that they claim as their own.
1210
 This leads to 
increased feelings of collectiveness, and it clearly differentiates between insiders and 
outsiders, which results in higher incidents of violent crime and weapons carrying, as 
it becomes necessary for the gang to protect their location.
1211
 Environmental 
criminology is thus linked to this research’s focus on weapons offences, as it 
identifies risk factors within the location, and ultimately seeks to reduce these by 
modifying the environmental aspects.
1212
  
 
Environmental criminology involves several different theoretical strands.
1213
 These 
include pattern theory, rational choice theory, and routine activity theory. Pattern 
theory ‘focuses on the offender and target set in place and time with emphasis on the 
place of the criminal event ... It tends to study crime statistics or the geographic 
layout of crime occurrences as opposed to the offender’s perspective’.1214 Rational 
choice theory ‘focuses on offender decision making ... the offender’s perspective of 
how they use the environment rather than just looking at what motivated the 
offender’.1215 Routine activity theory examines ‘the way sociological factors affect 
community structure that generate illegal acts … based on human ecology because of 
the interdependence between social activities that were carried out everyday within 
the community’.1216 Each of these theories influences the current research on self-
defence and knife crime, as they demonstrate the key variables generating a situation 
requiring self-defence, and circumstances in which people carry weapons. Each 
theory has a different perspective and focus, and contributes a new insight to the 
debate on self-defence and weapons offences. They all indicate that it is not merely 
the individual’s decision-making and actions that shapes criminality, but that the 
environment itself can be a signifier. Pattern theory is evident in the previous 
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discussions in Chapter 3 regarding offensive weapons, which found that certain 
locations had a higher chance of offence perpetration than others. Similarly, rational 
choice theory supports the notion of territoriality, as the use of space by rival gangs is 
partly responsible for the incidence of weapons offences. In the same vein, routine 
activity theory explains this behaviour by focusing on its context, namely the 
neighbourhood and environment in which it occurs.
1217
  
 
This idea that the design of a location can have a positive or negative impact on crime 
can shed light on the incidence of weapons offences and self-defence.  
 
‘The creation of urban environments that are defensible against crime has 
been a focal point of criminological discourse from as far back as the 
1960s, when sociologists discovered that certain places, like people, 
possess a higher risk of being victimized than others ... the physical design 
and layout of urban living environments are a principal factor that 
determine why some places are more vulnerable to crime than others’.1218  
 
Designing an area that allows greater community interaction and observation 
increases the level of natural surveillance available, and allows residents to gain 
control over their locality.
1219
 ‘Environmental criminologists suggest that the 
geographic location of various social activities and the architectural arrangements of 
spaces and building can promote or retard crime rates - mainly crime against 
property’.1220  
 
The theory of environmental criminology inspired the initiatives of Situational Crime 
Prevention (SCP), and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
(CPTED).
1221
 The idea of the defensibility of space has led to attempts to proactively 
design space in a manner that limits the possibility of crime in the area.
1222
 This 
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approach, termed CPTED, is defined as an attempt ‘to enhance the urban 
environment through design that reduces opportunities for crime and nuisance 
activity’.1223 A key factor that is perceived to increase the likelihood of crime is poor 
visibility. This may be due to several elements, such as lighting, overgrown 
vegetation, a structural design that allows plenty of hiding places, isolation, and 
unclear demarcation of public and private spaces.
1224
 This is necessarily connected to 
the discussion of self-defence in the context of householders as it demonstrates why 
certain households might become better targets than others, and perhaps if increased 
security measures and neighbourhood watch initiatives were implemented, this would 
be a more practical solution than extending the test of self-defence.
1225
  
 
These are convenient ways of looking at crime, reaching generalisations and 
conclusions on the level of its occurrence, as these methods provide proof that crime 
can be localised. This can provide insight to the locations of self-defence, whether in 
public or private, and also, for the analysis of the use of weapons. It has been reported 
that weapons carrying occurs more often in disadvantaged areas within large cities, 
and that ‘robbery and serious wounding are both concentrated in a relatively small 
number of areas’.1226 Thus, it is evident that location impacts the incidence of crime, 
especially crimes affecting the home, such as burglary, and those prevailing in public 
spaces, such as the possession and use of offensive weapons, by the creation of 
opportunities for their commission. Many incidents occur as a matter of timing and 
surrounding, they are dependent on the opportune conditions being present. 
 
5.2.2.(a) Opportunism 
 
The opportunity to commit crime is another consideration that is related to this 
research topic. Reynald and Elffers note that the accessibility of a location impacts the 
likelihood that crime will occur there. The easier it is to enter the space, the more 
people will use it, and this leads to its increased attractiveness to criminals.
1227
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Bottoms outlines opportune conditions and reasons for seizing the chance to commit 
property crimes. These are said to be ‘value, inertia, visibility and access’, further 
separated into two broader groups of (i) the attractiveness of the target, regarding its 
value or potential, and (ii) its accessibility, in terms of absence of surveillance 
(technological or natural), and physical access.
1228
 
 
The likelihood that an individual will seize an opportunity which is presented to 
commit a crime relies on circumstances.
1229
 Whether the offence will be carried out is 
reliant on the presence of the offender at the location at the time, and the 
attractiveness of the opportunity. More serious crimes are less likely to be purely 
opportunist, for example as ‘offenders usually decided to commit a residential 
burglary ‘in response to a perceived need’, typically an urgent need for money - for 
drugs, paying the rent, or for some other reason’,1230  and are therefore likely to 
contain some degree of urgency on the part of the offender. By understanding why 
crimes occur, it is possible to attempt to prevent their occurrence. For example, taking 
into account the element of opportunity, (which of course is not the only reason why 
crimes are committed), residents and homeowners can take steps to protect their 
property and valuables by making them less accessible and visible. While this will not 
deter all criminals, it goes some way at least towards providing a simple, practical 
solution. 
 
5.2.3 Young people and public places 
 
In contrast to the focus of the home as a special place and a key component of the 
formation of identity, a study based in the Netherlands has looked into the importance 
of public places for young people.
1231
 It notes that public places are important 
‘especially for fulfilling important social functions such as the construction of 
identities’.1232 The research notes the importance of the lack of supervision in public 
places for young people. It is a space in which they are not bothered by rules and their 
parents, ‘public spaces offer people a certain kind of freedom to do what they want: 
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“No one cares about what you do here ... public space offers people a kind of privacy; 
they can enjoy a certain anonymity by being able to disappear into the mass”.1233 This 
may be viewed as a surprising statement, as generally, one might expect to be more 
inhibited rather than liberated in public places. For example, one might possibly 
expect this due to fear that there is a higher potential for an altercation with the law 
and the police. However, it is clear that for young people in this study, there was a 
higher level of supervision and interference at their homes than in public spaces. This 
finding is confirmed by Abbott-Chapman and Robertson, who explain that public 
places can sometimes be appreciated by some as ‘private space’, representing a shift 
in the perception and assumptions attached to public and private spaces, and their use 
and roles within society.
1234
 
 
Additionally, the use of space can vary between different groups and individuals, 
creating a zone of inclusion and exclusion. Lieshout and Aarts explain:  
 
‘Firstly, self-organization is a way to informally influence something; 
people must organise themselves to make a space their place. In many 
public spots, unwritten and informal rules apply that determine how 
things work, and who is and who is not welcome there. Second, visible (or 
audible) behaviour at a certain place can make other people reluctant to 
visit it’.1235  
 
This is particularly true in relation to the discussion on youths and ‘turf’ or ‘postcode’ 
wars, as this describes their acquisition of control over their local areas.
1236
 
Particularly interesting in this context is the claim that  
 
‘processes of inclusion and exclusion in public spaces, such as the case of 
fenced-in neighbourhoods, can lead to greater discrepancies between 
(groups of) people. In general, behaviour that emphasizes a strong sense 
of us and them is perceived negatively ... Processes of exclusion disturb 
the self-regulating principle and therefore make public space less safe 
instead of safer’.1237  
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That finding seems to ring very true regarding the carrying of weapons in certain 
locations within cities, for fear of rivalries with other gangs and stepping outside 
one’s own territory onto another’s claimed space.  
 
Gunter conducted research on the attitudes of groups of youths, with a significant 
emphasis towards a culture of ‘badness’.1238 He found that the behaviour ‘is not about 
rebellion or hedonism, rather it is centred upon meeting up with friends ... is about 
friendships, routine and the familiar ... or doing nothing’. 1239  Far from being 
menacing, the suggestion here is that the young people, who are regarded as 
problematic because they congregate in public places, are in fact harmless.
1240
 Despite 
their negative appearance, most of these young people are merely interested in 
spending time with friends on common ground. The attitudes amongst these young 
people are not primarily centred upon committing crimes, but rather, on building a 
reputation and status for themselves within their community.
1241
 These actions have 
resulted in increased policing efforts to confront the unease that young people who 
behave in this way can generate,
1242
 and to try to change the use and perception of 
public places, in which no particular group should dominate others.  
 
The discussion of these issues relating to the use of public places by young people 
provides an example of the type of crimes and fear that occurs in public as opposed to 
private places. It explores the notion that not all people form stronger attachments 
with their home than they do with certain public places. It is also clear that many are 
more concerned about threats in public places than they are with threats in their 
homes. Therefore, it raises questions about the change in the law of self-defence for 
householders, because it does not support the decision to amend the law in one 
context only, at the expense of all individuals resorting to defensive force elsewhere. 
The discussion is connected to the analysis in this thesis on the carrying of offensive 
weapons, as it demonstrates that the strong territoriality and rivalry between various 
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gangs often provides the incentive for weapon carrying. Nevertheless, it also shows 
that it is often the reputation of individuals within neighbourhoods that are key to 
their motivation, and not the commission of any particular crimes or anti-social 
behaviour.  
 
This topic is related in a way to the following section on moral luck. The idea of 
moral luck is similarly based on chance, defining moral status where an agent lacks 
control,
1243
 and presenting challenges to an individual who must act in a difficult 
situation. It can be argued that these young people are not in full control over their 
behaviour.
1244
 Their actions are partly influenced and directed by their circumstances, 
or by their criminogenic environment.
1245
 Thus, they must conduct themselves in a 
certain way by virtue of their status and positioning within society. Accordingly, there 
is more involved in choice than one’s free will alone, as the social context1246 of the 
decision or action is also influential.
1247
  
 
5.2.4 Moral luck 
 
Nagel describes moral luck as ‘where a significant aspect of what someone does 
depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as 
an object of moral judgement’.1248 According to moral luck, the status of an actor as a 
moral agent depends not on one’s control and thoughts, but on one’s actions in the 
circumstances.
1249
 The theory is controversial and not all agree with its tenets; as 
Statman explains, it is sometimes considered to be an oxymoron due to the allocation 
of responsibility in the absence of control.
1250
 Nagel explains four different situations 
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and types of moral luck: ‘the phenomenon of constitutive luck - the kind of person you 
are ... luck in one’s circumstances - the kind of problems and situations one faces ... 
the causes and effects of action: luck in how one is determined by antecedent 
circumstances, and luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out’.1251 All four 
variations of moral luck are relevant to this discussion on self-defence, and 
particularly on the relevance of location to the defence, which relies to some extent 
upon luck.  
 
5.2.4(a) Luck in one’s person and luck in one’s circumstances 
 
The first aspect of Nagel’s definition, namely the individual’s characteristics has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2.
1252
 It is possible to consider the contribution of 
neuro-scientific enquiries and research in this context, which could prove that we 
have been pre-programmed to produce certain reactions to certain situations, as well 
as the emotion of fear.
1253
 This means that the actions of a person reacting in self-
defence may be subconsciously pre-determined in terms of the level of reaction and 
force that will be used. This depends upon the individual’s DNA make-up, which 
predisposes a particular response, even if the individual has not personally considered 
it.  
 
An important study by Soon et al
1254
 disclosed that brain activity precedes or 
predetermines actions, prior to the moment that the subjectively free decision is made 
by the individual. The research found that ‘the outcome of a decision can be encoded 
in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s
1255
 before it enters 
awareness’.1256 Therefore, science suggests that while we may believe that we are 
fully in control of our decisions and act on them instinctively this may be far from the 
truth. In fact, it is suggested that an unconscious mental process has already started to 
prepare our action or reaction ahead of the point when we become aware of our 
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intention.
1257
 The area of the brain involved in such decisions is the supplementary 
motor area (SMA), and studies have indicated that this section predetermines the 
individual’s action before it enters personal awareness. 1258  More specifically, the 
research also noted that ‘the preparatory time period reveals that this prior activity is 
not an unspecific preparation of a response. Instead it specifically encodes how a 
subject is going to decide’.1259 Thus, it can be noted that this questions the true level 
of control that a person has over their free will to reach decisions, which could alter 
our appreciation of the actions taken by individuals in self-defence.  
 
Opposing debates are developing between two groups: on the one side, philosophers 
advocate that the concept of free will is unimpaired by this scientific research, and, on 
the other side, scientists claim that the evidence has unsettled the foundations of free 
will through the concept of determinism.
1260
 Science has not yet fully proved the 
predictability of an outcome,
1261
 and cannot confirm conclusively that all decisions 
are made before the subject becomes aware of them.
1262
 Smith notes that if it 
transpires that perfect prediction of action is possible by analysing the unconscious 
brain activity, this would indeed challenge free will.
1263
  
 
In this regard, determinism presents challenges to the criminal law,
1264
 as it contrasts 
with our notion of responsibility, questioning the philosophical foundations of the 
legal approach.
1265
 Traditionally, in order to be criminally responsible, one must also 
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be free, and be acting according to one’s free will. However, if determinism is proved, 
namely that all actions are predetermined, this undermines the notion of free will, and 
could lead to problems with the assessment of an individual’s culpability.1266 On the 
other hand, Westen disagrees and claims that the conflict between determinism and 
free will is a ‘false problem’.1267 Perhaps it should be viewed as freedom to determine 
one’s actions according to one’s internal functioning of the mind, free from outside 
interference or coercion, rather than as being in complete control of the entire 
decision-making process occurring within one’s mind.1268 This is the compatibilist 
approach which considers that free will may be retained despite pre-determination, as 
thoughts, intentions, and actions remain individual to each person.
1269
 It may be said 
that conscious individuals maintain the power to accept or reject the chosen action, 
and exercise intention before committing to undertake it.
1270
 Therefore, the 
subconscious preparation could merely be shedding light on the whole thought 
process behind decision-making, and the point at which people become fully aware of 
their decision is only one cog in the machinery, thus not such a crucial point as may 
first be anticipated.
1271
  
 
This is significant in terms of moral luck as it could be a distinguishing feature in 
different cases of self-defence even in similar situations. The consequences of an 
unarmed intruder breaking into two separate properties could pivot on the fact that 
one defender had unconsciously decided on a weapon of opportunity, while the other 
had no pre-determination to use and locate a weapon. While the first case may result 
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in the intruder’s death, in the second, the intruder may be physically detained and 
remain unharmed. In both cases, the defenders are held to the standard of the 
reasonable person. Determinism has shown that different individuals can respond 
differently in the face of similar threats. This is not a surprising or innovative 
conclusion, but it does create ripples in the water in respect of expected criminal law 
standards, and supports a strong appreciation of subjective factors when considering 
self-defence.  
 
However, despite their differences, neither defender would be able to rely on 
determinism alone as an explanation for their actions. As Smith highlights ‘biological 
determinism doesn’t hold up as a defence in law. Legal scholars aren’t ready to ditch 
the principle of personal responsibility. “The law has to be based on the idea that 
people are responsible for their actions, except in exceptional circumstances”’.1272 
Therefore, while these factors may play a crucial role within one’s reaction to a 
situation requiring force in self-defence, they are unlikely to be taken into 
consideration while measuring the validity of the defence. This is not to say of course 
that such individuals would be left completely without a defence to their criminal 
action. The law does appreciate that certain individuals possess differing levels of 
control, and that those who possess a lower level may not be fully responsible for 
their actions, due to diminished responsibility for example.
1273
 
 
Similarly, the second type of moral luck explained by Nagel is particularly clear in 
one’s use of defensive force against an intruder. The element of moral luck or bad 
luck results from the circumstances of having one’s home invaded or being 
approached on the street by an aggressor. The defender has been thrown into a 
difficult position by virtue of his circumstances and it is as a result of moral luck that 
he faces the dilemma.  
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5.2.4(b) The causes and effects of action 
 
The third and fourth elements of Nagel’s definition refer to the causes and effects of 
the action taken in self-defence, and are pivotal in terms of the punishment one will 
potentially receive. Due to the need to use force against the aggressor, a situation is 
caused by the aggressor and is out of the control of the defender who is simply 
responding to it, which could result in the death of the aggressor. In such 
circumstances, the defender was placed in an involuntary position.  
 
If the degree of defensive force used results in serious harm or the death of the 
aggressor, the defender is still assessed as a moral agent.
1274
 Even if the circumstances 
themselves are beyond the individual’s control,1275 providing they retain a degree of 
control over their own capacities to act or react, they will be considered in control 
within the particular context that has arisen.
1276
 This view is reinforced by Enoch and 
Marmor who say that ‘The scope of moral responsibility depends, rather, on how 
foreseeable, probable, or likely the consequence was, given the relevant information 
available to the agent at the time of action’.1277 This statement reflects the nature of a 
decision on the applicability of self-defence, as it takes into consideration the 
circumstances, as the defender understood them to be at the time, and thus bases the 
lawfulness of one’s actions upon the reasonableness of the action within such a 
context.  
 
The reason for this is that a person is still considered to be a moral agent,
1278
 and is 
therefore subject to moral judgment.
1279
 The reason why individuals retain their status 
as moral beings for such assessment, despite the lack of control they exercise over the 
situation, is not easy to explain. Nelkin has discussed that this is contrary to the 
general expectation that people are responsible for the actions and behaviours that are 
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under their control, known as the ‘control principle’.1280 Nevertheless, despite the 
clear logic behind such a principle, adhering to a strict approach along these lines 
would make it extremely difficult to apply any moral responsibility for one’s actions. 
Indeed, the law has developed a way of side stepping the control principle, and 
provides doctrines to deal with moral luck through the application of defences (be 
they excuses or justifications) in appropriate situations. The agent’s actions, outside of 
the threatening circumstances and without the unlawfulness of the aggressor’s actions, 
would usually be a criminal wrong punishable by the standards of the criminal law. 
Nevertheless, one could be found justified in one’s actions and therefore not liable, 
depending on the circumstances and one’s moral luck.1281  
 
Nevertheless, it is challenging for the defender to know with certainty what the 
outcome will be prior to taking the defensive action. ‘In many cases of difficult choice 
the outcome cannot be foreseen with certainty. One kind of assessment of the choice is 
possible in advance, but another kind must await the outcome, because the outcome 
determines what has been done’. 1282  This is particularly true in relation to the 
situation faced by the householder when an intruder breaks into his home, and he uses 
force against him in self-defence. The matter of the reasonableness or justifiability of 
his actions will depend on the gravity of the injuries sustained by the intruder, 
whether he survives or dies, whether the force was proportionate, disproportionate, or 
grossly disproportionate. The reason for this can be explained as being that, ‘one is 
responsible for what one actually does - even if what one actually does depends in 
important ways on what is not within one’s control’.1283 This is one reason (among 
many already specified) why the change in the test of self-defence from reasonable 
force to grossly disproportionate force could be so damaging, as one is responsible for 
the consequences of one’s actions despite the manner in which the course of events 
leading up to the action proceeds.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1280
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the concept of location is crucial for the law of self-defence, and is 
particularly involved in the development of the recent law reform in England and 
Wales on the householder defence. Explanations of the special nature of the home 
have been evaluated, with the historical notion that ‘one’s home is one’s castle’, 
providing increased protection for homeowners defending within their own homes, 
without extending to public places. This is perhaps due to the heightened fear that 
individuals experience during home invasions, as well as the serious breach of the 
right to privacy. There are strong sentiments attached to the home which surround the 
debate about the householder defence, and clearly there has been an emphasis on the 
protection of security and control that the home offers to its inhabitants. However, 
while homes afford security to their inhabitants, public places are supposed to be safe 
for all people. Therefore, it is problematic to increase the scope of self-defence in 
merely one context. 
 
This chapter has considered different theories that offer explanations of what exactly 
forms the essential ingredient in the home that distinguishes the way in which self-
defence is considered. It has been questioned whether the crucial variable in this 
debate is the inside/outside dimension or the home/non-home dimension. Those 
arguing in favour of the castle theory would support the latter variable, but with its 
emphasis on the trespasser requirement, the inside/outside dimension is in fact the 
most important in respect of the legislation and the householder defence.  
 
The field of criminology provided insight into additional reasons that support the 
differentiation between public and private spaces. The fear of crime discussion was 
particularly telling, as it highlighted that the most common fears for the public are not 
in line with the change of householder defence. It is noteworthy that ‘street robbery’ 
is one of the primary fears of the general public.
1284
 Considering this, it is further 
unclear why the push for a change to the law was so centred upon self-protection in 
the home. It may be asserted that the legislative change was been made without a full 
appreciation of these matters.  
                                                        
1284
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Further, rather than amending the law without clear evidence of necessity, there are 
other practical alternatives available. For example, it was highlighted that reducing 
opportunities for crime and designing spaces accordingly would be a better allocation 
of resources. The amendment generalises perceptions of public and private spaces 
without appreciating the broader context. Young people in particular, often regard 
their local area (postcode, street, neighbourhood), as being their property, and hold 
the view that they ‘own’ the area in which they live. Differentials of power and 
economics prevent them from owning a more conventional piece of private space, 
thus leading to a need to protect their home environment. If the castle theory is the 
correct one, should it not also be able to encompass the home ‘turf’? It is also 
necessary to question the definitional limits of the home, where does it begin and end, 
for example does it extend to the garage, the drive, and the garden?
1285
 The legislation 
appears to restrict the increased test to within the home only, but there may be 
grounds for a wider interpretation with gated or enclosed gardens. These are 
important considerations for the use of weapons and will be a determining factor of 
the offence committed.  
 
The significance of location to cases of self-defence has certainly been shown to be of 
great import and value in this chapter, through the exploration of various theories. 
Two elements have come to light, namely the role of emotions and the potential that 
media representations can have in influencing the public’s general perception of this 
topic. The following chapter will explore these issues further, considering the 
relevance of emotions in cases of self-defence and offensive weapons, and the 
influence of the media on public perception and the occurrence of crime. 
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Chapter 6: Emotions and the Media 
 
6. Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the relevance and impact of two forms of pressures and 
influences on the law of self-defence, and the possession of offensive weapons. There 
are many issues which potentially impact upon or can be affected by the laws in these 
areas, but this chapter is focussed on the implications of emotions and media 
representations.  
 
Emotion can play a crucial role within the commission of crimes, and can largely 
shape a person’s decision on whether or not to act, and in what way to respond. It is 
submitted here that emotion, particularly fear, could impact a case of self-defence and 
the decision to carry a weapon, and on occasion, that it should be considered by the 
courts as a relevant factor. 
 
In addition, the media has an important role to play through the communication, and 
dissemination of information of public interest. Therefore, the mass media are 
responsible for the reporting of offences involving the possession of offensive 
weapons, as well as cases of self-defence. This role is vital as it represents the main 
method by which the majority of people come into contact with such discourse.
1286
 
Nevertheless, it can occasionally misinform people and cause fear through the 
exaggeration of facts, and reporting styles which often divorce reality from rhetoric. It 
is thus necessary to examine the effect of media reporting on the debate on both self-
defence and possession offences.  
 
6.1 Emotions 
 
It can reasonably be argued that emotions are present and influential in both cases of 
self-defence and crimes involving offensive weapons. First, in order to appreciate the 
role of emotions, it is necessary to provide an overview of its relationship with 
criminal law generally. Secondly, consideration will be given to the responses that are 
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generated by emotions. Thirdly, the role of fear in self-defence will be explored. 
Fourthly, the role of emotions in offensive weapons cases will be deliberated. Fifthly, 
a comparison is drawn between self-defence and the traditionally emotional defences 
of duress and loss of control. Finally, the emotion of guilt and its connection to the 
harms involved with inchoate offences is considered, as this is closely tied to 
possession offences. 
 
6.1.1 Overview of the role of emotions in criminal law 
 
‘It might seem obvious that human emotions play a significant part in the commission 
of crime, in punishment and social control’.1287 Few would disagree that the role of 
emotion can be crucial and highly influential within the realms of the criminal law. 
From determinations regarding appropriate levels of punishment to decisions to 
commit crimes,
1288
 ‘emotions are ubiquitous in criminal law, as they are in life’.1289 
From fear to anger, many emotions can be involved in the process of determining 
one’s action and response to any given situation.  
 
Indeed, emotions strongly influence human behaviour and thus criminal 
behaviour,
1290
 and can be said to ‘shape the landscape of our mental and social 
lives’.1291 Emotions are therefore to be firmly regarded as a factor for consideration by 
the criminal law. As Maroney observes, the law has always been willing to show due 
regard to the significance of emotions, despite the view that reason and emotion are 
entirely different entities, and that the law should primarily be concerned only with 
reason.
1292
 This approach to reason and emotion will shortly be explored whilst 
explaining the forces of emotions, particularly the emotion of fear.  
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The special role of emotions within the law is evident in the argument by Kahan and 
Nussbaum, that individuals who kill another person as a result of fear or anger should 
be punished far less severely than those who have calculated and premeditated the act 
of killing, and who act on their unlawful intentions without being under the influence 
of extreme emotion.
1293
 This demonstrates how the presence of emotions can attract 
different outcomes, moral and value judgments. Indeed, with regard to moral 
reasoning, the term ‘moral involuntariness’ has developed to explain situations in 
which defenders are not truly responsible for their actions as they lack free choice.
1294
 
The situation triggers the emotion that renders the action involuntary.
1295
 This in part 
can be explained by accepted features of emotions as being generated when 
something of interest to the individual is engaged; motivating and directing action by 
preparing the individual for events; and bearing some control over the action 
undertaken.
1296
  
 
While there are many different emotions such as love, joy, compassion, anger, rage, 
jealousy, and disgust,
1297
 the primary emotion of concern to this research is fear. The 
reason being that fear is cited as the main reason for possessing offensive weapons, 
and is a natural occurrence in cases where individuals resort to the use of force in self-
defence. This section seeks to illuminate how the emotion of fear can be highly 
relevant and pertinent in cases of self-defence and weapons offences. Bourke has 
stated that ‘fear has a strong claim to be one of the most dominant emotions’,1298 and 
in relation to this research it certainly will be considered in this manner. 
 
6.1.2 Mechanistic and evaluative conceptions of emotions 
 
Emotions are described as states of being which simply happen to individuals, as 
opposed to being chosen or controlled by them. They have strong effects and can 
overcome individuals extremely quickly allowing little or no time for an alternative 
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response.
1299
 This view of emotion links into the discussion of two separate theories 
of emotions, what Kahan and Nussbaum refer to as the ‘mechanistic conception’ and 
the ‘evaluative conception’. These views approach the understanding and explanation 
of emotions in entirely different ways. Simply put, the mechanistic conception regards 
emotions as forces that are devoid of reason, and which are incapable of moral 
evaluation, while in contrast, the evaluative theory advances that emotions are 
examples of cognitive decisions that lend themselves to moral reason.
1300
  
 
The mechanistic conception approaches emotions as compulsive forces that happen to 
the individual without allowing sufficient time for a considered thought process, 
‘emotions feel like things that sweep over us, or sweep us away, or invade us, often 
without our consent or control – and this intuitive idea is well preserved in the view 
that they really are impulses or drives that go their own way without embodying 
reasons or beliefs’.1301 Many would agree with this view, as indeed emotions can 
have strong effects on those who experience them. For example, Horder has 
proclaimed in relation to fear, especially when arising in emergency situations that the 
emotion can be understood to take over the individual’s rational thought process, and 
therefore might lead to ‘negligent wrongdoing’. 1302  This is reflected in Sartre’s 
argument, which demonstrates the power of emotions, that ‘the emotion is undergone. 
One cannot get out of it as one pleases; it fades away of itself, but one cannot put a 
stop to it’.1303 This view is in line with the mechanistic conception, as it ascribes 
significant force to emotions as states of being that overpower the individual, and 
consequently interferes with one’s ability to rationalise. 
 
Svendsen has examined the relationship between brain function and emotions, 
particularly in relation to fear. He explains that the amygdala
1304
 is the part of the 
brain responsible for this response, and notes that ‘the amygdala sends signals so 
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quickly that they overwhelm us before we have any chance of intervening rationally 
… There is quite simply very little human reason can do when fear sets in’.1305 This 
demonstrates that fear can certainly impact an individual’s ability to formulate 
decisions, but so too can anger, and these emotions often explain seemingly irrational 
actions taken by citizens in certain circumstances.
1306
  
 
However, it is not logical to always assert that the emotion itself restricts any thought 
processing on behalf of the individual. Jones too has explored the way in which the 
brain functions to send signals for certain emotions, and claims that the brain 
functions to produce predispositions of response for specific emotions when 
stimulated.
1307
 However, he clarified that this does not necessarily produce a definite 
predicable response as ‘a predisposition is not a predetermination’.1308 This suggests 
that the individual does have a degree of control over the response to the emotion, 
which in fact would support the proposition of the evaluative conception approach to 
emotions. 
 
It is possible that people are occasionally able to rein in even intense emotions, and to 
take control over the situation which gave rise to it, and act accordingly. Consider a 
person who is easily angered and who often lashes out under temper. Having become 
aware of and accepted this propensity, one may be inclined to attempt psychotherapy 
to manage the anger. Consequently, the individual may be able to successfully 
undergo emotion management techniques, and gain control over the emotion when it 
is experienced. In this regard, the evaluative conception is therefore more appropriate, 
and indeed is the preferred theory by Kahan and Nussbaum for explaining 
emotions.
1309
 
 
At the core of the evaluative conception is the belief that emotions include 
judgements about the objects that trigger them, that is to say, that the value of the 
subject is evaluated as an integral part of the emotion felt. This view explains that the 
emotion includes moral appraisal, and a reasoned feeling about the object, for 
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example ‘fear perceives the impending harm as significant’,1310  which is why it 
generates the reaction in the individual. While the mechanistic conception classifies 
emotions as conditions that immobilise the individual’s ability to control himself, the 
evaluative approach believes that is it possible for individuals to retain self-control
1311
 
when faced with extreme emotions, and that responsibility for those reactions should 
not be taken away from the individual.
1312
 This placing of responsibility is pertinent in 
cases of duress and loss of control which will be discussed shortly. 
 
The evaluative conception is reflected in self-defence, as defenders are assessed 
according to the reasonable person test. The defence attaches great significance to the 
reasonableness and rationality of one’s actions, and the responsibility for the conduct. 
Although fear is not a defined part of self-defence, the defence often involves the 
emotion of fear.
1313
 The defender will be facing a serious threat or attack, and thus 
will be in fear of his personal safety, or the safety of another. The following section 
explores this connection between fear and self-defence, first by delving deeper into 
the nature of fear and why it is experienced, and secondly, applying it within the 
specific case of self-defence. 
 
6.1.3 Responses that result from emotions 
 
Some emotions can produce specific types of responses from individuals. These 
responses can happen instinctively without allowing sufficient time for the actor to go 
through a process of reasoning about the potential consequences.
1314
 This follows on 
from a concept which has already been briefly introduced, that emotion and reason 
are separate entities. McGill explains that there is popular opinion regarding this 
distinction and separation of emotion and reason, and it is thought that the law should 
be careful whilst taking emotional considerations into account, as its realm of concern 
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should rather be reason. McGill demonstrates the difference between these two 
cognitive functions,  
 
‘when a man thinks clearly, and behaves in a deliberate and rational 
fashion, it is assumed that emotion is absent, suppressed or under control. 
When he “loses his head” or acts stupidly, his conduct is described as 
emotional, and reason is supposed to be absent or distraught by 
feeling’.1315  
 
Therefore, emotion is viewed as an unstable state, which is inferior to reason, which is 
in contrast more settled and reliable. 
 
However, as emotions can impact upon one’s ability to reason, by influencing the 
response in a person’s subconscious, it is necessary to understand how this occurs and 
why. Ekman has conducted research into the emotions and has discovered that there 
are ‘distinctive patterns of autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity for anger, fear 
and disgust’.1316 What this means is that emotions exhibit certain trends of reactions 
when triggered that have been evolved to prepare the actor, for example, anger is 
often associated with fighting, while fear is often associated with fleeing.
1317
 While 
there may not be a conclusive fear pattern,
1318
 it seems that flight has become 
commonly associated with fear,
1319
 as a method of creating the maximum distance 
from the actor and that which is causing his fear.
1320
 Both these emotions are also 
associated with certain feelings. Anger is said to be accompanied by a ‘boiling 
feeling’ while fear in contrast is accompanied by a ‘chilled and queasy feeling’.1321  
 
Bourke has shown that there are not only clearly distinguishable reactions which are 
produced by different emotions, but that the same emotion can lead to different 
responses. For example, she explains how different fears can lead to different 
reactions within the actor, ‘adrenalin often overwhelms individuals afraid of being 
attacked, while individuals terrified of contracting tuberculosis experience no such 
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physiological response’.1322 In this instance, the individual has very little input to the 
responses of one’s fears. Some argue that this ANS 1323  response is a process of 
evolution, while others counter that it is a product of culture and societal learning, as 
people have been ‘taught to engage in different types of behaviour when experiencing 
different emotions’.1324 For example, the history and experience of an individual will 
shape their fear, and the fear emotion is not universal across the human population.  
 
Furedi suggests that culture can influence sources of fear, namely, which objects or 
events produce a fearful reaction, as different cultures have different fears and ways 
of responding to them.
1325
 This view is logical and natural as ‘even though the 
emotions undoubtedly have a biological basis, it is clear that they are also shaped by 
both individual experiences and social norms. Emotions have an evolutionary, a 
social and a personal history’.1326 Therefore, the composition of an emotion is not 
easily deconstructed, as it is a symptom of multiple interconnected factors which has 
caused it to be felt and to develop into the response taken by the individual. 
 
Similarly, as emotions can induce certain responses, some emotions can produce 
specific types of crime, or are more often connected to specific crimes than others. 
Passion is one example, often resulting in ‘crimes of passion’. A notable feature of 
these crimes is that they are often viewed as tragedies, as they are committed by 
ordinary people who would not normally offend, but merely do so as a response to 
their circumstances. They can be said to be ‘fuelled by one or more of a myriad of 
emotions - the wounds of betrayal, the hurt of infidelity, broken hearts, wounded 
pride, spoiled virtue, jealousy, envy, and many more, they are criminalised by their 
acts’.1327 Although these emotions are natural human feelings which cannot easily be 
controlled, (in the sense that the individual does not choose to feel them, they are 
intrinsic reactions to events), they cannot be ignored if and when they lead to serious 
criminal acts, if and when they cross the line from being mere emotions to causing 
devastating consequences.  
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6.1.4 Fear and self-defence 
 
There appears to be a general consensus as to why fear is felt. Svendsen,
1328
 Kahan
1329
 
and Nussbaum
1330
 agree that fear is triggered when something of value to an 
individual is under threat. Fear arises when individuals are anxious that the things of 
importance to them, such as family, freedom, and life, are at risk of an attack, and that 
the threat faced is serious. Thus, fear becomes a standard and natural reaction in the 
face of such danger, as individuals will strive for self-preservation and to protect 
those entities which are of great value to them.
1331
 As Nussbaum explains ‘what 
inspires fear is the thought of damages impending that cut to the heart of my own 
cherished relationships and projects’. 1332  For this reason, acting in fear can be 
considered a reasonable response,
1333
 and could therefore potentially be an important 
consideration when dealing with cases of self-defence. 
 
The emotion of fear could not only affect cases of self-defence, but could also provide 
clear evidence of self-defence situations. The law in this respect acknowledges that 
situations of self-defence are problematic in that the individual does not have enough 
time to fully calculate and consider all the risks involved, and the consequence that 
may eventuate following the course of action chosen.
1334
 Such circumstances are 
highly intense and demand spontaneous, instinctive reactions, and ‘people who 
respond instantly out of emotion may be the ones we praise, and those who stay on the 
sidelines (to consider what is rationally required of them) may be the ones we 
blame’.1335 Therefore, an action as opposed to inaction may carry increased risks, but 
might also be the morally superior choice to make. As noted earlier, it may be claimed 
that these reactions are involuntary as the individual does not have any choice but to 
act, and thus they are not fully responsible for their conduct. However, there is a 
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general expectation that an attempt should be made to control emotions before acting 
on them; excusatory defences recognise situations where such control has failed.
1336
 
 
The problems that arise from instinctive, defensive reactions are addressed by the 
standards and securities of the reasonable force test. This requires an action to be both 
necessary and proportional in the circumstances in order for it to be classified as 
reasonable.
1337
 In applying a test to determine whether the action taken constitutes 
reasonable force, this demands a standard of all individuals to act according to the 
situation, in a reasonable and not unreasonable manner. This reflects that ‘as a matter 
of moral psychology ... even in a sudden emergency, we expect people to exercise 
residual powers of cognition that should prevent them grossly overreacting or making 
crass mistakes’.1338 There is a presumption that people are able to respond adequately 
but not excessively to difficult circumstances, and this is stronger for those in high 
intensity vocations, such as the police, especially given their training, who are 
expected to act more calmly and reasonably in the face of danger. 
 
On this point, we return to the case of Beckford,
1339
 who acted of out fear to protect 
both himself and his colleagues. In this situation it is considered that a policeman, 
who has been trained for such events, would not experience fear in the same way as 
an ordinary person, and so the standard of expectation regarding his response will be 
higher. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that ‘those whose job it is to face danger 
ought to be better prepared for it when it arrives than those for whom it comes as a 
bolt from the blue’.1340  Indeed, this appeals to an assessment of common sense. 
Horder argues that ‘the law ought to expect ordinary people who act in the maelstrom 
of circumstances, under the influence of great and immediate fear or compassion, to 
exercise only such residual powers of cognition as should prevent them making crass 
mistakes as a result of their emotional state’.1341 It appears therefore, that the law 
demands a higher standard of control to be exercised by those whose vocation 
provides training to prepare them for dangerous situations, than it does of the general 
public. Nevertheless, completely irrational behaviour in the face of extreme emotion 
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by the ordinary person will not be without scrutiny.
1342
 The reasonable force test 
requires the defensive action taken to be both necessary and proportionate in the 
circumstances, thus, a minimal standard of self-control is in operation. This displays 
an expectation for individuals to exercise courage
1343
 and control, and places the 
general presumption in favour of human ability to reach this standard.
1344
 
 
It may be asserted that the law of self-defence is governed by principles conducive to 
the evaluative conception of emotions.
1345
 This view appoints a narrow construction 
of self-defence, allowing the defence only when reasonable force has been used, 
therefore being both necessary and proportionate.
1346
 However, the law assesses the 
circumstances according to the defender’s belief, and therefore, while applying an 
objective test overall, it also includes an element of subjective analysis. Consequently, 
this enables the fairest application of the law. Indeed, Spain advances this view, 
explaining that the reasonable person test gives due regard to the morality of one’s 
actions, by assessing their appropriateness, while the subjective element ensures 
justice by considering the individual’s experience, with ‘the availability of the defence 
dependent upon his or her individual thoughts and emotions’. 1347  The test can 
therefore be considered to incorporate an appreciation of the intense emotions felt by 
the individual at the time of the defence, while not allowing this to cloud judgement 
altogether by demanding that only reasonable force be used.  
  
Kahan and Nussbaum discuss the belief that there is no consideration of emotion in 
the law of self-defence, that it is a defence which considers emotions as irrelevant. 
They reached the conclusion that such a view would be misguided and incorrect. 
They say that  
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‘It is impossible to understand why self-defense doctrine prefers the death 
of the aggressor to the impairment of certain interests without 
appreciating the law’s assessment of the defendant’s emotions … the 
defense doesn’t require proof that a particular defendant was motivated 
by a particular emotion, but the contours of the doctrine nevertheless 
reflect understandings about what kinds of emotions a “reasonable 
person” … would experience in particular situations … if a person has no 
realistic choice but to use deadly force, then her use of such force is 
neither culpable nor deterrable’.1348  
 
In assessing the circumstances as the defender believed them to be at the time, this 
undeniably inserts an appreciation of the emotions felt into the assessment of the 
defence. This view is supported by Maroney, who claims that the defence indeed 
incorporates elements of fear, in terms of the experience of the individual both 
psychologically and physically,
1349
 and this view is accepted in this research. 
Although there is no specific question of one’s emotional state in the defence, it 
nevertheless exists within the overall assessment of the circumstances, through the 
subjective belief of the defender at the time. If the reaction by the defender was 
chosen as a response to the fear and terror of the situation, this undoubtedly 
contributes to the moral evaluation of his reaction. The reason for this is that fear 
indicates a situation of self-defence; indeed, it would be rare to find a situation of self-
defence where fear was not present.  
 
Therefore, fear suggests a reasonable reaction, which can be verified by recourse to 
the reasonable force test. The reasonableness of killing in self-defence was discussed 
in Chapter 2, and the existence of fear contributes to the understanding that on 
occasion it can be reasonable to kill in self-defence.
1350
 As already mentioned, an 
analysis of the reasonableness of one’s actions includes an assessment of 
proportionality. The proportionality of killing has been an issue within the defence of 
necessity. Ost discusses the defence within the context of euthanasia and medical 
practitioners’ relieving the suffering of patients, and claims that it is for the courts of 
England and Wales to determine whether severe suffering, although not life 
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threatening, can be a proportionate harm to the taking of life.
1351
 Nevertheless, 
proportionality within self-defence contrasts with proportionality within necessity,
1352
 
especially within the context of relieving patient suffering. The reason is that self-
defence involves defensive action by one person to protect himself against the 
unlawful threat posed by another. There is a clear balancing between individuals, one 
who is aggressing, and one who is defending. Thus, the question of proportionality 
relates to the matching of the defensive action to the level of threat posed, considering 
the harm that would be suffered by the defender as well as the wrong being 
committed by the aggressor.
1353
 If the threat is to life, it will be proportionate for the 
fearful defender to kill to avoiding suffering the harm himself.
1354
  
 
Taking this a step further, it can be argued that on occasion the test of self-defence 
can be regarded as applying the principles of the evaluative conception of emotion, as 
opposed to its general trend towards the mechanistic view. This is evident in the 
treatment of the home or place of residence as exceptional institutions, and goes 
beyond the mere feelings of fear to including a person’s pride and dignity.1355 This 
follows on from the discussion in the previous chapter on location, and specifically 
the castle doctrine which has developed in some areas to safeguard the rights of 
homeowners. 
 
It is clear that emotions can be a vital factor in cases of self-defence. The main 
emotion involved is fear, and this is also probably the most obvious emotion, (along 
with anger perhaps), engaged in cases involving offensive weapons which will be 
discussed shortly. Within circumstances of self-defence, the very fact that one is 
acting upon an impulsive reaction to a threat or danger, renders the action acceptable. 
Owing to the individual’s belief that one’s life is in danger, one’s reaction is excused 
on the basis that ‘his belief, if genuinely held, and however unreasonable, negatives 
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mens rea; for his belief precludes with the intention to act unlawfully’.1356 This means 
that true cases of self-defence, lack a necessary ingredient of crime, that of a guilty 
intention, or mens rea. This is true even if the defender as well as intending to 
preserve himself, intends to cause some harm to the attacker in self-defence. The 
intention with which one decides to act is therefore a vital consideration in 
determining the punishment for the commission of the act, as in circumstances 
satisfying the test of self-defence, the defensive action is not unlawful.  
 
However, the pre-emptive carrying of weapons constitutes a problematic reaction to 
fear. People who carry weapons with them as a response to the fear that they 
experience, or perhaps the anger they feel, face a challenge as they are committing a 
crime in the first place by possessing such articles. While emotions can influence a 
decision to carry a weapon, it is not usually a sufficient explanation for the behaviour. 
 
6.1.5 Emotions and offensive weapons 
 
As has been shown, when a person acts out of fear they are not fully in control of their 
actions as they are moved by their emotions. As in cases of self-defence, this is 
similarly important in cases involving the possession of offensive weapons - although 
it does not carry the same weight. It has been said in several cases involving the 
possession of offensive weapons that fear alone is not enough to excuse the 
behaviour.
1357
 This links back to the discussion of the harm principle, as the carrying 
of offensive weapons greatly increases dangers within communities, and exposes 
society to unjustifiable risks. Therefore, although emotions can be very influential in 
the commission of crimes, the determining of the criminal’s culpability, and the 
punishments that should be prescribed, emotions are only a consideration which may 
be indicative of the actor’s intention, and are not conclusive evidence on their own. 
However, as will be seen below, emotion is not directly taken into consideration by 
the courts, other than in the defence of loss of control.  
 
The power of emotions in crime is reflected clearly in Loewy’s statement that ‘one 
acting on the emotions of the moment is relatively unlikely to be deterred by the 
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prospect of substantial punishment’.1358 This is especially true in self-defence cases, 
where often an instant reaction is taken without appreciating the consequences of the 
action. Indeed, it is agreed that no deterrent effect is possible with instinctive 
reactions of self-defence, and thus a severe punishment is not practical or merited.
1359
 
A person acting under the pressures of fear would quite reasonably respond in the 
same way again if faced with an immediate attack. However, the fear that influences 
weapons carrying has a different nature to the traditional fear of self-defence. The 
reason for this is that it is a constant state of fear as opposed to a feeling that suddenly 
overcomes the defender when faced with a threat. Perhaps this lends itself more to the 
emotion of anxiety than it does to fear, as the emotion is ever present due to the 
environment in which the individual lives.  
 
It has been shown that emotions can generate specific responses in individuals. As 
already explained, fear is often associated with fleeing, while anger results in fighting 
or striking out.
1360
 It may be argued that individuals who arm themselves with 
weapons, in a way, reverse the typical responses to these emotions. They carry 
weapons as a result of fear, but on this assessment, the act of arming oneself with a 
weapon is perhaps a more expected result of anger than fear. Carrying a weapon could 
be considered more in line with the typical fight response of anger.
1361
 Indeed, as an 
offensive weapon it sends a signal of conflict to an aggressor. However, Svendsen 
provides an explanation of this seeming confusion between emotional responses, as 
he claims that fear can be accompanied not only by flight but also by attack, and says 
that ‘fear can undoubtedly motivate attacks … emotions motivate action, but they do 
not determine it’.1362 Thus, the fear that these individuals experience on this analysis 
can impact their decision to carry a weapon. By virtue of their fear, they overestimate 
the risk of harm, and take action in self-preservation.
1363
 
 
However, due to the nature of weapons offences, (which was discussed in Chapter 3), 
it is possible that fear is not the only motivator for possession, and that other 
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additional concepts creep into one’s impulse to carry a weapon. In the specific context 
of weapons offences, primarily connected to young people and the perceived gang or 
street culture, a theme that runs through the literature is that ‘respect’ is a vital notion 
within such communities. The notion of respect here is that there is a way to treat 
individuals, and there is an expectation that respect must be earned and maintained, 
and if tarnished, then revenge should be enacted.
1364
 The preservation of this respect 
is shown through one’s willingness to fight to protect it, to be fearless when faced 
with threats, and to seek retribution in situations where they are disrespected.
1365
 This 
it is said can lead to cycles of violence, as different groups or gangs challenge each 
other whenever their respective territories have been crossed.
1366
 It is argued that this 
can in part explain the emotions of fear, anger, and resentment that surround these 
cultures. This leads to a belief that one should constantly be aware of dangers and 
threats, and should expect to come into contact with adversaries. Consequently, a 
motivation is provided for decisions to carry weapons, as they might be needed for 
self-defence.  
 
This understanding of the factors behind the behaviour of carrying weapons has been 
confirmed by Karstedt, who says that ‘Concern for identity and autonomy arouses 
intense feelings of anger if not treated with respect and recognition, and being 
shamed is a most powerful source of rage and feelings of revenge’.1367 Therefore, this 
provides an explanation of the different emotions and influences at play in decisions 
to carry weapons. There is certainly a mixture of different emotions at play in the 
dynamics of weapons possession. In contrast to the feelings of anger and rage 
mentioned by Karstedt above, fear is the most common emotion explaining weapons 
possession, especially knives in the UK.
1368
 As already explained in this thesis,
1369
 
studies have found that fear is the key reason that individuals arm themselves with 
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weapons. 
1370
 Individuals who encounter threatening and violent situations on a daily 
basis take the decision to prepare themselves so that they will be able to protect 
themselves, as they are fearful of harm from others.
1371
 Living in a community where 
crime and violence is a regular occurrence,
1372
 and a culture of carrying weapons is 
present causes the risk of harm to be significant, and correspondingly leads many 
individuals to fear for their lives. This fear correlates with the decision to carry a 
weapon.
1373
 
 
There is thus a connection between the carrying of offensive weapons and the defence 
of self-defence, as most individuals who carry weapons are reacting to the emotion of 
fear. However, self-defence is not the only defence that attracts debate in relation to 
the effect that emotions have on legal application. Indeed, comparatively, self-defence 
is far less concerned with emotions than are the defences of duress and loss of control, 
which have been referred to as ‘emotional excuses’.1374 The following section briefly 
explores the importance of the emotions of fear and anger within these defences.  
 
6.1.6 Emotional excuses: duress and loss of control 
 
In general, the defences most associated with emotional responses are duress and loss 
of control, previously known as provocation.
1375
 The former is most often associated 
with fear, specifically a fear of a threat of harm that impels the individual to act 
according to the ordering of the source of the threat.
1376
 In contrast, the latter was 
historically associated with the emotion of anger or rage,
1377
 which paralyses the 
actor’s self-control, and thus they lose control of their actions. The source of the 
emotion shapes the response induced, and there is an expectation that a person’s 
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normal behavioural choices are different to his preferences when under the power of 
emotions.
1378
 Posner explains that the reason behind the emotion is always important 
as it is indicative of whether an excuse may be offered or not, provided an adequate 
explanation for the emotional response is present.
1379
 When considering criminal 
defences, although the circumstances and emotion may cause the defendant to act out 
of character, this alone is insufficient.
1380
 It is not the emotion or altered character 
alone that excuses the action, but also the triggering reason behind it, the underlying 
motive for reacting. 
 
The defences of duress and loss of control are classified as excuses, or emotional 
excuses. As Uniacke explains, these defences ‘excuse the conduct of a person of 
normal cognitive and volitional capacities who acts under pressure of external 
circumstances that generate a powerful emotional response from which a wrongful 
action results’.1381 Applying this analysis to the defences, in relation to duress, the 
result is that the individual’s will is regarded as overborne by the emotion of fear, 
arising from an imminent threat. With loss of control, the individual’s actions are 
considered to be out of one’s control as a result of intense anger or fear.1382 An 
individual’s loss of control must be due to one of two possible qualifying triggers.1383 
The first qualifying trigger is that a fear of serious violence,
1384
 while the second 
relates to anger generated from things said or done, giving rise to ‘circumstances of an 
extremely grave character’,1385 and causing the defendant to experience a ‘justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged’. 1386  Both these defences, in part, excuse the 
behaviour due to the lack of responsibility of the individual for his involuntary 
actions.
1387
 
 
                                                        
1378
 E.A.Posner, op cit fn 1321 at, at 1978. 
1379
 ibid, at 1980. 
1380
 W.Wilson ‘The Structure of Criminal Defences’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 108, at 109. 
1381
 S.Uniacke ‘Emotional Excuses’, op cit fn 1374 at 95. 
1382
 Drogin has discussed the defence within the American context, and refers to it as an instance of 
‘extreme emotional disturbance’. E.Y.Drogin ‘Commentary: Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED), 
Heat of Passion, and Provocation: A Jurisprudent Science Perspective’ (2008) 36 Journal of Psychiatry 
& Law 133, at 134.  
1383
 S.Parsons ‘The Loss of Control Defence – Fit for Purpose?’ (2015) 79(2) The Journal of Criminal 
Law 94, at 94. 
1384
 Section 55(3) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
1385
 Section 55(4)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
1386
 Section 55(4)(b) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
1387
 S.Uniacke ‘Emotional Excuses’, op cit fn 1374 at 103. 
 285 
However, these defences do not excuse one’s behaviour entirely, as the defences 
question the individual’s ability to take steps to control the emotion as opposed to 
allowing it to become all-consuming of one’s will. In relation to duress, Spain claims 
that despite the extreme fear experienced, ‘the actor is understood always to be 
capable of choosing whether or not to submit to the threat’.1388 The same is true of 
those acting as a result of loss of control; there is a degree of expectation that human 
beings should be able to control their emotions, and a failure to do so will lead to 
culpability for the action taken.
1389
 The loss of control defence asserts this expectation 
through the objective requirement that ‘a person of D's sex and age, with a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have 
reacted in the same or in a similar way to D’.1390 Further, this expectation is reflected 
in the fact that unlike self-defence, duress is not available against a murder charge, 
and loss of control is only a partial defence.
1391
 Perhaps this is an indication that the 
individual has failed in relation to the level of effort expected, and thus merits some 
blame.
1392
 There is an assumption that most people are able to keep their reactions 
under control even when faced with a threat, and acting under emotion.
1393
 
 
Fear has already been examined at length in this chapter, but the loss of control 
defence also permits a consideration of the emotion of anger. Anger is a rather 
different emotion to fear, both in terms of the responses it triggers in the actor and the 
way in which the actor is judged. Research has found that anger affects an 
individual’s physiology in preparation for a physical confrontation by a warm 
sensation of blood surging to the upper body,
1394
 producing an eruptive reaction.
1395
 
                                                        
1388
 E.Spain , op cit fn 1288 at 67. 
1389
 S.Uniacke ‘Emotional Excuses’, op cit fn 1374 at 97. 
1390
 Section 54(1)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
1391
 Another difference is that self-defence is available against a broader range of threats (to life, or 
lesser harms such as actual bodily harm (ABH)), whereas a person relying on the defence of duress 
must be reacting as a result of a threat of death or serious harm (GBH). See D.W.Elliott ‘Necessity, 
Duress and Self-defence’ (1989) Criminal Law Review 611, at 616 for a discussion on this. 
1392
 R.Holton & S.Shute ‘Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence’, op cit fn 238 at 63. 
1393
 K.W.Simons ‘Self-defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-control?’, op cit fn 444 at 83-
84. 
1394
 Fear on the other hand prepares the individual to flee through a cooling sensation drawing blood 
away from the upper body down to the lower body. R.Lowe & T.Ziemke ‘The Feeling of Action 
Tendencies: on the Emotional Regulation of Goal-Directed Behaviour’ (2011) 2(346) Frontiers in 
Psychology 1, at 20. 
1395
 S.S.M.Edwards ‘Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control’, op cit fn 16 at 
228; S.S.M.Edwards ‘Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self-defence – the Law Commission’s 
Options for Reform’ op cit fn 16 at 183. 
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The emotion clouds the actor’s judgement and reasoning capabilities.1396 Anger can 
be considered to be a less acceptable emotional reason for action than fear, as it has at 
its core the motivation of retribution for some harm suffered;
1397
 as Lyons states 
‘anger is that desire for revenge’.1398  While anger is capable of inducing strong 
debilitating forces that overcome individuals causing loss of self-control,
1399
 the place 
from which anger originates is much darker than fear, as it is essentially a very 
negative emotion fuelled with the desire for revenge and retribution. It is thus clear 
that the loss of control action resulting from anger should not be considered as 
morally favourable
1400
 as, for example, fear in cases of self-defence, as the motivation 
is entirely different.  
 
Despite this statement on the moral status of the emotions of anger and fear, and 
despite the likely presence of fear in self-defence situations, fear has no specific place 
within the defence. It may be suggested that the reason for the absence of direct 
consideration of fear in self-defence is down to the justificatory and general nature of 
the defence.
1401
 While with loss of control, elements of blame remain attached to the 
actor and the action taken, in self-defence the conduct is considered lawful. Thus, 
additional proof of compelling evidence for the behaviour is required with the excuse 
defences, to show that the defendant would not have acted in such a manner when 
unmoved by emotion.
1402
 With self-defence, there is no need for this additional 
emotional explanation, although fear is likely to be assumed in most cases.
1403
 
Nevertheless, this demonstrates how significant the impact of emotion can be on 
one’s responses, and the important connection between emotion and the criminal law.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1396
 R.Holton & S.Shute ‘Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence’, op cit fn 238 at 53. 
1397
 R.S.Lazarus ‘The Cognition-Emotion Debate: A Bit of History’ in T.Dalgleish & M.Power (eds) 
Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1999), at 6. 
1398
 W.Lyons ‘Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion’ in T.Dalgleish & M.Power (eds) Handbook of 
Cognition and Emotion, (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1999), at 23. 
1399
 R.Holton & S.Shute ‘Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence’, op cit fn 238 at 57-58. 
1400
 E.Spain, op cit fn 1288 at 69. 
1401
 Loss of control is not a general defence as it is only available against a murder charge. 
1402
 Williams asserts that in assessing whether the defendant exercised choice over his actions while 
experiencing fear or terror, due to the strength of these emotions, they should be incorporated into the 
reasonable person test. G.Williams ‘Necessity: Duress of Circumstances or Moral Involuntariness?’, op 
cit fn 89 at 9. 
1403
 D.J.Baker, op cit fn 466, at 704; H.Frowe, op cit fn 97 at 5. 
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6.1.7 Guilt and inchoate offences 
 
Another emotion of relevance is the ‘moral emotion’ of guilt.1404 This emotion is 
different to the emotions that have already been discussed, namely, fear and anger, as 
it does not trigger a reaction in the individual in the same way.
1405
 While the previous 
emotions discussed are relevant as they shape an individual’s actions, guilt is 
commonly experienced after the action has produced negative consequences,
1406
 and 
influences the way the individual is judged and punished.  
 
While feelings of guilt would not prevent or deter a person from acting in self-
defence, nor necessarily from carrying offensive weapons, in relation to the latter, 
guilt is relevant to the way in which the actor is perceived and dealt with by the law. 
With regard to offences of possession, guilt is connected to the level of harm that is 
caused by the action. One reason why the occurrence of harm and the gravity of the 
harm shape the punishment imposed is that feelings of guilt are likely to be far 
stronger when harm has been caused. Different people will experience different levels 
of guilt, and a person with high moral standards that has never committed a crime will 
probably feel more guilt than a career criminal.
1407
 This is likely to be particularly 
evident in a classic case of self-defence, where typically an innocent, good natured 
individual finds himself faced with the need for defensive action against an 
aggressor.
1408
 However, generally, greater feelings of guilt are expected when a harm 
has been caused than when a harm has been attempted and failed, or has been 
recklessly or negligently risked, despite not causing the harm.  
 
To provide an example, consider two labourers who carry a penknife as a matter of 
course for their work. Both neglect to remove the penknife from their pocket before 
                                                        
1404
 According to Eisenberg, a moral emotion is distinguishable from the basic emotions as it has a 
‘fundamental role in morality’. N.Eisenberg ‘Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development’ (2000) 51 
Annual Review of Psychology 665, at 666. 
1405
 ibid at 667. The experience of guilt may be described as ‘regret over wrongdoing’.  
1406
 Consider for example the case of Vincent Cooke discussed earlier, (see page 238). Although he 
acted in lawful self-defence, the guilt and anxiety that he felt following killing a violent intruder in his 
home reduced him to reliance on medication.  
1407
 While character (moral or immoral) may influence the guilt felt by the individual, it does not 
provide an excuse for one’s behaviour. S.J.Morse ‘Culpability and Control’, op cit fn 388 at 1602, and 
1607-1608; and R.A.Duff, op cit 190 at 167; N.Eisenberg, op cit fn 1404 at 670. 
1408
 Indeed, this is true to a certain extent in relation to the case of R v Hussain and another op cit fn 
953. Here, although the actions were considered more akin to a revenge attack than to self-defence, the 
previous good character of the defendants mitigated the harshness of the punishment awarded. 
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going out for the evening.
1409
 While the first labourer does not encounter any trouble 
and the penknife remains in his pocket throughout the evening, the second is involved 
in a fight during which he stabs a man in the neck with the penknife, causing his 
death. Despite taking the same risk, the latter has caused harm, and may experience 
guilt, while the former will not.
1410
 
 
This in turn affects one’s culpability, as guilt can be an indication of wrongful action, 
and therefore greater guilt can mean that the conduct is regarded as being more 
wrongful.
1411
 By picturing  
 
‘several people, each of whom choose to run an unjustifiable risk - say, by 
driving too fast down a street - but only one of whom actually causes 
harm ... the one who causes harm will feel an extra measure of guilt, 
despite the fact that his subjective assessment of the risk was no greater 
than those who escaped causing harm’.1412  
 
In terms of societal impact, cases where harm has occurred are also viewed more 
negatively and disapprovingly than where harm has not eventuated. Society has 
therefore conditioned its subjects to feel greater shame for committing crime, by way 
of societal disapproval.
1413
 Brand-Ballard thus presents his view that in fact it is not 
because causing harm is more wrongful than not causing harm that it is viewed with 
more disdain, but rather it is the result of the social conditioning that people become 
accustomed to, that lead to feelings of guilt and shame when one has caused harm.
1414
 
 
It is interesting to consider this in relation to the possession of offensive weapons. The 
intention in such circumstances may not involve the use of the weapon at all, and may 
merely be to carry the article in order to feel safer. On the contrary, it might also be 
intended for use to threaten somebody, or further to inflict an injury upon someone. 
However, in its most common form, although statistically challenging to prove, 
possession offences are likely to occur far more often than the causing of injury. 
                                                        
1409
 This example draws upon the previous discussion in relation to forgotten possession in Chapter 3, 
(see page 146). 
1410
 Miller states that ‘guilt can be triggered by failure to abide by a norm we accept’. W.I.Miller The 
Anatomy of Disgust, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1997), at 201.  
1411
 J.Brand-Ballard ‘Moral Emotions and Culpability for Resultant Harm’ (2010-2011) 42 Rutgers 
Law Journal 315, at 322. 
1412 L.Alexander ‘Crime and Culpability’, op cit fn 400 at 8. 
1413
 J.Brand-Ballard , op cit fn 1411 at 326. 
1414
 ibid at 330. 
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Despite this diminished occurrence of harm, people who carry weapons should not get 
away with the crime of possession merely because they do not cause physical harm. It 
is due to the potential harms caused by weapons possession, that this is an area of 
activity that must be controlled.  
 
As Robinson explains, despite merely creating the possibility of harm, ‘punishment is 
imposed for intending to do harm or for creating a risk of harm’.1415 This argument is 
problematic for two reasons: first, it relates to a conditional event, and second, it 
raises the question whether thinking about doing something can be punishable. The 
conditional element is problematic because it is based on an unconfirmed, ambiguous 
event.
1416
 There is a possibility that if the necessary conditions were present that the 
crime will be committed. Equally, if the conditions do not materialise, the intent will 
never be acted upon. This leads directly onto the second issue, that it is merely bad 
thoughts that have occurred, and no tangible crime. Bad thoughts on their own are not 
punishable, as they do not produce a wrong.  
 
Regulation of thoughts would be impossible. Ensuring the certainty and foreseeability 
of the law would be unattainable, proving guilt would be futile, and the need for a 
proportionate punishment would be impractical. There is therefore a need for more 
than merely bad thoughts before punishment can be delivered. There must be 
evidence of some form of action, for example encouragement or assistance of a crime, 
a conspiracy, or an attempt. Conduct that causes a risk of harm must be addressed as 
it may in fact produce a different harm than that expected. Even if the action itself 
fails to cause the intended harm, it induces fear and apprehension of harm,
1417
 which 
is a harm in itself,
1418
 as evinced by the justifiability of defensive actions in self-
                                                        
1415
 P.H.Robinson ‘A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability’ 
(1975-1956) 23 UCLA Law Review 266, at 269. 
1416
 It only becomes unconditional once the decision to act upon the intention has been reached. 
L.Alexander & K.D.Kessler ‘Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes’ (1996-1997) 87 Journal of Criminal Law 
& Criminology 1138, at 1139. 
1417
 This is a recognised harm, as indeed it satisfies the offence of assault - causing the victim to fear 
the infliction of unlawful force immediately. While the possession of offensive weapons in public 
places often occurs without coming to anyone’s attention, on an occasion where it is noticed, or in an 
area with a high percentage of weapons carrying, it can cause this fear and apprehension of harm.  
1418
 P.H.Robinson, op cit fn 1415 at 265. 
 290 
defence. The balance to be achieved here is between the individual’s liberty and 
protection of the public.
1419
  
 
Cole questions the methods used for the determination of what should be proscribed 
under the criminal law and what falls outside its scope.
1420
 He notes that minor gains 
such as merely avoiding harm is not enough to justify grave intrusions on a person’s 
liberty; it may be necessary to show a potential deterrent effect as well.
1421
 Cole draws 
attention to the fact that many criminal statutes proscribe activities that do not always 
lead to certain, material harm. It is argued here that the avoidance of harm is not a 
minor gain - it has a substantial benefit. Further, by prohibiting action, harm 
avoidance is not an isolated result as it is achieved hand in hand with deterring the 
criminal conduct, for example, the carrying of dangerous weapons. Consequently, 
there are some prohibited actions that do not necessarily cause harm in every instance, 
but by carrying an increased risk of harm,
1422
 they provide a basis for their regulation.  
 
An illustrative example is the imposition of speed limits to control and contain road 
traffic incidents, to oversee the tendencies of drivers to speed in certain areas, and to 
target places which are viewed as particularly dangerous due to the number of crashes 
and fatal incidents which have occurred there.
1423
 This limits freedom on the roads, 
and exercises a degree of control over drivers in the hope that their conduct will be 
safer, and consequently that there will be a decreased risk of collisions. Cole raises a 
valid point, when he asks of such provisions ‘why do we feel comfortable enforcing 
them even when no one is around to be struck?’1424 He notes that provisions which 
prohibit the possession of offensive weapons serve the same purpose: that of ‘keeping 
weapons from the law-abiding as a means of keeping them from others’.1425 It is the 
possible level of public danger which justifies the imposition of such restrictions on 
liberty and of criminal liability if they are committed, as they involve significant risks 
                                                        
1419
 See also the previous discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.2.4, on harm and offensive weapons. 
1420
 K.Cole ‘The Voodoo We Do: Harm, Impossibility, And The Reductionist Impulse’ (1994) 5 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 31, at 37. 
1421
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of societal, as well as individual, harm. As they do not interfere greatly with public or 
individual interests, the majority of people do not complain about their impositions, 
and happily comply with their requirements, be it keeping to a specific speed, or 
refraining from carrying weapons in public. 
 
General compliance among the public with such prohibitions is not surprising, as 
most people do not have bad intentions. Namely, they are not law abiding citizens 
merely because of the law, rather, they would not act in the proscribed way even if it 
were lawful for them to do so. For example, most people do not feel the need to carry 
weapons, they do not have intent to use weapons against others, and do not object to 
the legal restrictions on doing so as it serves the purpose of targeting those who do 
possess such intentions. Feinberg has clarified that there may be a harm, and 
consequently ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest ... although no injury is 
done’.1426 The regulation of offensive weapons falls within this statement, because the 
mere presence of offensive weapons on the street presents a risk of harm. Despite not 
leading to a physically injured victim, this in itself is a harm worth protecting against 
and proscribing by law.
1427
 
 
This is the approach taken in the classification of inchoate offences, which refers to 
incomplete crimes. A person will be guilty of such crimes as soon as the necessary 
components have been satisfied, even if the full offence is not committed, or if the 
harm does not actually materialise.
1428
 This category of offences includes 
‘encouraging or assisting crime’ under sections 44-46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007; 
‘attempt’ under section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981; and ‘conspiracy’.1429 
Perhaps the most well-known type of inchoate offence is attempt.
1430
 An attempt 
requires not only intention to commit the relevant actus reus of the offence in 
                                                        
1426
 J.Feinberg, op cit fn 58 at 106. 
1427
 Again, see the previous discussion on harm and offensive weapons in Chapter 3, section 3.2.4. 
1428
 J.Brand-Ballard, op cit fn 1411 at 317-318. 
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 For a concise explanation of these offences, see the CPS, Inchoate Offences, 
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has surrounded the offences of encouraging or assisting crime in recent years, which replaced the 
former offence of incitement. For a detailed discussion of these offences, see the Law Commission 
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1430
 L.Alexander & K.K.Ferzan ‘Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action’ (2011-2012) 9 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 637, at 644. The definition of attempt was discussed in Chapter 2, page 44. It 
requires evidence that an action has been taken that is more than merely preparatory to the commission 
of an offence (Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981). 
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question, but also that steps be taken towards its completion, which are more than 
merely preparatory.
1431
 
 
A full appreciation of the effect and scope of these offences is best gained by way of 
example. The most appropriate illustration is achieved by imagining a case involving 
different defendants who have the same intention to commit an identical crime, but 
only one succeeds in causing the harm. According to Cole, ‘defendants should not be 
acquitted simply because they failed to cause harm. Two defendants who intended 
their acts to cause the same harm should receive the same punishment, even if one 
succeeded in bringing it about and the other failed’. 1432  A comparison of two 
defendants is not required by law, but it affords an insight into the practical effect of 
the offence. Brand-Ballard suggests that the question to be asked is whether the 
causing of harm makes one offender more culpable than the other who has failed to 
cause the same harm.  
 
It is necessary to assess whether the law should distinguish between these crimes, 
both involving guilty minds, yet only one produces the harm. This is similar to the 
example of the two labourers offered earlier
1433
 and generally to offences of 
possessing weapons without using them to threaten or injure another person. It seems 
obvious that when harm occurs, it is more serious than when harm does not occur. But 
if the action is prohibited because of its potential harms, should committing the act 
without succeeding in producing the harm be considered less wrong? The law has 
developed by providing different punishments according to the gravity of the offences 
and harms that have occurred,
1434
 and evidently, ‘the world is full of instances in 
which equally culpable people wind up very differently’.1435 Thus, for example, the 
punishment for driving under the influence of alcohol, and causing a death, is greater 
than taking the same risk of driving under the influence of alcohol, without injuring 
anyone. ‘Defendants who cause harm are punished more severely than those who 
                                                        
1431
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 K.Cole, op cit fn 1420 at, at 31. 
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merely attempt, or culpably risk, causing harm’.1436 It can therefore be concluded that 
causing a harm is more wrongful than attempting to cause a harm but failing to 
achieve the intended harm.
1437
 Nevertheless, the failed attempt is also quite clearly a 
wrong, and thus inchoate offences are engaged to restrict potential harms, and punish 
culpable actors.
1438
  
 
When considered with reference to the definition of attempt, which clearly requires 
steps to be taken towards the commission of the offence, it is evident that a wrongful 
intention alone is insufficient to give rise to culpability; there must be a corresponding 
action.
1439
 If this is applied to cases involving offensive weapons, it can be said that 
the mere possession of an offensive weapon is less wrongful than using the article to 
inflict injury or death.
1440
 The respective punishments will therefore differ according 
to the gravity of the offence. This makes sense as whenever serious harm has occurred 
it should be punished according to its detrimental consequences, whereas where a 
lesser harm has occurred, this should be considered when determining the 
punishment, which should be suitable to the crime. Punishment is of course one of the 
fundamental principles of criminal law,
1441
 distinguishing the criminal law from other 
legal areas. 
 
The intention of the actor is a pivotal consideration when assessing his unlawful 
actions, as well as their final consequences. The emotion of guilt is therefore a 
fundamental part of inchoate offences and possession offences, is experienced to 
varying degrees by different individuals following the negative consequences of their 
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 edn, The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. New York, 
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actions, and provides an explanation why punishment is deserved or required in 
connection with the type of harm that has ensued. 
 
6.1.8 Closing remarks on emotion 
 
It has been demonstrated in the course of this section that emotions can generate 
certain responses from individuals and that they can lead to specific crimes. Emotions 
can also be regarded as compulsive forces which take control of an individual’s 
thought process, (the mechanistic conception), or that they can be morally evaluated, 
(the evaluative conception). Emotions can also play an important role within certain 
criminal law defences, fear in self-defence and duress, and anger also in loss of 
control, and can be influential in an individual’s decision to carry an offensive 
weapon. It is therefore clear that emotion is closely connected to the field of criminal 
law and that ‘it is both undesirable and impossible to exclude emotion from legal 
analysis’.1442  
 
While the law treats different emotions in different ways depending on the 
circumstances,
1443
 and often expects a certain degree of control over emotions by 
individuals, ‘the criminal courts and procedures are a prominent institutional space 
and institutional mechanism for emotions in society’. 1444  Emotions cannot be 
completely separated from criminal action, and for the purposes of this research, most 
importantly, provide an understanding into the action taken in situations of self-
defence and motivations behind weapons offences.  
 
However, the law cannot allow all emotions to explain, justify or excuse criminal 
behaviour. As Kahan and Nussbaum explain, the law should not be suspicious of all 
emotions, but rather ‘law should prefer emotions that express morally true valuations 
to emotions that express morally false ones … so as to endorse … an appropriately 
high valuation of the worth of all persons, even those who act wrongly’.1445 Applied 
to the case of self-defence, the law has achieved a good balance in this respect. It 
allows reasonable emotions, such as fear, which affect the individual in the 
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 T.A.Maroney, op cit fn 1292 at 122. 
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 D.M.Kahan & M.C.Nussbaum, op cit fn 1289 at 272. 
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circumstances to be considered through its subjective element, but ensures fairness 
through the objective test of reasonable force, requiring necessity and proportionality 
to be adhered to. Similarly, there is some recognition within the interpretation of the 
statutory defences of good reason or reasonable excuse for weapons possession, that 
fear could potentially satisfy these defences.
1446
 Nevertheless, as already 
discussed,
1447
 fear alone will not be sufficient as there is usually a requirement for an 
attack to be imminent as well. This is also a necessary condition for fairness to restrict 
people who regularly deliberately expose themselves to risks from using fear as an 
excuse to permanently carry a weapon in public.  
 
Thus, emotions are an intrinsic part of human behaviour and reaction, and can 
continue to shape people’s choices and actions at all times. 1448  Emotions direct 
criminal action, and the law has designed a way to manage it within the scope of self-
defence. Despite this apparent success, it is notable that the law employs a different 
approach to emotions within different defences. As has been shown, while emotion 
has a key role within loss of control, it has no direct role within self-defence and 
duress. Although the definitions and conditions of these defences present reasons why 
this is the case, it is arguably an inconsistent position. Reilly notes that this is partly 
due to the lack of standardised emotion theory within the criminal law, and that there 
is a call for clarification of the role of emotions and wider consistency across the 
board when considering matters of criminal liability.
1449
  
 
While this is logical in terms of the assessment of emotions according to an objective 
standard within defences, including emotions as a direct component across the board 
could interfere with the accessibility of a defence. For example, while fear is likely to 
be naturally present in self-defence situations, it is not a necessary component of the 
defence. The action is considered lawful in the circumstances, due to the unlawful 
threat posed by the aggressor and the instinct to act in self-protection by the defender. 
The circumstances justify the action without need to consider the emotion. On the 
contrary, with loss of control, the circumstances alone are not excused; there must be 
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a corresponding emotional explanation for the action taken. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to find a consistent approach across the board due to differences between 
defences. Nevertheless, agreement over a theory of emotions could prove beneficial in 
explaining the approaches to emotions within different defences.  
 
As was noted earlier, emotions are not the only influence on the law in the context of 
self-defence and weapons offences. The field of the media can also be demanding on 
the law, steering calls for law reform, swaying public opinion and to some extent 
influencing the occurrence of crime. It is to this topic that the chapter turns in the 
following section.  
 
6.2 The media 
 
The way in which self-defensive actions and offensive weapons are perceived in 
society can rely heavily on media representations. There are many different media 
forms which may shape public opinions and inform mass knowledge of events 
through their communication. While newspapers, and online and televised news 
reporting are the main mediums of concern to this research other forms will also be 
mentioned. The existence of so many different types of sources of information 
provides the potential to reach a greater understanding by representing the wider 
picture. What conventional sources miss or leave untold, non-conventional materials 
discuss and fill the voids. This section explores the relationship between media 
generated public perceptions about self-defence and offensive weapons. Further, the 
impact of media representations on fear of crime and the occurrence of crime is also 
considered. It will be argued that the media has the potential to perpetuate fear in 
relation to knife crime, accoridingly shaping the belief that there is a need to carry a 
weapon, and also to influence policy decisions regarding the legal reform of self-
defence.  
 
Using news representations in this research provides valuable information, which may 
be missed by relying solely on legal texts and government publications. This thesis 
has been informed through many media outlets, benefitting in particular from the 
accessible nature of modern news reporting. The media is engaged in so far as it 
contributes towards the formation of public perception of crimes, (specifically knife 
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crime), of the victims and perpetrators, and of the role of defences, (namely, self-
defence). These sources are useful in relation to both self-defence and knife crime. 
Regarding the former, self-defence cases always attract significant attention in the 
media and ignite public interest. As will become evident, news reports on the law and 
individual cases are often widely consumed and shape the public perception of self-
defence. Regarding the latter, by examining such sources, an insight is also gained 
into the social issues surrounding knife crime, along with an idea of the location and 
age groups connected to these crimes, and also the nature of the attacks. These 
materials provide representations of the dynamics of knife crimes and an 
understanding of the impact such incidents have on the communities in which they 
occur.  
 
Crime is a frequent focus of media attention and such representations are highly 
influential. There is a ‘a complex intertextuality of media forms’,1450 which include 
not only the news, but also films, dramas, documentaries, and advancements in 
modern technology have brought new forms such as social media, with a wide reach, 
instant communication and accessible nature. Mass media has a bad reputation for 
glamorizing criminal behaviour and ‘stimulating unrealistic and irrational fears by 
exaggerating and sensationalizing the risks and seriousness of crimes’,1451 however 
they are an invaluable source of information regarding wider social issues 
surrounding crimes, and therefore merit attention. There is therefore an evident 
tension here between the sensationalisation of subjects and the dissemination of 
information of public interest. 
 
It is a truism to say that ‘media portrayals of crime and violence have become part of 
the spectacle of everyday life’.1452 Programmes on criminal investigative procedures, 
real crime, and detective series further amplify the perception of danger, while the 
news informs the public of the occurrence of crimes and violence within our society, 
across the country and worldwide on a daily basis. Consequently, stories and 
representations have become almost unavoidable, and expected. Crimes of violence in 
                                                        
1450
 E.Carrabine et al. Criminology: a Sociological Introduction, op cit fn 1056 at 338. 
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 R.Reiner S.Livingstone & J.Allen ‘No More Happy Endings? the Media and Popular Concern 
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(Routledge, Abingdon, 2000), at 107. 
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 D.Kidd-Hewitt ‘Crime and the Media: A Criminological Perspective’ in D.Kidd-Hewitt & 
R.Osborne (eds) Crime and the Media: The Post-modern Spectacle, (Pluto Press, London, 1995), at 1. 
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particular receive significant attention. Such incidents facilitate dramatic reports and 
attract wider audiences.
1453
 Jewkes notes that such accounts are a common feature in 
the news and other media forms as ‘violence fulfils the media’s desire to present 
dramatic events in the most graphic possible fashion’.1454 As well as facilitating the 
media to attract viewers or readers, crime, despite its often disturbing and frightening 
images, is a subject which engages the public.  
 
Katz explains that people have become accustomed to emotionally disturbing content, 
which has become a regular feature in life.
1455
 The media fulfil an important role in 
the distribution and dissemination of publicly relevant information about crime, and 
also the overall understanding of its impact within society. Despite claims that news 
reporting can be misleading and distort the real facts, Jewkes says that ‘there is a 
valuable investigative tradition in journalism which continues to play an important 
role, not least in the spheres of crime control, crime prevention and uncovering police 
corruption and miscarriages of justice’.1456 This places responsibility on the media to 
communicate in a responsible manner. When considered within the context of 
weapons offences, these representations have the capacity to influence perceptions 
about carrying and the need for possession. Similarly, within the context of self-
defence, representations can shape the public’s understanding of the law, and 
correspondingly fuel the misunderstanding of its unfairness.
1457
 
 
First, the public’s fascination with crime will be discussed. Secondly, attention will be 
given to the techniques used by the media to portray their stories. Thirdly, the impact 
of the media will be assessed, including policy considerations and the blurring of the 
line between reality and representation. Finally, after gaining an understanding of 
these techniques and effects, the specific contexts of the reporting of knife crime, self-
defence cases, and the portrayal of young people in the media will be evaluated. 
 
                                                        
1453
 M.Peelo ‘Framing Homicide Narratives in Newspapers: Mediated Witness and the Construction of 
Virtual Victimhood’ (2006) 2 Crime Media Culture 159, at 169. 
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 Y.Jewkes ‘The Construction of Crime News’ (2004) in C.Greer (ed), Crime and Media: A Reader, 
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2010), at 221.  
1455
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(Routledge, Abingdon, 2010), at 236. 
1456
 Y.Jewkes ‘The Construction of Crime News’, op cit fn 1454 at 225. 
1457
 The impact of the media on knife crime will be explored in section 6.2.4, and self-defence in 
section 6.2.5. 
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To understand the ability of the media to form and shape public perception with 
regard to these matters, it is necessary to gain insight into the relationship between the 
public and reporting of crime. For the media to have any effect
1458
 there must be an 
underlying interest and desire to know among the public in relation to the incidence of 
crime.
1459
  
 
6.2.1 Fascination with crime 
 
The relationship between crime and society is the subject of much discussion. Crime 
creates a sense of intrigue, and despite the often distressing or disturbing news 
communicated, there is a fascination to learn more about incidents and the people 
involved in them.
1460
 It appears that this can be explained in part by the feelings that 
are generated, and the need to experience them. As Svendsen explains: 
 
‘Fear lends colour to the world. A world without fear would be deadly 
boring. Biochemically speaking, fear is related to curiosity, something 
that can be an important reason why exciting films and experiences are 
so entertaining. Novels, films and TV series designed to fill people with 
tension and fear are among the most popular’.1461 
 
This demonstrates the relevance of fear to crime news consumption, and the fact that 
a fear of the unknown and what has not been experienced underlies the attraction 
towards the subject. Fear has a binary relationship to the media as it drives the interest 
to discover, and is also triggered by the information communicated. People are driven 
by their ‘limited direct contact or experience with these matters and rely on media 
reports and representation of them for their knowledge’.1462 This is particularly true in 
relation to crimes of violence of the most serious nature as few will have endured 
such harms. Similarly, this is apparent with crimes involving knives, such as knife 
                                                        
1458
 See section 6.2.3 for a discussion on the impact of media reporting generally. 
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1460
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possession, as only a minority of the population, of young people especially, are 
directly affected.
1463
 
 
Although fulfilling an important role of expanding public awareness, the fear and 
misrepresentations that can be generated, results in the impression that anyone can 
become a victim,
1464
 and that everyone has a similar chance of becoming a victim.
1465
 
In order to attract the widest readership or viewers, the media establish a connection 
between the crime and the public, by painting the picture that single unconnected 
events are not just that, but in fact are a social problem that places everyone at an 
increased risk.
1466
 This leads to a culture of fear, and a belief that anyone and 
everyone is at risk of danger.
1467
  
 
Osborne claims that representations of crimes have almost become an obsession, 
particularly in relation to that which is broadcasted on television, in the news, dramas 
and real crime documentaries.
1468
 It appears that this fascination with crime is a 
widely accepted feature of the media’s relationship with the public. This relationship 
has developed as a means of reminding us all as members of society that the world is 
full of perils that may endanger us.
1469
  
 
A risk created by the obsession with crime is that ‘maintaining a distinction between 
‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ is becoming increasingly difficult’.1470 This blurring of the line 
between reality and representation will be discussed shortly, and can be seen as a 
symptom of the techniques that are used to communicate certain messages. With a 
general interest in crime established, there are various methods employed by the 
media to affect and influence the consumer.  
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6.2.2 Techniques used by the media 
 
One successful technique used by the news media to attract audiences and induce 
certain responses, is the use of repetition. ‘Repetition is one of the key techniques that 
turns homicide stories into ‘mega’ stories, both repetition around the time of the case 
and its trial and, in some cases, repetition over many years’.1471 The more a story 
appears in the news the more memorable it becomes and the greater impact it has 
within society. This will be seen shortly with the murder of Phillip Lawrence in the 
section discussing knife crime. The more serious the crime, the more attention it will 
receive. This is evident in the over-reporting of violent crime, which makes it seem as 
though it occurs far more regularly than it does in reality. As well as violent crimes, 
individual cases will be widely reported if they are extraordinary: ‘unusual and 
sensational crime stories occupy a disproportionate amount of time and space in both 
local and national news’.1472 The more sensational the crime story, the more attention 
it will be given, as the saying goes ‘bad news sells’. People are not interested in 
hearing about mundane stories,
1473
 and all news media is guilty of highlighting 
negative facts.
1474
 This deduction can be explained simply by the sense of moral 
repulsion and disbelief that accompanies a serious and unusually violent attack, as it 
offends against the notion that people can peacefully live alongside each other in a 
safe, civilised society. In turn, this strengthens the debate in relation to self-defence, 
as it makes people more aware and fearful of potential dangers. Accordingly, there is 
an increase in the belief that there is a need for a generous legal approach to self-
defence.
1475
 
 
As well as repetition and over-reporting of violent crime, another technique used by 
the media is the reference to the location at which the crime occurred. Crime occurs 
most frequently in large inner cities. It is common to hear of knife crimes, for 
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example, in London.
1476
 Interestingly, when a crime takes place in rural areas, this 
immediately sparks substantial media interest and coverage as it is unusual, and 
breaks preconceptions about the safety of living in the countryside. It has an added 
shock factor and becomes a central part of the story. As Wallace claims, ‘The 
picturesque and the scenic are held up as immunizing features and preventative 
agents against the forces of evil’,1477  and in order to produce added impact, the 
geographical location is explained in terms of its distance from the nearest big city, 
and in terms of its peaceful, idyllic location.
1478
  
 
The abduction and murder of ten-year-olds Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002 
are an example of media reporting which emphasised the unlikely nature of the 
location. Similarly, the abduction and murder of 5-year-old April Jones from outside 
her home in Machynlleth (West Wales) in October 2012 was the first case of its kind 
in the area.
1479
 Veigh reports that ‘although such crimes are reacted to with outrage 
and anger wherever they occur, the fact that they have occurred in rural areas or 
villages, with their sleepy, idealised images, adds an extra, almost sensationalised, 
element to the way that they are reported in the media’.1480 This reflects the way in 
which the news hones in on the location of the crime in order to impact the public 
reaction.
1481
 Indeed, the same focus on the rurality of the location is evident in 
Anthony Martin’s case,1482 which raised discussions not only on self-defence, but also 
on rural crime.
1483
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Another technique used is the use of emotionally charged language.
1484
 Examples of 
the emotive language in headlines include ‘Parents distraught after 16-year-old son 
stabbed to death’,1485 and ‘Fatal stabbing of London teenager adds to fears over 
gang-related knife crime’.1486 This demonstrates the common emphasis upon the age 
of victims, the method of killing and the weapons culture of youth. The use of 
emotive language not only appeals to the reader’s empathy, but also enables the 
reader to appreciate the victim’s suffering and fear, as well as feel horrified at the evil 
of the perpetrator.
1487
  
 
Another technique is the choice of photographs shown on the screen or accompanying 
the text in the newspapers, which makes crimes ‘real’ to the audience. The 
photographs that accompany such stories also evoke emotion; usually of flowers or 
policemen at the scene of the crime, or of the victim. Furthermore, with the 
advancements of technology, online news stories and televised broadcasts often 
include amateur film clips from witnesses with smartphones, and social media also 
permits a live timeline and amplifies reporting of incidents.
1488
 This use of modern 
technology is especially pertinent with incidents of weapons attacks. For example, 
video clips were immediately circulated following the brutal murder of 25-year-old 
fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich using meat cleavers and a total of eight knives.
1489
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In addition to these techniques, news reports focus on particular cases without 
contextualizing the wider trends in offending for the crime in question.
1490
 This is 
often the situation with the reporting of knife crime incidents, commonly referring to 
other recent cases to suggest a crisis. The incident is therefore perceived as a more 
frightening event.
1491
  
 
Respondents in a study by Ditton stated that the reporting of crime on the news was 
something they viewed as being distant,
1492
 as something that is shown on television 
that they had no real connection to or experience of,
1493
 but there was a concern that 
this gave the impression that crime was on the rise. One seventeen-year-old man who 
was interviewed stated that crime is something that we hear about more and more, as 
if the incidents are now occurring far more regularly.
1494
 Another individual 
interviewed, a seventy-four-year-old woman, also claimed that it was happening more 
often, from her interpretation of the news. She pivotally states that ‘the world’s 
getting worse. People are not as nice as they used to be. I don’t know why they’ve 
changed’.1495 Jewkes suggests that there is a danger in this type of reporting which 
leads to such views, as it can be misleading. She notes in particular the tendency to 
ignore real victimization patterns by the media which ‘persist in presenting a picture 
of serious crime as random, meaningless, unpredictable and ready to strike anyone at 
any time’. 1496  According to crime surveys the reality is that crime is generally 
declining, not rising.
1497
  
 
Thus, the news has devised many techniques in order to capture the attention of the 
public, in order to inform them of important events and occurrences of crimes. The 
impact of the news is therefore visibly obvious and extensive in society, and provides 
vital communication to the public. The techniques that have been discussed, namely, 
repetition; the emphasis on the location; the use of photographs; and the lack of 
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context provided, are all evident in relation to crimes involving offensive weapons or 
bladed articles, and also self-defence. The media reporting of these offences and the 
defence can create a lasting impression on the public. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the impact of crime news, both generally, and within the specific contexts of 
knife crime and self-defence. 
 
6.2.3 The impact of media reporting  
 
The potential influences of the media that are considered here are its effect on crime 
commission, and the shaping of public perception and fear of crime. There has been 
substantial debate over the impact of media representations of crime and despite a 
search for a direct correlation between the representation and the commission of 
crimes, or the fear of crime level, studies have failed to prove a significant 
relationship between the media and crime.
1498
 However, considering the large amount 
of crime content in the news and other media forms, there are real and valid reasons to 
be concerned about the possible effects media violence might have on its 
consumers.
1499
  
 
Exposure to criminal representations can induce desensitisation which could lead to 
crime commission or cause alarm about the regularity of crime. Witnessing crime or 
violence can desensitise an individual and make them more likely to react in the same 
way in the future. This is true in relation to knife crime where people witness the 
injuries sustained by others and decide to carry a weapon in case they become the 
victim in the future.
1500
 Although the impact of media representations might be less 
strong than witnessing violence in person, it has the potential to cause the same 
perception about crime and the need for action, and irresponsible reporting will have a 
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wider reach, which could impact upon more individual decisions to carry weapons.
 
1501
  
 
Despite the reasonable foundations for concern over media effects, Ditton reports that 
‘an actual relationship has been discovered surprisingly infrequently’.1502 This may 
come as a surprise as people naturally have instinctive reactions of unease and fear 
when they view and read about violent crime in the news. There is certainly a 
common presumption that crime in the media does have significant effects and 
therefore influences the public’s perception of the world. 1503  Perse explains that 
despite the understandable expectation of a connection between the media and crime 
commission, ‘it is clearly simplistic and misleading to hold that violent themes in 
popular music, movies, comic books, or television might be the major cause for 
delinquency and the violent crime rate’.1504 Perse suggests that the tendency to pursue 
a connection between the two is easier than facing the true causes of crime, such as 
poverty - a greater social problem and a more sensitive area for political debate.
 1505
 
This view is supported by Fuerdi, who explains that the media do not cause society’s 
risk perception, but rather, merely augment it: ‘the media’s preoccupation with risk is 
a symptom of the problem and not its cause’.1506 It appears that the media influence 
public perception but apparently not the incidence of crime.  
 
It is possible that other forms of representation such as violent computer games and 
films have the potential to distance a person’s sense of reality to the point of being 
unrecognisable.
1507
 This might indeed cause particularly susceptible and vulnerable 
individuals, perhaps with a predisposition towards violence, to lose the ability to 
consider the consequences of their actions in real-life, and to consider violence 
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towards others as being acceptable.
1508
 There is insufficient evidence to confirm a 
directly positive correlation, and further research is required in this area as the speed 
of development of new technology may change the criminological understanding of 
copycat crime.
1509
 For the purposes of the present research, it is not possible to draw a 
general conclusion that violent video games or films are responsible for the 
occurrence of crime, as they do not influence most people negatively.
1510
 However, it 
is reasonable to observe that they may be influential upon some individuals,
1511
 and 
may be a contributing factor in their commission of crimes.
1512
 
 
Despite the fact that a significant correlation has not been proven, there are ways in 
which the media can, and do influence public opinions, especially about crimes. One 
way in which the media does affect the public is through their opinion and attitudes 
towards violence. It is suggested that violent media content, for example in computer 
games,
1513
 has an impact by over-exposing people to crime and making them more 
accepting of crime as a societal norm.
1514
 Consequently, people respond to the 
representations by becoming desensitised to the severity of crime, and are less easily 
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shocked by its occurrence and consequences. This result is related to the blurring of 
the line between fact and fiction, where an individual becomes detached from the 
reality of his actions. Thus the media does have some undeniable effects - the very 
objective is to relay information to the public and shape their understanding of 
contemporary matters.
1515
 
 
Another way in which media representations certainly have an impact is through the 
feelings that they induce within individuals. ‘The devices of ‘mediated witness’ 1516 
stir us emotionally as readers and as viewers and, thereby, cause us to feel more fully 
involved in the actual event’,1517 by nurturing a sense of outrage from the portrayal 
that the experiences could be directed towards anyone. Mediated messages are 
influential to the process of understanding and perception of criminal activity, and 
provide an interpretation of events to assist readers in their own decoding of the 
story.
1518
 A sense of closeness to the crime is harbored through the reporting 
techniques, creating a link between the audience, the incident, and its victim. Bourke 
claims that:  
 
‘the routine portrayal of violent death in the mass media has blunted 
sensibilities: when hearing about real-life viciousness we may feel pity 
or distaste, but when we identify the emotion of fear it is our fear that 
concerns us. It is the fear of something that may befall us, rather than 
fear for others’.1519  
 
Therefore, she clearly believes that a sense of fear can be developed by media 
exposure. This is the view taken in this research, namely, that media representations 
can induce fear among society.
1520
 
 
A typical example of this fear produced from criminal representations in the media is 
Crimewatch UK.
1521
 The programme is intended as a means of solving crimes through 
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1516
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1521
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the reconstruction of events, in the hope that the audience will have information of 
relevance which could help the criminal investigation. The reconstructions shown in 
the programme are often terrifying, and it is therefore attributed the blame for 
significant fear of crime among its viewers.
1522
  
 
Indeed, the media have been accused of sensationalizing crime and deviance,
1523
 
increasing fear through their exaggerations of serious crime. Marsh and Melville have 
looked at the impact of the media within the specific context of Chicago.
1524
 They 
note that while the crime rate was in decline and far lower than other states, the 
stereotype that had been persistently presented in the media of the city resulted in its 
perception as a city of crime and violence.
1525
 ‘The power of media ... lies in its 
pervasiveness and its ability to cultivate a general view of reality over time’.1526  
 
The habit of stereotyping within the media has significant consequences on public 
opinion of crime, which is consequently misunderstood and incorrect.
1527
 Public 
perception is shaped by these representations whether they are realistic or distorted. 
This is partly responsible for the belief that the law of self-defence is unfair, and the 
calls for extending the law ever more in favour of householders. The media can also 
be responsible for moral panic
1528
 across society, as it feeds a sense of fear in relation 
to a specific phenomenon which becomes the focus of debate and concern.
1529
 The 
term describes fear of crime by the public in relation to certain offensive behavior 
which is perceived as a significant threat to society.
1530
 Notably, the fear and 
perception of threat is usually disproportionate to the real threat posed by the 
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phenomenon.
1531
 This is evident in the panic relating to young people, gangs and the 
carrying of offensive weapons in public.  
 
Young people are regularly the focus of news stories about violence and serious 
crimes. However, they do not only feature in the news media, they also become the 
subjects of other media forms, such as televised dramas and documentaries. These 
representations also impact upon the activities of young people, as it is said that 
global media is one influence that ‘forms part of the context within which young 
people negotiate their identities, meanings and relative autonomy’.1532 Youth culture 
draws upon many media forms, and can be influenced by the portrayals in these 
mediums, for example, the need to carry a weapon for protection.
1533
  
 
It is therefore notable that crime is a common feature of television dramas, as this 
could be shaping the actions of young people. Knives as threatening weapons make 
regular appearances and reappearances, on programs such as NCIS, Criminal Minds 
and CSI. These shows provide entertainment to viewers and excitement through the 
provision of intellectual puzzles, allowing the tracing of crime stories from beginning 
to end and the visualization of criminal procedures. Viewers are given a sense of 
justice when retribution is enacted at the end of the episode,
1534
 and it has been 
asserted that another reason people like to watch crime dramas is to re-create ‘daily 
their moral sensibilities through shock and impulses of outrage’.1535 They have an 
educational value despite being slightly unrealistic as the criminal is usually found, 
convicted and prosecuted which does not always happen in real life. However, this is 
a matter of what makes good viewing and gets good ratings, and after watching 
horrifying events people like to see happy endings in order to maintain their hope and 
faith in humanity.
1536
 Brown explains that television is a means of providing solutions 
for audiences, despite sometimes being contrived. It serves the purpose of ensuring 
that people do not become too cynical and full of despair about the state of the world. 
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The role of retribution in crime dramas is important to bring entertainment and 
enjoyment to the viewers.
1537
 
 
Watching televised and cinematic representations of crimes with the added element of 
characters which the viewers can relate to, often become the reality to many, so that 
they consider these to be the truth. ‘We can no longer rely on a stable relationship or 
clear distinction between a ‘real’ event and its mediated representation. Consequently 
we can no longer work with the idea that the ‘real’ is more important, significant, or 
even ‘true’ than the representation’.1538 The line between fact and fiction is becoming 
increasingly less defined. Carrabine also makes this point that distinguishing between 
the social reality and the media representations and images is almost impossible.
1539
 It 
has been said that ‘mediatised images or simulations of reality become more 
meaningful and relevant, more perfect, more ‘real’ to people than the physical reality 
that surrounds them’.1540 This reflects the strength of the media’s ability to create 
dominating stereotypes that prevail over reality.  
 
6.2.4 Media representations of knife crime 
 
Knife crimes repeatedly hold a prominent place in media representations. Reports 
about incidents involving knives increase the perception of their occurrence. Due to 
the general nature of knives as easily accessible articles, this could have a detrimental 
effect by encouraging weapons possession. This matter was perhaps first thrown into 
the spotlight when Stephen Lawrence was murdered in 1993 in a racially motivated 
attack. His case has frequently been referred to since, and has been the subject of 
extensive inquiries into the handling of the case, with allegations of gross failures and 
institutional racism within the police.
1541
 Two of the original five men accused of his 
murder were finally convicted and jailed in 2012.
1542
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The issue arose again when Phillip Lawrence was murdered in London in 1995. The 
headmaster was stabbed by a 15-year old boy who was a part of a gang preparing to 
attack pupils at the school.
1543
 The case was subject to nationwide media reporting at 
the time, and remains to be a case of reference in contemporary crimes when knife 
killings occur. For example, The Observer reporting on the murder of 15 year old Zac 
Olumegbon in 2010, referred to the murder of Phillip Lawrence as one of the most 
high profile knife crimes in Britain.
1544
 As Peelo notes ‘after Phillip Lawrence’s death 
there was much media debate around morality in contemporary society and a 
campaign was set up to ban knives ... Hence, the tragedy of one person’s brutal 
killing becomes strangely depersonalized and held to represent a mass of social 
discontent’.1545 Both the Lawrence cases have become a symbol of the danger these 
crimes presents.  
 
The immediate response was widespread debate concerning young people carrying 
knives; the problems of street gangs fighting; the presence of knives in schools; as 
well as campaigns against the carrying of knives, and the introduction of amnesties 
whereby knives could be handed in to the police.
1546
 Such approaches offer only 
short-term solutions. While amnesties may succeed in removing a large amount of 
knives from the streets with immediate effect, it is not effective in the long-term. The 
reason for this is that the underlying causes of weapons carrying remain present, 
therefore until they are addressed, these knives will simply be replaced with 
others.
1547
 In the immediate aftermath, there was an urgent sense that actions had to 
be taken to tackle this growing problem, and the media gave the public a voice for 
their fears to be heard and for actions to be demanded.
1548
 
 
As well as providing such a platform for discussion, the news is a source of 
information about knife crime,
1549
 as it cross-references other similar crimes, 
providing an historical account as well. Both newspapers and news broadcasts pay 
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significant attention to the phenomena of ‘knife crime’ and have a great impact on the 
public perception and understanding of these crimes. Crime is a recurring theme of 
newsworthiness, and as Jewkes states, ‘every day newspaper headlines scream for our 
attention with stories about crime designed to shock, frighten, titillate and 
entertain’.1550 Crime news often reports single incidents and specific cases giving the 
victims a focal part in the stories, which results in a strong effect on the readers or 
viewers. Some examples which prove this statement are the following headlines: 
‘Knife crime rises fast as muggers target gadgets’;1551 ‘Boy, 16, stabbed to death in 
south-east London’;1552 ‘Boy, 14, stabbed in neck in Coventry’;1553 ‘Boy, 16, knifed in 
takeaway gang attack’.1554 A notable feature of several of these headlines is the young 
age of the victim, which induces greater reactions. Thus, the ‘possible role of media 
amplification in reinforcing a sense of fear seems an area worth exploring, especially 
in relation to the carrying of knives’.1555 
 
In assessing the potential impact of the media on incidents of crimes involving knives, 
research conducted by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies has questioned the use 
of the term ‘knife crime’, claiming that although it is ‘an expression commonly used 
by politicians and the media’,1556 it can be misleading and unclear what exactly it 
refers to.
1557
 They believe that the use of the term itself causes the sensationalism of 
the issues involved. This again is an example of the effect of media reporting, in this 
case the negative impact the method of addressing an issue by the use of a specific 
term can have. The term ‘knife crime’ is wide in scope and therefore induces greater 
feelings of fear among the public. The term can be broken down into several different 
offences. For example, ‘knife crime’ can indicate the possession of a knife in a public 
place, the use of a knife to cause fear by way of an assault, to cause actual bodily 
harm, to cause malicious wounding, and to murder. 
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The BBC reported a 10 per cent increase in knife robberies in 2012, from information 
gathered and made available through Police Recorded Crime, ‘Police recorded 
15,313 robbery offences involving a knife compared with 13,971 in the 12 months to 
Sep 2012’.1558 This report is an attempt to reflect the reality of knife crimes, showing 
their occurrence and noting the type of crimes that were facilitated. This 
unquestionably produces fear as it is a report which shows an increase in crime, 
without contextualising the stories and explaining potential reasons for the increase. 
The impact of media reporting of these crimes is also clear, and has strong potential to 
influence the consumer. Another report by the BBC explains that ‘knives are used in 
about 8% of violent incidents, according to the BCS’, and presents potential reasons 
behind knife carrying ‘they are the people who fear being attacked with knives, they 
carry them because they are scared and for respect ... There is a level of desperation 
on the streets, brought about by poverty, which is creating a culture of fear’.1559  
 
News accounts of knife crimes often draw attention to the fact that these are crimes 
occurring mainly in urban areas, and large inner cities. However, the Western Mail 
has shown that it is a more common problem elsewhere than is often assumed, 
bringing knife crime to light within the context of Wales. The story reported that ‘It is 
a sobering and also a frightening thought that a minority of teenagers are regularly 
arming themselves with weapons, including knives and loaded shotguns. Some 200 
teens have been arrested for such offences in Wales’.1560 
 
A potentially negative effect of such reporting of knife crime is that these 
representations may ‘communicate the idea that, for teenagers, carrying knives has 
become a fashion statement, can have the effect of becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy’. 1561  Due to the fact that knives are easily accessible, such stories are 
dangerous as they lead to the impression that a large number of young people are 
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carrying weapons,
1562
 and that they are necessary in order to remain safe and enable 
protection, which may influence the decision to carry weapons.  
 
Closely related to the reporting of knife crime in the news is the attention given to 
young people in connection with crimes of violence. The news constantly refers to the 
young age of both victims and perpetrators in connection with such crimes. This 
paints a bleak picture of youths, which is problematic as the involvement of young 
people in crime should not be exaggerated.
1563
 Notably, young people find the 
negative portrayals in the media of their generation as being unfair and difficult to 
overcome. The study suggests that although there is a need to ‘highlight the problem 
of knife crime in our society, we also need to give our young people better things to 
aspire to’,1564  and claims that a potential way to achieve this would be to draw 
attention to positive images of young people and awarding their achievements. The 
research also highlights that ‘99% of young people are decent and admirable and we 
should be promoting them positively’, 1565  which should not be forgotten. This 
highlights the need for representative reporting.  
 
The same study noted the potential dangers of negative media portrayals of young 
people. It suggests that the feeling among those interviewed was that they are all 
stereotyped as criminals and that this sends out the wrong message to young people. 
A key issue discovered by the report was that:  
 
‘the more stories that the media tells about knife and gun crime, the more 
young people will feel that carrying weapons is a way to get notoriety and 
fame. By endlessly printing or showing stories about violent crime young 
people can become fooled into thinking it is glamorous, or it is the only 
way to get their name known to the world, and so will not worry about the 
consequences of being caught’.1566  
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Hence it claims that the effects of news reporting on young people can in fact 
encourage the carrying of weapons, as it reinforces fears and insecurities. The 
conclusion reached was that broadcasting and reporting more positive stories would 
be beneficial. Although there is a generalisation that ‘bad news sells’, this must be 
balanced with positive stories as well.
1567
 Otherwise, the media becomes a part of the 
vicious circle surrounding weapons’ possession, as those at risk of becoming victims 
are already at risk of carrying due to their dangerous surroundings. Negative reporting 
could encourage such individuals to carry for fear of an increase in knife crime 
incidents, and the need for self-defence.  
 
6.2.5 Self-defence and the media 
 
Similarly, stories involving self-defence in the media domain are also often 
misleading, and generate outrage among the public who misunderstand the law. 
Indeed, a poll conducted by ComRes for the ITV Tonight programme discovered that 
50% of householders were confused about the law, and 11% did not understand the 
law at all.
1568
 The law in this area is often portrayed as being unfair and in need of 
reform, even though in practice it works well. This has already been discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, but considering the role and impact of media reporting on the topic 
is important. It is only mentioned briefly again here in order to present an example of 
the stories reported in this context.  
 
One prime example involving demands for a change in the law of self-defence is the 
following story in The Telegraph. The headline itself screamed for attention, 
‘Vulnerable pensioners need the self-defence law changed’. 1569  The story was 
accompanied by a gruesome picture of an elderly woman who had been beaten by an 
intruder in her home, again influencing the public and attracting reactions of outrage, 
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claiming that the law was to blame for her situation. The report referred to the fact 
that a survey had recently been conducted by The Sunday Telegraph which  
 
‘showed overwhelming public support for a change in the law to give 
people new powers to fight back against intruders. The poll, conducted by 
ICM, revealed that 72 per cent of people believe that the current law, 
allowing householders to use only “reasonable force” against intruders, 
is “inadequate and ill-defined”.1570  
 
This was used to strengthen the argument for a change in the law, painting the picture 
that there is no doubt that this is what the public wanted, and therefore the 
Government must respond. This is a clear illustration of the public perception in 
relation to the rights of self-defence in the home, before the amendment to the 
householder standard was introduced, that the law was balanced in favour of the 
criminal intruder and not the innocent householder.
1571
  
 
Other examples demonstrating the sensationalist element in crime reporting are the 
following headlines: ‘Now you can bash a burglar’1572 and ‘Man who killed burglar 
will not be charged’.1573 These headlines have a strong impact as self-defence is a 
topic attracting significant media attention, and is a subject on which almost 
everybody has an opinion.
1574
  
 
A notable example is the prosecution of Anthony Martin,
1575
 the Norfolk farmer who 
shot two burglars on his property in 1999, which is arguably one of the most well-
known cases, and one of the most widely reported cases connected to self-defence. A 
report of the case in The Guardian demonstrates the public outrage that followed his 
conviction, and Martin’s status as a form of ‘folk hero’, in the headline that read ‘The 
killer who won a nation’s sympathy’.1576 His was a case epitomising the nature of self-
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defence, and the public opinion that persons faced with intruders in their homes 
should be lawfully permitted to use any force in self-defence, without facing 
prosecution. The case hurtled the issue into the public domain and produced many 
calls for law reform. Indeed, ‘the incident ignited a furore in Britain’1577 due to the 
dissatisfaction at his conviction. Nevertheless, because of the circumstances of the 
case, that he had shot the burglars while they were fleeing and no longer posing a 
threat to him or his property, Martin’s case fell outside the scope of self-defence.  
 
The danger of wide scale press reporting of self-defence is that it can contribute to 
public confusion regarding the law, and it instils a sense of fear among society. For 
example, having been exposed to the risks, people are more likely to attempt to 
prepare themselves. A survey by Confused.com found that ‘some 49 per cent of the 
nation's households admit keeping a household item for use against intruders … of 
this number, 66 per cent say they are not afraid to use such a weapon in self-defence 
against an intruder in the event of a break-in’.1578 The effects of such media reports 
feed the culture of fear regarding home intrusions and leads to calls for changes in the 
law, which are often used opportunistically by political parties. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, this was the result in respect of passing the new householder standard, as it 
was a matter of populist politics.  
 
This is another danger inherent in the media reporting of self-defence, as despite the 
adequate operation of the law in most cases through the test of reasonable force, the 
representations by the media place the topic at the top of the public and political 
agenda time and time again.
1579
 Peelo argues that the reporting of crime has been 
framed within policy debates, and that crime has therefore become ‘a site of contest 
between competing groups with competing world views concerning how society 
should be run and control of crime agendas is about social and political power’.1580 
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Violence has become an activity exploited for political purposes,
1581
 and this is 
relevant to considerations on the law of self-defence and knife crime. This provides 
an opportunity for manipulation by the political parties to amend the law to please the 
public and gain more votes.
1582
 This is problematic as the law should only be 
modified when necessary, and not as a result of public misunderstanding and political 
opportunism.  
 
It is therefore clear that the media, particularly the news media, can have influential 
roles within policy debates as they shape public opinion and demand changes to be 
made in the law.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
It has become clear through the course of this chapter that emotions and the media can 
impact on public opinion and understanding of self-defence and offensive weapons. 
Emotions were explored as factors present in the commission of crimes and the 
determining of the appropriate penalty. Emotion, particularly fear, is a relevant factor 
which can be the main reason that somebody responds in the manner that they do. 
This seemingly provides an indication of an acceptable basis for the defence of self-
defence, although fear by itself is not a good reason for possessing an offensive 
weapon. The power of emotions and their capacity to overcome individuals have been 
evaluated, and they are clearly relevant considerations within the field of criminal 
law.  
 
Nevertheless, technically, emotions are not taken into account in legal decision-
making. Emotions are only directly considered in relation to the defence of loss of 
control, and even then, there is a requirement that another person of ordinary 
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1582
 See section 4.2.2(f) in Chapter 4. See also fn 876 on page 177, and fn 990 on page 205, for a 
discussion on Mendelle, P. Self-defence law shows how politicians use legislation as PR, The 
Guardian, 31 October, <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/oct/31/self-defence-law-legislation-pr> 
(accessed on 04/08/13). 
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tolerance could have reacted in the same way.
1583
 However, emotions are indirectly 
relevant to self-defence, as the fear felt influences the reasonableness of the defensive 
action.
1584
 It can therefore be indicative of lawful self-defence. As has been 
illustrated, there are clearly many considerations and pressures at play in the fields of 
self-defence and weapons offences.  
 
The media and the news media in particular, also have a role in assisting the public to 
understand criminal activity. There are many different sources of texts and media that 
are informative to this research, both regarding self-defence and knife crime. Crime is 
a major topic in the media and has a huge public interest. Consequently, there is much 
in the news, on television, in films and in books that may provide valuable insight into 
the factors surrounding the debates on these topics. The danger with using such 
sources, and relying on media representations of crime as a source of information, is 
that they often create a ‘false picture of crime which promotes stereotyping, bias, 
prejudice and gross oversimplification of the facts’.1585 As explained in the chapter, 
there is a risk also of forgetting that they are merely representations, and interpreting 
all media forms as reality, whereas it is possibly only the news media that should be 
an expected source of real facts.  
 
Despite the fact that studies have not found a significant correlation between the 
media and either the commission of crime or fear of crime, it has been shown that the 
news certainly does have some effects on society. It has an influential role in the 
shaping of public opinions about crime as it facilitates ‘a key moment in the process 
whereby public discourses covering crime and justice are made available for general 
consumption’.1586 It is the main medium for the communication of information to the 
public about crime, and a forum for political discourse. It can be considered to have 
influenced the change of law to permit disproportionate force for householders acting 
in self-defence, as the change was shaped by public dissatisfaction with the law and a 
political desire to be seen to balance the issue in favour of the innocent householder. 
 
                                                        
1583
 A.Reilly, op cit fn 1449 at 130-131.  
1584
 ibid at 141. 
1585
 Y.Jewkes Media and Crime, op cit fn 1527 at 141. 
1586
 P.Schlesinger H.Tumbler & G.Murdock ‘The Media Politics of Crime and Criminal Justice’ (1991) 
in C.Greer (ed), Crime and Media: A Reader, (Routledge, Abingdon, 2010), at 255.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7. Final conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the length and breadth of the law of self-defence with a 
particular focus on the relationship between the defence and offences involving 
offensive weapons. It has demonstrated that the interplay between these legal fields is 
complex and often uncertain. The two central themes have been the analysis of the 
extent to which self-defence can provide a defence to weapons possession offences, 
and the reasons why the law differentiates based on location. It is clear that location 
has become an important variable in the legal application of self-defence, and it is a 
direct component of weapons possession offences. In focusing on these two central 
themes, the research has highlighted a number of important issues pertaining to self-
defence.  
 
7.1 The scope of self-defence as a defence to weapons offences 
 
With regard to the first theme, the relationship between the defence and offensive 
weapons displays a contradictory approach. This is apparent in the fact that self-
defence provides a defence to any physical force exerted, but not to the lesser harm 
causing offence of weapon possession. The concept of harm demonstrates that risk 
and potential to cause harm are key principles in prohibiting weapons. The relevance 
of self-defence to such offences was explored alongside the statutory defences of 
‘good reason’ and ‘reasonable excuse’. Although there is some confusion in that self-
defence justifies the defensive action but not the enabling act of possession, it appears 
sensible that the complete defence is probably not the most appropriate for these 
possession offences. This is partly due to the justificatory nature of self-defence. 
While not necessarily crucial in terms of practical interpretation by the courts, the 
classification of defences as justifications or excuses are theoretically indicative of the 
nature of a defence, and whether it merely reduces or removes punishment. Therefore, 
the classification of self-defence as a justification explains why it is an inappropriate 
defence for weapons offences, as it makes a powerful statement that the action is not 
wrongful. If this were applied to offensive weapons, it would destabilise the objective 
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of the legislation, and could send misleading signals that possession is generally 
lawful as a preparatory act in self-defence. 
 
This is certainly a grey area of law, and some divergent interpretations have emerged. 
The courts have taken a narrow approach in interpreting the legislation in order to 
apply its purview of keeping weapons off the streets and society safe.
1587
 There is a 
strong motivation behind the prohibition of possession to decrease the general threats 
that such items present both to specific identifiable individuals, and to collective 
society.  
 
With regard to offensive weapons and bladed articles, fear and self-protection are the 
most common reasons for possession.
1588
 However, the courts have traditionally taken 
a strict approach to the relevance of fear, and it will only be considered a ‘good 
reason’ or ‘reasonable excuse’ if also accompanied by evidence of an imminent 
attack. The case of R v Clancy
1589
 has thrown some doubt on this as it suggests that 
fear can be sufficient. There is therefore a need for further express clarification on 
whether or not fear can support a defence within such contexts. A consistent approach 
must be developed here, and fear should be permitted as a consideration in cases of 
self-defence and weapons possession if appropriate. It may be said that it would be 
appropriate if there was clear evidence that fear was the leading ingredient forming 
the decision to act, and there was reasonable cause for the person to be fearful. 
 
Fear is evident not only from the defender’s perspective, but also in society’s reaction 
to media representations on the purported rise of weapons possession. Over the years 
since the commencement of this research, and before embarking on this study, moral 
panics have surfaced over the presence of knives on the streets.
1590
 This has fuelled 
political debates and policy decisions on the issue, and has also resulted in the 
establishment of many organisations, partnerships, voluntary projects, and youth 
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cit fn 514 at 2. 
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groups to tackle the problem of knife possession. It has been shown that there are 
certain risk factors that render individuals more likely to carry a weapon, and that 
surroundings play a significant part in this. The majority of knife crime incidents 
occur in areas of social depravation, with high unemployment and poverty rates, and 
neighbourhoods where a gang culture is present among young people.
1591
 The 
development of projects and organisations that seek to modify behaviour by 
increasing options for individuals living in areas with high rates of knife crime is very 
important as these initiatives represent an alternative to legal intervention. There are 
limits to the power of the law to address the issues of possession as it responds 
retrospectively. Therefore, these organisations provide a valuable proactive method of 
reducing the amount of weapons in circulation and the number of young people 
carrying weapons in high risk locations.
1592
 Sensitive town and country planning can 
also have a beneficial effect in creating crime reducing environments. 
 
7.2 Location as a distinct variable in the law 
 
The second central theme of the research is timely as significant legal changes have 
occurred on the matter in recent years. At the time of commencing this study, there 
were discussions that the law would be amended to provide enhanced protection to 
householders acting in self-defence in their own home against intruders. During the 
course of researching and writing this thesis, the law was indeed reformed. However, 
this change was unnecessary, as the ‘reasonable force’ test adequately provided the 
necessary flexibility for application as required on a case-by-case basis. As discussed, 
the overall assessment of the opposing arguments supported maintaining the test as it 
was, as opposed to introducing the new amendment.
1593
  
 
Uncertainty surrounds the real effect and scope of the new provision, and to what 
extent it will change the law of self-defence. Case-by-case decisions may not see a 
radical departure from the previous test. Nevertheless, permitting disproportionate 
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force is a dramatic change, and will certainly affect some individual cases, as well as 
perhaps change perceptions about the defence. It may encourage people to use force 
where they would not have previously, or to use more force than they previously 
would have. Increasing the safety-net for householders may influence attitudes to 
become more akin to those of the United States which has a much more open policy 
on self-defence and the right to bear arms.
1594
 
 
A clear distinction now exists between self-defence in a private and a public space. 
The element of location illustrates that the castle doctrine is influential in the change 
of law to provide greater flexibility for householders. Criticism of this reform formed 
a significant part of the thesis, as the reasons for creating a new test within 
householder cases was unsupported either by persuasive need or empirical evidence. 
The importance of location for individuals was examined and shows that rather than 
being purely a matter of analysing location based on a home/non-home dimension, the 
key factor in the legislation is in fact the inside/outside dimension. This reflects the 
role of the home as a barrier from outside interference. Thus, the status of the 
aggressor as a trespasser was the catalyst for the enhanced legal protection for 
householders. This emphasis on trespassers is misguided and creates inconsistencies 
based on the aggressor’s status, and an arbitrary position for vulnerable victims 
defending within their homes.
1595
 
 
In seeking a justification for the greater protection offered to householders, a 
satisfactory answer to the question ‘why is the home treated differently to public 
places in self-defence?’ was not found. It is maintained here that the defence should 
provide the same level of protection to all individuals regardless of the circumstances, 
and that the creation of two separate tests was unnecessary. The home was contrasted 
with public places and it was highlighted that the home is a special entity. It offers a 
safe haven for individuals, a place of control where they have the power to invite or 
reject entry as they deem appropriate. Nevertheless, it is contended here that public 
places should also be safe for everyone, and that the notions of the home as a castle 
and fortress ignores the plights of victims of domestic abuse, the homeless, and some 
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young people who feel a greater sense of affinity in the public sphere.
1596
 The 
discussion on this aspect indicates a strong sense of attachment and that emotions 
might be shaping the different perceptions of location. Similarly, the levels of harm 
caused may be influential. It is possible that the level of harm suffered is greater in 
private places, as home intrusions offend more than the individual’s property rights, 
but also their privacy, autonomy, and general safety at home.  
 
However, in seeking to explain the householder distinction, the justificatory theories 
of self-defence are not easily extended to the enhanced provision. Many theories have 
been developed over the years, but for the purposes of this research the focus was 
placed upon rights and forfeiture; natural law; consequentialism; forced choice; 
double effect; and autonomy. Each separate theory has advantages and disadvantages 
in its ability to explain why self-defence is permissible. It is undesirable to select 
merely one of these theories and to forcefully mould it into a fully justificatory theory 
of self-defence, as there are aspects that cannot be explained by recourse to any theory 
by itself. Rather, it is proposed that a combination of these theories would achieve the 
most complete underlying framework for the defence.
1597
 Notably, none of these 
theories convincingly explain or succeed in justifying the householder provision, as it 
is contrary to the fundamental nature and purpose of self-defence. The reason for this 
is that necessity and proportionality are required for a just application of the defence. 
Therefore, the lack of proportionality requirement creates an imbalance in the 
competing interests involved when assessing self-defence. 
 
When considering why disproportionate force has been permitted, it appears that the 
change of legislation has been largely shaped by popular politics and the desire to 
please a public dissatisfied by what they perceived to be an unfair position for 
householders acting against intruders.
1598
 The role of the media in shaping public 
opinion about self-defence and offensive weapons offences was discussed. Here, it 
was demonstrated that while it is challenging to conclusively prove media effects on 
crime, there was evidence to support that media representations are indeed influential 
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and that this has shaped the public perception of self-defence and the belief in a need 
for greater protection for householders.
1599
 This is problematic as the representations 
often paint a misleading picture of the legal position, and underlies the common 
misunderstanding of the rules of self-defence and what falls within the test of 
‘reasonable force’. 
 
The law expects individuals to exercise a reasonable degree of control over their 
actions even when affected by fear, anger or other emotions. It is contended that fear 
is especially relevant to considerations of self-defence and weapons offences. 
Although not expressly included within the definition of the defence or considered by 
the courts, it was argued that fear plays a part in cases of self-defence as it indicates 
reasonableness on the part of the defender. The very nature of self-defence implies 
fear, and it would be unusual for a case not to involve the emotion. As fear clearly 
represents the primary reason for self-defence, it is argued that consideration of 
emotions should be allowed to be fully appreciated in this defence. The consideration 
of emotions is an explicit part of the defence of ‘loss of control’, with fear or anger 
satisfying one of the qualifying triggers under the defence. It is submitted that fear 
should also attract more consideration in cases of self-defence. 
 
7.3 Closing Observations 
 
To conclude, this thesis has arrived at a number of deductions. First, the reasonable 
force test is an appropriate measurement of self-defence. Second, there should be only 
one standard of self-defence. This means that the reasonable force test should apply in 
the same way regardless of the circumstances and location, whether inside or outside 
the home. Although the test is naturally context sensitive, this is a matter of individual 
case-by-case application. Despite the clear emotive attachments, meanings and 
connection of the home, these are insufficient to permit greater force in householder 
cases. Therefore, the amendments to permit disproportionate force were unnecessary. 
Third, the relationship between self-defence and offensive weapons or bladed articles 
is contradictory. The defence permits the greater harm of infliction of injury, but does 
not justify the lesser harm of possession. It is submitted that while self-defence is not 
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appropriate, where fear is the reason for possession, the defences of ‘good reason’ or 
‘reasonable excuse’ should be more lenient where appropriate.  
 
The change of householder provision has been influenced by an environment where 
many believe strongly that ‘Right need never yield to wrong’,1600 that defensive rights 
should be broadly based on the aggressor’s moral fault. Nevertheless, the key 
component of self-defence is that it is an action taken in response to an unlawful 
threat or attack, and it is targeted towards resisting aggression only. The primary aim 
is not the act of causing harm.
1601
 The intention or the reason for acting is logically 
important, as ‘the morality of what one does has to do with the reasons one does what 
one does’.1602 For self-defence to be justified it must be proved that the defensive 
force was only exerted in response to the attack faced. The repelling of unlawful force 
is a morally acceptable reason for acting, and a worthy exception to the criminal law.  
 
The standard of reasonable force with its requirements of necessity and 
proportionality does not place too heavy a burden on defenders, especially 
householders. The fundamental point that should be emphasised is that ‘The criminal 
law does not require that persons behave perfectly, but only that they behave 
reasonably’.1603 
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